Kleio 33, 2001

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Kleio 33, 2001

Historiographical reflections on the significance of the South African War

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The South African War has had more ink spilt on it than any other topic in South African history. A flood of books have been published since the centenary commemorations began in October 1999. Before this, it was the causes/origins of the war, rather than the war itself, that attracted most attention among professional historians. In the 1980s and 1990s there was a shift from 'drum and trumpet history', concerned with military aspects of the war, to its social history.[1] But relatively little scholarly work has been done on the wider significance of the war in South African history. Though the impact of the war on British and global politics, and other parts of the Empire, has now begun to be tackled,[2] we still lack a comprehensive, scholarly assessment of the consequences of the war for South Africa itself. With the centenary of the end of the war fast approaching, historians should surely turn their attention from the war itself, and the debate on its causes, and spend more time debating its consequences.[3]

In this short article, I cannot even begin to tackle this agenda, but I hope to lay out some markers for it by discussing – inevitably in a highly selective way – what some historians have said, often in passing, about the significance of the war in South African history. I shall suggest possible reasons why the question of significance has been relatively neglected, and raise some questions for further research.

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[1] B Nasson, 'Tot siens to all that? South Africa's Great War, 1899–1902', *South African Historical Journal (SAHJ)* 32 (May 1995). I R Smith, 'Reading history: the Boer War', *History Today*, 34 (May 1984) surveys the literature on the war, but needs to be updated and extended. Also note I F Beckett, 'The historiography of small wars: early historians and the South African War', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 2,2 (August 1991).

[2] See, eg, the special issue of the *SAHJ* on the war: November 1999; J Gooch (ed), *The Boer War: direction, experience and image* (London, 2000); P Denis and J Grey (eds), *The Boer War: army, nation and empire* (Canberra, 2000); A Porter, 'The South African War and the historians', *African Affairs*, 99 (October 2000).

[3] Historians have investigated specific consequences of the war, such as its impact on the Rand and on Cape Town: D Cammack, *The Rand at war* (London, 1990); V Bickford-Smith, *Ethnic pride and racial prejudice in Victorian Cape Town* (Cambridge, 1995). We know, for example, that the war led directly to the establishment of the first chair of history in the country, at the South African College in Cape Town: C Webb, *History in crisis* (Cape Town, 1977); H Phillips, 'First lessons in South African history', *SAHJ*, 34 (May 1996), p 164. There are brief discussions of the significance of the war in, among others, G le May, *British supremacy in South Africa* (Oxford, 1966), ch 9; Bill Nasson discusses the significance of the war for the Cape with subtlety, but obliquely, in the last chapter of *Abraham Esau's war* (Cambridge, 1991) and again in his recent general history of the war: *The South African War 1899–1902* (London, 1999). I am not here concerned with significance arising from the debate on the causes of the war, a debate that raised key questions about the relationship between capitalism and imperialism.

* * *

The first major historian to comment on the significance of the war was George McCall Theal, the most prolific of all South African historians. Theal lived in this country during the war, and wrote about it while it took place and afterwards. For him, its significance lay primarily in what it meant for English-Afrikaner relations. In the course of the war, he wrote *Progress of South Africa in the century* for the 'Nineteenth Century Series'. He had to admit that it 'seems almost mockery to write of moral progress in South Africa during the nineteenth century, when at its close Englishmen and Dutchmen ... are found heaping reproaches upon each other, and steeping their hands in each other's gore'. Despite his Eurocentricity, Theal was aware of the significance of a war being fought between whites in a country in which whites were a minority. The conflict between English-speakers and Afrikaners, he wrote, was especially deplorable because they were 'people who must continue to live together on the same soil ... and who ought to be as one in face of the great mass of barbarism beyond and among them'. Theal nevertheless concluded his book on South Africa in the nineteenth century optimistically, with the hope that the war might be 'followed by the perfect reconciliation of the two kindred peoples who occupy its soil'.[4] A decade and a half later, he still held the view that good had come from the war. By that time, he was able to write that 'traces of the tremendous conflict they had gone through could hardly be observed', and his assessment was that the war had, after all, had a beneficial effect, for it had created among the English a feeling of respect for the Boers, who had 'played the game fairly, and kept it up well', and this had made possible a new era of co-operation between Afrikaners and English-speakers.[5] The consequences of the war for blacks he ignored entirely.

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[4] G Theal, *Progress of South Africa* (London, 1902), pp 500–501.

[5] G Theal, *History of South Africa*, 8th ed (London, 1916), p 418. This argument was advanced by L S Amery in the fifth volume of *The Times history of the War* (London, 1908). 'The foundations of racial harmony', he wrote, 'were laid by the war, and laid the more securely because the struggle was so long and so keenly sustained': p viii (editor's Preface, dated 1907). This was further explained in vol 6 (1909): 'there never was a war fought so obstinately and yet with such humanity and such essential chivalry. Neither side had cause to reproach itself or its adversaries. Both had good cause for just pride and mutual respect.': p 219.

For decades after Theal, most historians saw the significance of the war primarily in political terms. In his brilliant general history, C W de Kiewiet first wrote that the war, though 'brought by gold', had been the outcome of 'a constitutional crisis', and then went on to see the 'blood and suffering of the Boer War' as 'a political revolution which ended the ancien regime of separate and conflicting communities'. Other historians of a liberal persuasion similarly stressed that the chief result of the war was that it brought British rule to the ex-Republics; by extending British rule to the entire region, it had ended an era of divided sovereignty.[6] De Kiewiet himself, in later work, did recognise that that was too simple: that while the war had indeed made all South Africa British, it had created new divisions, which were not conducive for unity. By the 1950s he no longer saw the war in a positive light, as helping to promote the Union inaugurated on the eighth anniversary of the Treaty of Vereeniging. Instead, he now viewed the war as a negative development, as one that had created new conflicts, and therefore prevented due recognition being given to the magnanimity involved in Britain's voluntary transfer of power later in the first decade of the twentieth century, when self-government was granted the ex-republics.[7]

By the 1950s the view that the war had had a beneficial outcome, in that it had paved the way for Union, was out of favour. Liberal historians such as Jean van der Poel and Leonard Thompson, writing at the University of Cape Town as segregationist policies intensified, regarded the Union of 1910 as unfortunate, because it had made possible Transvaal dominance of the new state and therefore meant the ending, in stages, of the Cape liberal tradition of non-racialism. If there had not been a war, these historians hinted, South Africa might have developed gradually, and peacefully, into a federation, and in that federation the Cape liberal tradition might have survived and flourished.[8] Instead, as a result of the war, the British had put Anglo-Afrikaner conciliation before justice to Africans. Article 8 of the Treaty of Vereeniging, postponing consideration of the grant of the franchise to

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[6] C W de Kiewiet, *A history of South Africa social and economic* (London, 1941), p 140; N Mansergh, *The Commonwealth experience*, vol I (London, 1969), p 93.

[7] C W de Kiewiet, *The anatomy of South African misery* (London, 1956), p l6.

[8] C Saunders, 'Historiographical aspects' in J Carruthers (ed), *The Jameson Raid* (Houghton, 1996), citing J van der Poel and, in 1995, Gerald Shaw, deputy editor of the *Cape Times*; L M Thompson, *The unification of South Africa* (Oxford, 1960).

'natives' until after the introduction of self-government to the republics, was now seen as the price paid by Africans for British magnanimity to the Boers.[9]

From the early 1970s revisionist historians, under the influence of neo-Marxism, broke with the emphasis the liberal historians had placed on constitutionalism and political history. Not surprisingly, given the stress that the revisionists laid on the importance of gold and industrial capitalism in the making of the modern South African state, the war was now presented as little more than a temporary discontinuity, important mainly for making possible the reconstruction era that followed it. For the revisionists that era was the crucible of modern South Africa, in which racial segregation was forged and the modern state was born. British victory in the war made it possible for Milner to implement his pre-war aims; the significance of the war was that it did what Milner wanted it to do: provide the basis for modern capitalist expansion in South Africa.[10] Synthesising the revisionist arguments, John Cell suggested that the period beginning in 1901 was the one occasion 'when the course of South African history might have been turned in a radically different direction' (he wrote a decade before the recent transition from apartheid to democracy), had Milner been a dictator of another kind. But Cell quickly went on to say that that was not really conceivable. 'Milner's dictatorship was far from absolute', and he had, above all, to get the gold mines back into full production.[11]

* * *

Theal, wishing to promote white nationalism, sought to direct attention away from the bitter divisions the war caused between English-speakers and Afrikaners. This fitted well into the conciliation policy of Botha and Smuts. But it was difficult not to lay emphasis on what de Kiewiet called 'the unfortunate legacy of resentment and rancor left by the Boer war'.[12] Eric Walker concluded his chapter on the period of the war in the *Cambridge history of the British Empire* by recalling Salisbury's prophecy, made before the war began, that if the Boers did not fight, they would hate the British for a generation, but if they fought and lost they would hate for still longer.[13] In the event, Afrikaner resentment was directed not only against the imperial power that had brought about the war and then been responsible for its worst atrocities. That resentment was also directed against English-speaking South Africans, who were lumped with Britain and blamed for what had happened. The imperial power was distant, and the ties that bound South Africa to London were dismantled progressively, and blaming the English-speaking whites, who controlled the economy, and were culturally arrogant, was useful politically. Thomas Pakenham and others have suggested that memories of the war were kept alive into the 1950s and 1960s to help weaken white opposition to apartheid.[14] More recently, as a Truth and Reconciliation Commission investigated the atrocities of apartheid, it was suggested, ahistorically, that had there been some kind of Truth Commission after the South African War, the legacy of bitterness might have been assuaged.[15] The inquiries which the British made into what had gone on in the concentration camps did not meet the case, and no apology was forthcoming.[16] The legacy of bitterness fueled Afrikaner nationalism, which fed on memories of the atrocities perpetrated in the war, as well as on the humiliation of defeat. For some that humiliation was made much worse by the fact that it had occurred 'in the presence of an inferior and subject race'.[17]

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[9] 9 N Mansergh, *South Africa 1906–1961: the price of magnanimity* (London, 1962).

[10] M Legassick, 'British hegemony and the origins of segregation in South Africa, 1901–14' in W Beinart and S Dubow (eds), *Segregation and apartheid in twentieth century South Africa* (London, 1995); S Marks and S Trapido, 'Milner and the South African state', *History Workshop Journal*, 8 (1979) and 'Milner and the South African state revised' in M Twaddle (ed), *Imperialism, the state and war* (London, 1992). Irving Hexham made the strange argument that the war created apartheid: *The irony of apartheid* (New York, 1981), pp 24, 30.

[11] J Cell, *The highest stage of white supremacy* (Cambridge, 1982), p 62

[12] De Kiewiet, *Anatomy*, p 20.

As the bitter memory of the war 'burnt itself into the collective consciousness of ... the Afrikaners',[18] helping to forge a new unity among Afrikaners, Afrikaner historians did their best to try to interpret the war as 'the foundation experience of the nation'.[19] But there were difficulties with this. Writing about the suffering of the women and children in the concentration camps was painful, and especially from the late 1930s it was the heroism of the Boer generals that received attention.[20] By then the war was receiving less attention in the nationalist mythology; it had taken a distinctly second place to the Great Trek. Indeed, the place of the war in Afrikaner nationalist mythology had always, been problematic. For it was difficult to ignore the fact that the war had created new and bitter divisions among Afrikaners themselves. Those divisions, and the new ones created by the controversy over the terms on which peace was made, and whether the decision to end the fighting was the right one, made the war a difficult issue around which to seek to create a new *volkseenheid*. This helps explain why the war did not remain the central symbol in Afrikaner mythology. The *Vrouemonument* outside Bloemfontein, which was not unveiled on any anniversary of the war but instead on the 'Day of the Vow' in 1913, was never as important in that nationalism as the Voortrekker monument became. The war had, after all, ended in defeat, while the suffering of the Afrikaners brought about by the war was not something to be celebrated.

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[13] E Walker in A P Newton (ed), *Cambridge history of the British Empire*, vol 8 (Cambridge, 1936), p 328.

[14] Pakenham, *Boer War*, p 576.

[15] CF A Krog's comments in A Boraine, *et al*, *The healing of a nation?* (Cape Town, 1995), esp p 114.

[16] Calls for such an apology revived in the 1990s, and Prime Minister Blair gave a partial one when he visited the country in 1998, as did the Duke of Kent in October 1999.

[17] De Kiewiet, *Anatomy*, p 20. It is often said that the war itself helped bring Cape Afrikaners and those of the interior closer together: eg T D Moodie, *The rise of Afrikanerdom* (Berkeley, 1975), p 41.

[18] F W de Klerk, *The last trek* (London, 1998), p 6.

[19] Esp A Grundlingh, 'War, wordsmiths and the volk': Afrikaans historical writing on the Anglo Boer War of 1899–1902 and the War in Afrikaner nationalist consciousness, 1902–1990' in E Lehmann and E Reckwitz (eds, *Mfecane to Boer War: versions of South African history* (Essen, 1992).

As Albert Grundlingh has shown, after the National Party came to power in 1948 the war gradually lost its ideological function, as a shift to a broader white nationalism took place, and as socio-economic change meant that Afrikaners were less inclined to remember past suffering.[21] But the war was not used to help bolster that shift to a broader nationalism. Though the scale of casualties in the American Civil War was far greater, that war was in time used to aid reconciliation, by being redefined as a case of fratricide, a civil war between errant 'brothers'.[22] In South Africa this did not happen, perhaps because the suffering of the Afrikaners was greater than anything the southerners experienced,[23] or because, though the South African war became in part a civil war,[24] the Afrikaans and English-speaking communities were too distinct. Their distinctiveness did not allow a comparable post-war sense of having a shared destiny.

The very questions which the war threw up for Afrikaners made possible an alternative, anti-nationalist interpretation of the lessons to be learned from it. In the aftermath of the Soweto Uprising of 1976, the political philosopher André du Toit asked whether his people should not do what they had been done in May 1902 and accept a negotiated settlement, this time with the black majority. They should, he suggested, again opt for accommodation rather than continued confrontation, and give up political power in the interests of the survival of Afrikaner cultural identity.[25] In the late 1970s Du Toit's call fell on stony ground, but after a disastrous decade under P W Botha a new Afrikaner leadership, under F W de Klerk, decided to do what du Toit had advocated over a decade previously.[26]

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[20] Cf Moodie, *Rise of Afrikanerdom*, p 224; D O'Meara, *Forty lost years* (Johannesburg, 1995), p 41.

[21] Grundlingh, 'War, wordsmiths and the volk', p 52.

[22] Cf B Anderson, *Imagined communities* (New York, 2nd ed 1991), ch 11, 'Memory and forgetting'. I thank NOrman Etherington for this reference.

[23] De Klerk, *Last trek*, p 6, contrasting Sherman's march on Atlanta and the concentration camps of the South African War.

[24] Cf esp I Smith, 'Was the South African War (1899–1902) a civil war?', unpublished seminar paper, University of Cape Town, 1993.

* * *

The Africanist perspective which emerged in South African historiography in the 1960s sought to place Africans at the centre of the national story. For some Africanists the South African War was relatively unimportant because it belonged to imperial history, and was fought among whites. When in the mid 1990s the question of commemorating the centenary was raised, some said that the war was of little or no relevance to black people.[27] Why commemorate the centenary of a long-ago war fought between two minority groups, a 'mere ruling-class squabble'?[28] And from the perspective of wider African history, the war has similarly sometimes seemed relatively unimportant. The war was left out of, in Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore's survey for example, in text on *Africa since 1800*,[29] while the relevant volume in UNESCO's multi-volume *General history of Africa*, an overtly Africanist work, dismissed the war, saying: 'The particular interest of the Anglo-Boer war (1899–1902) is that it was fought between the Europeans themselves.'[30]

But there was another view, one which remembered that in fact blacks had played a significant part in the war. It was Sol T Plaatje in

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[25] Anon [A du Toit], 'Confrontation, accommodation and the future of Afrikanerdom', *South African Outlook*, October 1977. An Afrikaans version of the same paper appeared in *Standpunte*.

[26] E g P Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a miracle* (London, 1997).

[27] The government nevertheless came round to the view that the war should be commemorated, and in his inauguration address President Thabo Mbeki mentioned its commitment to the commemoration: *Cape Times*, 17 June 1999: Mbeki's speech, 16 June 1999.

[28] D Denoon, 'Participation in the Boer War', in B Ogot (ed), *War and society in Africa* (London, 1972), p 109. Denoon himself did not, of course, dismiss it in this way.

[29] They had chapters on the partition to 1891, then on colonial rule and on south Africa from 1902: R Oliver and A Atmore, *Africa since 1880* (4th ed, Cambridge, 1994).

[30] A Boahen (ed), *General history of Africa*, vol 7 (London, 1985), p 37. (chapter by G Uzoigwe). Also in this volume, Walter Rodney possibly confusing the wars of 1880–81 and 1899–1902, wrote of 'The Anglo-Boer wars (1899–1902)' as 'anti-imperialist resistances' (p 335. Cf A Wessels, *The phases of the Anglo-Boer War* (Bloemfontein, 1998).

1916, and Silas Molema in his *Bantu past and present* a few years later, who first wrote at length about the black role in the war; each devoted a chapter in their books to that theme.[31] It was another fifty years before the significance of the black role was taken up by professional historians. The uncovering of the 'hidden history[32] of black involvement in the war began in the new era of Africanist scholarship in the 1960s. The first flowering of this scholarship took place from South Africa.[33] Some of those involved were African scholars from South Africa,[34] others people wishing to recover an African agency, in the war as elsewhere.[35]

One of the questions the new Africanist scholarship threw up was the relationship between the South African War and the earlier wars of conquest in which African societies had been brought under white rule.[36] From an Africanist perspective, the South African War seemed set apart from those earlier wars of conquest. From an imperial perspective, however, the war could be seen as the culmination of a scramble for southern Africa, in which Britain extended its control not only over African-ruled territory, but also over the Trekker republics, which were brought under British rule during the war. In their classic *Africa and the Victorians*, Ronald Robinson and Jack Gallagher viewed the South African War as concluding a partition of southern Africa, beginning in the 1870s, involving the extension of British rule over both Africans and Boers.[37] As with the earlier extension of British rule over the Transvaal in 1877, the coming of British rule to the interior in 1900 was to mean that white rule of blacks became much more efficient. In 1877, however, the British were able to take over the Transvaal without resistance, whereas the war of 1899–1902 provided much scope for Africans to act, either with imperial forces in their own interests, or sometimes to seek to recover their previous independence. Documentation of African initiatives in the war has absorbed much attention in recent decades, yet remains incomplete and has not yet been synthesised.[38]

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[31] S T Plaatje, *Native life in South Africa* (London, 1916), ch 19; S Molema, *The Bantu past and present* (Cape Town, 1963, original edition 1920), ch 23: 'Bantu in the South African War'.

[32] The phrase is John Lonsdale's, in *Cambridge history of Africa*, vol 7 (Cambridge, 1988), p 721.

[33] P Bonner, 'African participation in the Anglo-Boer War', MA thesis, University of London, 1967; B Hankey, 'Black pawns in a white man's game' MA thesis, Queen's University, 1969; H J and R E Simons, *Class and colour in South Africa* (Harmondsworth, 1969); Denoon, 'Participation' (a paper written in 1969).

[34] Hulme Tsamsanqa Siwundhla, 'The position of the non-Europeans in the Anglo-Boer War', Claremont Graduate School, 1977. He was unable to visit South Africa, for 'political reasons' (p xi) but used the War Office files in the Public Record Office, and reached the erroneous conclusion that the Boers recruited more blacks than the British did: p 32. Cf his 'White ideologies and non-European participation in the Anglo-Boer War, 1899–1902', *Journal of Black Studies*, 15(2), 1984. Jacob Mohlamme, whose maternal grandfather had been in the siege of Mafeking, completed a much fuller thesis under Jan Vansina at the University of Wisconsin (Madison), in 1985, based in part on oral research which he undertook among the Kgatla and Rolong: J S Mohlamme, 'Black people in the Boer republics during and in the aftermath of the South African War of l899–1902', esp p l96.

[35] S B Spies, *Methods of barbarism* (London, 1977); Pakenham, *Boer War* (1979); P Warwick, *Black people in the South African War* (London, 1983); Nasson, *Esau's war*. Jeremy Krikler argued that during the war, in the western Transvaal, a major class war took place, in which black peasants rose against their landlords and pushed back, for a time, colonial encroachment on their lands: *Revolution from above, rebellion from below* (Oxford, 1991). Earlier, Denoon and others pointed out that, because of the war, Africans had continued to withhold their labour from the mines after it was over.Bill Nasson drew comparisons with the Mfecane wars of the early nineteenth century in his *South African War.*

[36] Bill Nasson drew comparisons with the Mfecane wars of the early nineteenth century in his *South African War.*

The precise impact of the war on the evolution of black political consciousness in the various parts of South Africa also remains to be demonstrated, though the work of Peter Walshe and André Odendaal has shown the war to have been the context in which new political organisations were formed, such as the African People's Organisation (APO) in Cape Town in 1902 and the South African Native Congress.[39] Most is known about the Cape in this regard, thanks especially to the writing of Bill Nasson, but no one has yet brought together the scattered material available to show how the war ushered in a new era for blacks. In the aftermath of the war, Henry Sylvester Williams, F Z S Peregrino and others promoted pan-Africanist causes. John Tengo Jabavu had given his support to the Afrikaner Bond and broken with A K. Soga of *Izwi Labantu*, before the war, but there is more to be learned about how the war itself helped deepen the divisions among the African elite at the Cape, especially between – on the one hand – those members of that elite who enthusiastically supported the British side, and often failed to discriminate between the British themselves, and those who ruled them in the Cape and Natal, and, on the other, the central figure of John Tengo Jabavu.[40]

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[37] In *The scramble for southern Africa* (Cambridge, 1977), Deryck Schreuder saw the'scramble' as being completed by 1895, when all South Africa was under white rule. Yet he called the South African War 'the greatest of all the colonial wars': pp 311–12. For a critique of Schreuder, see esp S Marks, 'Scrambling for southern Africa', *Journal of African History*, 23 (1982).

[38] At the conference on the war held at the University of South Africa in August 1998, there were numerous calls for such a synthesis to be produced.

[39] P Walshe, *The rise of African nationalism* (London, 1970); A Odendaal, *Vukani Bantu* (Cape Town, 1980), ch 2. For the eastern Cape see esp A Odendaal, 'African political mobilisation in the eastern Cape, 1880–1910', unpublished Cambridge PhD, 1983.

[40] C Saunders, 'Leonard Ngcongco, John Tengo Jabavu, and the South African War', *Pula* 11 (1997), pp 63–69; 'Henry Sylvester Williams and South Africa', *Quarterly Bulletin of the South African Library*, June 2001, forthcoming.

Seeing the war as 'a classic example of imperialist aggression … for capitalist greed', Jack and Ray Simons suggested that Britain might have used its victory in the war to free 'Africans, Coloureds and Asians from racial tyranny'.[41] Though that was not a realistic possibility, there were grounds for blacks to hope that the war would bring an extension of the Cape franchise to the interior. And yet Jabavu was proved right in being skeptical that any good would come from African support for the British cause. Those who had hoped for some reward for loyalty during the war were proved wrong.[42]

The scholarly work done on the war from an Africanist perspective established that there had been massive black involvement, that it had been significant – especially in helping to lead the Boers to sue for peace in May 1902 – and that the war had had a major impact on blacks, who had suffered at least as much as whites. Almost as many blacks were held in concentration camps as whites.[43] Yet it remained the case that the war itself had mainly been fought between whites – imperial, colonial and republican. Donald Denoon, though pointing to the importance of the black role in the war, yet recognised, what some later seemed almost to forget, that the fighting was 'predominantly … a white business'.[44] He also suggested that it was only because all major black resistance had been crushed by the late 1890s that whites could allow themselves the 'luxury' of inter-racial conflict. That luxury was only possible because it was a time of 'truce in the evolving racial struggle'.[45]

One line of inquiry little pursued to date is that of trans-national comparative perspectives on the significance of the war.[46] At the time, numerous comparisons were drawn between the South African War and the American Civil War half a century earlier, but no modern historian has attempted a systematic comparison between those two wars, or sought to compare the place each occupies in the history of its country. It may be that historians have assumed, for this and other possible comparisons, that no appropriate basis for comparison exists, but that is an assumption that needs to be tested. Any comparison with the American Civil War must obviously ask about the role of blacks. How important was it that in South Africa there was a majority population not centrally involved in the fighting? Blacks played a much larger role in the fighting in the American Civil War, for which they were, of course, rewarded. Fredrickson says that the North's reliance on black troops from 1863 made it inevitable that the war would transform race relations.[47]

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[41] Simons, *Class and colour*, ch 3: 'Imperialist war', p 63.

[42] C Saunders, 'Black attitudes to the Empire', in D Lowry (ed), *The South African War reappraised* (Manchester, 2000). Henry Sylvester Williams, the Africanist activist of West Indian origins, shared Jabavu's doubts that conditions for blacks would improve after the war: see his *The British Negro: a factor in the Empire* (London, 1902), esp p 22.

[43] The most detailed work on this is being done by Stowell Kessler for a PhD at the University of Cape Town. I am only concerned here with black South African involvement. Some blacks from other countries were involved, such as Aboriginal trackers, for whom see D Huggonson, 'The black trackers of Bloemfontein', *Land Rights News* (Australia), February 1990.

[44] D Denoon, *Southern Africa since 1800* (London, Longman, 1984), p 104.

[45] Denoon, *Southern Africa*, pp 100–7; 'Participation', p 120.

[46] The American historian George Fredrickson makes a few comparative points in *White supremacy* (New York, 1981) and *Black liberation* (New York, 1995). Maurice Boucher related the South African War to its immediate predecessor, the Spanish-American War of 1898, in 'Imperialism, the Transvaal press and the Spanish-American War of 1898', *Kleio*, V, 2 (1973).

* * *

We can now begin to rethink the war from a new vantage-point, that of majority-ruled South Africa. Writing in l969, in one of the most thoughtful and provocative articles ever penned on the war, Donald Denoon linked the South African War with another guerrilla war, another 'people's war', on 'the same terrain', then beginning.[48] This more recent war for liberation was fought, ironically, against a government of descendants of those who had fought the earlier war of liberation against British imperialism. The South African War was once called, from behind the Iron Curtain, 'one of the most glorious chapters in the history of liberation wars',[49] because it was so clearly an anti-imperialist struggle. From within the more recent liberation struggle have come attempts to see the Boer fighters as heroic, and their struggle as part of a more general 'struggle for freedom'.[50] At another polemical extreme, however, those who are critical of the compromises made in the recent liberation struggle see the South African War as a struggle between imperialism and racists, a conflict over 'who would be masters over the conquered colonial wage slaves'.[51] From this perspective, the Boers did not seek true 'freedom'; they were concerned with their own freedom, not that of the majority.

Now that we are some years from the end of the more recent liberation war, it is apparent that, even taking into account the revelations before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the extent of the activities of the guerrillas of Umkhonto we Sizwe within the country, the armed struggle of the 1970s and 1980s was not fought on anything like the same scale as the one at the beginning of the century. While there are some parallels between the two, there are also striking differences. While the recent anti-apartheid war ended, like the South African War, in a negotiated settlement, this time the settlement produced, not only an end to fighting, but more importantly a transfer of power. Power passed to the majority from the descendants of those who had lost the South African War but then won the peace.

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[47] Fredrickson, *White supremacy*, p 195.

[48] Denoon, 'Participation' pp 109–110.

[49] E Sik, *The history of black Africa* (Budapest, 1966), quoted by H Jaffe, *History of Africa*, (London, 1985), p 98.

[50] A Sachs, in *Leadership*, 9 (March 1990), p 84, quoted by Grundlingh, 'War, wordsmiths and the volk', p 54.

[51] H Jaffe, *European colonial despotism* (London, 1994), p 128.

In the South African War most blacks had not viewed liberation as meaning a return to the past, to a lost independence. Liberation was seen, rather, in terms of freedom from repressive British rule. For the new African elite, incorporation on equal terms was the desired goal; loyalty to Britain and the Empire was repeatedly stressed. And yet that loyalty was not rewarded: the war did not end in any kind of liberation but in the 'great betrayal' at the 'white peace' of Vereeniging. The more recent struggle, for a very different kind of liberation, was not only successful, but left the country less ravaged than in 1902, and with a Truth Commission to uncover, and to some extent to make amends for, the gross violations of human rights that had occurred in the course of the struggle.[52] The nature of the transition – which was based not on a violent overthrow of the old order, but on a compromise – is reflected in the recently-expressed wish of the government to commemorate the South African War 'within the broad principles of inclusiveness, reconciliation and a balanced historical perspective'.[53]

What, then, was the prime significance of the war? For Africans the war was but one in a long history of disasters; Jeremy Krikler's 'rebellion from below', in which Africans of the western Transvaal sought to overturn white control of their lands and their lives, was short-lived and without long-term consequences. Despite being betrayed by Britain, the African elite continued to hope against hope for British aid; it was a long time after the end of the war before they accepted that there was nothing to be gained from loyalty to the Crown. The war did reverse the Great Trek and bring all South Africa under British rule, but self-government was soon restored to the ex-republics. That seems to leave the over-riding significance of the war as negative: it brought no change to the essential racial order. But it did have major consequences for the racial ordering of the society. As Bernard Magubane, drawing upon ideas of the revisionists of the 1970s, has most recently and most fully suggested,[54] by bringing British rule to the interior the war meant the intensification and rationalisation of segregationist practices, and shifted the burden of exceptionalism to the Cape. While the war did not alter the balance of power within the white community, or between whites and blacks, it did help shift that power to the north.[55] So while we cannot know what would have happened had there been no war, we can conclude that the war played a major role in the creation of the racist state that would last eighty-odd years and dominate South Africa's twentieth-century history, until that state – and, in a sense, the legacy of the war as well – was overturned in the 'negotiated revolution' of the 1990s.

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[52] A Truth Commission set-up following the South African War might have recorded more atrocities, in a much shorter period of time, than the post-apartheid TRC, for this was as close as South Africa has yet come to total war, a ruthless and destructive war which saw more deaths in South Africa itself, the majority as a result of disease, than the recent liberation struggle. Many of the worst atrocities in recent decades occurred outside South Africa, and for legal reasons, the TRC was not been able to explore those in detail. There were 27 000 white deaths and perhaps 20 000 black deaths in concentration camps, 22 000 British soldiers were killed and 7 000 Boer soldiers. On deaths in the recent war see M Coleman (ed), *A crime against humanity* (Cape Town, 1998); there were 14 000 in the period 1990–94: p 226.

[53] Minister L Mtshali, quoted in 'Historical rewrite for South Africa', *The West Australian*, l8 June 1998. The official *History* of the war had been compiled with a view to reconciliation with the Boers.

In America, the golden jubilee of the civil war was an occasion used to create what Michael Kammen calls 'a new national synthesis' on the meaning of the war, involving the ideas that secession was wrong, that ending slavery was good, and that Reconstruction was misguided.[56] The South African War was little remembered at half-century,[57] and even after a century, it remains to be seen whether we are now able to move towards a shared view of the war, as one that was unnecessary, a tragedy in which all suffered, and a missed opportunity for change.

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[54] B Magubane, *The making of a racist state* (Trenton, 1996).

[55] Denoon, *Southern Africa*, p 105. The American Civil War, by contrast, transferred the burden of exceptionalism from north to south: cf J M Macpherson, *The battle cry of freedom* (New York 1989), p 812. But America's south was like South Africa's north, in being most reactionary in race relations.

[56] M Kammen, *Mystic chords of memory* (New York, 1991), p 416.

[57] But J H Breytenbach did compile *Die betekenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog: vyftig jaar, 11 Okt 1899–11 Okt 1949* (Johannesburg, 1949).

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Irving versus Lipstadt: a historian's view of the case

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Introductory

Readers of David Irving's *Hitler's war*[1] might consider it unjust that he has been described as a Holocaust denier. The book is a history of the Second World War seen from Hitler's standpoint, and most of it is concerned with purely military history. Irving's argument about the fate of the Jews is that Hitler's policy was to resettle them in the east; that doing so in wartime created appalling conditions; that Hitler's subordinates considered his virulent antisemitism sufficient authorisation to put Jews to death rather than let them die of starvation and disease; and that Hitler did not become aware of his subordinates' actions until October 1943 or possibly later, by which time the process was largely a *fait accompli*. So the Holocaust happened, and Hitler bears a heavy responsibility for it, but he did not actually order it. Hitler's slovenly habits, his preoccupation with the war, and the ramshackle nature of the Nazi state, make this thesis not entirely implausible. Irving argues that it is convenient for Germans to put all the blame on one omnipotent lunatic whom it was death to disobey, but that the guilt was much more widely spread.

Irving does not hold a salaried academic post: he is a professional writer entirely dependent on the sale of his books, and he charged that false accusations of Holocaust denial were destroying his career and means of livelihood by alienating publishers, booksellers and readers. His most influential accuser, Deborah Lipstadt, refused to debate the matter with him. 'There is no debate', she said: 'I refuse to lower myself to debating with the revisionists.'[2] In Germany and some other countries what is regarded as denying the Holocaust is a criminal offence. Irving sees this as amounting to a ban on legitimate historical debate. It was as a champion of freedom of speech that David Irving entered the lists, without legal representation, against the Goliath of a legal team assembled by Deborah Lipstadt and her publishers, Penguin Books.

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[1] David Irving, *Hitler's war, vol 1, 1939–1942, vol 2, 1942–1945*, (London, 1983; first publ 1977).

[2] Quoted on Irving's website, http://www.fpp.co.uk, which contains much material on the case, including a full transcript of the proceedings, the expert reports, and the judgement. I am grateful to Simon Dagut for assistance with the internet. I am also grateful to Carolyn Hamilton and the participants in a seminar held on an earlier draft of this paper on 2 October 2000 at the Graduate School for the Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of the Witwatersrand.

Or so it might seem. But there is another side to Irving. For years he led a double life, with one foot in the door of respectable scholarship and the other in the camp of conspiracy theory and racist extremism.

Academic historians have praised Irving's scholarly industry and his mastery of primary sources, and one has collaborated with him in editing sources for publication.[3] Irving has discovered many hitherto unknown collections of documents, largely by gaining the confidence of widows of German generals and prominent Nazis, and he has made these papers accessible to other scholars. The German Federal Archives described him as a Trüffelschwein, which he said he hoped was 'more flattering than it sounds'[4]. Irving's moment of glory came when Hugh Trevor-Roper, the Regius Professor of Modern History at the University of Oxford, pronounced the newly discovered 'Hitler Diaries' genuine. Irving declared them forged, and was proved right. Irving has made great play with this coup. What he fails to mention nowadays is that when he found the 'diaries' presented a favourable image of Hitler, he changed his mind and declared them authentic, until scientific tests on the paper and ink made this opinion impossible to maintain. He was the first to declare them forged and the last to declare them authentic.[5]

Irving's opinions underwent a decisive shift in 1988. In the first edition of *Hitler's war* (1977) he sought to exculpate Hitler as far as possible from responsibility for the Holocaust. In the 1991 edition all mention of systematic extermination was eliminated. What he described as his 'conversion'[6] occurred in Toronto. He went to Canada to give testimony as an expert on the Third Reich in the trial of Ernst Zundel, author of *The Hitler we loved and why*, who was charged (under an old law since struck down as unconstitutional) with having spread false information in a pamphlet entitled *Did six million really*

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[3] This was Donald Cameron Watt, who gave evidence in Irving's favour, but only after being served with a subpoena, having declined to do so voluntarily: *Proceedings*, Day 7, pp 22–52 (on Irving's website – see note 2). Likewise Sir John Keegan, the military editor of the *Daily Telegraph*, who had reviewed Irving's *Hitler's war* favourably: *Proceedings*, Day 16, pp 11–12.

[4] *Proceedings*, Day 1, p 61.

[5] Richard J Evans, *Expert witness report*, pp 25–6 (on Irving's website – see note 2). In referring to Evans's *Report*, I use the pagination as it appears on the website, which differs from the original. The paragraphs of the *Report* are numbered, but the numbers are confusing and impossible to follow.

[6] Evans, *Report*, p 58.

die? On the night before Irving's testimony, the defence lawyers handed him a report by another 'expert witness', Fred Leuchter, of which he had time to read only a part. But this was enough for him to tell the court the next day that he no longer believed the accepted view of the Nazi extermination camps, that he now understood 'that the whole of the Holocaust mythology is after all open to doubt' and that he was 'now becoming more and more hardened in this view'.[7]

Fred Leuchter has since been completely discredited. The Canadian court rejected his evidence on the grounds that he had no expertise in any relevant field. His 'research' consisted of illegally chipping off bits of masonry from the remains of gas chambers and from a room used to fumigate clothing at Auschwitz; his 'findings' were completely vitiated by his assumption that more hydrogen cyanide was needed to kill humans than to kill lice, while according to genuine experts lice require a concentration 22 times as great.[8]

Irving declared Leuchter's report a 'truly epoch making investigation' and said it had made him 'into a hardcore disbeliever'. He announced to an appreciative audience in Calgary that 'more women died on the back seat of Edward Kennedy's car at Chappaquiddick than ever died in a gas chamber in Auschwitz'. Shortly before he was deported he said he intended forming an 'Association of Auschwitz Survivors, Survivors of the Holocaust and Other Liars – A-S-S-H-O-L-S'.[9]

Back in London he published the 'Leuchter Report' with an introduction by himself, and announced that it exposed 'the blood libel on the German people, as I call it, the lie that the Germans had factories of death with gas chambers in which they liquidated millions of their opponents'. He said he was conducting a 'one man intifada' against the official history of the Holocaust.[10]

Irving does not loom very large in Lipstadt's *Denying the Holocaust*, but she describes him as 'one of the most dangerous spokespersons for Holocaust denial'[11] because his reputation as a serious historian makes it difficult to dismiss him as a crank. She accused him not only of Holocaust denial, but also of falsifying and manipulating evidence in pursuit of his political agenda. When Irving brought his libel action, the defence had to justify Lipstadt's statements and this required an examination of what Irving wrote both before and after his conversion. A number of expert witnesses were engaged, chief among them Richard Evans, Professor of Modern History at the University of Cambridge, the author of a number of works on German history and on historiography. Evans states that he was astonished by the things he and his research assistants discovered.

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[7] *Proceedings*, Day 7, pp 108–115.

[8] Deborah E Lipstadt, *Denying the Holocaust: the growing assault on truth and memory*, (New York, 1993), chapter 9.

[9] *Proceedings*, Day 1, pp 98–9.

[10] *Proceedings*, Day 2, p 228; Lipstadt, *Denying*, p 179.

[11] Lipstadt, *Denying*, p 181.

For example, Irving's statements about the high levels of Jewish criminality in Berlin in the last years of the Weimar Republic, which purport to be based on 'Interpol figures', were in fact a repetition and even embellishment of statements by a member of the *Schutzstaffel* (SS) hanged after the war for atrocities on the eastern front, statements contradicted by official figures which Irving did not use.[12] Irving's assertion that Hitler was 'livid with rage' over *Kristallnacht* and took immediate steps to put a stop to this state-sponsored pogrom is based on the self-exculpatory oral evidence Irving collected from Hitler's former adjutants decades after the event, and is contradicted by many contemporary documents known to him.[13] Irving's figure for civilian casualties in the Allied bombing of Dresden is ten times the most reliable estimate, and is based on a document he knew to be a forgery.[14]

Hitler and the Holocaust

Turning to matters more directly relevant to the trial, I examine firstly Irving's earlier argument that Hitler did not order the extermination of the Jews and did not know about it until the process was virtually complete, and secondly his post-conversion position. In considering the question of Hitler's alleged innocence and ignorance, one must bear in mind that the Nazis made every attempt to keep the 'final solution' secret, that they communicated about it by word of mouth rather than in writing, that they used camouflaged language, and that they destroyed a great many documents as well as physical installations before the end of the war.

Himmler's telephone log

In the introduction to *Hitler's war* Irving states that there is

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[12] David Irving, *Goebbels: mastermind of the Third Reich* (London, 1996), pp 46–7; Evans, *Report*, pp 356–9; *Proceedings*, Day 29, pp 98–105.

[13] Irving's most extended treatment of *Kristallnacht* is in his *Goebbels*, chapter 32, pp 271–82. Evans's critique is in pp 116–153 of his *Report*. See also *Proceedings*, Day 12, pp 75–142, Day 13, pp 23–69, Day 21, pp 8–162.

[14] David Irving, *The destruction of Dresden* (London, 1963); Evans, *Report*, pp 273–305; *Proceedings*, Day 13, pp 69–185, Day 23, pp 194–224.

'incontrovertible evidence' that 'Hitler ordered on November 30, 1941, that there was to be ''no liquidation'' of the Jews'. Irving added that 'without much difficulty, I found in Himmler's private files his own handwritten note on this', thus implying the remissness of other historians.[15] Irving attaches considerable importance to this note, reproducing it in facsimile and mentioning it sixteen times in the course of the book.

The note is written in Himmler's telephone log and reads 'Jew-transport from Berlin', and then on the next line, 'No liquidation'. Himmler gave the order by telephone from Hitler's headquarters; but this was a large and rambling complex, and there is no evidence that he made this phone call on Hitler's instructions. The experts stated, and Irving was forced to acknowledge in court, that the original German, which Irving mistranscribed (though he had transcribed it correctly in a letter three years before the publication of *Hitler's war*)[16] makes it clear that the note refers to one train-load of Jews from Berlin, not to Jews in general. It thus proves the opposite of what Irving wants it to prove. It is the exception that proves the rule. As Hugh Trevor-Roper pointed out when reviewing the book, 'one does not veto an action unless one thinks it is otherwise likely to occur'. If the order came from Hitler, as Irving argues, it would show that Hitler knew there was a policy of liquidating the Jews, something which Irving wishes to deny.[17]

The following day Himmler made a call to an SS general summarised in his telephone log as 'Verwaltungsführer der SS haben zu bleiben'. This means 'administrative leaders of the SS are to stay'.[18] Irving represents it as an order (from Hitler's headquarters and by implication on his instructions) that 'Jews are to stay where they are'.[19] In his evidence at the trial Irving explained that he had misread 'haben' as 'Juden', although the sentence makes no sense in this form. He explained he thought it was two sentences ('haben' begins a new line, albeit indented) although this would leave the SS administrative officers with nothing said about them. The defence counsel (Richard Rampton, QC) demonstrated in court that it was quite easy to distinguish in Himmler's handwriting between the letters j and h, u and a, and d and b, and that Irving had not confused them anywhere else.[20]

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[15] Irving, *Hitler's war*, vol I, p xiv.

[16] *Proceedings*, Day 3, pp 28–9; *Judgement*, V, 5.106 (on Irving's website – see note 2).

[17] Quotations and information from Evans, *Report*, 166–8. The reason for the order was a temporary hesitation over exterminating German Jews as distinct from *Ostjuden*.

[18] Evans, *Report*, p 168.

[19] Irving, *Hitler's war*, vol I, p 332.

Irving was obliged to admit that after the error was pointed out to him he did not correct it in the 1991 edition of *Hitler's war*. At first he said this was because the error was discovered too late for any changes to be made, since the edition was typeset in 1985 or 1986 and thereafter reproduced photographically. When it was pointed out to him that it must have been typeset after his 1988 conversion since all references to the Holocaust had been omitted, he changed tack and said it simply an oversight, and that failing to correct one word out of half a million was surely excusable, especially since it was 'pretty meaningless' and 'totally immaterial and unimportant'. Why then was it included in the first place? This was 'purely because it was the next entry in the telephone log'.[21] This is palpably absurd and false: the statement occurs at the end of a section devoted to proving that Hitler did not want the Jews exterminated and is clearly meant to be an important piece of evidence in support of this contention.

The 'Schlegelberger' note

A document which Irving regards as very important is an undated, unsigned, unaddressed, and a typed copy of a note on unheaded paper stating that Hitler's top civil servant, Hans Lammers, 'informed me that the Führer has repeatedly pronounced that he wants the solution of the Jewish Question put off until after the war is over'.[22] It is surmised that State Secretary Schlegelberger of the Ministry of Justice was the author of this note, but there is no proof that this is so. Irving states that 'no other historians have quoted this document' and suggests that this is because it is 'hard to reconcile with their obsessively held views' that Hitler was responsible for the extermination of the Jews. In fact, he said on one occasion, it is 'of extreme embarrassment' to them: 'they close their eyes and when they open them it is still there'.[23] Given the obscurity of its provenance it is not surprising that historians have paid little attention to this document and not drawn any definite conclusions from it. But they have not ignored it: a German historian discussed this document in print before Irving and indeed told him of its existence, as he earlier acknowledged; so his suggestion of a conspiracy of silence on the part of academic historians is not convincing.

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[20] *Proceedings*, Day 4, pp 121–32.

[21] *Proceedings*, Day 3, pp 66–81

[22] Evans, *Report*, pp 217–30.

[23] *Proceedings*, Day 6 p 184, quoting a lecture by Irving.

The interpretation of this document presents obvious difficulties (though Irving has no doubts – he describes it as the 'most cardinal piece of proof in this entire story of what Hitler knew about what was going on').[24] The file in which it is located contains mainly documents from 1942, but it was placed there not by German civil servants but by the Allies after the Nuremburg trials. The other documents in the file are mainly concerned with the Nazis' intractable problem of what to do with German Jews married to Gentiles, and Germans who were partly Jewish, a problem that was never solved, with the result that most of them survived. The next sentence refers to 'the present discussions', and there were indeed many discussions on this question in 1942. If the document does date to 1942, as Irving believes, it most likely relates to this narrow 'Jewish Question'. It is difficult to understand how even Irving could really believe that it refers to the 'Jewish Question' as a whole, since by 1942 massive deportations of Jews to the east were in progress, and Irving acknowledges that Hitler knew and approved of these deportations even though he denies that Hitler knew what fate befell the Jews when they reached their destination.

Hitler's knowledge of Einsatzgruppen actions

When Germany invaded Soviet Russia in June 1941 detachments of the SS known as *Einsatzgruppen* (operation groups) followed in the wake of the army to pacify the conquered territory. This was done by shooting communist functionaries, partisans, saboteurs, and anyone else likely to cause trouble. The latter rapidly escalated from certain categories of Jews to all Jews.[25]

On 1 August 1941 Heinrich Müller, the head of the Gestapo within Heydrich's Security Police, sent a message to the four *Einsatzgruppen*: 'The Führer is to be kept informed continually from here about the work of the *Einsatzgruppen* in the East'.[26] Through these reports historians are well-informed about the shootings in the east. One surviving report is retyped in the large print which the vain and short-sighted Hitler could read without glasses. It is Report No 51, signed by

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[24] *Proceedings,* Day 6, p 184.

[25] Christopher R Browning, *Expert opinion, evidence for the implementation of the Final Solution*, Part 1, on Irving's website (see note 2).

[26] Browning, *Evidence,* paragraph 4.5.

Himmler, which states that in the regions of Russia South, Ukraine and Bialystok in the period August to November 1942, a total of 363 211 Jews had been shot together with about 23 000 non-Jews. The report is ostensibly on ‘combating partisans’. Himmler’s appointment book shows that on 18 December 1941 he and Hitler had discussed the ‘Jewish question’ and had decided that Jews were ‘to be annihilated as partisans’. Combating partisans served as a cover for genocide.[27]

Irving mentions Himmler’s report,[28] but only in the context of combating partisans: he does not allow it to influence his opinion that Hitler knew nothing of what was happening to the Jews in the east. In court Irving explained this perfunctory use of the document by saying that it was an ‘orphan’ document, the only one of its kind, that although it was laid before Hitler he probably paid no attention to it as he would have been preoccupied with the battle of Stalingrad at the time, and that Himmler, realising this, probably thought it was a good time to slip it into the pile of papers for Hitler’s attention in order to cover himself against any subsequent accusation of failure to keep the Führer informed of what his *Einsatzgruppen* were doing.[29] All this is, of course, pure speculation, and much less plausible than the obvious conclusion that Hitler wanted to be kept informed, and was.

Irving makes no mention anywhere of the order from Müller that Hitler was to be kept informed. He claimed that he had seen it for the first time in court, despite the fact that it is preserved in the archives of the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich where he had worked at various times over thirty years. At first he appeared to suggest that the document was a forgery. When the judge insisted on knowing whether or not this was his argument, he replied ‘I think for the purpose of today I will accept that it is genuine’, but reserved the right to change his mind.[30]

Defence counsel Rampton pointed out that the document was printed in Professor Gerald Fleming’s book on Hitler and the ‘final solution’, of which Irving possessed both the English and the German editions; but he said he had read neither. Rampton pointed out that when Irving had been asked by a member of an lecture audience what he thought of Fleming’s book he had replied that although it was well written and based on much research, he ‘mixes first, second and third order evidence’. How could he say that without having read the book? Irving replied that his remarks were based on reviews of the book.[31] When Rampton pointed out that Irving's copy of the book was marked beyond the page on which the Müller order is printed, Irving explained that although he had 'not read the book as such', he had read the first few pages and looked up particular points, unfortunately missing the Müller order. He pointed out that the page on which it was printed was not marked.[32]

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[27] Browning, *Evidence*, paragraphs 4.1.6–4.1.8

[28] Irving, *Hitler’s war*, p 436 & n.

[29] *Proceedings*, Day 2, pp 262–78.

[30] *Proceedings*, Day 14, p 60.

Hitler's table talk and the Einsatzgruppen

In his biography of Goebbels (1996) Irving quotes part of *Hitler's table talk* of 25 October 1941 to reinforce his argument that Hitler was unaware of the shootings in the east and wished to defer the Jewish question until after the war was over:

> 'By the way,' he added, 'it's not a bad thing that public' rumour attributes to us a plan to exterminate the Jews.' He pointed out however that he had no intention of starting anything at present. 'There's no point in adding to one's difficulties at a time like this!'[33]

Evans demonstrates how misleading this is.[34] Hitler prefaced his remarks by referring to his 'prophecy' to the Reichstag of the annihilation of the Jews (see below). The first sentence quoted in the above passage is correctly translated as 'It's good if the terror that we are exterminating Jewry goes before us'. This implies that the extermination is proceeding, whereas Irving's 'rumour', 'attributes' and 'plan' all imply that it is not.

The remainder of the above passage comes from three pages further on in the published English version of *Hitler's table talk*. The context is Bishop Von Galen's public protest against the Nazi euthanasia programme, which brought it to a halt. Von Galen was a Cardinal, an aristocrat, and an ex-army officer, and at a time when Hitler needed to retain the support of the officer corps and of the forty percent of Germans who were Catholics he could not afford any move against him. Hitler stated that lack of immediate reaction did not mean matters simply disappeared: in due course the account book would be taken out. 'I had to remain inactive for a long time against the Jews too. There's no sense in artificially making extra difficulties for oneself; the more cleverly one operates, the better.' Hitler was currently inactive against Von Galen, but his inactivity against the Jews was clearly in the past. What he said provides no justification for Irving to represent him as saying that ‘he had no intention of starting anything at present’ against the Jews.

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[31] *Proceedings*, Day 14, pp 66–7.

[32] *Proceedings*, Day 29, pp 81–5.

[33] Irving, *Goebbels*, p 377, based on H R Trevor-Roper (ed) *Hitler's table talk* (London, 1953), pp 87 & 90.

[34] Evans, *Report*, pp 155–8.

What Irving was unable to explain to the court was why he used the inaccurate English translation (as he had on another occasion acknowledged it to be) published by Weidenfeld and Nicolson in 1953 instead of the German original published in 1980; or why, having boasted that he was the first historian to whom the original German manuscript had been shown (in 1977) by its owner, he failed to use that, thus departing from his oft-reiterated rule of only using authentic originals.

He denied that he preferred an inaccurate translation because it happened to suit his ideological purposes. Instead he produced a flurry of excuses: it was the ‘official translation’; he found it an adequate translation which did not seriously deviate from the original; that ‘Schrecken’, which Evans translated as ‘terror’ and which the Weidenfeld and Nicolson edition translated as ‘public rumour’, really meant a ‘spook’ or ‘goblin’; that although the dictionary gave its meaning as ‘fright, shock, terror, alarm, panic, consternation, dismay, fear, horror’, the fact that Evans chose the third in this list showed that he was the one who preferred to manipulate its meaning; that George Weidenfeld was a Jew who could not be accused of wanting to exonerate Hitler; that ‘public rumour’ was not so widely deviant a translation as to warrant tampering with it and risking exposure to unfair criticism from other historians familiar only with the Weidenfeld and Nicolson translation; that the Weidenfeld and Nicolson translation was a good, flowing, literate translation which he preferred to a wooden translation; that what mattered was not whether one word had been mistranslated but the general sense of the passage which was not affected by this small error; that when he wrote the first (1977) edition of *Hitler’s war* he did not have access to the original German and that although he did have access to it thereafter, the 1991 edition was just a reissue (despite all the alterations in it, including the deletion of all references to the Holocaust); that in writing the Goebbels biography (1996) he used *Hitler’s war* as his source; that he had to compress if he were not to ‘write a book two or three times as long [and] endlessly boring, as the academics write them’; that there was ‘a whole series of documents which lie in my direction’; and that the reason other historians ‘start poking fingers and sneering’ at him was because of his skill and success in ferreting out documents. As Rampton said: ‘Mr Irving, I have to put it to you, you just say any old thing to get yourself out of a corner.’

Although Irving used the Weidenfeld and Nicolson translation, his note does not refer to it, nor even to the published German version; it refers to the original manuscript which is in private hands in Switzerland. This, Irving explained, was because he wished 'to point people reading my books to where they can find the original documents so they can check it for themselves'. In this he contrasted himself favourably with the academic expert witnesses retained by the defence who 'just take books down off a shelf and use those as sources'. There is nothing in the court record to indicate that Irving was trying to be funny; his capacity for self-deception appears to be close to absolute.[35]

Goebbels's diary

Hitler made what appears to have been a threat to exterminate the Jews in a speech of 30 January 1939 in the Reichstag:

> Today I will be a prophet again. If international Jewry within Europe and abroad should succeed once more in plunging the peoples into a world war, then the consequence will be not the Bolshevization of the world and therewith a victory of Jewry, but on the contrary the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe.

Nazi policy at this time (three months after *Kristallnacht*) was to harrass the Jews into emigration. Negotiations were proceeding with international bodies whereby the Nazis hoped that world Jewry would pay for the removal of the Jews from Germany. Threatening bigger and more lethal actions against the Jews, it has been argued,[36] was calculated to persuade international bodies and western governments to expedite this process.

The calculation failed, but the 'prophecy' came to be regarded by the Nazis as a sort of warrant for genocide. Just as in retrospect one can see that P W Botha's references to 'total onslaught' and 'total response' were intended to justify his government's adoption of a policy of murdering its opponents, so the repeated references by Hitler and his henchmen to the Reichstag 'prophecy' seem to have had a similar purpose. Irving, however, attaches no importance to these repeated references. He dismisses them as Hitler's 'gramophone record', by which he seems to mean they were something Hitler recited to please the party faithful but which were of no real significance.[37]

Goebbels did not see it in that light. The *Einsatzgruppen* operated only in Soviet Russia. As their activities rapidly escalated to genocide, ways were found to do the same to the Jews in German-occupied Poland. The vans which had been adapted to kill euthanasia victims with exhaust fumes were moved to Poland, and fixed extermination camps were also set up and began operation in early 1942. Goebbels referred to this 'barbaric procedure' in his diary entry for 27 March 1942, stating that '60% of them must be liquidated, while only 40% can be put to work':

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[35] *Proceedings*, Day 4, pp 168–90.

[36] *Proceedings*, Day 24, pp 83–8, Dr Longerich's evidence.

[37] *Proceedings*, Day 4, p 141; Day 16, p 121; Day 29, pp 152 & 155; see especially Day 32, p 94.

> The Jews are being punished barbarically, to be sure, but they have fully deserved it. The prophecy that the Führer issued to them on the way, for the eventuality that they started a new world war, is beginning to realise itself in the most terrible manner. One must not allow any sentimentalities to rule in these matters. If we did not defend ourselves against them, the Jews would annihilate us. It is a struggle for life and death between the Aryan race and the Jewish bacillus. No other government and no other regime could muster the strength for a general solution of the question. Here too, the Führer is the persistent pioneer and spokesman of a radical solution, which is demanded by the way things are and thus appears to be unavoidable.[38]

This passage is surely incompatible with any argument that Hitler did not know what was happening to the Jews. Even Goebbels regarded what was happening as barbaric and terrible but his reference to Hitler's 'prophecy' and his use of Hitlerian phrases (such as 'Jewish bacillus') show that the Führer had convinced him, or mesmerised him into believing, that it was unavoidable. Irving refers briefly to this passage to show that Goebbels knew what was happening, but he quotes none of it and says nothing of Goebbels' references to Hitler. He then continues: 'but [Goebbels] evidently held his tongue whenever he met Hitler. After seeing him on March 19, Goebbels quotes only Hitler's remark: ''The Jews must get out of Europe. If need be, we must resort to the most brutal methods.''' [39]

This is then followed by a number of references to the Nazis' earlier policy (abandoned when the war made it impracticable) of resettling the Jews in Madagascar or elsewhere, and a reference to Hitler's (non-existent)[40] 'November 1941 order forbidding the liquidation of the Jews'. Thus Hitler's 'get out of Europe', even using 'the most brutal methods', is made to appear a reference to emigration; and the fact that Goebbels never records having informed Hitler of the extermination programme, which would of course have been totally unnecessary, is made to appear significant.

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[38] Evans, *Report*, p 232. Evans deals with this subject on pp 230–46.

[39] Irving, *Hitler's war*, vol I, p 392. The chronological confusion that Evans refers to (p 234) in the first edition of *Hitler's war* (1977) has been rectified in the 1988 impression of the paperback edition.

[40] See above, *Himmler's telephone log*.

Irving's justification for omitting passages in Goebbels's diary which implicate Hitler is that they were intended as 'alibis' and should not be believed. But, as Evans asks, who could be the intended readership of alibis in a private diary? Why should a devout believer in the Thousand Year Reich have thought such alibis necessary? And what could have been Goebbels's purpose in inserting alibis when he also included many passages showing that he too favoured the extermination of the Jews?[41] Irving could do nothing in court to shake the criticisms Evans made of his treatment of this evidence.[42]

Himmler ad Hitler

Irving regards it of great importance that no document signed by Hitler ordering the extermination of the Jews has ever been found. He has even offered a reward of £1 000 to anyone who can produce it. It is unlikely that such a document ever existed. Hitler's method of ruling was to expound his vision for the future and leave its implementation entirely to his subordinates; as little as possible concerning the fate of the Jews was committed to paper; and Hitler was in frequent personal contact with Himmler, the Reichsführer SS, whose task it was to carry out the 'final solution' of the Jewish question.[43]

Irving contends Himmler initiated the extermination that programme and kept Hitler in the dark, despite acknowledging that when he interviewed Himmler's last adjutant and his own brother both thought it unlikely that he would have dared act on his own initiative.[44] Himmler has been described as 'a colourless, insecure personality … completely under the spell of Hitler … with ability as an administrator, ambition and an over-zealous devotion to duty'.[45]

In May 1940, before the invasion of Soviet Russia, and before the 'final solution' was adopted, Himmler wrote a secret memorandum, approved by Hitler, on the reshuffling of 'alien populations' in the newly conquered Poland. Poles were to be moved out of the part annexed to Germany and replaced by ethnic Germans from the east. Himmler intended to 'erase the concept of Jews' by 'emigration of all Jews to a colony in Africa or elsewhere'. He recognised that his proposals would cause suffering, but said they were ‘still the mildest and best, if one rejects the Bolshevik method of physical extermination of a people out of inner conviction as un-German and impossible’.[46]

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[41] Evans, *Report*, pp 233–4.

[42] *Proceedings*, Day 23, pp 17–73; *Judgement*, paragraphs 13.10, 13.27 and 13.28.

[43] See Evans, *Report*, pp 350–5, *Hitler's decision-making process*.

[44] Evans, *Report*, p 353.

[45] Alan Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin: parallel lives* (London, 1993), p 704. Bullock states that this description is based on 'all who knew him'.

By June 1941, when the invasion of Russia was launched, or shortly thereafter, extermination had ceased to be un-German and impossible. On a number of occasions Himmler stated or implied that the decision had been Hitler’s. On 26 July 1942 he wrote: ‘The occupied eastern territories will become free of Jews. The Führer has put the responsibility of completing this very difficult order on my shoulders. In any case no-one can relieve me of the responsibility. So I forbid all discussion.’ On 9 October 1942 he ordered all Jews in the districts of Warsaw and Lublin to be put in concentration camps, adding ‘but there too the Jews will one day disappear, according to the wishes of the Führer’. Hitler’s private secretary recalled:

> One day Himmler was confronted by a few generals about the atrocities committed in Poland. To my surprise Himmler defended himself with the assurance that he was only carrying out the ‘Führer’s’ orders. But he immediately added: ‘The Führer’s person may on no account be brought into connection with this. I take on full responsibility’.[47]

Irving ignores this evidence. When he refers to an address by Himmler to an audience of generals on 5 May 1944 he tells his readers that 'never before, and never after, did Himmler hint at a *Führer* Order’. Himmler told the generals on this occasion that he had ‘uncompromisingly’ solved the ‘Jewish problem’ in German-occupied Europe, adding: ‘I am telling this to you as my comrades. We are all soldiers regardless of which uniform we wear. You can imagine how I felt executing this soldierly order issued to me, but I obediently complied and carried it out to the best of my convictions.’

Irving acknowledges that only Hitler could issue a ‘soldierly order’ to Himmler, but says ‘there is reason to doubt he dared show this passage to his Führer’, since Hitler would know it to be untrue – this despite the fact that a transcript of the speech was typed in the special large print used for documents to be shown to Hitler. Irving’s reason for doubt is that the page containing the crucial words ‘was manifestly retyped and inserted in the transcript at a later date, as the different indenting shows’.[48] But these typographical speculations are surely, as the judge said, fanciful.[49] Hitler was in daily contact with his generals and could not have failed to learn from them what Himmler said. Himmler would surely not have dared tell the generals that the order to exterminate the Jews came from Hitler had it not been true.

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[46] Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin*, pp 707–8.
[47] Evans, *Report*, pp 352–3.
[48] Irving, *Hitler’s war*, vol II, pp 630–1 & n.

In the 1991 (post-conversion) edition of *Hitler's war* this speech by Himmler to the generals has disappeared. In court Irving professed bafflement at its disappearance; he suggested his American editors must have left it out.[50]

Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Horthy

On another occasion Hitler himself was very explicit about the necessity for the extermination of the Jews. In 1943 he and Ribbentrop met Admiral Horthy, the Regent of Hungary. (Horthy's titles, in a country without a navy or a monarchy, are oddities the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire left in its wake). Hungary was Germany's ally, and Hitler wanted it to hand over its Jews to the SS. Horthy resisted this pressure. In the minutes of the meeting on 16 April, which Irving accepts are accurate, Horthy is reported to have stated that 'he had done everything which one could decently undertake against the Jews, but one could surely not murder them or kill them in some other way. The Führer replied that this was also not necessary. Hungary could accommodate the Jews in concentration camps just like Slovakia did'.

This produced no satisfactory response. On the following day, therefore, Hitler and Ribbentrop were much more open about the fate they intended for the Jews and why they considered it necessary. When Horthy repeated that he surely could not kill the Jews, Ribbentrop replied that 'the Jews must either be annihilated or taken to concentration camps'. Hitler said that the Jews were degenerate parasites and that this state of affairs had been cleared up in Poland. 'If the Jews there didn't want to work, they were shot. If they couldn't work, they had to perish. They had to be treated like tuberculosis bacilli'. Even 'innocent natural creatures like hares and deer had to be killed' to prevent harm, so why should beasts who spread Bolshevism be spared?

Subsequent events make it perfectly clear what Hitler wanted, if further clarity were needed. Horthy remained recalcitrant, so Germany installed a puppet government, and the SS were sent in to deport the Jews to Auschwitz, where they were killed.

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[49] *Judgement*, paragraph 13.46.

[50] *Judgement*, paragraph 13.46.

These events[51] are well-known to historians of the period, so simple omission was not an option for Irving. He was obliged to resort to obfuscation. He consigns Ribbentrop's statement to the obscurity of the endnotes, though it is surely important enough to be in the text (it was important enough to get Ribbentrop hanged). Then he provides reasons why Hitler might have been particularly upset and said things he did not really mean. Irving describes Polish Jews roaming the country committing murder and sabotage and states that fifty thousand Jews were on the point of staging an armed uprising in the Warsaw ghetto. Then appears a sentence in inverted commas: 'This is just the kind of incident that shows how dangerous these Jews are.'

Evans describes this as pure invention on Irving's part. There is no record of Hitler having uttered the quoted sentence. Neither did he make any reference to Jews committing murder and sabotage in Poland. And he could not possibly have referred to the Warsaw ghetto uprising (which did not involve anything like as many as fifty thousand armed Jews) since it had not yet occurred.

Irving runs the meetings of 16 and 17 April together as though they were one meeting, which enables him to rearrange the material to Hitler's advantage. He refers to Hitler's comparisons with tuberculosis bacilli and hares and deer; then quotes Horthy's statement that the Jews could hardly be murdered; but leaves till last, as though it were his last word on the subject, Hitler's soothing reassurance, 'there is no need for that'. This chronological confusion was pointed out to Irving in 1977, but he did not correct it in later editions of *Hitler's war.* In court he represented it as nothing more than a slip, getting a date wrong by a mere day; but the effect on the unsuspecting reader is much more than this would suggest.

In later editions new reasons were inserted for Hitler's statements, including the Katyn forest massacre of Poles by Russians, although Hitler made no mention of this to Horthy. But no special or immediate reasons are necessary to explain the genocidal language Hitler used on this occasion: he had used the same kind of language on numerous previous occasions stretching over decades. It is only because Irving denies this fact, or dismisses it as 'Hitler's gramophone record', that he has to resort to distortion and invention.

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[51] Irving, *Hitler's war*, pp 508–510; Evans, *Report*, pp 246–55; *Proceedings*, Day 12, pp 32–55, Day 23, pp 112–22, 149–60; Day 29, pp 85–7; Day 32, pp 12–15.

Did the Holocaust happen?

The many wild statements made by Irving after his conversion are not all consistent with each other, but if one connects up the more extreme of them one arrives at something like the following. The Jews had a rough time during the war but there is no reason to believe that their experience was worse than that of many other communities.[52] Moreover they brought much of their troubles upon themselves, partly by being generally obnoxious,[53] but more particularly because Chaim Weizmann, the leader of world Jewry, wrote a letter in late August 1939 to Neville Chamberlain, later published in *The Times*, stating that the Jews would stand by Great Britain and fight on the side of the democracies. This was virtually a Jewish declaration of war on Germany, and an announcement that all German Jews were traitors, and it led Hitler to intern the Jews as enemy aliens.[54] Conditions in the internment or concentration camps deteriorated during the war, largely as a result of murderous Allied bombing raids, which impeded medical and food supplies.[55] There were also unauthorised shootings on the eastern front similar to the Mai Lai massacre in Vietnam.[56] But the fantastic story of systematic extermination in gas chambers was an invention of British wartime propaganda,[57] eagerly taken up after the war by Zionists to extort money from Germany in so-called compensation and to justify the establishment and maintenance of the state of Israel and all it entailed, including violence against the Arabs. The Holocaust myth also conveniently serves to inhibit criticism of Jewish swindlers.[58] As for the disappearance of the Jewish population of eastern Europe, some moved to Russia, some migrated to Palestine, and others fled to Dresden where they were exterminated by Allied bombers.[59]

The Jewish declaration of war on Germany, like many of Irving's historical interpretations, was first put forward by Adolf Hitler. Weizmann was President of the World Zionist Organisation and of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, but scarcely the leader of world Jewry. The World Zionist Organisation represented about six percent of world Jewry and about four percent of German Jews. It was not a state and had no capacity to wage war. The purpose of Weizmann's letter to Chamberlain was to assure the Mandatory Power that despite past conflict the Jews of Palestine would side with Britain against the far greater threat presented by the Nazis. Weizmann had no control over the Jews of Europe.[60] He had little control even over the Jews of Palestine, some of whom made a bizarre attempt to form an alliance with the Nazis against Britain.[61]

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[52] Evans, *Report*, 59.

[53] Evans, *Report*, p 89.

[54] Evans, *Report*, pp 362–7; Lipstadt, *Denying*, pp 111 & 213–15.

[55] *Proceedings*, Day 19, pp 196 & 205.

[56] *Proceedings*, Day 4, p 109.

[57] Evans, *Report*, p 74.

[58] Evans, *Report*, p 86; *Proceedings*, Day 7, p 184.

[59] Evans, *Report*, p 65; *Proceedings*, Day 19, pp 176–9.

Most of Irving's post-conversion assertions are obviously absurd. He provided archival references for his statement that British propagandists invented the story of Nazi gas chambers, but they provide no support for this statement. What they show is that British officials were incredulous when the first reports of systematic gassing emerged, and were chary of making such apparently fantastic accusations lest they damage the credibility of their war propaganda.[62] The backfiring of British propaganda in the First World War, when such stories as Germans using Belgian children as bell clappers were proved false, were in many people's minds during the Second World War. In America and in Germany as well as in Britain this memory caused the early reports of gas chambers to be sceptically received.[63]

In court Irving was determined to defend his pre-conversion scholarship. But the attempt to argue that Hitler's henchmen concealed from him what was happening in the east, while at the same time arguing that nothing was happening in the east, proved too difficult. The difficulty, together with the irrefutable evidence the expert witnesses produced, caused Irving's views on the Holocaust to 'evolve', as the judge put it, during the trial. He soon abandoned the 'Mai Lai' theory of the *Einsatzgruppen* and conceded that the shootings were systematic, that Hitler knew and approved of them, and that between half a million and one and a half million people were shot, most of them Jews.[64] At first he asserted that gas vans had been used only on an experimental basis and on a very limited scale, but eventually conceded that this was not so. At first he denied that there had been gas chambers at Treblinka, Sobibor and Belzec, but then conceded this, as well as that gassing had been carried out at these camps on a considerable scale.[65]

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[60] Evans, *Report*, pp 362–7

[61] Conor Cruise O'Brien, *The siege: the saga of Israel and Zionism* (London, 1988), pp 246–7.

[62] Evans, *Report*, p 74.

[63] Deborah E Lipstadt, *Beyond belief: the American press and the coming of the Holocaust 1933–1945* (New York, 1986), pp 8–9; Evans, *Report*, p 339.

[64] *Proceedings*, Day 4, pp 106–7; *Judgement*, paras 13.56–8.

But this 'evolution' was anything but a smooth learning curve. On a number of occasions Irving denied what he had earlier conceded, explaining that he had made the concessions simply to speed up the trial.[66] On one occasion he insisted his concession that there were gas chambers at Treblinka, Sobibor and Belzec had been his view all along, until it was demonstrated that he had denied it in his initial pleadings.[67] He repeatedly stated he was 'not a Holocaust historian',[68] so any errors were not deliberate falsifications. But if he was not a Holocaust historian, why had he made categorical statements on the subject which contradicted the consensus of Holocaust historians? His statement at one point that he was an expert on the way Holocaust historians went about their research, 'but not on their findings, so to speak' is scarcely convincing.[69] Moreover when he appeared as an expert witness in the trial of Ernst Zundel in Canada in 1988 he answered questions on the Holocaust, stating for example that 'I am not familiar with any documentary evidence of any such figure of 6 million. It must have been of the order of 100,000 or more'. In London, perhaps fearful that this might be construed as Holocaust denial, he first denied having said it, but then, having been shown the Canadian court record, he said he had done 'what any scientist would, which is give a lower limit and an upper limit'; thus claiming, however implausibly, the expertise on the subject he had earlier denied he possessed.[70]

Irving's last stand was at Auschwitz, which he insisted was nothing more than a labour camp. More specifically, he nailed his colours to mortuary 1 of crematorium 2. There were other gas chambers at Auschwitz, but this was, according to the expert witness, Professor Van Pelt, the most lethal: about half a million people, virtually all Jews, perished in this building, more than in any other place of its size on earth. Irving denied it was a gas chamber, and, no longer relying on Leuchter, declared he would abandon his legal action if anyone could prove the existence of the holes in the roof through which the pellets of Zyklon-B were allegedly poured.

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[65] *Judgement*, para 3.63.

[66] *Proceedings*, Day 5, pp 5–10; Day 23, pp 15–6; Day 24, pp 160–5, 189–91; Day 19, pp 200–1; Day 25, pp 1–2, 162–3.

[67] *Proceedings*, Day 19, pp 191–2, 199.

[68] *Proceedings*, Day 1, p 12; Day 2, p 232; Day 5, p 138; Day 6, p 81; Day 7, p 90; Day 8, p 161; Day 14, pp 34, 42, 50 & 63.

[69] *Proceedings*, Day 2, pp 130–1

[70] *Proceedings*, Day 19, pp 202–4

The roof is at present in ruins, the building having been blown up by the Nazis ahead of the approaching Russians; whether it ever had chimneys or holes in the roof is now impossible to ascertain visually. Irving produced a photograph taken of the one small section of the roof which is more or less intact, which appeared to show no sign of a hole; but Van Pelt gave credible reasons why that part of the roof would not have had a hole in it. The judge accepted that there are a number of eye-witness accounts and drawings which are mutually corroborative without being cross-contaminated, as well as aerial photographs which, though indistinct and difficult to interpret, are consistent with the existence of small chimneys on the building.[71] Irving rejected all this evidence, declaring the eye-witnesses to be mentally ill or liars and the photographs wrongly interpreted. In his summing up he stated that Van Pelt had accepted that there were no holes in the roof; the judge corrected him, pointing out that all Van Pelt had said was that none were visible in its present ruined state.[72]

Even Irving's harshest critics acknowledge his 'capacity to think on his feet and express himself fluently;'[73] but this very ability sometimes gets him into trouble. While he was arguing that mortuary 1 of crematorium 2 was not a gas chamber, evidence of cyanide deposits within it was produced. This was, Irving promptly said, because it was used for fumigating 'objects or cadavers'. Asked the point of gassing corpses, he said it was to kill the lice that spread the typhus that had caused the deaths. But then he was unable to explain why it should be, when the former mortuary was converted to its new purpose, that the corpse-slide was removed and replaced by steps, down which the corpses would have had to be carried; or why an adjacent undressing-room (*Auskleidekeller*) was necessary; or why it was necessary to fumigate corpses which were then immediately incinerated; or why the concentration of cyanide was lower than that in the acknowledged fumigation rooms (lice needing over twenty times the concentration of cyanide necessary to kill humans); or why a glass spy-hole in the door was necessary if only inanimate objects were gassed; or why the metal grille over the spy-hole was on the inside; or how the fumigant had been introduced into a room with no windows and a gas-tight door, if there were no ducts or holes in the roof, as he claimed.

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[71] *Judgement*, para 13.83.

[72] *Proceedings*, Day 32, pp 161–2.

[73] Dan Jacobson, 'The downfall of David Irving', *Times Literary Supplement*, 21 April 2000, p 12.

Irving also asserted that the room was an air-raid shelter. He explained that the gas-proof doors were in case of gas-bombs; but was unable to provide a rational explanation of why an air-raid shelter should have been situated one and a half miles from the SS barracks; or explain why something as innocuous as an air-raid shelter should have been described as a 'bath-house for special purposes'; or answer any of the other objections to this impromptu theory.[74] In all this flurry of irrelevance, the fact that Irving had not a shred of evidence for either suggestion seems to have passed almost unnoticed.

Judgement

Since Irving has publicly denied the Holocaust on many occasions, often in the most offensive terms,[75] it is difficult to see how he could have hoped to obtain damages for being called a Holocaust denier. He made an attempt to redefine the Holocaust, rejecting 'a systematic programme of exterminating Jews conducted by the Nazi regime' in favour of 'the tragedy that befell the Jewish people during World War II', or even the 'whole of World War II', including deaths by bombing.[76] But there was no ambiguity about what Lipstadt accused him of denying; it would be absurd to suggest she accused him of saying the Second World War had never taken place. He did not apparently expect such searching scrutiny of his writings, and characteristically represented it as part of the international Jewish conspiracy against him:

> the real Defendants in this case are not represented in this court but their presence has been with us throughout like Banquo's ghost … We have them to thank for the spectacle that has been presented in this court room since January. Without their financial assistance, it is unlikely that Mr Rampton and this defence team and his instructing solicitors could have mounted this colossal onslaught on my name.[77]

One has to remind oneself that Irving initiated the case and that his aim was to get Lipstadt's book suppressed.

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[74] *Proceedings*, Day 8, pp 85–8; Day 11, pp 183–6; *Judgement*, paras 7.121–2 & 13.84–6.

[75] *Judgement*, paras 13.92–99.

[76] *Proceedings*, Day 2, pp 153–5.

[77] *Proceedings*, Day 32, p 114. Banquo's ghost appears to be the anti-defamation league of the B'nai Brith.

Having in his own estimation 'run rings round' the expert witnesses and caused them to 'crumble',[78] and having made recommendations for 'when your Lordship comes to consider such things as costs and damages',[79] the judgement must have come as a shock. Mr Justice Gray found that the defence plea of justification succeeded in that

> in numerous respects, Irving has misstated historical evidence; adopted positions which run counter to the weight of the evidence; given credence to unreliable evidence and disregarded or dismissed credible evidence … the effect of what Irving has written has been to portray Hitler in a favourable light and to divert blame from him onto others … I have seen no instance where Irving has misinterpreted the evidence or misstated the facts in a manner which is detrimental to Hitler … [on occasion] Irving's treatment of the historical evidence is so perverse and egregious that it is difficult to accept that it is inadvertence on his part … Irving on occasion applies double standards to the documentary evidence, accepting documents which fit in with his thesis and rejecting those which do not … [and] there is a comparable lack of even-handedness when it comes to Irving's treatment of eye-witnesses.

The judge found significance in Irving's concessions during the trial and in his subsequent retractions. 'Irving's readiness to resile from positions he had adopted in what he has written and said about important aspects of the Holocaust demonstrates his willingness to make assertions about the Nazi era which, as he must appreciate, are irreconcilable with the available evidence.' And he said there was force in the defence's contention that Irving's subsequent retraction of these concessions 'manifests a determination to adhere to his preferred version of history, even if the evidence does not support it'.

The judge found that Irving's pro-Nazi and antisemitic political activities together with his historical falsifications warranted the inference that 'for the most part the falsification of the historical record was deliberate and that Irving was motivated by a desire to present events in a manner consistent with his own ideological beliefs even if that involved distortion and manipulation of historical evidence.'[80]

The judgement was not wholly adverse. Judge Gray stated that 'as a military historian, Irving has much to commend him', mentioning his 'thorough and painstaking research', his discovery and disclosure of new sources of information, his 'unparalleled' knowledge of the Second World War and the 'clear and vivid' style in which he writes. In this, the judge rejected Richard Evans's assessment that he could not be described as a historian at all,[81] and accepted the views of Sir John Keegan and Professor DC Watt, the two witnesses who appeared, albeit under subpoena, for Irving.

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[78] BBC interview with Tim Sebastian, 25 April 2000.

[79] *Proceedings*, Day 32, p 114.

[80] *Judgement*, paras 13.140–13.163.

Keegan stuck to his view that the two outstanding books on the Second World War were Chester Wilmot's *Struggle for Europe*, and David Irving's *Hitler's war*. He described Irving's view that Hitler did not know what was happening to the Jews as perverse and in defiance of reason and common sense, but said that Irving's picture of how Hitler conducted military operations was done extremely well. Watt stated that he had found Irving a very effective scholarly collaborator in bringing out an edition of German documents, and said that in areas where his 'particular political convictions are not involved I am most impressed by the scholarship'.[82]

But what are these areas? Irving's chief political conviction is his admiration for Hitler, the man who lifted up the beaten and humiliated German nation, cured its ills, and restored its self-respect: 'friend of the arts, benefactor of the impoverished, defender of the innocent, persecutor of the delinquent'.[83] Such a conviction impinges on virtually every subject he has written about. His hostile portraits of Churchill and other Allied leaders serve to set up a false moral equivalence between them and Hitler. His gross exaggeration of civilian casualties in Allied bombing raids is explicitly used to palliate Auschwitz.[84] Gordon Craig of Stanford University, whom Evans describes as a 'customarily generous reviewer', comments that Irving accepts 'the Führer's attribution of all military setbacks to the incompetence or disloyalty of the General Staff and the commanding generals, without making any appraisal of Hitler's own deficiencies as a commander'. This surely must raise doubts about Irving's reliability even as a military historian.[85]

Keegan and Watt, like readers generally, probably assume that Irving, while liable to error, makes a genuine attempt to arrive at the truth. Evans has come to the opposite conclusion. He states that Irving has falsified history from the very beginning of his career (his first book was on the bombing of Dresden).

> Not one of his books, speeches or articles, not one paragraph, not one sentence in any of them, can be taken on trust as an accurate representation of its historical subject.

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[81] Evans, *Report*, p 377.

[82] *Proceedings*, Day 7, pp 39–49, Day 16, pp 3–11.

[83] Evans, *Report*, p 105.

[84] Evans, *Report*, p 62.

[85] Evans, *Report*, pp 105–6; and see generally, pp 28–40 & 103–111.

> All of them are completely worthless as history, because Irving cannot be trusted anywhere, in any of them, to give a reliable account of what he is talking or writing about.[86]

The court record and Irving's statements after the trial suggest that he says whatever he thinks he can get away with, and that he is quite impervious to argument. Deborah Lipstadt is surely justified in refusing to debate with him and with Holocaust deniers in general. As in the case of evolution deniers, HIV deniers and spherical-earth-deniers, the opinions of Holocaust deniers are not derived from the evidence and arguments on which they ostensibly rest. As fast as the arguments are knocked away they are replaced by others, while the opinions remain unchanged.

There are legitimate debates about the Holocaust. One such is that between 'intentionalists' and 'functionalists'. The former hold that the Holocaust happened because Hitler was from the first determined to exterminate the Jews, and circumstances provided him with the oppportunity. The latter argue that the racist radicalism of the Nazis generated its own dynamic, and that during the war on the eastern front there was a process of escalation in mind and deed. There is evidence to support both views, and the debate has been fruitful in producing a more nuanced and accurate account.[87] At one time Irving was regarded as having made a contribution to this debate by challenging the tendency to explain everything by reference to the will of Hitler. But any usefulness he might once have had as an irritant and stimulus to research has surely now been exhausted.[88]

Irving accuses academic historians of 'inter-historian incest', meaning that they base their books on each others books. He boasts of not reading books himself but of relying on the original documents.[89] One of the books he has not read is *Mein Kampf*.[90] Reading it might have raised doubts whether it was really true, as he maintains, that Hitler was merely a tactical antisemite, that he lost interest in the subject once he gained power,[91] and thereafter intervened 'on behalf of the

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[86] Evans, *Report*, p 377.

[87] Compare the 'instrumentalist' Lucy Dawidowicz, *The war against the Jews, 1933–45* (Harmondsworth, 1977; first publ London, 1975) with Christopher Browning, *The path to genocide: essays on launching the Final Solution* (New York, 1992), esp chaps 1, 2 & 5, which take account of 'functionalist' arguments.

[88] Evans, *Report*, p 375.

[89] Irving, *Hitler's war*, vol I, p xiii; *Proceedings*, Day 1, p 30; Day 2, p 173; Day 5, p 182; Day 32, pp 77–8; Evans, *Report*, pp 21–2.

[90] *Proceedings,* Day 24, pp 107–8.

[91] *Proceedings*, Day 24, p 101.

Jews rather than against them', being in fact 'the best friend the Jews ever had in the Third Reich'.[92] References to Jews in *Mein Kampf* are replete with the imagery of pollution, vermin and disease. More surprising is the religious language. As one reads the book it becomes increasingly clear that the Jews have taken the place in Hilter's world view occupied in his childhood by the Devil.[93] Hitler's antisemitism was visceral and implacable. Irving seems not to have heard of, let alone read, Ian Kershaw's recent biography of Hitler.[94] From it he might have learned how Hitler came to see Bolshevism as the work of the Jews, and the destruction of both as his life's work.[95] His policy of not reading books has left Irving hugely ill-informed about the nature of Hitler's antisemitism (assuming that he really believes what he says).

Irving has no academic qualifications. Evans argues that this is not sufficient reason for refusing to call a writer a historian, since it is possible to learn the craft on the job.[96] Nevertheless Irving's lack of formal training is possibly of some relevance. His approach to scholarship has a certain similarity to that of his fellow-autodidact, Adolf Hitler. Irving's contempt for academics resembles Hitler's opinion on the 'so-called intelligentsia':

> They have not the faculty of distinguishing between what is useful and useless in a book, so that they may retain the former in their minds and if possible skip over the latter or throw it overboard as useless ballast ... Each little piece of knowledge thus gained must be treated as if it were a little stone to be inserted into a mosaic, so that it finds its proper place among all the other pieces that help to form a general *Weltanschauung* in the brain of the reader.

Alan Bullock comments: 'He had no feeling for literature at all, or interest in books for their own sake, but regarded them solely as a source from which he could extract material that fitted in with views he already held.'[97]

In his approach to history, Irving bears some resemblance to the laymen who confuse archaeology with treasure-hunting. Ignoring the total assemblage of published scholarship, evidence, questions, argument and debate, Irving shovels through the primary sources, retrieving only what he wants to find: 'gems', 'pure gold' 'a nugget', 'embedded in the trivia, like in a goldmine, in the slurry, there are diamonds like this', 'a high level diamond document of unquestioned integrity'.[98] This last is the 'Schlegelberger' note, discussed above. What all these treasures have in common is that they are isolated scraps whose ambiguity facilitates interpretations exculpating Hitler. Irving cautions that 'you have to be very careful before you use the Goebbels diary as pure gold source material. You have to refilter it out of that evil brain',[99] a procedure presumably necessitated by the evil brain's tendency to incriminate Hitler.

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[92] *Proceedings*, Day 21, p 163.

[93] Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans R Manheim, intro D C Watt (London, 1973), esp pp 60, 294, 584–5, 605.

[94] *Proceedings*, Day 3, p 35.

[95] Ian Kershaw, *Hitler, 1889–1936*, vol I, *Hubris* (Penguin, London, 1999) esp pp 151–3, 245–6.

[96] Evans, *Report*, pp 20–1.

[97] Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin*, pp 23–4.

According to Irving, academic historians tell their readers what to think, while he simply provides his readers with the evidence and lets them draw their own conclusions. He describes his practice as:

> just putting the evidence in the pages and not joining up the dots and allowing the reader to do the dot joining for himself. I assume that my readers have a certain degree of intellectual honesty and ability, that they are capable of forming their own conclusions provided I present the evidence to them with as much integrity as possible. Other historians, like no doubt some of the experts in this case, like to join up the dots for you and that is where the mistakes I think creep in.[100]

This sounds reasonable, but what it amounts to in practice is selecting, summarising, paraphrasing and juxtaposing documents in such a way as to nudge the uninformed and unsuspecting reader in a predetermined direction. Explicit argument and analysis enable readers to be on their guard. Often one does not know whether it is Irving's or Hitler's views one is reading. Perhaps it does not make much difference. *Hitler's war* has been described as the autobiography Hitler never wrote. But then it must be read with all the caution that memoirs require, especially the memoirs of someone like Hitler.

Professor Watt commented that not all the writings of some senior academic historians would stand up to the kind of scrutiny to which Irving's have been subjected. He referred to an unnamed historian occupying a post of some importance in the United States who argued that Stalin killed hardly anyone; then the KGB archives were opened, whereupon he hastily changed his views.[101] But at least he changed his views: he did not argue the KGB documents were all forgeries.

Evans refers to a young American Marxist historian whose book, published by Princeton University Press, was initially well received, until it was found to be full of errors, including inaccurate paraphrases masquerading as quotations, omission of words (such as 'not') from quotations, invention of sources and so on. The result was that he was hounded from the historical profession. He later re-entered university employment teaching law, a subject Evans describes as ‘perhaps more comfortable with the manipulation and tendentious interpretation of evidence than history is', a phrase he tactfully omitted from his report to the court.[102] This may be an extreme case, but many less extreme cases might be quoted. Every academic historian is conscious of future referees breathing down his or her neck. Professional writers, dependent on sales, are subject to different pressures, which are not necessarily conducive to accuracy.

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[98] *Proceedings*, Day 2, p 168; Day 3, pp 20, 73, 192, 193; Day 6, p 179; Day 8, pp 25–6; Day 24, p 132.

[99] *Proceedings*, Day 5, p 31.

[100] *Proceedings*, Day 5, p 182. See also Day 4, pp 66 & 79; Day 6, pp 182–4.

[101] *Proceedings*, Day 7, p 49.

Peer review is nowhere more savage than in the field of history. As watchdogs, academic historians seem especially fond of sinking their teeth into each other. Hugh Trevor-Roper was a particularly savage watchdog in his day, which is why the ‘Hitler Diaries' débâcle caused such widespread joy. Richard Evans tried to explain to Irving that peer review and the submission of manuscripts to referees were perfectly normal practices, and that his increasingly bizarre and offensive statements from 1988 made it not at all surprising that reputable publishers had turned their backs on him; but Irving persisted in believing that illegitimate external political pressure had been brought to bear on his former publishers by the international conspiracy against him.[103]

Even within the academy, not all writing about the past is the work of historians. Anthropologists, literary theorists and practitioners of cultural studies follow different rules from those of historians, rules with which historians are often uncomfortable. Some hide beneath the carapace of fashionable theories that there are no rules, often with dismaying results.[104]

Peter Novick considers Deborah Lipstadt an alarmist, arguing that Holocaust denial is confined to a tiny minority, whom he describes (protesting too much, perhaps) as ‘screwballs', ‘cranks', ‘kooks', ‘misfits', 'nuts' and ‘fruitcakes'. But Lipstadt argues that beyond the kooks there is a growing penumbra of well-intentioned but ill-informed people, some influenced by relativist ‘postmodernist' theories, who believe that both sides of every question should be heard, that debate is healthy, and everything is open to debate; and that such people are susceptible to plausibly presented denial theories. Vulgar relativism and vulgar liberalism might both be summed up in Cole Porter's words as 'anything goes'; the result is the vague idea that whether or not the Holocaust ever happened is a legitimate historical debate.[105]

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[102] Richard J Evans, *In defence of history* (London, 1997), pp 116–24; Evans, *Report*, p 376. An account of this affair, by a friend and former teacher of the historian/lawyer in question is in Peter Novick, *That noble dream: the ‘objectivity question' and the American historical question* (Cambridge, 1988), pp 612–621.

[103] *Proceedings*, Day 19, pp 95–7.

[104] See the examples in Evans, *In defence of history*, and especially Keith Windschuttle, *The killing of hHistory: how literary critics and social theorists are murdering our past* (New York, 1997).

Innocent of theory, Irving is one of nature's postmodernists. He uses history to generate a 'knowledge' of the past that sustains his cultural and political values, he treats texts as having no fixed or certain meaning, he reads his own meanings into the documents he uses, and holds that if the orthodox account of the Holocaust is more widely accepted than the revisionist account, this is not because of its greater proximity to the 'truth' or closer conformity to the 'evidence', but because of the massively entrenched financial and ideological power of international Jewry.

Fortunately, there is nothing post modernist about Mr Justice Gray. The defence was obliged to concede that Lipstadt's statements were defamatory. Its plea was justification: that what Lipstadt said about Irving was true and what Irving said about the Holocaust was false. Had the judge believed that there is no such thing as historical truth or objectivity, that there are no grounds to be found in the historical record for preferring one construction of its meaning to another, that meanings are imparted to documents by their readers, and that all meanings are equally valid, the plea of justification would have failed and Irving would have won. This should serve as a salutary warning that however amusing these academic games may be to their practitioners they could have serious consequences in the real world.

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[105] Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American life* (New York, 1999), pp 270–2; Evans, *Defence of history*, pp 238–43. Novick is no doubt correct that student editors who run deniers' advertisements have not read Foucault and Derrida. His statement that they have read Thomas Jefferson and John Stuart Mill is more doubtful. Most probably, like most people, they have absorbed both sets of ideas at tenth-hand.

Kleio 33, 2001

'Only a liberal of high-sounding words?': Margaret Ballinger's liberalism and her relationship with South African liberals, 1926–1968

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In the 1950s young and impatient liberals accused Margaret Ballinger, at that stage South Africa's most prominent liberal, of being too conservative. They accused her of believing that high-sounding words and phrases were sufficient for a person to be a good liberal and opponent of apartheid. This was an ironic turn about: until the 1930s the boot had been on the other foot and it had been Margaret who had accused South African liberalism of the same failings. By an analysis of Margaret's political philosophy and relationship with her fellow liberals this article will explain the complexity and ambiguities of her liberalism, and look at her opposition to racial and political intolerance and oppression in South Africa.

Margaret Ballinger (née Hodgson) was born on 11 January 1894 in Glasgow, Scotland, and in 1904 she emigrated with her parents to South Africa where they settled in Port Elizabeth. Here she spent the last years of her childhood in a politically-conscious family, supportive of Cape liberalism. Its principles of equality before the law, no colour discrimination, political tolerance and the rights of the individual, strongly influenced Margaret's values and gave shape to her political beliefs.[1]

It was, however, Margaret's association with the well-known liberal historian, W M Macmillan, first as a student at Rhodes University and then as a collegue at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), which had the strongest influence on her political ideas and approach. Like Macmillan, she believed that segregation was impractical in twentieth-century South Africa because of the inextricable intertwining of black and white interests.[2] This belief became the crux of Margaret's opposition to segregation and later to apartheid during her parliamentary career as she firmly believed that economics and not race was the most important formative factor in South African history. In addition, she believed that segregation, and later apartheid, were attempts to justify discriminatory domination of the black majority by the white minority and that enforced segregation led to racial tension and hatred.[3] She was to argue that blacks should rather be systematically involved in all aspects of society and not subjected to forced integration. Her solution for South Africa's racial problem was the extension of the colour-blind franchise of the Cape to the rest of the Union.

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[1] R Segal, *Political Africa, a who's who of personalities and parties* (London,1961), p 26; *Sunday Times*, 15 May 1960; *M Ballinger, From union to apartheid: a trek into isolation* (Cape Town, 1969), p 37.

Although she regarded herself a liberal, Margaret, like Macmillan, could more accurately be described as a social democrat in the Fabian mould. Her approach was in line with the Fabian tradition of reconstructing society on socialist lines by means of propaganda, education and negotiation rather than through revolution. She believed that the best way to effect change was through persuasion. Demonstrating one's case with convincing evidence and presenting it in a reasonable and logical manner would persuade others of the need to reform existing institutions. Fabianism complemented Margaret's liberal principles. Its philosophy of an evolutionary process by which the privileged would improve the position of the underprivileged and develop a better society was central to her political principles. This emphasis on society distanced her from the majority of South African liberals whose liberalism remained within the Lockean tradition of restraining government intervention in the actions and rights of the individual. Her social democracy also meant that she was more prepared to advocate state involvement to improve the position of the underprivileged. This placed her to the left of mainstream South African liberalism, and many of her fellow South African liberals regarded her as too radical.

Despite her Fabian leanings, Margaret's liberalism always remained true to its liberal Cape roots. Liberalism in South Africa grew out of nineteenth-century British liberalism. It embraced the principles of parliamentary democracy, freedom of thought and speech, acceptance of the rule of law and the rights of the individual. Enshrined in her liberalism there was the acceptance of a franchise with educational and age qualifications which rejected the colour bar and advocated the principle of equal rights for all civilised men[4]. To Alan Paton these principles could be summarised as

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[2] H Macmillan, 'Paralysed conservatives W M Macmillan the social scientists, and the ''common society'', 1923–1948, Conference to mark the centenary of W M Macmillan Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London), (4–5 October 1985), pp 1,8.

[3] House of Assembly Debates (hereafter Hansard), 31 May 1959, col 7744–7745.

> … a generosity of spirit, a tolerance of others, an attempt to comprehend otherness, a commitment to the rule of law, a high ideal of the worth and dignity of man, a repugnance for authoritarianism and a love of freedom.[5]

These were the principles Margaret grew up with and to which she would remain loyal all her life.

Cape liberalism suffered a serious blow in 1910 when the Union of South Africa did not allow for the extension of the the Cape vote to the northern provinces. Although coloureds and Africans in the Cape Province retained the qualified vote, they lost the right to sit in parliament. After 1910 Cape liberalism steadily lost ground as segregatory laws multiplied and widened the breach between white and black South Africans. There were still parliamentarians, especially in the South African Party and its successor, the United Party (UP), who regarded themselves as liberals and espoused traditional liberal values. But in general their attitude towards Africans was paternalistic and while they continued to insist on fair treatment for Africans and the maintenance of the Cape vote, they did not question the *status quo* of white guardianship. In keeping with their paternalistic viewpoint they saw some aspects of segregation as advantageous to Africans.

A second stream within South African liberalism was characterised by a pragmatic tradition representing itself as the protector or guardian of 'native interests'. Liberals in this category made a thorough study of the needs of Africans and actively attempted to improve their socio-economic position.[6] In order to do so they were prepared to challenge the *status quo* in South Africa. Margaret's liberalism was firmly imbedded in this stream. Yet, as this study will show, it also had unique aspects.

Macmillan's belief that academics should not live in an ivory tower, but also be social critics and even activists, rubbed off on Margaret. From 1926, together with Macmillan, she actively participated in the

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[4] R Davenport, 'The Cape Liberal tradition to 1910' in J Butler, R Elphick and D Welsh (eds), *Democratic liberalism in South Africa its history and prospect* (Cape Town, 1987), pp 21, 26–27; L Marquard, *Liberalism in South Africa* (Johannesburg, pp 22–23.

[5] P Alexander, *Alan Paton* (Oxford, 1994), p 383.

[6] Forum: 'Liberalism in South Africa', *Social Dynamics,* vol 10, no 1 (1948), p 89.

Johannesburg Joint Council of Europeans and Africans (JJC), one of the councils formed after 1921 which worked for improved race relations and African upliftment and had equal membership of Africans and whites. Unlike many other liberals she did not restrict her activities to tea parties and philosophical discussions about race relations, but was actively involved at grassroots level.[7] The fact that she was more than a 'tea-and-sympathy' liberal earned her the respect of Africans and eventually led to her nomination and election as a Native Representative.

Macmillan's opinions meant a great deal to Margaret but, ironically, her support for his views led to a growing conflict between her and the more moderate liberal establishment. This was to bedevil her relationship with the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), the flagship of South African liberalism. The SAIRR was founded in 1929. It was conceived as a non-political research body to investigate all aspects of race relations in a scholarly and 'scientific' way and to educate public opinion in order to root out racial prejudice. The leading figures in its formation were J D Rheinallt Jones, chief organiser of the Joint Council movement, and C T Loram, a prominent educationist who was a broadminded conservative rather than a liberal.[8] He firmly believed that the Institute had to be non-political because a political stance would undermine its attempts to secure 'native betterment'.[9]

Margaret supported Macmillan in his struggle with moderate liberals such as Rheinallt Jones and R F A Hoernlé, a prominent Wits academic, over the role of anthropology in the search for a solution to South Africa's racial problems. There were serious differences between, on the one hand, the so-called 'economic' approach advocated by Macmillan, and on the other, the non-political 'anthropological' approach. To a moderate liberal like Edgar Brookes, Macmillan's economic approach was too simplistic an explanation for South Africa's complex problems and encouraged student radicalism 'with the accent of Moscow'.[10] For his part, Macmillan was critical of the 'paralysing conservatism' of the anthropology adherents and believed that anthropology played dangerously into the hands of those segregationists who denied the common humanity of Africans.[11]

It was, however, differences over the tactics that should be used to oppose segregation that came to classify the anthropology adherents as 'conservative' and Macmillan and his followers as the radical group. Macmillan argued that South African liberals had to take a clear standpoint on the race question; they could not merely be intellectually involved. If, as he believed, South Africa's problems were caused by bad government and administration, then they could be solved through political action by replacing bad laws with better ones. If liberalism was to succeed it had to assert itself in a practical way and the Joint Councils and SAIRR had to take a clear political standpoint against segregation. The SAIRR and the more conservative members of the JJC were not prepared to accede to this.[12]

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[7] *The Forum,* 10 Nov 1950.

[8] E Brookes, *A South African pilgrimage* (Johannesburg, 1977), p 36.

[9] J W Horton, 'South Africa's joint councils: Black-white co-operation between the two world wars', *South African Historical Journal,* (Nov 1972), pp 35, 36, 37.

[10] E H Brookes, *The colour problems of South Africa* (Lovedale, 1934), p 13.

[11] C Saunders, *The making of the South African past: major historians on race and class* (Cape Town, 1988), p 56.

In February 1931 Macmillan became the chairman of the JJC and under his leadership and with Margaret's support the Council took a more assertive stance on racial issues. This led to clashes with conservative white members of the Council.[13]

Pressured by Macmillan Margaret became the secretary of the JJC in 1933. She found the heavy workload untenable and resigned in September 1933. Her position as secretary had not been made easier by the appointment of Advocate Oliver Schreiner (who later became an Appeal Judge), as Macmillan's successor as chairman. His cautious approach had tried her patience badly, she found him 'abysmally conservative and obstinate' and 'terrified of my rashness'. She could not convince him to act more assertively in the JJC policy to improve the position of Africans.[14] Margaret's future husband, William Ballinger, explained her predicament in the following terms: 'The Joint Council movement is steadily becoming a wishy washy, namby pamby social service organisation. Miss H [Margaret] and myself are desolated because we cannot get them to deal with real live issues.'[15]

Margaret was also a severe critic of the SAIRR. Her disapproval stemmed from her concern about the dangers she saw in the social welfare approach of the Institute. At a time when African organisations were moribund or dead, social welfare spoon-fed Africans and failed to teach them to think for themselves. She believed that the only effective counter to white oppression was to rebuild African organisations and provide them with a specific political motive.[16] William claimed that the social workers 'squirmed' under their attacks, but a more realistic Margaret admitted that the 'progressive' liberals were swamped by the weight of conservative and philanthropic opinion.[17]

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[12] W Macmillan, *My South African years* (Cape Town, 1975) pp 214–216 ; H Macmillan, 'Paralysed conservatives', p 19.

[13] University of the Witwatersrand, Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (hereafter ICU), File 3, W Ballinger – Holtby, 9 Sept and 23 Sept 1931; University of the Witwatersrand, Joint Council Records (hereafter JCR), CJ 2.4.1, JJC Minutes, 17 April 1930 and 10 Aug 1931; Rhodes House,Oxford, London Group on African Affairs (hereafter LGAA), Box 1, File 1, W Ballinger-Livie-Noble, 2 May 1932.

[14] ICU, File 3, Margaret-Holtby, 21 June 1933 and Margaret – Leys, 17 July 1933.

[15] LGAA, Box 1, File 1, William – Holtby, 4 Jan 1933.

William Ballinger also contributed to Margaret's estrangement from her fellow liberals. He was a Scottish trade unionist who came to South Africa as advisor to the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU). Because of his poor working-class background and lack of formal education, William had a huge chip on his shoulder.[18] He was always quick to feel that he was being patronised, humoured and marginalised by liberals, whether in the Joint Councils or SAIRR. (Liberals despised him as a not-too-intelligent, boring, quarrelsome person with no social graces.)[19] His differences with Rheinallt Jones, for example, developed into a lifelong vendetta that permanently alienated him from the Institute and strained Margaret's relationship with fellow liberals. Yet while her marriage contributed to her deteriorating relationship with her fellow liberals, it failed to provide her with compensatory support. Ideologically and politically, William was no match for his wife. For Margaret, he was never able to fill the gap left by Macmillan who had left South Africa in 1932.

As result of Macmillan's departure and her rift with the JJC and SAIRR, Margaret's sense of isolation grew more acute. She was depressed by the realisation that there were no organised bodies other than the JJC and the SAIRR with whom she and William could affiliate to oppose racial oppression.[20] By the mid 1930s, Margaret felt isolated, exhausted, politically impotent and depressed about how little she was achieving.[21]

The Ballingers visited Britain in 1934, a visit which led to the formation of the liberal Society of the Friends of Africa (FOA). At a meeting on 27 September 1934 the Ballingers and some of their British supporters formed the committee which established the FOA. Its goal was the encouragement of 'native' development in South Africa, and the dissemination of accurate information and guidance to movements for social, economic and educational progress. Under a new constitution adopted in 1940, the FOA set out to work for the acceptance of a 'Brotherhood of Man' in South Africa hoping to secure the abolition of all discrimination based solely on race or colour, and the improvement of the economic and social conditions of the exploited masses.[22] Margaret and William hoped to use the FOA not only to weaken the SAIRR's monolithic hold on South African liberalism but also to provide a platform for more militant liberals to oppose the *status quo* in South Africa.[23]

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[16] LGAA, Box 1, File 1, MargaretHoltby, 12 Oct 1932.

[17] Hull Central Library, Winifred Holtby collection (hereafter WHC), File 4.12, William – Holtby, 1 March 1933; ICU, file 3, MargaretHoltby, 16 July 1933.

[18] FA Mouton, ' ''A rising councillor'': the origins and making of William Ballinger, 1892–1928', *Kleio,* XXV (1993), pp 7994.

[19] Personal communication with D Haggie, 4 Aug 1986; H Jaff, 7 Aug 1986; P Lewsen, 1 Sept 198; C D Wollheim, 14 Aug 1986 and Alan Paton, 22 Aug 1986.

[20] WHC, file 4.13, Margaret – Leys, 23 Aug 1933 and File 4.12, William – Holtby, 14 Feb 1934.

[21] LGAA, Box 1, File 1, Margaret – Livie-Noble, 21 Dec 1932.

The FOA, however, was unable to compete with the SAIRR and this body continued to dominate South African liberalism. Its dominance made it difficult for the FOA to raise funds or muster support in South Africa and the new organisation also had to contend with white South Africa's innate racism: in 1936 it was evicted from its premises after complaints that too many Africans used the staircase to the office.[24]

In 1937 Margaret sought election as a Native Representative in terms of the Representation of Natives Act (1936) and was elected to the eastern Cape in the House of Assembly where she gained an international reputation as a brilliant parliamentarian and a firm opponent of all forms of political and racial intolerance.

After 1937 Margaret's growing reputation was accompanied by an improvement in her relations with the SAIRR. By May 1942 Margaret, Douglas Buchanan and Donald Molteno, all prominent FOA members, had been elected to the SAIRR's executive committee. Together they attempted to use their position to persuade the Institute to come out clearly against segregation. In January 1943 Buchanan, in his capacity as chairman of the FOA, proposed a union between the Friends and the SAIRR under conditions which would have seen the Institute accepting the FOA's objectives and personnel. He also insisted on the Institute taking an uncompromising political line against segregation. Hoernlé and Rheinallt Jones strongly opposed the proposal as they wanted to maintain the Institute's non-political approach. More importantly they could not face any further dealings with William and amalgamation seemed to imply that this would be the case.[25]

The refusal of the SAIRR to agree to an amalgamation of the two organisations on FOA terms was disastrous for the struggling FOA. Its failure to attract members made it difficult for it to survive.[26] Increasingly it became an organisation in name only and it faded away in the early 1950s.

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[22] University of the Witwatersrand, Ballinger Collection (hereafter BC), F2.5, Constitution of the FOA, 18 April 1941; Creech Jones Collection, Rhodes House, University of Oxford (hereafter CJC), Box 6, File 1, Minutes of meeting held 27 Sept 1934.

[23] PB Rich, *White power and the liberal conscience: racial segregation and South African liberalism* (Johannesburg, 1984), pp 43, 50.

[24] BC, F2.6, William's FOA report, 1 October–31 Dec 1936.

[25] SAIRR, B3.13, The policy of the SAIRR, 5 Jan 1943.

Despite the failure of the FOA, a growing number of liberals were moving in the direction of the same social-democratic views. For example, the Libertas Bond, a Johannesburg liberal society with Margaret a prominent member, was formed in the 1940s with the aim of defending liberty and educating and mobilising public opinion to eliminate poverty, improve the lot of the poor, revise the pass-laws and abolish discriminatory taxes.[27] The movement of liberal opinion towards Margaret's views did not, however, diminish her isolation. Her work as a Native Representative precluded her from involvement with the inner workings of liberal groups, while her status stood her apart from such groupings. Her aloof and reserved personality also made it difficult for liberals outside her circle of friends to like her. They found her formidable and saw her attitude towards them as frigid and surly. As her reputation as South Africa's most prominent liberal and an outstanding parliamentarian grew so she became more arrogant and her 'I know better' attitude antagonised those around her. Despite this, Margaret maintained her association with liberal organisations. She remained a member of the JJC and the SAIRR. Until the pressure of work forced her resignation in October 1944, she was a vice-president of the Campaign for Right and Justice, a left-liberal organisation formed by the Anglican priest Michael Scott to campaign for social, economic, judicial and political reforms in South Africa.

Margaret was also involved in 1938 and 1939 in attempts to form a liberal party under the leadership of Jan Hofmeyr who had left the Cabinet and UP caucus because he disagreed with the party's racial policy. She was part of a deputation that held consultations with Hofmeyr, not because she had a high opinion of his leadership capabilities, but because she regarded it as a 'disagreeble necessity' to start a liberal party. She complained to Macmillan that Hofmeyr was an unknown quantity with a curious sort of conscience that guaranteed nothing. Her scepticism was justified ans nothing further came of the plan to form a party under his leadership.[28]

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[26] BC, F2.2 (File 4), D Buchanan – William, 23 Aug 1946, William – Buchanan, 27 Aug 1946.

[27] A Paton, *Hofmeyr* (Cape Town, 1965), pp 303–304.

[28] Paton, *Hofmey,* pp 297, 304; Ballinger, *From union to apartheid,* p 9; William Macmillan Collection in the possession of Mrs M Macmillan, Dorchester-on-Thames, Margaret – Macmillan, 12 May 1938.

Margaret and Hofmeyr could never see much good in the other. The strained relationship was a carry over from their differences at the time when Hofmeyr was the Wits principal. In contrast to her fellow Native Representatives, Margaret had little time for Hofmeyr, who returned to the Cabinet in September 1939 as Smuts's deputy. Although Hofmeyr was regarded as the most liberal member of the Cabinet, to Margaret he was conservative and she had no confidence in his leadership abilities. She later complained to the UP MP Harry Oppenheimer that Hofmeyr was only a liberal in theory. For his part, Hofmeyr was equally critical of Margaret.[29] In the long run the liberal cause in South Africa suffered through the inability of the country's two most prominent liberal-minded people to rise above their personal differences.

After the UP's defeat in 1948 there was a move to form a more progressive party capable of providing effective opposition to apartheid and pressure was placed on Margaret to take the initiative. Before the election she had not been prepared to contemplate such a step as she had not wanted to undermine the UP's chances of electoral success. Once the party had been defeated, however, she seriously considered the idea.[30] She was not prepared, however, to rush into such a step until she had gauged how much support a liberal party would attract. As her initial findings were discouraging, she decided against the establishment of such a party.[31]

This was the last time Margaret played an active role in efforts to form a liberal party. Thereafter she became opposed to any such party, fearing that without money and an effective party organisation it would be weak and peripheral, unable to achieve anything positive while in the process weakening liberal influence. She believed that liberals would be more effective as a pressure group in the UP, the official parliamentary opposition, and that they should help it win the next election. Despite its numerous shortcomings she still saw the UP as the only moderate alternative to the National Party (NP).

Margaret did, however, agree with a number of liberals to form societies to strengthen liberal principles in South Africa. In 1952 she was a founder member of the Johannesburg Liberal Group (JLG), a study and research group that eschewed political activities.[32] The JLG had an all-white membership and some of its members were anything but liberal. This raised considerable doubts about its credentials in liberal circles.[33] Ironically the wheel had turned the full circle for Margaret and she now supported 'non-political' liberalism which she had previously despised in the SAIRR.

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[29] Personal communication with H Opperheimer, 26 Aug 1986; R M de Villiers, 14 Dec 1986.

[30] University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, Alan Paton Centre, Liberal Party Collection (hereafter LPC), PC 2/2/3, Margaret – P. Brown, 26 Jan 1965.

[31] *Sunday Times,* 10 Sept 1950.

[32] BC, F3.2, Minutes of JLG meeting, 26 Nov 1952.

In its desire to remain an exclusive study group the JLG distanced itself from other liberal groups. When the South African Liberal Association (SALA), a federation of liberal groupings, was formed in Cape Town on 16–17 January 1953 the JLG did not affiliate. Margaret was annoyed to discover afterwards that in her absence the Association had appointed her as its president without her formal permission.[34] The presidency indicated Margaret's continued prestige as a liberal, but in reality she had very little to do with the SALA and attempted to dampen its enthusiasm for the establishment of a liberal party.[35]

The defeat of the UP in the parliamentary election of 1953 reinforced the liberal belief in the need for a liberal party to oppose apartheid unequivocally. Margaret still remained opposed to the concept of such a party and attended the SALA council meeting of 8–9 May 1953 in which the issue was to be discussed so as to oppose any attempt to form a party. She was however confronted with a *fait accompli* when Leslie Rubin, SALA vice-chairman, without Margaret's consultation, released a press statement before the meeting, publicly linking Margaret's name with the formation of a liberal party. This made it very difficult for her as South Africa's foremost liberal to oppose such a party.[36] A liberal party without Margaret Ballinger would have been unthinkable and despite her reservations and misgivings she voted in favour of the resolution.[37]

A further reason for Margaret's decision to support the establishment of a liberal party was her fear that one of the other groups affiliated to SALA would unilaterally form a party. She believed that if a party was formed it was essential that it be a national party, based on the priciples of Cape Liberalism and under moderate leadership.[38]

Despite her reluctance Margaret was elected president and leader of the Liberal Party (LP). Hofmeyr had died in 1948 and she had replaced him in the public mind as the foremost South African liberal in politics. She had come to personify South African liberalism and there was no other person with her stature to lead the party.[39] Margaret had no choice but to accept the leadership although she later complained that she had not joined the liberal party, but that it had joined her.[40]

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[33] LPC, PC 2/2/1/2, O D Wollheim – A Paton, 2 May 1953.

[34] BC, B2.11 (File 1), O D Wollheim – Margaret, 10 April 1953.

[35] BC, F3.2, JLG minutes, 26 April 1953.

[36] University of Cape Town, Leo Marquard Collection, L Marquard – P. Brown, 27 Dec 1964; Personal comunication with W Stanford, 17 Dec 1986; O D Wollheim, 16 Dec 1986; J Gibson, 18 Dec 1986.

[37] LPC, PC 2323, Margaret – Brown, 21 June 1965; P. Lewsen, *Reverberations* (Cape Town, 1996), p 152.

[38] J Robertson, *Liberalism in South Africa* (Oxford, 1971), pp 110–111; M B Gallinger, 'Revival of the liberal tradition', *The Forum,* June 1953.

Margaret regarded the leadership as a burden to be dropped as soon as possible. At the LP's National Committee meeting of 30–31 October 1954 Margaret tendered her resignation, but was persuaded to withdraw it as there was no suitable successor.[41] Her desire to relinquish the leadership, however, was reinforced by growing differences on the franchise and extra-parliamentary question which led to a fierce struggle in the party between the Transvaal 'radicals' and the Cape 'moderates'. The moderates championed a qualified vote because, in keeping with the Cape liberal tradition, they believed that the suffrage was not a right, but was a privilege for which a person had to qualify. The radicals wanted the opposite. They argued that the vote was a basic right and that the qualified franchise was a dead weight for the party in its attempts to attract African support, while leftists used it as a stick to beat the party. Margaret became emotionally involved in the dispute, siding with the Cape liberals.

At the first LP conference in June 1953 the principle of a qualified suffrage was accepted as party policy. This was unacceptable to the younger and more radical members who continued to campaign for a universal franchise.[42] The following year they succeeded when the annual party conference accepted this as part of LP policy. They had to accept a compromise, however; there was first to be a transitional period with a qualified franchise before a universal vote was implemented. Even this was too radical for the moderates who began a campaign to restore the former policy.[43] Margaret, who was not able to attend the conference for health reasons, was upset that the issue had been raised again, but was prepared to accept the compromise as she realised that universal sufferage was ultimately inevitable.[44] To maintain party unity she made it clear that she accepted the compromise and also informed the Cape moderates that she was disturbed at their reluctance to accept it. She pointed out to them that if liberalism was to have a future in South Africa they had to be practical and accept the compromise.[45]

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[39] BC, B2.11 (File 2), Wollheim – provincial chairmen, 26 Nov 1954.

[40] C W M Gell, 'Liberal Party – a reply', *The Forum,* Feb 1956.

[41] BC, B2.11 (File 2), Wollheim – provincial chairmen, 26 Nov 1954; LPC microfilm, roll 4, Wollheim – M Friedman, 11 Nov 1954.

[42] R Vigne, 'The demise of the ''Cape liberal tradition''': on the founding of the Liberal Party of South Africa, South African Historical Society Biennial Conference, Rhodes University, 2–5 July 1995), pp 14–15.

[43] BC, B2.11 (File 2), J Boerne – Margaret, 16 June 1954.

[44] University of the Witwatersrand, Liberal party Collection on microfilm (hereafter LPC Microfilm), roll 3, Gell – Margaret, 4 May 1954.

The franchise compromise did not heal the rifts in the party. Many radicals still wanted an immediate universal franchise without a transitional period. Margaret refused to accept this and she threatened to resign as party leader if it was accepted as official policy. Until 1960 when it became party policy, she doggedly opposed any step in that direction.[46]

Despite her stature and her pragmatic acceptance of the inevitability of universal suffrage, Margaret's support for the moderate wing of the party saw her becoming increasingly unpopular in the party. Her growing unpopularity was also increased by the internal division over the issue of involvement in extra-parliamentary activities. She and other moderates argued that the LP should operate as a conventional political party if they were to persuade whites to oppose apartheid. Margaret never lost hope that the NP could be defeated at the polling booth. As a result, despite the fact that the LP was a non-racial party, she continued to focus her energies on winning over the white population. As a critical Paton pointed out, she wanted to fight for the rights of all men and women, but did not particularly want to have all men and women in the fight.[47]

The more radical LP members realised that the party could never hope to win an all-white election and that they could oppose apartheid more effectively through extra-parliamentary tactics. Margaret was not prepared to employ these means. She feared this could lead to unconstitutional acts and she was suspicious of and antagonistic towards the younger and more radical members who had little patience with the old Cape liberalism. In turn she regarded their activities as detrimental to the LP. Margaret was also worried that the moderates were being forced out of the party. This explains her suspicion of radical attempts to recruit African members because she believed that the radicals would use their presence to gain control of the party. Margaret tried to prevent a radical takeover of the party by taking a strong stand against their activities.[48]

Margaret's growing aversion to the radicals strengthened a realisation that she was moving to the right of the general membership,[49] a fact which could certainly not be expected to endear her to the radicals particularly when seen in conjunction with her intolerant, cool and arrogant attitude towards them. In addition, the radicals come to see her as representing a stultifying and narrow-minded influence that was detrimental to the progress of the party. For example, she supported the decision not to attend the Congress of the People, a mass meeting of anti-apartheid organisations to draw up a freedom charter for South Africa, fearing that the Congress had become a communist front.[50] This decision strained the LP's relationship with the ANC. The radicals also criticised her parliamentary activities as being too conservative. Margaret was thus in the ironic situation, that whereas in the twenties and thirties she had been regarded by fellow liberals as too radical, the a new generation of liberals now regarded her political stance as anachronistic. This criticism and questioning of her liberal *bona fides* by a younger generation dismayed and hurt Margaret. She found it incomprehensible that after years of praise for her work in parliament, she should be criticised by her own party.[51] She complained bitterly to Wollheim that the Party takes the backbone out of me and completely destroys my morale and my will to work for it … I don't owe the party anything except a lot of personal discouragement and belittlement …[52]

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[45] *Ibid,* CPC minutes, 27 July 1954 and 15 Oct 1954.

[46] *The Natal Witness,* 31 Jan 1957; Hansard, 22 Feb 1955, col 1537–1539.

[47] A Paton, *Journey continued* (Cape Town, 1988), p 121.

[48] BC, B2.11 (File 2), H Pittman – Margaret, 16 July 1954.

It was not only the radicals who were unhappy with her leadership. Alan Paton, who had personally never liked her, made his dissatisfaction with her lacklustre leadership very clear:

> I do not like this weak-kneed attitude towards Mrs. Ballinger. … If she does not consider it to be an honour to lead the Party, then I think she should finally decide not to do so. … I represent a very strong section of Party opinion.[53]

On 24 September 1955 Margaret again tendered her resignation as leader of the party. The National Executive Committee accepted her resignation with regret.[54] Yet after the uncertainty of the previous years her replacement by Alan Paton was received by many members with a sense of relief. The radicals obviously felt this way. According to Peter Hjul, a prominent Cape radical, they were tired of moderates who did nothing and believed that playing with high-sounding words and phrases made one a good liberal.[55]

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[49] Borthwick Institute of Historical Research, University of York, Patrick Duncan collection (hereafter PDC), 6.15, Isacowitz – P Duncan, 4 Aug 1955.

[50] D Everatt, ' ''Frankly frightened'': the Liberal Party and the Congress of the People, Paper presented at the Institute for Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University (14 April 1987), P Brown, 'The Liberal Party: a chronology with comment' Liberal Party Workshop: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University, (17–19 July 1985), pp 13–16.

[51] BC, B2.11 (File 3), Wollheim – Margaret, 8 July 1955; LPC microfilm, roll 3, Margaret – Wollheim, 3 July 195?; BC, B2.11 (File 1), Margaret – Isacowitz, 10 Oct 1955.

[52] LPC microfilm, roll 3, Margaret Wollheim, 3 July 1955.

[53] LPC, PC 2/3/1/1, Paton J Boerne, 22 Nov 1954.

[54] Personal communication with O D Wollheim, 16 Dec 1986; LPC microfilm, roll 3, National Committee minutes, 24 Sept 1955.

Despite Margaret's shortcomings, the prestige of her name, and especially her role in maintaining party unity, played a crucial role in the LP's survival in its early years. Her leadership of the party and her continued membership after 1955 had a calming effect on the more conservative members and prevented them from leaving the party. And notwithstanding her alienation from developments within the party she continued to argue the LP had an obligation to its supporters and that it had to be a 'standard to which all good men might repair'.[56]

Margaret's loyalty was severely tested after the 1958 parliamentary election which the NP won with an increased majority and which saw the LP candidates routed. The radicals in the party seized on the result to argue that as the NP would never be defeated in a whites-only election, the party should focus on extra-parliamentary activities and become more militant.[57] The radicals carried the day and the party came out in support of measures such as the boycott of South African products in Britain by anti-apartheid activists. Margaret saw the party's support of foreign pressure against South Africa as shocking and disastrous.[58]

In an attempt to stem the growing radicalism within the party, she arranged a meeting of prominent moderates to discuss ways of countering the growing radicalism in its ranks. The meeting drew up a letter to the party's leadership requesting that the LP strive for a qualified franchise, tone down its extra-parliamentary activities and distance itself from foreign pressure on South Africa. The chairman of the LP, Peter Brown, refused to accept the request.[59] On the contrary, the principle of universal suffrage was accepted as party policy in May 1960. As a result a number of prominent Cape moderates left the LP to join the newly-formed Progressive Party (PP) which supported a qualified suffrage. Brown was sure that Margaret would also leave the party and according to Wollheim she was initially eager to do so.

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[55] LPC, PC 2/11/5/1, P Hjul – Brown, 3 Dec 1956.

[56] LPC microfilm, roll 1, National Executive minutes, 6 June 1955; BC, B2.16.2 (File 8), Paton – Margaret, 27 April 1960.

[57] D Irvine, 'The Liberal Party, 19531968' in *Democratic liberalism in South Africa,* pp 123, 125..

[58] LPC microfilm, roll 5, LP Cape Provincial Congress minutes, 7 Feb 1960; University of Cape Town, Margaret Ballinger Collection, A2.7, Diary 12 Jan 1960.

[59] BC B2.11 (File 4), Wollheim Brown, 3 March 1960, Brown Margaret, 14 March 1960.

She then astonished observers by accepting the new franchise policy and by admitting that a qualified vote did not provide the whole answer for a multi-racial society.[60] She remained a member of the LP, a decision that the party greeted with relief as even the radicals were afraid that her resignation might cause a mass exodus of moderates from the party.

While Margaret's continued membership of the LP was partly the result of her loyalty to the party it was also caused by her view of the PP MPs. Her attitude to them was arrogant and aloof and alienated them from her. Ironically, Dr Jan Steytler, leader of the PP, deliberately distanced the party from her because he felt that she still had a reputation for being too liberal and that this could damage the electoral chances of the PP.[61]

Margaret was eventually forced to leave parliament in 1960 when the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act abolished the Native Representatives. In March 1965 she made a surprise return to active politics when she became chairman of the Cape Provincial Division of the LP. After 1960 she had had very little contact with the party which she continued to regard as too radical. By the mid 1960s, however, the LP was coming under tremendous pressure. Government harrassment, intimidation and the banning without trial, under the Suppression of Communism Act, of numerous leading party figures were all taking their toll on the party. In 1965 the Cape chairman, Barney Zackon, was banned and in desperate need of a person of stature who would not easily be banned, the party turned to Margaret, who accepted the challenge.[62] Her decision to accept the chairmanship was a strong indication of her political courage and loyalty to the principles of liberalism in a period of extreme political intolerance. Her open acceptance of these principles dramatically increased her stature in the party.[63]

Although her post was supposed to be purely nominal, Margaret threw herself into the work.[64] For three difficult years she kept the liberal flag flying, until the party's decision to disband in 1968 rather than to accept the terms of the Prohibition of Political Interference Act which prohibited multi-racial political parties. Although Margaret felt that the disbanding of the LP was a severe setback, she quoted Alan Paton's words that despite South Africa's rejection of the LP it would eventually accept its policies.[65]

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[60] Ballinger, *From union to apartheid,* p. 398.

[61] Personal communication with J Steytler, 30 Dec 1986.

[62] Brown, 'The Liberal Party', p. 60.

[63] MBC, D5.13, E Wentzel – Margaret, 13 March 1965; Personal communication with Peter Brown, 11 Sept 1986.

[64] LPC, PC 2/11/8/2, Cape Provincial Committee, 22 June 1965.

Despite Margaret's numerous disappointments and frustrations with the LP, her association with the party was the highlight of her political career. It epitomised her loyalty to the principles of liberalism. The LP's goal of a non-racial and democratic South Africa was to prove more important to her than her differences with the party. Her critics in the LP appreciated this and Alan Paton summed up the attitude of many party members in the following tribute: 'Some of our more enthusiastic members sometimes exasperated you by their extremism, their unrealism, their utopianism. But they never, and you never doubted, our common devotion to the cause of a non-racial democracy.[66]

Despite Margaret's numerous differences with other liberals she shared with them the belief that South Africa's only salvation was to transform through a gradual constitutional reform process into a just and democratic country. She firmly believed that encouraging uncompromising African militancy could lead to violence and that this would make Africans the victims. She only demanded changes that she believed whites were capable of delivering. The tragedy lay in the fact that whites were not even prepared to listen to these moderate and reasoned challenges.

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[65] MBC, D5.73, M Ballinger, 'The end of the Liberal Party'.

[66] *Contact,* 21 May 1960.

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The Kwa-Ndebele independence issue: a critical appraisal of the crises around independence in Kwa-Ndebele 1982–1989

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Kwa-Ndebele, a small peri-urban settlement about sixty kilometres north-east of Pretoria, was purported to be home for the South Ndebele South Africans. Consistent with the National Party's insistence that the black people are not a homogeneous group, but consist of a number of distinctly separate ethnic minorities, it made sense that in the government's formulation of programmes to regulate racial relations after the Second World War, the ethnic factor should be accorded such significance. It was in recognition of this fact that the government divided the black population into ethnic units, each in its own 'homeland', where it could develop culturally, economically and politically.

During the early stages of separate development, the apartheid ideologues consistently left the South Ndebele out of these emerging plans for an ethnically-partitioned South Africa, in the hope that they would integrate with other ethnic groups until they disappeared.[1] The early 1970s, however, a decision was taken to recognise the South Ndebele as a separate ethnic unit and urgent steps were taken to consolidate the farms around Weltevrede into a homeland. What had changed? The intention of this article is to provide an answer to this question by focusing on the reasons for the establishment of Kwa-Ndebele. It also looks at its failure, in contrast to the success of the former homelands to become independent from South Africa as planned for 11 December 1986.

Given the veritable mountain of literature on apartheid, it is important to note that the impact of apartheid on the Ndebele has not yet been exhaustively analysed by historians and the events of 1986 around the independence issue provide a basis on which such an analysis can best be made. Naturally, the scope of the enquiry does not permit an in-depth study of the historical origins of the Ndebele as an ethnic group; this has been ably done by N J van Warmelo[2], C J van Vuuren[3], and J C Coetzee[4]. However, Coetzee's evaluation is done more from the standpoint of a white South African who, like government statesmen in the mid-1980s, interpreted the influx of people into Kwa-Ndebele as a desire for self-determination and identification with Ndebele nationalism. Such an analysis deliberately chooses to ignore the Ndebele's resentment of the government's policy of ethnic compartmentalisation of South Africa. This article seeks to offer a different viewpoint in that the Ndebele's quest for unity during the period covered in Coetzee's thesis was very different from what the government planned to offer them in 1986, hence the massive uprising against independence. Except for Ritchken's chapter[5] and Derrick Nielsen's seminal paper[6] no other serious attempt to understand the events around the Kwa-Ndebele independence crises has been made. The only detailed study of note around the issue is Colleen McCaul's Study[7] and the Transvaal Rural Action Committee's publication.[8] Yet the two latter works have obvious limitations as historical sources in that they are merely chronological records of the events as they unfolded in Kwa-Ndebele at the time and they do not purport to be scholarly works on the issue. Unlike these, this enquiry seeks to provide a full evaluation of the crises around independence by using other sources which were either ignored by these writers or were not yet available to them.

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[1] *Die Volksblad*, 16 March 1979.

The first major steps for the constitutional development of the homelands came in 1963 when the Transkei was granted a considerable measure of self-government. A short while later, legislative assemblies were established in Kwazulu, Ciskei, Lebowa, Venda, Gazankulu, Bophuthatswana and QwaQwa. Traditional African leaders welcomed the change as they hoped that it would reinforce and rehabilitate tribalism which was in the process of disintegration, and thus restore the power of the chiefs.[9] Significantly missing from the scenario were the homelands for the Swazi and the Ndebele, the satisfaction of whose political aspirations did not seem an urgent matter for the Nationalist government during the early stages of separate develoment. Be that as it may, a brief overview of the history of the Ndebele is crucial to an understanding of their struggle against independence in the mid-1980s.

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[2] N J van Warmelo, *Transvaal Ndebele texts: ethnological publications*, vol 1 (Pretoria, 1930).

[3] C J van Vuuren, 'Ndzundza Ndebele en die Mapochsgrotte', *South African Journal of Ethnology,* 8, 2 (1985).

[4] J C Coetzee, 'Die strewe tot etniese konsolidasie en nasionale selfverwesenliking by die Ndebele van Transvaal' (D Phil thesis, Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education, 1980).

[5] E Ritchken, 'The Kwa-Ndebele struggle against independence', *South African Review,* vol 5 (Johannesburg, 1989).

[6] D Nielsen, ' ''Bringing together that which belongs together'': the establishment of Kwa-Ndebele and the incorporation of Moutse' Seminar paper presented at the University of the Witwatersrand (11 March 1996).

[7] C McCaul, *Satellite in revolt, Kwa-Ndebele: an economic and political profile* (Johannesburg, 1987).

[8] 'Kwa-Ndebele: the struggle against independence' in W Cobbet and R Cohen (eds), *Popular struggles in South Africa* (London, 1988).

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Unlike the Matabele of Mzilikazi who entered the Transvaal in the 19th century at the time of the Mfecane, the South Ndebele, according to a fairly recent study were a 'Nguni-sprekende groep wat moontlik so vroeg as die sestiende eeu in Transvaal gevestig het'.[10] This makes the South Ndebele the earliest Nguni immigrants into the Transvaal. Their earliest settlement was at Emhlangeni near Randfontein, and their first identifiable chief was Mfana, father of Mhlanga. However, those who came to be known as the Transvaal Ndebele are offshoots from a group under chief Musi, the son of chief Mhlanga. Although other accounts mention six sons, the most reliable account maintains that Musi had seven sons, namely Manala, Ndzundza, Mhwaduba, Dlomu, Mthombeni (Kekana), Skosana and Sibasa.[11]

On account of a succession dispute between Manala and Ndzundza, Musi's chiefdom became divided into the Manala and the Ndzundza Ndebele. It is not known for certain what occasioned the division of the other groups. What has been established is that all the branches of the Ndebele suffered heavily at the hands of Mzilikazi during the 1820s. Manala sought refuge at the Wallmansthal mission station, while the Ndzundza regrouped under chief Mapoch, and eventually settled east of the Steelpoort River, where they established themselves as a regional power in the strongholds of KoNomtjharhelo (Mapoch Caves).[12]

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[9] A Rycroft (ed), *Race and the law in South Africa* (Cape Town, 1987), p 29.

[10] F A van Jaarsveld, 'Die Ndzundza-Ndebele en die blankes in Transvaal 1845–1883 (MA dissertation, Rhodes University, 1985), p 246.

[11] C J van Vuuren, 'Die vestigingspatroon van die Suid-Ndebele' (MA dissertation, University of Pretoria, 1983), pp 12–13.

[12] Kwa-Ndebele Monumentekomitee, *The Ndzundza Ndebele and the Mapoch Caves* (Pretoria, 1983), p 34.

Although the Ndzundza were relatively strong, they were overshadowed by the more powerful Pedi kingdom to the north.[13] Though both communities lived fairly peacefully with the Boer Trekkers in the Eastern Transvaal, there were frequent disputes over land, labour and taxes. When Britain annexed the Transvaal in 1877, she immediately set out to break the power of the African chiefdoms in the region. The subsequent defeat of the Pedi in 1879 left the Ndzundza vulnerable as the last obstacle to complete colonial control in the region. When the Transvaal was returned to Boer rule in 1881, the South African Republic (SAR) was determined to end Ndzundza independence.[14] First it demanded that the Ndzundza recognise the white settler's ownership of land, provide labour, pay rent and taxes. It was these demands that the Ndzundza, now led by Chief Nyabela, refused to meet. Secondly, Chief Nyabela's refusal to hand over Chief Mampuru who had sought asylum after the murder of his brother, Chief Sekhukhune, ignited the already volatile situation. In retribution, Sekhukhune's followers and the SAR burghers sieged the Ndzundza stronghold for eight months until starvation led to their surrender.[15] In this way the Ndzundza, like all other African chiefdoms, were defeated and subjugated under white rule.

One of the outcomes of this so-called Mapoch War was the decision taken on 20 July 1883 by the SAR that the Ndebele should be dispersed throughout the Republic to prevent future problems.[16] Consequently, the Ndzundza were distributed amongst the Boer farmers as indentured servants for a period of five years.[17] Because the squatter legislation of 1887 prohibited people from congregating on farms[18] the end of the period of formal indenture in 1888 saw the Ndzundza moving from farm to farm, since no land had been set aside for their settlement. All subsequent Ndebele attempts to forge unity in their ranks in preparation for later recognition as a nation also failed.[19] In 1923 Chief Mayisha Cornelius Mahlangu purchased a farm Weltevreden north-east of Pretoria in the Groblersdal district where he then settled with a section of the Ndebele.[20]

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[13] P Delius, *The land belongs to us: the Pedi polity, the Boers and the British in the nineteenth-century Transvaal* (Johannesburg, 1983), p 24. See also P Delius, 'Abel Erasmus: Power and profit in the eastern Transvaal', in Beinart *et al* (eds), *Putting a plough to the ground: accumulation and dispossession in rural South Africa 1850–1930* (Johannesburg, 1986), p 178.

[14] Delius, *The land belongs to us*, p 178.

[15] For an overview of this so-called 'Mapoch War' see, H P van Coller, 'Mampoer in die stryd om die Bapedi-troon: die Mapoch-oorlog 1882–1883', *Historiese Studies,* 3, 3–4, (OctoberDecember 1942), p 128.

[16] F S Cillie, 'The Mapoch's gronden: an aspect of the poor white question' (MA dissertation, University of Pretoria, 1934), p 3.

[17] Van Vuuren, 'Ndzundza-Ndebele en die Mapochsgrotte', p 44. See also E A Schneider, *Paint, pride and politics: aesthetic and meaning in Transvaal Ndebele wall art* (D Phil thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1986), p 205 and S N Phatlane, 'The history of the Ndzundza Ndebele: a focus on the Mapoch Caves 1840–1979' (BA Hons essay, University of the North, 1988).

[18] Ritchken, 'The Kwa-Ndebele struggle against independence', p 431.

At the close of the 1960s a combination of factors such as increasing in the mechanisation on farms which rendered many farm labourers redundant and youth resistance to farm labour and their demand for access to education, led to the eviction of the Ndebele from farms.[21] Those who were evicted settled in the established homelands of Lebowa and Bophuthatswana, since for the Ndebele there was no demarcated area of settlement. As van Vuuren put it: 'met die inwerkingtreding van die wet op die bevordering van swart selfbestuur is die Suid-Ndebele nie as 'n afsonderlike etniese eenheid aangedui nie'.[22] However, on 22 November 1968 Mapoch accepted recognition of the Ndzundza Tribal Authority within Lebowa.[23] Meanwhile, a number of Ndebele tribal authorities had been established in Bophuthatswana.[24] Representatives of all these tribal authorities started pestering the government to remove them from the jurisdiction of these homelands and to recognise them as a separate group.[25] Although this request was consistent with the government's own policy of ethnic 'balkanisation' of South Africa, its refusal to do this served to confirm the view that the Ndebele were expected to 'disappear' into other ethnic groups.

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Yet in a move which represented a radical change of attitude towards the Ndebele ethnic group, in March 1972 the officials of the Bantu Affairs Department (BAD) met with the leaders of the various Ndebele elites to discuss the possibility of creating a Ndebele homeland. Subsequently, in April 1973, BAD issued final plans for such a homeland to be consolidated in the Weltevreden area.[26] In view of these developments, the surface area of Weltevreden was enlarged by the addition of farms: Kliplaatdrift, Waterval, Pieterskraal, Kameelrivier, Vrieskraal, Mathyszenloop and Valschfontein.[27] On 5 July 1974 the Ndzundza Tribal Authority was elevated to regional authority status. Attempts were made by the Ndzundza elite to include the Manala Tribal Authority into this regional authority and numerous representations were made to the Commissioner of Bantu Affairs to this effect.[28] Consequently, on 7 October 1977 the Ndebele Territorial Authority was established, combining the Ndzundza and Mnyamana Regional Authorities.

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[19] Central Archives Depot (CAD), *Ndzundza-Manala National Association* 11/9/1919 File No 1016/19/f.

[20] D N James, 'Kinship and land in an inter-ethnic rural community' (MA dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, 1987), p 49.

[21] Ritchken, 'The Kwa-Ndebele struggle against independence', p 434.

[22] Van Vuuren, 'Ndzundza-Ndebele en die Mapochsgrotte', p 44.

[23] CAD, Notice no 2143 of 22 November 1968 File 6/1/2/13.

[24] McCaul, *Satellite in revolt*, p 4.

[25] CAD, Memorandum to Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 5/4/70, File No 11/2/2.

[26] South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), *Survey of race relations 1973*, p 152.

Following these developments, the government of Bophuthatswana introduced legislation which compelled everyone within the homeland borders to apply for citizenship or leave the homeland.The citizenship was later used in the allocation of resources and further resulted in a wave of harassment of non-Tswanas within the homeland. As a result, about 10 000 families resettled in the newly created homeland of the Ndebele, albeit for different reasons.[29] On 1 October 1979 the Kwa-Ndebele Legislative Assembly was established in terms of section 1 of the National States Act of 1971 and self-government status was obtained on 1 April 1981. Ironically, the Minister of Cooperation and Development, Dr Piet Koornhof, referred to the many people who were displaced by the government's other policies as well as those who came from Bophuthatswana into Kwa-Ndebele, as people who 'wanted to return to their own home where they felt at home'.[30] As part of the propaganda of the time, in opening the Kwa-Ndebele Legislative Assembly the state president, Marais Viljoen, also referred to the influx of people into Kwa-Ndebele in the late 1970s and early 1980s as the result of a 'surging' nationalism of the Ndebele nation. '… As the flame of nationalism had burned strongly in Africa since the Second World War, how could it be wrong for the government of South Africa to acknowledge the human desire for unfettered freedom …' 'Down the years', the state president continued, 'your people have remained loyal to their language and their culture, thus ensuring that they were not swallowed up by the other black peoples, so that today they can maintain themselves as a nation in its own right with its own territory … Through the large scale migration of your people to their own country, the Ndebele nation is bringing together that which belongs together'.[31] This propaganda that the people who eventually settled in Kwa-Ndebele had actually voted with their feet, was belied by later developments within the homeland when the same people who were supposed to have been motivated by a 'surging' nationalism, refused to accept independence from South Africa.

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[27] McCaul, *Satellite in revolt*, p 5.

[28] CAD, *Letter to Commissioner of Bantu Affairs*, 27/9/74, File 1–12/28, No 1/1/3.

[29] Post, 15 December 1978.

[30] *Hansard*, 21, col 10735 (1983).

[31] *Informa*, September 1981.

By 1981, the very year in which the homeland achieved self-governing status, it became clear that the leadership had already set the territory on the path to independence by signing an agreement with Holiday Inns, promising the company casino rights in an independent Kwa-Ndebele.[32] Although this report was denied by South Africa's commissioner general in Kwa-Ndebele, J H Mills, that as a non-independent homeland Kwa-Ndebele did not have powers to legislate on matters of gambling,[33] the suggestion is at least enough to indicate how early the issue of independence was on the agenda of the territory's leadership. Only a year later the legislative assembly passed a motion requesting the state to prepare Kwa-Ndebele for independence.[34] Despite the reality that Kwa-Ndebele had provided accommodation to many people who had been rendered homeless by various aspects of apartheid and that it had woefully meagre resources, the government was eager to comply, because independence would ensure that the state's responsibility for health care, welfare and social services for this population would be passed on to the new state.

The independence issue inevitably focused attention on conditions in the homeland itself with observers describing them as follows: 'There are few other places in South Africa that are so depressing and dreary as the shanty-covered hills that constitute Kwa-Ndebele. The daily struggle for survival in this stony dry and inhospitable land is exhausting and disspiriting. Life is a never-ending round of work and travel interrupted by a few hours' sleep.'[35] None of the descriptions suggested that Kwa-Ndebele would provide a better alternative to apartheid. As Stultz maintained: 'The most dramatic accomplishment of Transkei independence is that the territory itself has been purged of apartheid regulations ...'[36] In fact, for a successful racial partition, three crucial variables may be suggested, namely physical resources, political consent and actual national liberation. A point of particular interest is that a state resulting from partition should be economically viable in the sense that it should be able to subsist without the aid of the mother state. In short this means that the residents of such a state should be able to work and prosper in the area of their permanent residence.

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[32] *The Star*, 25 February 1981.

[33] SAIRR, *Survey of race relations 1982*, p 433.

[34] *The Sunday Times*, 30 May 1982.

[35] Transvaal Rural Action Committee (TRAC), 'Kwa-Ndebele: the struggle against independence', in Cobbett and Cohen, *Popular struggles in South Africa*, pp 115–116.

[36] N M Stultz, *Transkei's half loaf: race separatism in South Africa* (Cape Town, 1980) p 76.

Admittedly, viability has no generally accepted meaning, but this may be said to mean physical independence, adequate employment options, ability to produce sufficient physical and human capital, enough autonomy to exercise tariff exchange and investment controls and the institutionalised capacity for self-sustained growth.[37] Contrary to these requirements, the following description by Allister Sparks is telling to say the least: 'Kwa-Ndebele was formed by buying 19 white farms, building an instant capital called Siyabuswa, finding a compliant member of the Ndebele tribe named Simon Skosana who was willing to play ball, making him chief minister of a nominated legislative assembly, then on his say so, declaring that the people of Kwa-Ndebele had opted for independence.'[38] This view was also shared by various other newspapers of the time. For instance, shortly after its establishment Kwa-Ndebele was disparaginly referred to as 'the homeland of shattered hopes,'[39] and a land of 'tin huts and hunger'.[40]

From Pretoria's point of view the significance of defining as decolonisation the unfolding of South African race policy toward Africans was that, in justifying this policy at home and overseas, the South African Government could plausibly argue that the test for the policy's sincerity and success ought to be its similarity to the record of various European efforts at decolonisation in Africa and elsewhere. Yet viewed in this light Kwa-Ndebele was still not as worthy a candidate for sovereignty as were Lesotho, Ghana or Nigeria at the time of their independence. For instance, on the basis of the 1980 census, by 1982 Kwa-Ndebele had an estimated official population of 200 000 people.[41] According to a 1984 survey, the year initially earmarked for independence, the number had grown to 261 875 people.[42] Since it has become customary to define and thereby measure the economic development of any country in terms of the number of people employed within its borders, other factors such as higher incomes, more and better health care services, education and training facilities, adequate transport services and other social amenities are also important. Yet judged by these criteria, Kwa-Ndebele was still underdeveloped. According to one report, the territory had virtually no agriculture in 1982.[43] Research done by the Bereau of Economic Research (BENSO) found that in 1981, the year of Kwa-Ndebele self-government, the homeland's agricultural potential was very limited, with only 15% to 20% of the land being arable.[44] In addition, the number of unemployed men between the ages of 18 and 64 had risen from 3 263 of the total population in 1979 to 8 263 of the 1984 population. Only 8% of the economically active people were employed within the homeland's borders while 92% worked outside, predominantly in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) complex into whose regional economy the homeland was tightly woven.[45] Of the average annual per capita income of R341 in 1982, only 12% of this was earned inside the homeland and R50 million of its R69 million budget came from direct South African aid.[46]

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[37] C N Okeke, *Controversial subjects of contemporary international law* (Rotterdam, 1974), p 87.

[38] *The Natal Witness*, 16 January 1986.

[39] *The Star*, 8 December 1980.

[40] *Sunday Express,* 31 May 1981.

[41] SAIRR, *Survey of race relations 1982*, p 396.

[42] Bureau of market research University of South Africa (BMR), *Income and expenditure patterns of households in Kwa-Ndebele, 1984*, Research report no 117 (Pretoria, 1984), p 4.

The integration of the homeland into the PWV labour market, coupled with the government's policy of driving as many blacks as possible away from white areas, created a demand for large scale transportation of commuters to and from work on a regular basis. Consequently, to meet this demand, the government preferred to subsidise these commuters so heavily that it has been argued that the Kwa-Ndebele bus subsidy was actually the government's largest single expense in the development of the homeland, with the subsidy equivalent to R2 000 a year for each commuter[47] being higher than the homeland's actual Gross Domestic Product. 'A negative social investment', says an American journalist Joseph Lelyveld, 'that went up in gas fumes, when it might just as easily have gone into new housing for the same black workers nearer the industrial centres, if that had not violated the apartheid design'.[48] Yet in the economics of apartheid, Pretoria preferred the high cost of subsidising such travel to having more blacks living in urban areas. In the light of these conditions, the prospects for a self-sufficient and independent Kwa-Ndebele were far from rosy and the homeland leadership was well aware of this reality. Therefore, to the homeland leadership it became increasingly clear that in order to realise their objective in spite of opposition by the residents, a strategy would have to be devised. In this case, coercion through vigilantism was the answer to any possible objection to Kwa-Ndebele becoming independent. As chief minister S S Skosana put it 'We started this homeland with only R16.40 in our coffers and 240 Ndebele people, with one school to our credit. We are now able to count our money in millions. I cycled all over getting our people together. Now that we have built expensive schools people want to burn them. Mbokotho will deal with such people.'[49]

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[43] *The Star*, 29 June 1982

[44] *The Star*, 18 September 1985.

[45] BMR, Income and expenditure patterns of households in Kwa-Ndebele, 1984, p 14.

[46] *The Star*, 18 September 1985.

[47] *The Star*, 6 June 1986.

[48] J Lelyveld, *Move your shadow: South Africa black and white*, (Johannesburg, 1986), p 123.

With these words, the chief minister gave sweeping powers to a vigilante group which was masquerading as a cultural organisation. Although according to Skosana 'Mbokotho' was established in 1976 as 'Mabangalala,' when the pupils started challenging the legitimacy of Bantu Education in the aftermath of the Soweto riots, it is self-evident that the organisation was revived as Mbokotho in the mid 1980s with the purpose of stemming out the flood of anti-independence opposition. This growing reliance on illegal methods and the emergence of unofficial organisations alongside the official security structures was a disturbing trend not unique to Kwa-Ndebele. Gazankulu had its own 'Ximoko xa rixaka cultural organisation',[50] Kwazulu had 'Inkatha ye sizwe cultural movement' while Lebowa too had its own 'Thari ya setshaba cultural and liberation movement' which on account of Inkatha's unpopularity among progressive forces, was dubbed Lebowa's own *Inkathari*.[51] Common to all these groupings was that they were built on and maintained by coercion.

Unlike the other organisations, however, it was clear that the establishment of Mbokotho was informed by the preconceived plans for Kwa-Ndebele independence. Because it was clear to Pretoria that bantustan independence in the mid-1980s would not go unchallenged, Mbokotho would serve as an intimidating tool against any form of resistance. With Maqhawe Piet Ntuli as the man in charge of the ministry that issued trading and taxi licences, no one would have his licence approved unless he joined Mbokotho.[52] This factor accounted for the overwhelming support for Mbokotho among business and taxi owners.[53]

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[49] *Pace*, 28 April 1986, p 24. See also *The Sowetan*, 28 January 1986.

[50] SAIRR, *Survey of race relations 1987/88*, p lv.

[51] *The Sowetan*, 4 May 1987.

[52] Interview with P K Mahlangu, 14 May 1997.

[53] *Beeld*, 15 May 1986; *The Argus*, 15 May 1986.

It is impossible to discuss the history of Kwa-Ndebele in the period under review without dealing with the incorporation of Moutse, for this was no less than a *conditio sine qua non* for the independence of that homeland.[54] The Moutse district near Groblersdal was the home to some of the longest established Northern Sotho communities with the Bantoane community, claiming to have resided on the land since 1780.[55] The area comprised 66 000 hactares with a population of more than 120 000 people.[56] According to the 1980 census, 58% of the population was North Sotho, 38% Ndebele and 4% of mixed origin.[57] As a result of the area's early settlement, 53% of the land was held under either individual or communal freehold tenure, while the rest had been trust land since 1921.[58] In terms of separate development, the government recognised three tribal and three community authorities which together constituted the Moutse Regional Authority in 1970.[59] In both language and culture Moutse belonged to the North Sotho group of Lebowa. All its chiefs were North Sothos. Sixteen of the twenty members of the Moutse Regional Authority were Sothos while forty of the district's 46 primary schools used Northern Sotho as their medium of instruction.[60] In the light of the foregoing, it is not surprising that prior to the consolidation proposals of 1975, Moutse had always been included in the government's plans for the Northern Sotho national unit of Lebowa. For instance, it became part of the Lebowa Territorial Authority in 1962 and of the Self-Governing Lebowa Legislative Assembly in 1972, where it had four seats.[61]

In 1979 the South African government, contrary to its initial intentions, recognised the South Ndebele as a national unit also entitled to self-government. Yet it consistently ignored the persistent requests by the Northern Ndebeles to be united with their brethren in the south, claiming that this could not be accomplished without massive population resettlement. But because it wished to become independent, Kwa-Ndebele was given preferential treatment with regard to land allocation when the Commission for Co-operation and Development recommended that, in accordance with the 1975 consolidation proposals, the district of Moutse be excised from Lebowa and be added to Kwa-Ndebele.[62] Amidst widespread opposition to the move, on 24 October 1980 the state president, Marais Viljoen, published Proclamation R210, which officially excised Moutse from Lebowa and provisionally placed it under the Department of Co-operation and Development (DCAD) with effect from 1 November 1980.[63]

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[54] J Dugard, 'The Moutse issue', in G Kruger and P Rainey, *Kwa-Ndebele – the future? Proceedings of a forum organised by lawyers for human rights and held at the Universitry of Pretoria on 16 May 1988* (Pretoria, 1988), p 35.

[55] 'Home sweet home', *Financial Mail*, 99, 11 (14 March 1986), p 69.

[56] J Small and H Winkler, *Botho sechabeng: a feeling of community, a description of forms of tenure in Transvaal rural communities* (Johannesburg, 1992), p 24.

[57] Bothma, *Ethnological report on Moutse*, 25 July 1983.

[58] This refers to land set aside for African settlement in terms of the Land Act of 1913, as amended 1936. It was this act which entrenched the racial division of land in South Africa, and provided the cornerstone of the bantustan system.

[59] RSA, *Government gazette*, no 2909, 30 October 1970.

[60] *Pretoria News*, 10 March 1986.

[61] Small and Winkler: *Botho sechabeng, a feeling of community*, p 27.

Developments elsewhere in South Africa forced the government to take precautions. A 1982 court ruling nullified the excision of the Ingwavuma district of Kwazulu.[64] Aware of the implications that this ruling might have on Moutse, the DCAD introduced legislation which would ensure that the legal standing of the 1980 Proclamation was placed beyond the courts. The Laws on Cooperation and Development Act (Act No 112 of 1983) wrote into law the excision of Moutse from Lebowa. Section 16 of the act which applied retroactively to 1980, removed the Moutse Regional Authority from the scheduled area of the Lebowa Legislative Assembly. Section 17 terminated the representation of Moutse residents in the Lebowa Legislative Assembly. Section 18 deleted Moutse from the schedule to the Lebowa Constitution Proclamation. But sections 17 and 18 only came into effect on 1 January 1986.[65] In this way, Moutse's excision was now *fait accompli*. But as a 'black spot', Moutse soon represented an anomaly for apartheid in that it was a black rural community with some historical claim to land outside the bantustans. To remedy this, on 31 December 1985 the government issued Proclamation R227 which amended schedule 1 of the Kwa-Ndebele Constitution Proclamation R205 of 1979 by adding Moutse to it. Proclamation R228 which came into effect on 1 January 1986 brought into effect sections 17 and 18 of the Laws on Cooperation and Development Amendment Act of 1983.[66] Thus for better or worse the people of Moutse were resettled by the stroke of a legislative pen. As John Dugard put it, 'instead of moving people physically into another inhospitable area against their will, here we find that the inhospitable area is itself moved to them by the device of drawing a boundary ...'[67] According to him, in the same way as many Czechs were forced to become part of Nazi Germany by the incorporation of Sudetenland into Hitler's Germany in the 1930s, so the people of Moutse were forced to become part of Kwa-Ndebele against their will. In the end, the successful legal challenges to this move by the residents had serious political repercussions for apartheid in general and for Kwa-Ndebele in particular.

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[62] *The Citizen*, 4 January 1986.

[63] Small and Winkler, *Botho sechabeng: a feeling of community*, p 27.

[64] R L Abel, *Politics by other means: law in the struggle against apartheid, 1980–1994* (New York, 1995), p 489.

[65] McCaul, *Satellite in revolt*, p 60.

[66] *The Star*, 3 January 1986.

In a bid to give physical effect to the previous day's proclamation which incorporated the area into Kwa-Ndebele, in the early hours of 1 January 1986 Mbokotho invaded Moutse. In this encounter with the resisting residents, many people were abducted while others were killed. Those abducted were taken to Kwa-Ndebele for torture. Overseeing and participating in the vigilante operation was the homeland chief minister S S Skosana and his righthand man Piet Maqhawe Ntuli. Among the reasons for their opposition to incorporation was that the Moutse residents did not want to lose their South African citizenship by falling under a potential independent Kwa-Ndebele.

The legal efforts to contest the excision of Moutse by the Lebowa chief minister Dr C N Phatudi were unsuccesful when both on 28 June and on 3 December 1986 Justice Spoelstra of the Pretoria Supreme Court ruled that if any fundamental rights of the Moutse people to which the applicants had referred had been removed, that had been done by virtue of the 1983 Act of Parliament which legally excised Moutse from Lebowa, and not by the proclamation which incorporated it into Kwa-Ndebele.[68]

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The resistance of the Moutse residents to the incorporation of their area into Kwa-Ndebele was paralleled by the resistance of the Kwa-Ndebele residents to the independence of their homeland. Indeed, these events put Kwa-Ndebele in the spotlight as the death toll increased daily following Mbokotho's determination to crush all opposition.

What ignited the spark was the State President's announcement on 7 May 1986 that Kwa-Ndebele would become independent on 11 December that year.[69] According to the Interior Minister, Maqhawe Piet

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[67] Dugard, 'The Moutse issue', in *Kwa-Ndebele – the future*?, p 40.

[68] *The Weekly Mail,* 11 December 1986.

[69] *Hansard,* vol 14, May 1986, p 51.

Ntuli, there was no need to refer the decision to a popular vote because 'independence was implicit in Kwa-Ndebele's acceptance of self-government'.[70] In the meantime, a delegation of government officials had paid a visit to the 'Republics' of Venda and the Ciskei with the purpose of gaining experience on preparations for independence celebrations.[71] During this time, the Ndzundza royal family was continually being confronted with complaints related to Mbokotho. Though it was part of the traditional leadership that commanded strong support in the region, it had been more and more undermined by the development of more modern kinds of leadership such as bureaucrats who were fairly ambitious. Be that as it may, the royal family was in a good position to mount opposition to the planned independence because it had the capacity to call mass meetings, could meet with the 'comrades', had contacts with the civil service, and also had the necessary authority to meet and make representations to senior South African government and security force members.

On 12 May 1986 the royal family called a mass meeting at the royal kraal, with the view to finding solution to Mbokotho atrocities in the territory. At the political level, the meeting was attended by the Minister of Justice, Law and Order, M F Mahlangu, Minister of Works, K M Mtsweni, and the Minister of Health, Welfare and Pensions, Prince C N Mahlangu. An estimated crowd of 20 000 residents was also in attendance.[72] Among other demands made at the meeting were that Mbokotho should be disbanded, that the independence decision be revoked and the entire cabinet and the Legislative Assembly members should resign.[73] A report-back meeting was scheduled for 14 May 1986, but when that day arrived, the holding of such a meeting was prohibited by the local magistrate J Theron.[74] However, the notice calling off the meeting came too late to deter people from converging in their thousands on the morning of 14 May 1986. Actually there was a spontaneous stay-away on that day as buses were hijacked. Instead of transporting commuters to Pretoria, they were ordered by the masses to turn around and make their way to the royal kraal. According to members of the unrest monitoring group, the meeting which broke up in violent confusion had been peaceful until the South African Defence Force repeatedly fired tear gas and rubber bullets from casspirs and a helicopter which was hovering above the Ndzundza area, to disperse the hitherto unlawful gathering.[75] In the pandemonium that ensued, many people were injured and some lost their lives.[76] This incident fuelled the people's determination to fight Mbokotho and independence to the bitter end. The day was marked by petrol bombing of Mbokotho property as well as government buildings in retaliation to what was perceived as official arrogance in the handling of the independence issue and the Mbokotho violence. In the end, the cost of physical damage to property totalled an estimated R4 million.[77] Gradully, the crisis changed from being anti-Mbokotho in motivation to being anti-independence in essence.

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[70] McCaul, *Satellite in revolt*, p 9.

[71] Report on the Venda and Ciskei visits: recommendations to the chief minister, (1986).

[72] *The Star*, 15 May 1997.

[73] Affidavit by Prince S J Mahlangu, p 5.

[74] *The Star*, 15 May 1986.

In the beginning, comrade resistance movements in Kwa-Ndebele, first to Mbokotho and then to independence, had a narrow social base, in contrast to the resistance movements to apartheid in the townships, that had a strong trade union component. The Ndzundza royal family set in motion a process of consultation with the local population and established village committees throughout the homeland. Together, the committees formed the United Democratic Front (UDF) affiliated Kwa-Ndebele Youth Congress (KWAYCO) under the leadership of Prince S J Mahlangu. This reflects the ambivalent political position of the Ndzundza royal house and the extent to which the excesses of Mbokotho had promoted an unusual alliance between the traditionally conservative leadership, youth and community representatives opposed to independence. What is more, this alliance also loosely embraced some white farmers in the region who resented the incorporation of their land into the bantustan as proposed in the 1983 consolidation proposals.[78]

KWAYCO was an unbrella body with more than 25 youth congresses organised at village level. The structures were rural equivalents of 'street committees' established in the townships. Members of KWAYCO left their homes and operated from the bushes to avoid Mbokotho. But because it had links with the UDF, it represented a serious challenge to Mbokotho's authority and legitimacy. Since the disruption of the meeting on 14 May there had been a spontaneous school boycott in protest against the detention of some pupils. On 2 June KWAYCO also called on the entire Kwa-Ndebele workforce, including the civil service, to a three day stay-away. Though the last constituency to enter the fray, standing in relative isolation from the student body and other extra-parliamentary political formations, the action taken by the civil servants was unprecedented. Their participation in the stayaway substantially broadened both the base and the strength of those opposing independence and raised for the first time the possibility of paralysing the entire administrative apparatus. In response to this, the commissioner general of Kwa-Ndebele issued additional emergency restrictions for the homeland which were amongst the most stringent anywhere in South Africa, with the reasons for detention being especially arbitrary.[79] On 15 July another stay-away was mounted also protesting against the independence issue. About 160 people were reported dead between 12 May and 25 July 1986.[80] In this way, the political activists and the homeland leadership stood adamantly poles apart. Antagonism on both sides grew, attitudes hardened, and an abysmal gulf in mutual trust formed and widened.

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[75] *The Sowetan*, 15 May 1986.

[76] SAIRR, *Survey of race relations 1986*, p 682.

[77] *Rapport*, 18 May 1986.

[78] C Murray, 'Displaced urbanisation: rural slums', in W Beinart and S Dubow (eds), *Segregation and apartheid in twentieth-century South Africa* (London, 1995), p 247.

The usual way to justify the homelands was to deploy an argument frequently used to combat political activity in rural areas, namely to suggest that those who lived in these areas were quite content and that radical agitators from the townships were behind the turmoil. This view accounted for the prohibition of ousiders in the homeland during the unrest period. The result was a news blackout of the independence crisis, with developments in the area channelled through the government's own Bureau for Information. As could be expected from the government-controlled media, there was a deliberate unwillingness to publicise what was in effect a civil war which had erupted in spite of the state of emergency. When the death toll rose dramatically, there was an initial denial of the problem by government officials who together with the police under-reported vigilante killings through the media.

Resorting to force is apt to provoke resistance which may recoil upon the aggressor. On 29 July 1986, Maqhawe Piet Ntuli, the power behind Mbokotho, was killed by a car bomb planted by Gideon Nieuwoudt of the Vlakplaas Security Police.[81] This certainly sounds ironic; that the power behind Mbokotho, the man who was in the forefront of plans to make Kwa-Ndebele independent should be killed by a Vlakplaas security police and therefore put a halt to his efforts to implement the state ideology of 'bantustanisation'. But the man was believed to be a double agent. He was suspected of working for the African National Congress (ANC) and distabilising the homeland in order to make it ungovernable, and therefore not ready for independence. As news of the blast spread, there were widespread celebrations throughout the homeland with the people hoping that with Maqhawe gone, the independence decision would be revoked.

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[79] *Kwa-Ndebele official gazette*, no 45, government notice no 9, 12 August 1986.

[80] McCaul, *Satellite in revolt*, p 93.

[81] South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), *Truth and Reconciliation Commission: special report*, 1997 See S Nuttall and C Coetzee (eds), *Negotiating the past: the making of memory in South Africa* (Cape Town, 1998), p 46.

Ntuli's death was fundamentally important in that it shifted the balance of power in favour of the anti-independence forces. In the first place, it prompted an emergency meeting of the tribal chiefs and the cabinet on 1 August, where for the first time the chiefs spoke unanimously against Mbokotho and less emphatically about independence. An important outcome of the meeting was that a legislative was to be called on 7 August to discuss the unrest situation and the future of Mbokotho. However, the session only took place on 12 August. It was on this occasion that the decision to opt for independence was revoked and Mbokotho outlawed. In the same reaction to Maqhawe's death, the people celebrated and slaughtered cows. For them, it was more than just sacrificial cows that they slaughtered. Pretoria's grand plan to separate South Africa's people had also been well and truly slaughtered.

The banning of Mbokotho and the revocation of the independence decision were fatal blows to Skosana's self-esteem from which he never recovered. In retaliation, Skosana fired Police Commissioner C M van Niekerk, blaming the security forces for Ntuli's murder, and he was also angry that Van Niekerk had refused to arrest Prince James Mahlangu.[82] Van Niekerk was replaced by Brigadier Hertzog Lerm who immediately introduced stringent security measures for the homeland. Meanwhile, Skosana sought legal advice on the way independence had been dropped, arguing that violence in Kwa-Ndebele was part of the unrest throughout South Africa and not attributable to independence. This change of attitude led to a renewed 'spree of arrests' which were obvious signs of his administration's commitment to independence.

In consequence to these new developments, on 17 November Kwa-Ndebele's civil servants mounted their third stay-away in protest against the spate of detentions of their leaders.[83] On the same day of the stay-away, Skosana died of diabetes in the Rand Clinic. And with him died the idea of independence. Or so it seemed.

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[82] *Insig*, December 1989.

[83] SAIRR, *Survey of race relations 1986*, p 692.

The death of Skosana raised three pivotal questions. Firstly, there was the question of his succession, because Kwa-Ndebele now needed someone with the political will to reduce chaos to order. Secondly, what would happen to his renewed quest for independence, as evidenced by his authorisation to detain the royalists? And lastly, what would be the fate of those detained now that he was dead? On 27 November the Legislative Assembly held a special session to appoint a new chief minister. Less than 48 hours before, Prince James Mahlangu, a strong contender for the position, had been released from detention, thus enabling him to stand for the elections. However, the 'people's Prince' lost a secret ballot election by 25 votes to the 41 votes for Majozi George Mahlangu, whose election raised fears of a resurgence of violence because of his association with the slain Mbokotho leader, Maqhawe Piet Ntuli.[84] His election as chief minister was a major *coup* for the pro-independence faction in the Legislative Assembly.

Indeed, nothing illustrated Majozi's lack of political foresight more strikingly than his announcement to pursue the independence ideal of his predecessor. This example of the chief minister's insensitivity to the public mood aroused widespread criticism at a time when public respect for him had already been shaken by revelations that he was the actual mover of the motion that gave birth to Mbokotho. As a prelude to what was up his sleeve, Majozi wasted no time in purging the assembly of all known opponents of independence. During the early months of 1987, as a ploy to downgrade the Ndzundza paramountcy, the Majozi administration spent its energies in a propaganda campaign in which aspersions were cast on the legitimacy of Ndzundza's claims to royal status. At the same time there was an attempt to bring the Manala tribe into the 'pro-independence faction' as well as the attempt to enhance its status in Ndebele politics.[85]

On 7 May 1987, with no visible opposition in the assembly because leaders of the anti-independence lobby were either in jail, on the run or utterly intimidated, the Kwa-Ndebele Legislative Assembly voted to rescind the decision to cancel independence. As could be expected, within 24 hours of the announcement, the anti-independence faction went on the rampage again, destroying both Mbokotho and government property, school buildings and circuit offices. At the same time, thousands of pupils mounted a sponteneous school boycott while many more fled the homeland. Mbokotho's response resulted in the petrol bombing of King Mapoch's kraal and thus the struggle against independence was revived.

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[84] SAIRR, *Survey of race relations 1986*, p 692.

[85] *New Nation*, 21–27 May 1987.

This time Mbokotho, technically disbanded in August 1986, resurfaced in another guise. Large numbers of ex-Mbokotho members were incorporated into the homeland police force as 'kitskonstabels', popularly known in the territory as the 'green beans', a somewhat derogatory term derived from the colour of their uniform. This development only confirmed the suspicion that the police and Mbokotho were one force against the anti-independence group. Forcibly driven from their communities, their possessions burnt, these men could hardly be expected to act as impartial enforcers of the law. This time, now in uniform and equipped with firearms and, as bitter people harbouring grudges against the opponents of independence, it is understandable why the torture and pickhandle beatings of detainees increased so dramatically. They certainly had a vested interest in seeing independence win the day, as it was the shortest path back to restoring their businesses. As Maqhawe Piet Ntuli remarked, 'even the worst idiot knows that his shop will never be rebuilt unless we win.'[86] The incorporation of ex-Mbokotho members into the police force was widely viewed as a diabolic attempt by the homeland leadership to legitimise the vigilantes because the homeland stood to benefit from their violent activity.

Nevertheless, in what could be regarded as a serious turn of the tide against the pro-independence faction, on 9 June 1987, the state president brought to an ubrupt halt the Kwa-Ndebele administration's renewed decision to take the independence option by stating preconditions for such an eventuality. He declared that greater autonomy should be obtained in an orderly fashion and on the basis of the broad support of the population of Kwa-Ndebele. Secondly, the homeland government would have to consider some acceptable method of demonstrating that it had the support of the broad population in its quest for independence.[87]

In a desperate attempt to meet these conditions, Majozi held a series of meetings with taxi owners, businessmen, teachers, *indunas* and civil servants throughout the homeland, following which he hoped to convey to the state president the message that the people of Kwa-Ndebele were in favour of independence. Meanwhile, the opposition was forbidden from holding any such meeting within the homeland.

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[86] Interview with P K Mahlangu, 14 May 1997.

[87] *Pretoria News*, 12 June 1987.

This was correctly interpreted by the anti-independence lobby as an abuse of the emergency regulations. To circumvent the chief minister's emergency powers, they therefore held their own meetings in the neighbouring Moutse.[88] The effectiveness of these efforts was reflected in the subsequent elections which unseated Majozi Mahlangu as chief minister. On 26 October six Kwa-Ndebele women challenged the validity of the 1984 constitution which disenfranchised women. They asked the supreme court for an order declaring invalid the discriminatory provisions of the 1984 constitution, an order setting aside the 1984 elections as well as an order interdicting the 'elected' members of the assembly, including the chief minister, from carrying out any functions of the assembly.[89]

On 20 May 1988 judgement was delivered, when Justice C F Eloff granted an order declaring null and void those provisions of Proclamation R205 of 1979 which excluded women from the right to vote for and to serve in the Kwa-Ndebele Legislative Assembly. He also declared the election of the chief minister (Majozi Mahlangu) and 15 others as members of the Legislative assembly, null and void. At the same time he invalidated the 1984 elections.[90] Indeed this ruling which constituted a major legal setback for the Kwa-Ndebele administration meant in essence that Majozi Mahlangu was unlawfully holding the office of chief minister. The other implication was that the legality of all the actions and decisions taken by the Legislative Assembly since November 1984 was in doubt. Since Majozi had always claimed a mandate to pursue his controversial quest for independence on the basis of the 1984 elections, with this ruling in mind, his dubious mandate was now also suspect.

On 15 September 1988 the South African government decreed that the Kwa-Ndebele Legislative Assembly should dissolve on 7 November and that new elections be held the next day. In this way, Majozi, who was consistently reluctant to submit his pro-independence decision to the will of the people, was forced to hold the elections on 8 November, with disastrous repercussions for his administration. In the election, the anti-independence candidates won all 16 seats, with Headman Matthews Sipho Mahlangu, a political newcomer, defeating Majozi Mahlangu by 6 130 votes to 1 938.[91] Thus the writing was on the wall regarding Kwa-Ndebele's political future, if indeed it had a future. With

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[88] *Interview with P K Mahlangu*, 14 May 1997.

[89] Budlender, 'Constitutional issues in Kwa-Ndebele', in Kruger and Rainey, *Kwa-Ndebele: the future?*, p 94.

[90] Abel, *Politics by other means*, p 447.

[91] *Ibid*, p 479.

Maqhawe Piet Ntuli and Simon Skosana dead, Mbokotho theoretically 'banned' and now with Majozi effectively eliminated by popular vote, the anti-independence factions had reason to celebrate their victory, not only at the polls but, strictly speaking, victory against the state's policy of separate development.

Another blow was in store for the pro-independence faction. On 29 March 1988, the Appellate Division upheld Moutse's excision from Lebowa but invalidated Proclamation R227 of 1985 which incorporated Moutse into Kwa-Ndebele. In issuing the proclamation the state president had, on his own admission, ignored the ethnic factor but had instead incorporated Moutse into Kwa-Ndebele for administrative convenience. He had thus not exercised his powers in accordance with his brief, namely to create *volkseenhede*.[92] In a unanimous decision on the case, declaring that incorporation for the sake of administrative convenience disregarded the ethnic origins of the majority of the inhabitants, Judge Grosskopf said emphatically:

> 'Hier het ons te doen met 'n groot getal Noord-Sothos in 'n vaste en tradisionele woongebied, waarin hulle die meerderheid vorm en waar daar gepoog word om dit by die Suid-Ndebeles se nasionale staat toe te voeg. Dit is gevolglik maklik om tot die gevolgtrekking te kom dat hierdie poging indruis teen die doel waarvoor die grondwet van die nasionale state tot stand gekom het.'[93]

Thus Moutse's case against incorporation into Kwa-Ndebele was won using apartheid logic. Kwa-Ndebele was designated a homeland for 'Ndebeles', yet the 120 000 Moutse residents were mostly North Sothos. There was absolutely no indication that the state president was motivated by the desire to add the Ndebele of Moutse to their brothers in Kwa-Ndebele. Instead the motives were purely administrative. A larger continuous area could be more easily administered than separate areas under different administrations. According to Nielsen, Moutse's incorporation into Kwa-Ndebele 'would have allowed the government the unusual luxury of increasing a homeland's size without having to purchase white farms with attendant fiscal and political costs'.[94] The irony of the case was most strikingly illustrated by a *Sowetan* cartoon which depicted a white judge protecting Moutse women and children from a bearded Majozi.[95] In this way the Verwoerdian ethnic considerations legally negated the move to give geographical substance to Kwa-Ndebele.

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[92] *Beeld*, 30 Maart 1988.

[93] *Ibid*.

[94] Nielsen, 'Bringing together that which belongs together', p 12.

[95] *The Sowetan*, 30 March 1988.

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The incorporation of Moutse into Kwa-Ndebele clearly cut across all the state principles of separate development embodied in legislation since 1959. For instance, the government could not justify the incorporation as a means of uniting the Ndebele minority in Moutse with its Kwa-Ndebele homeland without, at the same time, violating the right of the North Sotho majority to remain in South Africa or to join its homeland of Lebowa. Then, too, South Africa could not abandon the rationale of ethnic homogeneity in favour of geographic contiguity or administrative convenience without betraying grand apartheid in the process. For instance, it promoted grand apartheid as essential to black self-determination on the one hand, and yet it refused to hold a referendum in Moutse about incorporation and in Kwa-Ndebele about independence, on the other. The other irony of the matter is that had the incorporation of Moutse succeeded in terms of government plans, a national state would have come into being with 40% of its citizens not part of an ethnic whole. The establishment of Kwa-Ndebele and the failure to unite all the Ndebeles in it, including the so-called Northern Ndebele resident in Lebowa, defeated the whole purpose of bringing together that which belonged together.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the government insisted on granting greater political autonomy to Kwa-Ndebele in a clear, yet unstated attempt to make Kwa-Ndebele functional to the state's interests. With Kwa-Ndebele as a classical example, it is self-evident that the homelands were increasingly being made to perform a significant secondary function in that during the mid-1980s, much of the opposition and discontent against the prevailing political conditions in South Africa was easily channelled into and against the homeland political structures. As Omer-Cooper puts it, 'The resentment of Africans in the Bantustans themselves would also be directed against their black governments rather than the government of South Africa as a whole'.[96] Undoubtedly, the crises in Kwa-Ndebele had also been in the short interest of the central government because it kept pressure off the central state and it was therefore a great accomplishment that 'comrades' in the bantustan should view Mbokotho as their main enemy rather than the apartheid government in general.

What is clear is that, like the apartheid government which parented it, the Kwa-Ndebele government had a serious legitimacy crisis which could not be addressed unless fundamental black political demands within a greater South Africa were addressed. Instead, the homeland administration addressed this legitimacy crisis from a security perspective and thus perpetuated conflict to the detriment of much-needed development in the area. Its extreme reliance on the vigilantes and the curtailment of political activity have produced a culture of militant anti-independence protest unknown in the history of the bantustans. Closely analysed, the homeland administration viewed its opponents as a security threat and therefore placed excessive reliance on the police to contain this perceived threat. Consequently, the police could rely on executive ratification for their excesses. As Nick de Villiers puts it, 'not only does the tone of the police leadership permit assaults, it positively encourages them'.[97] Generally it is not in the nature of insecure governments to conceptualise the opposition as a consequence of their own lack of credibility, but rather as a consequence of their lack of power. This accounts for the initial unwillingness of the Kwa-Ndebele leadership to deal with Mbokotho related violence through the police. This growing reliance on extra-legal methods and the emergence of unofficial organisations alongside the official security structures was a disturbing trend throughout South Africa during the height of protest against apartheid. According to Hysom, these vigilantes were more suited for the purpose for which they were created and they proved more effective in dealing with popular organisations and progressive individuals than had police repression and detentions. He points out that the police and the army, as organs of the state, were limited by potential publicity and legal considerations in their ability to perpetrate the kind of deliberate terror and violence that was needed to combat popular protests.[98] Thus the vigilantes could act as a surrogate police force unrestrained by legal limits. But be that as it may, Kwa-Ndebele could still not become independent as planned and the intriguing question is, why not?

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[96] J D Omer-Cooper, *History of southern Africa* (London, 1987), p 213.

The central concern of this article is to demonstrate that the struggle against independence in Kwa-Ndebele cannot be separated from the nationwide uprising against apartheid that had been apparent since 1984. By 1986, unlike the case in 1976 when the Transkei became independent, the youth of Kwa-Ndebele had developed a level of resistance to apartheid in general and to the idea of homelands in particular, that was as deeply rooted as the resistance of the youth in South Africa's most troubled townships. The sheer controversy which had surrounded South Africa's policies of partition have inculcated a high level of political awareness even in rural communities. But in Kwa-Ndebele not only have the excesses of Mbokotho increased the degree of politicisation, they have also generated conflict within the once-conservative rural community including the royalists who traditionally might have been allies to the regime.

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[97] N de Villiers, 'Aspects of the role of the police in Kwa-Ndebele', in *Kwa-Ndebele: the future*? p 57.

[98] N Hysom, *Mabangalala: the rise of right-wing vigilantes in South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1986), p 121.

Again the timing for Kwa-Ndebele independence was an important determinant of the outcome. For instance, since 1983 the state had been busy with a process of constitutional restructuring in terms of which homeland administrations were seen rather as integral parts of second-tier than as first-tier governments. In spite of this, the government insisted on Kwa-Ndebele independence because the strategy was to introduce reforms and yet leave apartheid intact. It was hoped that homeland independence would appease certain demands for change on the one hand, and serve as cover for the continuation of white domination on the other. Thus, the people of Kwa-Ndebele resisted independence basically because it lacked the legitimising element of real and material sacrifice on the part of the government. Independence would certainly not lessen the reality of white privilege as well as the political supremacy of all whites in the region, nor would it introduce radical departures from past practice in the allocation of resources. Clearly, the Kwa-Ndebele government was trapped in the homeland framework set by Pretoria and was doomed to a co-optive role which it could not address without negating itself. This explains in part, the reason why the government sought to portray the conflict in this homeland as a power struggle among blacks rather than a liberation struggle against apartheid.

Of all the homelands, Kwa-Ndebele was least viable for independence.It has become customary to define and thereby measure the economic development of a country in terms of the number of people employed within its borders. With regard to Kwa-Ndebele, only 8% of all the economically active people were employed in the homeland and 92% worked outside it, predominantly in the PWV complex into whose regional economy the homeland was tightly woven.[99] Of the average annual per capita income of R341 in 1982, only 12% of this income was earned inside the homeland and R50 million of its R69 million budget came from direct South African aid.[100] This total economic dependence on South Africa implied that a slightest turn of a sleeping elephant in order to make itself comfortable, would annihilate the entire universe of a colony of ants.

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[99] BMR, Income and expenditure patterns of households in Kwa-Ndebele, research report no 117, p 14.

Another reason why Kwa-Ndebele did not become independent is the lack of international recognition of independent bantustans, evidenced by the position of the TBVC states in international politics. While it may be argued that existence of a state is independent of its recognition, since the absence of a birth certificate does not mean that one is not born, it must be acknowledged that recognition does play an important part in establishing the claim to statehood of an entity like the Transkei, that had broken away from another state. As O' Connell puts it, 'existence in fact may be controversial and in the last resort it is recognition which affirmatively answers the question whether the pretender to capacity has the qualifications for it'.[101] For instance it was clear to Kwa-Ndebele residents in 1986 that, unlike the member states of the 'South African Commonwealth,'[102] (TBVC), the member states of the British Commonwealth are fully independent states in every sense. In the field of external affairs, their autonomy is unlimited. They enjoy and exercise extensively the rights of separate legation and negotiation of treaties. They are capable of being subjects of international disputes, and they may be separately or collectively neutrals or belligerents.[103] Because these rights were unheard of in the already independent bantustsans, it is clear that attempts to grant independence to an economically non-viable Kwa-Ndebele in 1986 were governed more by political and administrative expedients than by economic considerations. Be that as it may, if it had ever been born, the 'independent' state of Kwa-Ndebele would have been the bloodiest of apartheid's children.

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[100] *The Star*, 18 September 1985.

[101] D P O' Connell, *International law,* vol 1 (London, 1965), p 140.

[102] G A Craig, *Germany 1865–1945* (Oxford, 1986), p 245.

[103] J G Starke, *International law* (London, 1972), p 124.

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G A Cockrell: Martin Melck (1723–1781)

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Oriëntering

Martin Melck, stamvader van die Melck-familie in Suid-Afrika[1] was een van die invloedrykste figure gedurende die tweede helfte van die 18de eeu aan die Kaap. Hy het in 1746 op 23-jarige leeftyd as Oos-Pruisiese boorling voet aan wal in die Kaap gesit.[2] Op daardie tydstip was die halfwegstasie wat daardie Jan van Riebeeck in 1652 namens die *Vereenighde Oostindische g'octrooijeerde Compagnie* (VOC) in bedryf moes stel, bykans 'n honderd jaar oud.[3] Die halfwegstasie wat aanvanklik as verversingspos en herstelwerf vir die VOC-handelskepe tussen Nederland en die Nabye Ooste[4] sou dien, het teen die helfte van die 18de eeu so ontwikkel dat die aanvraag vir vars proviand vir skeepslui toegeneem het. Om in hierdie aanvraag te voorsien, is sommige Kompanjie-amptenare van hul amptelike verpligtinge vrygestel ten einde as 'vryburgers'[5] koring sowel as groente en vrugte te verbou en met vee te begin boer. Die vryburgers is toegelaat om na behoefte meer grond te bekom, arbeiders[6] op hul plase aan te stel en handel te begin dryf. Hulle is ook mettertyd toegelaat om die pryse van podukte wat hulle aan VOC-skepe voorsien het, met die Kompanjie-owerhede te beding.[7]

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[1] C Pama, *Die Groot Afrikaanse familenaamboek* (Kaapstad, 1983), p 222; W Schmidt, *Der Kulturanteil der Deutschtums um Aufbau des Burenvolkes* (Hannover, 1938), p 38.

[2] J Hoge, 'Personalia of the Germans at the Cape, 1652–1806', *Archives Yearbook of SA History,* (1946), p 265.

[3] C F J Muller, *Vyfhonderd jaar Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedenis* (Pretoria, 1972), p 18.

[4] Die Nabye Ooste (Oos-Indiese eilande soos Banda, Java en die Molukke) was uitsluitlik bekend vir speserye en kosbare handelsartikels soos juwele en kleiner huishoudelike artikels en kledingstowwe. Om hierdie rede het talle Europese lande belang gestel in handelsbande met die Nabye Ooste (vgl E A Walker, *A history of southern Africa* (Cape Town, 1962) pp 22–26: A J H van der Walt, J A Wiid, A L Geyer, (reds) verwerk en bygewerk deur D W Kruger, *Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika* (Kaapstad, 1973), pp 45–46.

[5] P J van der Merwe, *Die trekboer in die geskiedenis van die Kaapkolonie (1657–1842)* (Kaapstad, 1938), p 2.

[6] Swart slawe uit Madagaskar en Oos-Indiese eilande soos Java, Timor en Malakka het as handearbeiders of vakmanne soos wamakers, smede of kuipers op plase gewerk. Blanke knegte is gewoonlik as vakmanne of toesighouers uit die geledere van werknemers van die VOC aangestel. Vgl G A Cockrell, *'Die lewe van Martin Melck 1723–1781'* (MA-verhandeling, Universiteit van Stellenbosch, 1984), pp 21–26, 76–77.)

Die verversingspos was met Melck se koms na die Kaap wesenlik 'n landboukolonie met 'n bevolking wat toenemend 'n selfstandige, selfvoorsienende en onafhanklike bestaan wou voer. Die verbouing van graangewasse, groente- en vrugteboerdery, pluimveeboerdery en klein- en grootveeboerdery het teen 'n snelle tempo begin toeneem. Teen hierdie tyd het gevestigde veeboere hulle reeds in die omgewing oos van die Koue Bokkeveldberge en die Groot Brakrivier bevind. Noordwaarts het talle boere oor die Bergrivier tot in die omgewing van die Olifantsrivier begin trek.[8]

Die herkoms en jeugjare van Martin Melck

Martin Melck (dit is soos hy sy naam geskryf het[9]) se ouers, Georg en Catharina Elizabeth Scholerin, is op 8 Januarie 1714 in die Oos-Pruisiese hawestad, Memel (tans Klaipéda aan die Baltiese oftewel Oossee in Litaue[10]) getroud. Georg en Catharina was woonagtig in Crammeist, 'n voorstad van Memel en die geboortedorp van hul vier seuns van wie twee – Martin en George – aan ons bekend is. Martin is op 20 Oktober 1723 gebore en twee dae daarna in die St Johanneskerk, een van twee Lutherse kerke in Crammeist, gedoop. Georg Melck het ook in die omgang bekend gestaan as 'Jurgen Melck', die Duitse ekwivalent van 'Georg', want in verskeie dokumente – byvoorbeeld 'n testament wat Martin Melck op 12 April 1753 opgestel het, word na sy vader as 'Jurgen'[11] Melck verwys.

Georg Melck was 'n booteienaar in Memel en het passasiers en huishoudelike verbruiksgoedere tussen die Pruisiese hoofstad, Köningsberg (tans die Poolse stad Kaliningrad aan die Baltiese See[12]) en Memel, vervoer. As jong seun het Martin, wat sy vader op menige seetog oor die Koersiese Golf vergesel het, nie net seemansvaardighede by sy vader geleer nie, maar ook hoe om uitgebreide sakebelange te vestig en te bestuur.[13] In sy latere lewe aan die Kaap het die seemanslewe Martin

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[7] Muller, *Vyfhonderd jaar,* pp 41–46, 52–56: Van der Walt, Wiid en Geyer, *Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika,* pp 44–49.

[8] Van der Walt, Wiid, Geyer, *Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika* pp 90–96; R R Sellerman & C de K Fowler, *A Historical atlas 1789–1970 for South African schools* (Cape Town, 1970), p 49.

[9] Pama, *Familienaamboek,* p 222.

[10] A Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution* (London, 1994), pp 60, 94.

[11] Cockrell, *'Melck',* pp 1–3.

[12] Lieven, *Baltic Revolution,* p 94.

[13] H A Kurchat, 'Verslag is Martin Melck namens Memeler Dampfboot', (Memel, 1976), p 2.

Melck baie goed te pas gekom. Dit blyk byvoorbeeld uit die feit dat die Kaapse owerhede hom as die geskikste persoon beskou het om die die *Colebrooke*, 'n Engelse skip wat in 1778 aan die Valsbaaise kus op die rotse geloop het, te berg.[14]

Uit briefwisseling jare later tussen Martin Melck en pastor E F Alberti, Lutherse predikant in Amsterdam, blyk dit dat hy sterk godsdienstig opgevoed is en groot waardering teenoor sy ouers daarvoor uitgespreek het.[15] Melck het ook met 'den diepste eerbied en genegenheid'[16] van die Pruisiese koningshuis gepraat. Hy het selfs 'n swart ebbehout-arend met ivoor-inlegwerk bokant die kaggel in sy woonhuis op Elsenburg naby Stellenbosch laat inbou. Dié wapenskild van die Pruisiese koningshuis het hy altyd met trots aan besoekers getoon.[17]

Op 17 September 1741, op 18-jarige leeftyd, is Melck as leerling van die messelaarsgilde te Riga, geleë aan die kus van Letland, ingeskryf.[18] Volgens Pruisiese wet was Martin in hierdie stadium van sy lewe reeds veronderstel om te kon lees en skryf. Volgens koninklike dekrete tussen 1717–1736 was elke kind tussen 5 en 12 jaar oud veronderstel om elementêre skoolopleiding te ondergaan.[19] Alle getuienis dui daarop dat Melck egter nié kon lees of skryf nie: uit *geen* bron blyk dit byvoorbeeld dat Melck self briewe of verslae geskryf het nie. Uit sy latere korrespondensie met pastor Alberti blyk dit byvoorbeeld dat hy aan 'n persoon sy brief gedikteer en dit daarna slegs in onsamehangende handskrif onderteken het. Sy bewerige en onsamehangende handtekening op hierdie en verskeie ander dokumente toon duidelik dat hy werklik moeisaam geskryf het, moontlik vanweë disleksie. Skout-bynag Stavorinus, 'n wêreldreisiger, het persoonlik by Melck verneem dat hy nie kon lees of skryf nie. In aantekeninge wat hy in 1774 na sy besoek aan Melck gemaak het, voer Stavorinus aan: 'Met dit alles kon deze man noch leezen, noch schrijven, maar een goed geheugen hebbende'.[20]

Martin Melck het na Riga gegaan omdat daar reeds vanaf die 14de eeu gevestigde opleidingsentra vir vakmanne was. Riga was tot die 17de eeu die eiendom van Pruisiese landhere. Duitse handelaars en vakmanne het deur die vorming van vakmangildes en groot korporasies die fondamente gelê vir die ekonomiese opbloei van Riga. Na voltooiing van sy ambag het Melck op 18 Julie 1745 'n getuigskrif van die gildemeesters gevra. Hierin word vermeld dat hy 'n hardwerkende, voorbeeldige en godsdienstige seun was.[21]

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[14] Cape Archival Depository (hierna CAD), Politieke Raad (hierna C) C745 Kaapsche Geschillen, Coenraadz(oon) aan Goewerneur, 12.10.1778, p 72.

[15] Lutherse Kerkargief Kaapstad (hierna LKA), Notules 1776–1780, Melck aan Alberti, 22.5.1776, ongepagineer.

[16] J S Stavorinus, *Reize van Zeeland over de Kaap de Goede Hoop en Batavia naar Samarang* (Leiden, 1793), p 51.

[17] *Ibid,* p 51; J Hoge, 'Personalia', pp 265–266.

[18] Hoge, 'Personalia', p 265.

[19] H Tuttle, *History of Prussia to the accession of Frederick the Great*, vol I, 1134–1749 (Boston 1988), pp 471–477.

[20] Stavorinus, *Reize* p 55.

Aan die begin van 1746 het hy as soldaat in diens van die VOC in Nederland getree. Die motivering vir hierdie stap kon nie met sekerheid vasgestel word nie. Enkele sterk moontlikhede kan egter vermeld word: die VOC was teen die helfte van die 18de eeu 'n magtige ekonomiese krag in die wêreld. As handelsmoondheid het Nederland sedert 1602 (met die stigting van die VOC) sterk handelsmonopolieë oor die wêreld opgebou. Die VOC het ook aan die Kaap belange verkry deur hier in 1652 'n halfwegstasie vir skepe na die Ooste te stig. Van die sleutelkragte wat die VOC-belange hier moes beskerm en uitbrei, was die soldategarnisoene. Veldtogte is gereeld deur agente van die VOC geloods om soldate vir hierdie doel te werf. Die oorgrote meerderheid emigrante wat hulle in die eerste jare aan die Kaap gevestig het, was Duitsers was.[22] Die agteruitgang van Pruise na die Dertigjarige Oorlog in 1648 en die voortdurende militêre botsings met Charles II van Swede het tot gevolg gehad dat baie Duitsers in ander lande 'n heenkome gevind het.[23] Nederland het hierdie emigrante verwelkom, want sy groot en uitgebreide handelsondernemings het meer mense vereis as wat sy eie bevolking kon oplewer. Die Duitsers het gevolglik as soldate by die VOC aangesluit waarvan baie na die Kaap gekom het om hulle later as vryburgers te vestig. Baie Duitsers het ook later aan die Kaap belangrike bevorderingsposte in die staatsdiens beklee. Duitsers, soos J N von Dessin (boekhouer), Jan Hendrik Hop (bekende vryburger en ekspedisieleier), Andreas Horak (landdros te Swellendam) en Jacob van Rheenen (boer), het later bekende figure in die Kaapse geskiedenis geword. In die meeste gevalle is kontak met die moederland behou en kon Duitsers dáár altyd verneem hoe omstandighede aan die Kaap daar uitgesien het.[24]

'n Ander moontlikheid vir Melck se koms na die Kaap is dat die Melck-gesin persoonlike kennisse daar gehad het. Jacob van Rheenen, stamvader van die bekende Van Rheenen-familie in Suid-Afrika, was ook uit Crammeist in Pruise afkomstig. Hy het in 1721 in diens van die VOC getree en dieselfde jaar na die Kaap geëmigreer. In 1725 het hy vryburger geword en in die daaropvolgende dekades het hy en sy seuns 'n leidende rol op politieke en ekonomiese gebied in die Kaapse samelewing gespeel. As in ag geneem word dat Crammeist teen 1730 net 26 huiseienaars gehad het, is dit hoogs waarskynlik dat Martin se vader, Georg Melck, en Jacob van Rheenen mekaar geken het. Vir 'n ondernemende jong man, soos Martin Melck hom later self sou bewys, was die relatiewe voorspoed van verskeie Duitsers aan die Kaap waarskynlik 'n groot aansporing om via die VOC na die Kaap te kom.[25]

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[21] J Hoge, 'Personalia', p 165.

[22] Pama, *Familienaamboek,.* pp 9–10.

[23] C J H Hayes, M W Baldwin, C W Cole, *History of western civilization* (London, 1970), pp 435–436.

[24] Cockrell, *'Melck',* pp 12–13.

'n Verdere moontlike rede wat aangevoer kan word, is die oorlogstoestande in Europa wat Pruise sedert 1740 'n groot verlies aan geld en menselewens gekos het. Vanweë 'n geskil oor Silesië het Frederick die Grote, die Pruisiese koning, kort na sy bewindsaanvaarding (1740) in 'n oorlog met Oostenryk betrokke geraak. Hierdie oorlog het met tussenposes tot 1745 voortgeduur en was die oorsaak van skrikwekkende terugslae op finansiële en maatskaplike gebied. Frederick die Grote wou geen buitelandse lenings aangaan nie en gevolglik moes die Pruisiese volk lywige bydraes tot die staatskas in die vorm van skenkings en verhoogde belastings maak. Hoewel die koning sedert 1745 met 'n grootskaalse heropbou begin het, het die Silesiese oorloë ontwikkeling in Pruise baie gestrem. Die na-oorlogse probleme van Pruise het daartoe bygedra dat baie Duitsers na werkgeleenthede buite Pruise gesoek het.[26] Melck se koms na Suid-Afrika lê dus nie opgesluit in 'n enkele rede nie, maar kan moontlik aan 'n kombinasie van faktore toegeskryf word.

Die koms na die Kaap

Omdat die VOC self verantwoordelik was vir die beskerming van sy belange oorsee, was daar altyd 'n groot getal soldate wat die VOC-eiendom oorsee beskerm het. Gedurende die 18de eeu het die Kaapse garnisoen uit ongeveer 200 manskappe bestaan.[27]

Soos talle ander Duitse jong mans op soek na geleenthede om 'n selfstandige bestaan te voer, het ook Melck gesoek na geleenthede om homself na sy ideale en talente uit te leef. Jong Duitsers is dan ook aangespoor om weë en middele te soek wat hul toekoms sonder erge hindernisse kon waarborg. Melck het gevolglik in 1745 as 'n soldaat met 'n salaris van 9 gulden per maand by die VOC aangesluit. Vergeleke met die salarisse en betiteling van die skeepslui per skip, het 'n soldaat 'n ondergeskikte posisie beklee.[28] Van die vyf range wat daar was, was Martin as soldaat byvoorbeeld tweede laaste in rangorde. Die bemanning van elke skip het gewissel van 280 tot 300 man. Die kaptein, die bevelvoerder van die skip, het 50 tot 80 gulden per maand ontvang.[29] Salarisgewys het die soldaat dieselfde as 'n onervare matroos ontvang. Stavorinus het Melck inderdaad beskryf as 'n man wat 'in eene geringe kwaliteit' na die Kaap gekom het.

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[25] Kurchat, 'Verslag', pp 2–3.

[26] Tuttle, *Prussia,* Vol I, pp 402–410.

[27] O F Mentzel, *A geographical and Togographical description of the Cape of Good Hope,* vol II 1725–1780, translated by H T Mandelbrote (Cape Town 1947), pp 31–32.

Op 21 April 1746 het Melck as 'n VOC-soldaat met die *Slot van Capelle* onder aanvoering van kaptein Pieter Jelleszoon uit die hawe van Texel na die Kaap vertrek,[30] en op Dinsdag, 26 Julie 1746, kon die *skip* Simonsbaai binnevaar. Tydens die reis van meer as drie maande is ses manskappe oorlede. Met die aankoms in Simonsbaai was daar nog ses manskappe wat sodanig siek was dat hulle nie in staat was om te werk nie. Die 23-jarige Martin Melck was een van tien bemanningslede wat nie bestem was om die reis na Batavia voort te sit nie, maar sou aan die Kaap agterbly. Waarskynlik het hy self daarvoor gevra óf ander kennisse soos die Van Rheenens het vir hom voorspraak gemaak.[31]

Op 5 Augustus 1746 het die *Slot van Capelle* opdrag van goewerneur Swellengrebel gekry om met die eerste geskikte wind sy reis na Batavia voort te sit. Dit blyk dat Melck op dié dag formeel aan land gegaan het, want op dieselfde dag het hy ook sy salaris van 31 gulden en 10 stuiwers vir die 3½ maande ter see ontvang. Melck is dadelik by een van die kompanies onder bevel van ene majoor Meynertzhagen ingedeel.[32]

Om Melck se weë verder te begryp, is dit belangrik om 'n idee te vorm van die algemene militêre opset aan die Kaap gedurende die 18de eeu. Die kompanies was verantwoordelik vir die beveiliging van die Kaap onder meer deur die permanente bemanning van die Kompanjie-wagposte. Aangesien die Kaapse garnisoen slegs 'n vasgestelde aantal soldate nodig gehad het, het dit dikwels gebeur dat daar 'n sekere getal surplus soldate was. Hoewel hierdie soldate steeds in hulle onderskeie kompanies moes bly, is hulle deur die betrokke kompanie aan sakemanne of boere teen 'n vasgestelde salaris as knegte oftewel

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[28] *Ibid,* p 54.
[29] *Ibid,* p 54.
[30] CAD, C531 Uitgaande Brieven, 5.8.1746, p 480.
[31] CAD, C620 Daghregister, 12.7.1746, p 231, CAD, C531 Uitgaande Brieven, 5.8.1746, p 480.
[32] J Hoge, 'Martin Melck', *Tydskrif vir Wetenskap en Kuns** (1934), p 199.

päsgangers verhuur. Daarbenewens het dergelike soldate stééds elkeen 'n salaris van 9 gulden per maand ontvang. Soldate wat oor 'n redelike skolastiese opvoeding of ambagskwalifikasie beskik het, is deur hierdie stelsel bevoordeel, want hulle werkgewer kon hulle funksioneel aanwend en is die werkgewer ook toegelaat om sy huurling ekstra te betaal. Hierdie *päsgangers* het die voorreg gehad om te kies waar hulle graag wou werk. Omdat die *päsgangers* klaarblyklik onder gunstiger omstandighede hul werk as garnisoensoldate verrig het, was hulle verplig om vir dié vergunning 'n bedrag van 12 gulden van hul privaatverdienste aan die Kompanjie af te staan. Hierdie geld is maandeliks as bonus verdeel onder die soldate wat aktiewe diens by die kasteel en onderskeie wagposte gedoen het. In die praktyk het die *päsganger* dus sy bykomende salaris (wat nooit minder as 12 gulden 'n maand was nie) net so aan die Kompanjie afgestaan en van sy soldy gelewe. Sommige soldate het meer as 12 gulden van sy werkgewer ontvang, en kon dus die ekstra verdienste in sak steek. Die *päsganger* se eerste belange het egter by die Kompanjie gelê, en daarom moes hy hom ook te eniger tyd gereed hou om vir aktiewe diens (bv. oorlogstyd) opgeroep te word.[33]

As vakkundige het Melck die geleentheid benut om hom as *päsganger* op plase beskikbaar te stel. Afgesien van sy kennis van messelwerk, het hy ook kennis van verwante bedrywe, soos steenbakkery en kalkbrandery, gehad.[34]

Melck se eerste burgelike werkgewer was J P Giebelaar, 'n Duitser uit Nassau-Dillenburg en vooruitstrewende boer in die Stellenbosch-distrik. Giebelaar het waarskynlik soveel moontlikhede in Melck gesien dat hy hom as meesterkneg (plaasvoorman) aangestel het.[35] Hoewel geen kontrak tussen Melck en Giebelaar gevind kon word nie, dui 'n dokument van September 1746 aan dat hy reeds kort na sy aankoms aan die Kaap by Giebelaar op die plaas begin werk het. Daarna toon 'n betaalstaat van 'n silwermyn waarin Giebelaar (en selfs die Kompanjie) 'n aandeel gehad het dat Melck by die silwermyn begin werk het. Melck se naam verskyn eerstens as een van agt 'militaire' wat elk 4 riksdaalders en 6 stuiwers vir hul werk gedurende September by die myn ontvang het. Tweedens verskyn Melck se naam in 'n nota in die kantlyn wat aandui dat 'Marten Melcke [sic] gaat ondre ult[imo] deeser van het werk [by die silwermyn] af en weer na Giebelaar toe'.[36] Dit was juis Melck met sy kennis van die morfologie van grond wat die sogenaamde 'ertslagen' van silwer naby Stellenbosch met sy werksaamhede aldaar in twyfel begin trek het. Die eienaar van die myn, ene Muller, is 'n jaar later as 'n bedrieër deur Melck aan die kaak gestel, want daar is bevind dat die 'erts' nooit silwerneerslae bevat het nie, maar bloot 'n minderwaardige soort klip wat na silwer gelyk het. Muller is in 1748 deur die direkteure (aandeelhouers) voor die hof gedaag en daar is bevind dat hy slegs vinnig wou geld maak en dan verdwyn. Hy is daarna permanent uit die Kaap verban.[37]

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[33] Cockrell, *'Melck'*, pp 21–22.

[34] CAD, C43 Resolutien, 23.10.1751, p 23.

[35] Hoge, 'Martin Melck', p 129.

[36] CAD, C730, Werksaamhede by die Simonsbergmyne, 30.9.1746, p 160.

Giebelaar is vroeg in 1747 oorlede, waarna Melck hom by een van die aandeelhouers in die 'silwermyn', Jacob Cloete aangesluit het. Cloete het Melck teen 12 gulden (ongeveer 14 sent) per maand gehuur en van 'spijs, drank en goeie huijsvesting' voorsien.[38] Giebelaar én Cloete het Melck toegelaat om op eie inisiatief kalkoonde te bou en 'n kalkbrandery te begin. Hierdie kalkklip het Melck in die omgewing van Stellenbosch en die Strand gekry. Daarna is die kalk in klei-oonde gebak, fyngemaal en aan burgers verkoop om hul huise en ander geboue mee af te wit.[39] Sedert 1748 het Melck in sy private hoedanigheid ook kalk en bakstene aan die Kompanjie verkoop. Met hierdie kalk en bakstene is die Stellenbosse Drostdy en 'n watermeul op Stellenbosch gebou.[40] Tussen 1749 en 1753 het Melck 69% van alle stene en 92% van alle kalk aan die Stellenbosse owerhede voorsien waarvoor hy meer as 4000 gulden ontvang het. Met die geld het hy vir hom twee plase, Aan't Pad en Watergang, van Nicolaas Vlok gekoop.

Vanweë sy relatief groeiende selfstandigheid en vinniger opgang as enige ander ondernemende soldate het hy in 1748 verklaar dat hy graag 'n Kaapse vryburger wou word. Toe hy in 1750 by die Kompanjie aansoek doen, het hy gemeld dat hy 'thans vermeynd onder Godes Zorgen en genoegzaam in staat is om zij buiten den dienste van der Edele Compangnie op een eerlijke en betamelike wyse te erneern'.[41] Op 4 Mei 1750 is hy gevolglik in die vryburgersrol van Stellenbosch ingeskryf.[42]

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[37] D A Kotze, *'Nederlandse belangstelling in die mineralebronne van suidelike Afrika'* (MA-verhandeling, Universiteit van Stellenbosch, 1947), pp 229–239.

[38] CAD, C653,Raad van Justisie (hierna CJ) 2890, Contracten, 20.12.1747, p 84.

[39] CAD, C653, Daghregister van Stellenbosch en Drakenstein,1746–1750, 15.7.1749, p 695.

[40] *Ibid*, 15.7.1749, p 695; 10.10.1749, p 743; 9.3.1750, p 770; 18.10.1751, p 25; 24.4.1752, p 42; 21.10.1752, p 771; 21.1.1753, p 112.

[41] CAD, C249, Requesten en Nominatien, 1750, p 198.

[42] Hoge, 'Personalia', p 765.

Melck word grootboer

Nadat Melck vryburger geword het, het hy met Anna Margaretha Hop, weduwee van sy vorige werkgewer, J P Giebelaar, en die dogter van 'n invloedryke boer, Jan Hop, getrou.[43] As gevolg van sy huwelik met Anna Hop het hy nie net by 'n invloedryke familie ingeskakel nie, maar ook Elsenburg (110 morg, ongeveer 100 hektaar) en Muldersvlei (40 morg, ongeveer 35 hektaar) ryker geword. Elsenburg het destyds, slegs uit die noordelike gedeelte van die oorspronklike plaas wat aan Simon van der Stel behoort het, bestaan.[44] Dit was 'n deel van Elsenburg wat aan Samuel Elsevier, sekundus van Simon van der Stel, behoort het.[45] In 1754 het Melck die aangrensende stuk grond (die suidelike deel van die oorspronklike Elsenburg) van ongeveer 92 morg by die bestaande Elsenburg gevoeg deur dit by J B Hoffman vir 5 000 gulden kontant te koop.[46]

Deur sy huwelik met Anna Margaretha Hop het Melck 'n welvarende man geword. Tog het hierdie skielike voorspoed besondere eise ten opsigte van goeie voorspoed landboubestuur en eiendomsontwikkeling gestel: iets waarvoor Melck met sy gesonde sakevernuf kans gesien het. Hoewel hy sy slawegetal (15 slawe) in 1752 dieselfde as in 1753 was, het sy getal wingerdstokke tussen 1752 en 1753 bykans drievoudig tot 23 000 toegneem. In 1754 het hy reeds 60 000 wingerdstokke aangeplant. Intussen het hy sy veestapel ook stadigaan laat uitbrei.[47]

Omdat hy hom aanvanklik op wingerdbou toegespits het, het hy tussen 1754 en 1770 verskeie plase in die omgewing van Stellenbosch gekoop – en soms weer verkoop. Op 25 April 1754 het hy Aan 't Pad en Watergang aan Nicolaas Vlok terugverkoop en die plaas Koelenhof (60 morg) en 'n aangrensende stuk grond uit die boedel van ene Van der Lith gekoop.[48] Omdat Elsenburg die eintlike Melck-standplaas in die omgewing van Stellenbosch was, het hy in die 60er jare talle plase soos Paarde Valleij, Driesprong, Kleijgat , Uitkyk en De Laaste Gift in die omgewing van Stellenbosch gekoop. Dit blyk dus dat hy sy wingerdboerdery wou konsolideer.[49]

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43 Argief van die Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk (hierna NGKA) G2/7/1, Stellenbosse huweliksregister, 1700–1843, ongepagineer; Masters Office and Orphan Chamber (hierna MOOC) 7/1/23, Testament: Melck 12.4.1753, ongepagineer.

44 Aktekantoor, Kaapstad (hierna AK), Transportaktes (hierna T) T290, 22.9.1752, ongepagineer. 45 *Ibid,* ongepagineer.

45 *Ibid,* ongepagineer.

46 AK, T3060, Transportaktes, 2.2.1754, ongepagineer.

47 AK, Opgaafrolle (hierna J) 188 van Stellenbosch en Drakenstein, 1753, p 71.

48 AK, T3060, 2.2.1754, ongepagineer.

49 AK, J197, 1754–1756, ongepagineer.



Kersefontein in 1779, onderskeidelik vanuit die ooste (bo) en vanuit die weste (onder) gesien. Die bewoording soos dit op die sketse van Gordon verskyn lui soos volg: Bo: 'Bergrivier Plaats van M Melck vanuit de Oost zijde gesien'. Onder: 'Vanuit de West zijde gesien'

Bron: *Gordon atlas,* deel II, 1779 (Rijksmuseum Amsterdam), ongepagineerd.

Benewens die aansienlike aantal plase het hy ook 'n groot getal eiendomme in Kaapstad besit. Buiten die aantal pakhuise (store) wat hy besit het, het hy ook in die vroeg 70er jare 3 huise in Kaapstad gehad. Sy omvangryke wynboerdery het meegebring dat hy die wynpagregte in die omgewing van Kaapstad bekom het. Dit beteken dat Melck die alleenreg gehad het om wyn by die kleinmaat, dit wil sê hoeveelhede van minder as 'n halfaam (ongeveer 5 liter) te mag verkoop. Sy wynpagregte het gestrek vanaf die oewer van die Bloemrivier (die huidige Woodstock) tot by Soutrivier.[50]

Stavorinus het in 1774 Elsenburg 'die van verre, en zelfs van naby als een dorp'[51] beskryf. In die huis self was byvoorbeeld skilderye, portrette en spieëls met vergulde rame. Silverware was in oorvloed. Uit 'n inventaris wat in 1781 opgestel is, was daar byvoorbeeld verskeie soorte materiaal, 1 200 pond suiker, 201 komberse, 1 044 pond seep, 280 mud saadkoring en talle wa-toebehore soos 1 558 waspeke. Hy het ook goed vir sy plaasarbeiders gesorg. 'n Interessante feit is dat hy slegs Duitsers as plaasvoormanne aangestel het. Op Elsenburg het hy ook sy eie meulhuis gehad waar hy koring vir mense gemaal het. Hy het self gemeld dat dit nie ekonomies was om koring op Stellenbosch te laat maal nie. Die meul is aangedryf deur 'n kanaal wat naby die huis verbygevloei het.[52]

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[50] Cockrell, *'Melck',* pp 48–53.

[51] Stavorinus, *Reize,* p 51.

Baie van Melck se plaasvoormanne en knegte was gespesialiseerde mense. So byvoorbeeld het hy 'n kuiper, ene Cupido uit Mosambiek, gehad. Een van sy plaasvoormanne Philip Diepenbruck was 'n voortreflike takelaar en smid. Jan Diepenbruck en Jurgen Knopnadel was onderskeidelik 'n uitstekende tuinier en 'n gekwalifiseerde boekhouer.[53]

Benewens die feit dat hy 'n suksesvolle wynboer was, was Melck ook groot skaap- en beesboer. Hoewel hy vee in die omgewing van Stellenbosch aangehou het, het hy in die 60er en 70er jare St Helena, Pampoenkraal en sy groot trots, Kersefontein,[54] wat langs die Bergvivier geleë was, aangekoop. Van sy 3 020 skape was 2 090 op Kersefontein. In 1781 het hy 1 129 beeste gehad. Op Kersefontein alleen was 122 melkkoeie, 129 guskoeie, 159 verskalwers, 150 jong osse en 126 trekosse. Die inventaris van sy boedel toon dat daar 21 slawe alleen op Kersefontein gewerk het.[55] Melck se skape en beeste was tussen 1753 en 1780 getallegewys tussen 40% en 60% meer as die gemiddelde skaap- en beesboer s'n was.

L Melck het ook koringbou beoefen. In teenstelling met die vinnige groei in sy wingerdboerdery, en meer geleidelike groei in sy veegetalle, was sy koringverbouing wisselvallig dog onder baie goeie bestuur. In sommige jare soos 1764, 1769 en 1771 het hy niks gesaai nie. In ander jare, soos, 1753, 1754, 1757, 1761, 1762 en 1763 het Melck onderskeidelik 15, 10, 8, 15 en 10 mud gesaai en nooit meer as 100 mud gewen nie. Die oeste in hierdie periode was klaarblyklik net genoeg vir hul huisverbruik en vir die werknemers in sy diens. In ander jare het hy 35 tot 50 mud gesaai en gemiddeld 450 mud gewen. Gedurende hierdie

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[52] CAD, MOOC 7/1/28 Inventaris: Melck, 25.6.1781, ongepagineer.

[53] Cockrell, *'Melck',* pp 63–65.

[54] AK, T4370, 16.8.1770.

[55] CAD, MOOC 7/1/28, Inventaris, Melck, 20.7.1781, ongepagineer.

'goeie' jare was hy dan ook een van die groter produsente aan die Kaap omdat die gemiddelde produksie van groot koringboere 400 tot 450 mud beloop het.[56]

Dié wisselvalligheid in produksie kan toegeskryf word aan die algemene probleme wat die koringprodusent gedurende die agtiende eeu ondervind het: veranderende klimaatstoestande, belastings op produksie, die lang afstande na die Kaapse mark, die verbod op binnelandse vryhandel asook die feit dat alle koring teen vasgestelde pryse aan die Kompanjie verkoop moes word. Die boere kon slegs koring aan vreemde skepe lewer nadat die Kompanjie vir eie verbruik genoeg ontvang het.[57]

Goeie oeste was dus vir die boer geen waarborg dat hy 'n goeie afset sou hê nie. Indien vreemde skepe sou wegbly, kon dit rampspoedige gevolge vir graanboere hê. Dit blyk egter dat Melck van tyd tot tyd genoeg koring gesaai het om die mark te voorsien as die aanvraag voldoende was. As kapitaalkragtige wynboer en sakeman kon hy dit bekostig om koring vir 'n sekere tydperk op te berg as die markaanvraag swak was. Op Elsenburg het hy oor pakhuise beskik waarin hy groot hoeveelhede koring geberg het.[58]

Daar moet in ag geneem word dat hy eerstens wynboer was in 'n streek wat vir wynproduksie geskik was. Hy was tweedens veeboer, waarskynlik omdat veeboerdery minder kapitaal en arbeidsinsette vereis het, en die vraag na vleis steeds goed was. Graanbou was dus nie vir hom 'n voorkeurboerdery nie.

'n Opvallende en betekenisvolle toename in Melck se koringproduksie het na 1773 plaasgevind nadat hy sy groot plase in die noordelike binneland bekom het. Sedert daardie jaar het hy 'n konstant 'n gemiddelde produksie van 240 mud koring per jaar geproduseer. Dié produksietoename kan waarskynlik toegeskryf word aan die besluit van die Here XVII om na 1772 ook koring na Nederland uit te voer; die moontlikhede vir 'n buitelandse mark was nou groter. Hierbenewens moet in aanmerking geneem word dat Melck se plaas, Kersefontein naby Saldanhabaai, 'zeer goed waren om koorn te winnen'.[59] Op Kersefontein het hy 'n groot pakhuis gehad waarin hy koring geberg het. Ten tye van sy dood in 1781 het hy in dié pakhuis vierhonderd mud koring gehad.[60]

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[56] Cockrell, *'Melck',* pp 105–109.
[57] Hoge, 'Personalia', pp 263–266.
[58] C de Bodsar, *Cape Dutch houses and farms* (Cape Town, 1964), pp 66–67.
[59] Stavorinus, *Reize,* pp 53–58.
[60] CAD, MOOC 7/1/28, Inventaris: Melck, 20.7.1781, ongepagineer.

Tydens Stavorinus se besoek aan Melck het die afsetprobleem van koringprodukte ter sprake gekom. Stavorinus het Melck spesifiek hieromtrent uitgevra omdat boere hom reeds ingelig het dat Melck hom 'met veel kundigheid' oor hierdie saak kon inlig. Nadat Stavorinus aan Melck gevra het 'wat hij van het tegenwoordig Project dacht, om Kaapsche Producten naar Nederland over te voeren',[61] het Melck geantwoord dat dit groot voordele vir die land inhou, mits die nodige geriewe geskep word. Dit het daarop neegekom dat die Kompanjie op verskeie plase pakhuise moes oprig, sodat die boere gedurende die swak oesjaar hul koring kon opberg totdat hulle genoeg graan byeengebring het om na die Kaap te vervoer.

Boere wat ver van die stad gewoon het, kon soms vanweë onbegaanbare paaie en vol riviere nie by Kaapstad uitkom nie. Daarom het Melck aan die hand gedoen dat pakhuisgeriewe in Mosselbaai en Saldanhabaai geskep moet word sodat nabygeleë boere hul produkte daar kon aflaai om direk vanuit hierdie baaie verskeep te word. Melck se argument was dus dat die Kompanjie kostedoeltreffende bemarkingsgeleenthede vir die koringboer moes skep deur die risikofaktore uit te skakel.[62]

Benewens graanboer was Melck 'n gerekende perdeteler. Toe hy in 1781 oorlede is, het hy 249 perde aan sy seun, Marthinus, nagelaat. Hiervan was 84 trek- en ryperde wat hy op Elsenburg aangehou het. Die meeste van sy perde was egter 'aanteel paarden'[63] waarvan 104 op Elsenburg en 61 op Kersefontein was. Melck se stoetery was van Arabies-Persiese afkoms, omdat dit al bloedlyn was wat tot 1782 aan die Kaap aangetref is. Hoewel Simon van der Stel reeds in 1689 Persiese stoetperde ingevoer het, bestaan daar nie inligting oor die presiese aard en omvang van privaatstoeterye gedurende die 17de tot laat 18de eeu nie.

Publieke veilings deur die Kompanjie en privaat persone waartydens perde te koop aangebied is, is reeds sedert 1655 gehou en het heelwat belangstelling gelok. Dit is ook bekend dat perdeteelt reeds teen die helfte van die 18de eeu 'n gevestigde bedryf was. As vermoënde boer en een van die groot perde-eienaars aan die Kaap is dit redelik om te aanvaar dat Melck ook perde op publieke veilings te koop aangebied het. Hy het waarskynlik ook 'n aandeel gehad in die eerste uitvoere van Suid-Afrikaanse perde na die buiteland in 1769. In hierdie jaar is 'n groot aantal perde vir die Britse leër na Indië uitgevoer.

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[61] Stavorinus, *Reize,* p 55.

[62] *Ibid.*

[63] CAD, MOOC 7/1/23, Inventaris: Melck 20.7.1781, ongepagineer.

Dit ly geen twyfel nie dat Martin Melck die grondslag gelê het vir die bekende stoetery wat sy kleinseun, Marthinus Melck, opgebou het. Marthinus, Martin Melck se seun, is in 1789 op 28-jarige ouderdom oorlede, Sy vrou se tweede man het daarna Kersefontein verkoop, maar dié plaas is weer in 1801 deur Martin Melck se kleinseun vir 86 000 gulden gekoop. Hierna is 'n alombekende perdestoetery op Kersefontein begin. Die perde wat Martin Melck se kleinseun geteel het, was bekend as die 'Melck-perde'.[64]

Benewens perde van Arabiese en Engelse afkoms, het Marthinus ook begin om Spaanse skimmels te teel. Die eerste skimmels wat in Suid-Afrika aangeland het, was afkomstig van Napoleontiese skepe wat in 1807 deur die Engelse gekonfiskeer is. Marthinus het van die nakomelinge van dié perde bekom en 'n welbekende skimmelperd-teler geword. Van der Heyde Schreuder skryf: 'The only distinct type of Cape Horse that was produced, were the famous 'Cape Greys' bred by Mr Melck'.[65]

Toe lord Charles Somerset in 1817 'n klompie volbloedperde uit Engeland ingevoer het, was Kersefontein een van die plase waar hy van die perde te koop gekry het. Somerset was ook 'n perdeliefhebber en het dikwels naweke by die Melcks op Kersefontein gaan kuier.[66]

Martin Melck se voorliefde vir hengel het meegebring dat hy op sy plaas, De Paarde Valleij, 'n vallei laat dieper maak het en toe 'n kanaal vanaf die Lourensrivier tot in die vlei laat grawe het.[67] In 1760 het hy deur Adriaan van Schoor, die landdros van Stellenbosch, 'n versoek aan die politieke bewindhebbers gerig dat slegs hy en die toekomstige eienaars van die plaas daar mag visvang. Melck meld byvoorbeeld dat sommige 'vuilaardige menschen'[68] na willekeur daar visvang, sonder om die visse 'n kans te gee om 'n sekere tyd van die jaar aan te teel, of minstens groter te word. Melck se versoek is deur die Politieke Raad goedgekeur.

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[64] Cockrell, *'Melck',* pp 111–113.

[65] P J van der Heyde Schreuder, The cape horse, its origin, breeding and development (thesis, Cornell University, USA, 1915), pp 82-83.

[66] D Child, *The saga of the South African horse* (Cape Town, 1967), p 15.

[67] P Heap, *The story of Hottentots Holland* (Cape Town, 1970), p 65.

[68] CAD, C52 Resolutien, 2.9.1760, p 23.

Melck het ook gereeld naby die mond van die Bergrivier gehengel. In die rivier, naby die Kersefontein-plaashuis, het ook gereeld twee bootjies vir hengeldoeleindes gelê.[69]

Werksaamhede aan die Eersterivier

Gedurende die winter van 1768 het die Eersterivier vir die soveelste keer sy walle oorstroom en groot vloedskade aan Stellenbosch aangerig. Benewens die skade wat aan landerye aangerig is, was die Drosdy, wat op die bekende Stellenbosch-eiland (die huidige Kweekskool-omgewing) geleë was, telkemale na groot reëns oorstroom. Uit notules van vergaderings van die Landdros en Heemrade blyk dat die grootste probleem gelê het by die plek waar die rivier 'in tweën komst te verdeelen',[70] dan onderskeidelik noord en suid om die eiland vloei en weer aan die westekant bymekaar aangesluit het. Wanneer die rivier in vloed was, het die sterk stroom regsom (noordwaarts) teen die skuins kant van die eiland gedruk en daarvandaan Stellenbosch binnegestroom. Die oppervlak van die Stellenbosch-eiland was destyds ook baie nader aan die watervlak van die rivier. Opgrawings het aangetoon dat die ou fondamente twee meter onderkant die huidige vlak was.

Op 1 November 1768 is daar op aandrag van goewerneur Ryk Tulbagh 'n buitengewone vergadering belê om die probleme aangaande die rivier te bespreek Op 8 November het 'n tweede vergadering gevolg waartydens die finale planne vir ingrypende veranderinge aan die loop van die rivier bekend gemaak is. Vir hierdie belangrike werk was twee deskundiges nodig om die 'bijzonder opzigt en bestier' te behartig. Die keuse het gevolglik op Martin Melck, en burger-luitenant Jan Bernard Hoffman geval. Na Melck word spesifiek verwys as 'een bequaam persoon' wat die nodige vakkundige kennis gehad het.

Vir Melck was dié projek gewis 'n uitdaging: een van sy groot voorliefdes was projekte waarmee hy sy vakmansvernuf kon uitleef. Hierbenewens het hy homself ook bewys as iemand met besondere bestuursvernuf: daarvan getuig sy uitgebreide en ekonomies gesonde boerderybelange asook sy sakebelange in die wynbedryf. Melck is daarom ook aangestel as finansiële bestuurder van die projek – 'n taak wat hy met groot noukeurigheid uitgevoer het.

Die ingesetenes van Stellenbosch en Drakenstein is daarop deur die Landdros en Heemrade verplig om slawe aan Melck en Hoffman teen 'n vergoeding van een riksdaalder per dag per slaaf te voorsien. Op versoek van Melck het die Goewerneur vir landdros Mentz van Swellendam gemagtig om met kapteins van Khoekhoe-krale in sy distrik te onderhandel om sodoende meer handlangers te bekom. Die werwingspoging was suksesvol, want uit die notuleboek van die Landdros en Heemrade blyk dat 'tot comsumptie der Hottentotten' voedsel en drank en ander kleinighede voorsien is.[72]

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[69] CAD, MOOC 7/1/28, Inventaris: Melck, 20.6.1781, ongepagineer.

[70] CAD, Landdros en Heemrade van Stellenbosch (hierna 1STB) 1/17 Notule van Landdros en Heemrade, 1.11.1768, p 50.71 CAD, *Ibid,* p 172.

Volgens opdrag moes Melck en Hoffman toesien dat die Eersterivier 'zoals deselve tussen het Eiland en gemelde bouwplaats voor 't grootste gedeelte zynen loop heeft, voortaan in 't geheel te doen cours houden, zullen dienvolgens dan loop des waters van rondsom gemelde Eiland word afgeweerd, in dier voegen dat de doortogt agterom gestopt en van tijd tot tijd sal moeten verden gevuldt en toegedept terwijl voorby hetselve door het opwerpen en leggen van een dam zo sufficant als immers mogelijk zal syn, geen meerder water zal komen over te vloeijen'.[73]

Die woorde 'de doortogt agterom gestopt' kan misleidend wees, want dit kan vertolk word dat Melck en Hoffman die suidelike koers van die rivier agterom die eiland moes beëindig. Dié vertolking kan probleme skep, omdat die kontrakteurs net andersom te werk gegaan het en slegs die voorste (noordelike) arm afgesluit het. Daar bestaan ook geen verandering in owerheidsbesluite oor hierdie saak nie. Met die woorde 'de doortogt agterom' is in der waarheid bedoel dat nie die *totale* noordelike vloei gedemp moes word nie, maar net die opening waardeur die water in die noordelike arm ingevloei het. Dié openinge was skuins agter die Drosdy geleë. Die woorde 'diensvolgens den loop des waters van rondsom gemelde Eijland werd afgeweerd' pas ook meer by die idee om die noordelike arm te sluit, want dit het 'n duidelike kromming om die eiland gemaak.

Benewens Melck en Hoffman se taak om die rivier op gemelde punt te sluit, moes hulle ook alle draaie in die rivier reguit maak en opgehoopte sand en klippe in die middel van die rivier verwyder sodat die rivier onverhinderd sy loop kon neem. Die klippe uit die stroombedding is gebruik om die walle behoorlik uit te pak ten einde uitkalwering van die rivierwal te voorkom.[74]

Die groot omvang van die projek blyk uit 'n bondige finansiële verslag van die Landdros en Heemrade aan die goewerneur. Buiten die Khoekhoe uit die distrik Swellendam is 50 slawe uit die distrik gehuur.

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[72] CAD, *Ibid,* p 191.

[73] CAD, *ibid,* p 163.

[74] Cockrell, *'Melck',* pp 125–129.

Die presiese aantal Khoekhoe is nie bekend nie, maar uit die verslae aangaande die goedere wat deur hulle verbruik is, blyk dit dat daar verskeie Khoe-arbeiders was. Binne die vyf maande van werksaamhede het hulle 68 mud koring, 260 skape en 'n mud sout verbruik.

Uit die verslag blyk dit voorts dat Melck en Hoffman ook die dienste van 'n messelaar, ene Spies, bekom het. Dit was waarskynlik Pieter Spies wat in die vroeë sestigerjare by Melck in diens was. Hy is teen een riksdaalder per dag gehuur, en sy take het, en sy opsigterswerk ingesluit.

Die openinge in die agterste deurvloei is op so 'n wyse afgesluit dat daar met hoogwater, dus wanneer die rivier baie sterk afgekom het, nog 'n oorvloei in die ou loop gelaat kon word. Toe die rivier vir die eerste keer sterk gevloei het, het dit so gebeur, maar die afsluiting het meegegee en die hele rivier weer sy loop aan die noordekant geneem het. In Oktober 1769 is besluit dat Melck en Hoffman die oorspronklike afsluitpunte algeheel moes opvul. Die agterste (suidelike) loop is gevolglik ook dieper en wyer gemaak sodat die rivier voortaan in sy geheel in die agterste loop kon vloei.[75]

Padbouer

Gedurende die winterreëns van 1773 het die wapad van Kaapstad na Rondebosch sodanig verspoel dat dit onherstelbaar beskadig is. In Augustus 1773 het die Politieke Raad besluit om 'n nuwe pad van die Kasteel af na Rondebosch te bou. Vir hierdie taak sou 'onvermijdelik een deskundige zijde Persoon werd vereijscht'.[76] Die keuse het op Martin Melck geval, aangesien hy reeds dergelike werk in die omgewing van Stellenbosch gedoen het. Dit val ook op dat Melck ruim van sy eie slawe vir hierdie tipe werk voorsien het. Hy het die Politieke Raad ook bygestaan met die wyse waarop geld deur middel van effektiewe belastinginvordering vir die projek ingevorder kon word. Hierdie werk het van September 1774 tot 1776 voortgeduur.

Dit wil voorkom of Melck een van sy eertydse plaasvoormanne en bekende messelaar ook en Pieter Spies, gebruik gemaak het om hom van tegniese kennis te voorsien. Melck self kon in elk geval ook nie elke dag self by die padbouery wees om hom te help nie.[77]

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[75] CAD, ISTB 1/17 Notule van Landdros en Heenrade, 16.10.1769, pp 191–198.

[76] CAD, C66, Resolutien, 15.10.1774, p 121.

[77] Cockrell, *'Melck'*, pp 130–137.


N
1768
N.G. Kerk
Wapad naar de Kaap (Huidige Dorpstraat)
Eersterivier
Drosdy
EILAND
Drosdy- plaas
= Afsluitpunte
N
1769
N.G. Kerk
Wapad naar de Kaap (Huidige Dorpstraat)
Drosdy
Eersterivier
Drosdy-plaas

Sketsplanne om die veranderinge wat Melock in 1769 aan die Eersterivier se loop aangebring het, aan te dui. Die 1 768-sketsplan dui die noordelike vertakking om die eiland aan. In 1769 het slegs die suidelike vertakking oorgebly.

Bron: H Fransen, 'Stellenbosse argitektuur', in F Smuts (red), *Stellenbosch drie eeue* (Stellenbosch, 1979), pp 86-87.

Berging van die *Colebrooke*

Op 25 Augustus 1778 het die *Colebrooke*, 'n Engelse skip onderweg na Simonstad, 'n rots onder die wateroppervlak getref en stadig begin sink. Die skip was reeds in Valsbaai toe die ongeluk gebeur het, en 'n sterk noordwestewind het die skip na die oostelike strandgebied van Valsbaai gedryf. Naby Hangklip het die skip op die rotse geloop en uitmekaar gebreek. Verskeie dele van die skip, sowel as komberse, lakens, klere en koperware het oor 'n wye gebied op die strand uitgespoel.[78]

Christoffel Brand, die poshouer te Simonsbaai, het dadelik die goewerneur van die ramp in kennis gestel. M A Bergh, die landdros van Stellenbosch, is daarop opdrag gegee om 'n burgerkommando uit te stuur ten einde die uitgespoelde goedere te bewaak. Terselfdertyd is reëlings getref om 'n geskikte persoon te vind vir die beging van die uitgespoelde goedere. Op hierdie stadium is reeds berigte ontvang van mense wat van die uitgespoelde goedere begin steel het. Dit was weldra duidelik dat Melck die geskikste persoon was om die skeepsgoedere te berg, want 'volgens openbare blyke' was hy 'paraater'[79] om die tipe werk te verrig.

Volgens alle aanduidinge was dit Melck se kennis van die see, sy vakmansvaardigheid en ondernemingsgees wat die Kompanjie laat besluit het om dié taak aan hom op te dra. Hierbenewens moet in ag geneem word dat hy waarskynlik oor die vakkundiges en gereedskap beskik het om sodanige werk te verrig. Die Landdros se opdrag aan Melck was om 'alle soodaanige goederen, het zy scheepsgereedschappen of andersints hoegenaamd, als aldaar en verder zyn opgespeld, of nog zullen komen aandryven, op die best mogelykste wyse te bergen en daar meede te handelen sodaanig als sy lieden onderling zyn over aan gekomen'.[80]

Die vertroue wat die Kompanjie in Melck gehad het, blyk eerstens uit die feit dat hy onder geen toesighouding gewerk het nie en tweedens dat hy volgens sy eie oordeel mense kon stuur om die werk te verrig. Die landdros van Stellenbosch het gevolglik die burgerkomando's wat wag gestaan het, opdrag gegee om

> op die komst van gemelde Melck, of die hy sal zenden, aanstond's van daar op te breeken, en naar Stellenbosch terug te marcheeren, laatende die

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[78] CAD, C466 Inkomende Brieven 27.9.1779, pp 287–288.

[79] CAD. T45, Kaapsche Geschillen 12.10.1778, p 72.

[80] CAD, *Ibid,* p 88.

> opgespoelde goederen soo wel als het wrak van het schip, en wat verden daarvan dependeerd aan die sorge van meermelden Melck.[81]

Melck het waarskynlik 'n besoek aan die wrak gebring en instruksie gegee hoe te werk gegaan moes word, maar vanweë sy vele verpligtinge het hy nie persoonlik die bergingswerk waargeneem nie. Dit is egter bekend dat hy twee van sy knegte en twee van sy seuns na die toneel van die ramp gestuur het. Adam Gundelach en Hendrik Bierman, jarelange vertrouelinge van Melck wat onderskeidelik as kuiper en smid by hom in diens was, kon die bergingstaak met sukses uitvoer. Gundelach, Bierman en Melck se seuns het 'veele dagen en nagten agter een'[82] gewerk om die nodige bergingswerk te doen.

Slawe

Dit was alom bekend dat Melck sy slawe goed behandel het. Hy het sy slawe oor 'n wye terrein ingespan en sorg gedra dat ouer slawe die jongeres formeel oplei. Melck se boerderybelange het tussen 1753 en 1780 so uitgebrei dat hy een van die groot slawebesitters aan die Kaap was.[83]

In 1753 was die gemiddelde getal slawe per boer in die Stellenbosch-Drakensteingebied 21. In hierdie jaar het Melck slegs 14 manlike slawe besit en was ongeveer die 14de grootste slawebesitter. Sy uitgebreide boerderybelange toon in die opgaafrolle van Stellenbosch en Drakenstein aan dat hy tussen 1760 en 1780 met 116 slawe dié grootste slawebesitter aan die Kaap was. Die 'bekende' Cloete-familie het in 1780 51 slawe besit. Vier van Melck se slawe was kundige vakmanne. Ene Philander, David, Cupido en Suko was goeie wamakers. Ander soos Japar en Maart was uitstekende smede. In 1762 het Melck ook twee slawe Januarie en April, as kokke in sy huishouding aangestel.[84]

Kerkman

Melck was van huis uit 'n toegewyde Lutheraan en aktief betrokke by die ideale en werksaamhede van die Lutherse kerk aan die Kaap. Vanaf die eerste jare van die VOC se bewind aan die Kaap is slegs bestaansreg aan die Gereformeerde Kerk toegeken. Gereformeerdes het die bestaansreg van die Lutherse Kerk hoegenaamd nie erken nie. Met sy koms aan die Kaap het Melck met ontsteltenis van die gesindheid van die Gereformeerde Kerk verneem en ontevrede met die feit dat Lutherane in die geheim ('nu hier en dan elders'[85]) moes vergader.

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[81] CAD, C743 Kaapsche Geschillen 2.9.1778, pp 88–89.

[82] CAD, C748 Kaapsche Geschillen 12.10.1778, p 72.

[83] Cockrell, *'Melck'*, pp 72–73.

[84] CAD, J212 Opgaafrolle van Stellenbosch en Drakenstein, 1780, ongepagineer.

Na die dood van hul hardnekkige Gereformeerde teenstander, goewerneur Ryk Tulbagh, het Melck 'n pakhuis (stoor) in Kaapstad aan die Lutherane gegee 'ten verrigtinge van hulle openbare godsdienst.'[86] Die pakhuis was (in die geheim) ingerig soos 'n kerk.

In 'n brief aan Alberti, Lutherse predikant in Amsterdam, het Melck versoek dat Alberti die VOC moes probeer oorreed om die Lutherse kerk aan die Kaap gevestig te kry. In Desember 1778, na jare se birefwisseling en dringende versoeke, het die Here VII die Politieke Raad aan die Kaap die volmag gegee dat 'n Lutherse kerk in Suid-Afrika gestig kon word. Op 22 November het pastor A Kolver die eerste Lutherse predikant in Suid-Afrika, sy intreepreek gelewer.[87] Op 6 Maart 1781 het die Lutherse kerkraad besluit om 'n gedenkteken ter nagedagtenis van Melck en sy besondere bydrae tot die Lutherse Kerk te laat ontwerp. Die besluit het uitgeloop op die ontwerp van 'n pragtige gedenkplaat wat tot vandag toe nog in die Lutherse Kerk in Kaapstad te siene is.

Hoewel Melck 'n Lutheraan was, het hy nooit toegelaat dat die geloofverskil tussen hom sy eggenotes 'n inbreuk maak nie. Hy is twee keer getroud – met beide vrouens uit die Gereformeerde Kerk. Sy eerste vrou Anna is aan borskanker in 1776 oorlede, waarna hy in 1778 met Maria Rosina Loubscher getroud is.

Melck se besondere toegeneëntheid het meegebring dat die Gereformeerde Kerk 'n graf in 1781 – die jaar van sy oorlye – aan sy nasate geskenk het. Hy is toe in die kerkhof van die Gereformeerde gemeente naby die Lutherse kerk in Kaapstad begrawe.[88]

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[85] CAD, CJ2673, Testamente en Kodisille, no 18, 8.6.1776, p 17.

[86] CAD, *Ibid,* p 70.

[87] A M Hugo, *Die kerk van Stellenbosch, 1686–1963,* (Kaapstad, 1963), pp 102–104.

[88] Cockrell, 'Melck', pp 141–163.

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The crisis of academic history revisited

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Recently, Tim Nuttall and John Wright published two articles[1] dealing with academic history's declining status, both in South Africa and overseas. The authors provide an analysis of the dilemmas of the profession, not only in South Africa but overseas as well, while simultaneously providing us with a survey of much of the relevant literature. As such they offer us an articulate and stimulating 'state of the art' synthesis of contemporary historians' views about their profession and its changing public image over the past thirty years. My survey will attempt to summarise the more salient aspects of these two articles briefly, treating them as essentially two parts of the same argument. I would then like to question some of their basic assumptions. My focus will deal primarily with the decline of academic history in the West as a whole, rather than specifically with South Africa.

As the authors rightly point out, history prior to the nineteenth century was largely a literary discipline. Only from 1870 did separate history departments begin to function at Western European and American universities,[2] although the seminar, already from the second quarter of the nineteenth century, had become a defining characteristic of the history profession.[3]

From about the 1960s, on the other hand, the history profession began to be seriously attacked, ushering the decline in the status of academic history, so evident in the West during the past thirty years. Linked to this was the 'postmodernist' challenge to the traditional 'modernist' historical concept. This concept claimed that the past could be objectively conceived, leading to a broad consensus of opinion, irrespective of any variations in an individual's social, gender economic or national background.[4] To postmodernist thought, on the other hand, a historian's concept of objectivity, reality and truth was just a social or intellectual 'construct'.[5]

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[1] T Nuttall & J Wright, 'Exploring beyond History with a capital ''H'' ', *Current Writing* 10,2(1998); T Nuttall & J Wright, 'Probing the Predicaments of Academic History in Contemporary South Africa', *South African Historical Journal,* 42 (May, 2000).

[2] Nuttall & Wright, 'Exploring beyond History', p 48.

[3] Nuttall & Wright, 'Probing the Predicaments', pp 44.

> According to Nuttall and Wright
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> [e]xplanations which focus on recent shifts in the international political and economic order, and which point to the increasing economic and political and intellectual uncertainties of the last three or four decades are, in our view, essential for an understanding of what is happening to the discipline of academic history in the Western World and in South Africa.[6]

The authors accordingly point to a number of aspects of change encouraging such increasing uncertainties. Among these are, for example, the weakening of nationalism in the West, and the weakening of faith in the future.[7]

Since academic history had depended on support from the traditional nation state and its appeal to patriotism, the decline of this form of state was inimical to the welfare of the profession. The new, modified nation state was less patriotic and founded more on market principles of individual self interest and 'consumerism'. In post-1994 South Africa, this trend has been particularly noticeable, with history being increasingly subordinated to the interests of tourism and local 'heritage' studies.[8]

Borrowing from contemporary literature of the Left, Nuttall and Wright also argue that an increasing polarisation between the rich on the one hand and the middle and working classes on the other has made the masses less and less optimistic about the future, and thus more alienated from their culture and its history. Science and technology are no longer seen as a panacea for social and economic ills, but on the contrary, serving the interests of an increasingly impersonal 'globalist', capitalistic society with its associated threat of social and professional marginalisation. Disillusionment in 'progress' is thus accompanied by disillusionment in academic history. Instead, the public seeks comfort more and more in private 'heritage' histories, presumably glorifying local popular cultures and doing so from an anti modernist perspective.[9] If historians are to survive professionally, argue the authors, then they must come to terms with, and pay more attention to, these newer, more overtly subjective and anti-intellectual popular histories.[10]

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[4] Nuttall & Wright, 'Exploring beyond History', pp 39, 43–45, 55; Nuttall & Wright, 'Probing the Predicaments', p 36.

[5] Nuttall & Wright, 'Probing the Predicaments', p 37; Nuttall & Wright, 'Exploring beyond History', p 44.

[6] Nuttall & Wright, 'Probing the Predicaments', p 40

[7] *Ibid,* pp#41–42, 44–45.

[8] *Ibid,* pp 41–42, 47–48.

Articulate and informative as it is, Nuttall and Wright's thesis can be criticised for not sufficiently distinguishing between the evolution of academic history during the past thirty years on the one hand and the far more successful evolution of more robust academic disciplines in the natural sciences on the other. They focus on the 'postmodernist' critics of history, many of whom are either in the other branches of the humanities or outside the academic world altogether.[11] What they do not consider is history's more formidable academic rivals in such disciplines as molecular biology and computer sciences.

Is history's problem simply that it remains too rigidly and exclusively academic or rather that it is increasingly seen as not academic enough, in the sense of lacking sufficient analytical rigour and largely dealing in archaic and artificial intellectual constructs? In this sense, the postmodernists attack history because it is seen increasingly as a soft target. And the disillusioned non-academic public rejects it not because it represents the establishment but because it actually represents it less and less, having in effect been disinherited by this same establishment.

In this respect, the popular 'weakening of faith in the future,' alluded to by the authors,[12] should not necessarily be seen as a reason for the decline of academic history's appeal among the broad public. It is doubtful that the public was ever particularly enthusiastic about academic history, even during its heyday. But they did respect it, if only because they saw it as intellectually and socially relevant. Whether or not the masses are today disillusioned with science and technology, and, more generally, with the future, there is little doubt that they increasingly feel they must come to terms with it, if only because, unlike history, it increasingly, for better or worse, defines the context of their lives. They have abandoned any interest in academic history not because of any alleged unpleasant associations with science and the future, but rather because history, as a discipline, increasingly appears to have very little connection with either.

In attempting to explain the decline of the history profession, Nuttall and Wright correctly focus on the 1960s and 1970s as a watershed.[13] In doing so, they contrast the post 1960s with the previous origins and heyday of academic history. This dichotomy in fact perhaps deserves more elaboration. At the risk of oversimplification, the 'modernist' period to which the authors allude to could be defined as the period between 1848 and 1968. The dates, while arbitrary, have a logic of their own. The year of the 1848 revolutions in Europe heralded the new forces of nationalism upon which academic history would so depend. The year, 1968, coincides with the student revolts in both the United States and continental Europe which heralded the decline of the traditional nation state of the previous century as well as signaling a public disillusionment with many aspects of the academic world.

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[9] *Ibid,* pp 38–39, 44–45.

[10] Nuttall & Wright, 'Exploring beyond History', pp 44, 48, 56–57.

[11] *Ibid,* pp 44–45.

[12] Nuttall and Wright, 'Probing the Predicaments', pp 44–45.

But 1848 and 1968 not only stand as convenient markers for the growth and flourishing of academic history; they serve this same purpose even more clearly for history's great academic ally, Marxist studies. Marxism has both been modernist history's most famous disciple as well as a constant source of inspiration, either directly or dialectically. While Nuttall and Wright do allude to a common contemporary modernist dilemma shared by Marxists and academic historians,[14] they do so perhaps too briefly. In fact, one may argue that Marxist studies and academic history have shared a very similar history and that they are now both increasingly on the defensive.

The year 1848, was, of course, the year of Marx's *Communist manifesto* which in effect first publicised Marxist thought on a wide scale. Conversely, with the year 1968, Marxism began to lose its previous degree of academic respectability and political hegemony. The same student revolts which challenged the patriotic nation state, and thus also modernist academic history, also challenged Marxist studies. This was complemented politically by the temporary overthrow of communism in Czechoslovakia. If the 'Prague spring' discredited the orthodox Left, its suppression later in the year further discredited this same Left, both within the Soviet bloc and abroad. The concept of the 'New Left', which now emerged, increasingly, albeit not exclusively, represented people with very little interest in Marxist studies, a phenomenon only too obvious among South African leftist academic and political circles of the past twenty years.

The weakening of the traditional nation state, and in turn the weakening of universities (particularly their departments in the humanities), has meant, as the authors argue, the simultaneous weakening of modernist history's institutional base[15]. They might likewise have pointed out that the Soviet bloc's decline and ultimate demise, between 1968 and 1991, deprived Marxism of its own institutional base, however unpalatable this argument might appear to many Western Marxists. The Soviet demise to a considerable degree resembled the demise of the traditional patriotic nation states in the West. Communist states had justified the teaching of and research in Marxist history just as western nation states had justified the same for non-communist modernist history.

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[13] Nuttall and Wright, 'Exploring beyond History', p 40; Nuttal and Wright, 'Probing the Predicaments', pp 36, 38.

[14] Nuttall & Wright, 'Exploring beyond History', p 44.

But it is not enough to show parallels between modernist academic history and its Marxist counterpart. In order still further to 'probe the predicaments' of contemporary academic history, it would be helpful also to refer to a significant contrast, the far more successful evolution of the biological and computer sciences, particularly during the past thirty years. Ironically, the growth of modernist history originally occurred within the context of the growth of interest in the life sciences, notably biology and medicine, during the second and third quarters of the nineteenth century. The growth of interest in the life sciences justified an increased interest in evolution and this of course could only encourage historical studies.

Like academic history, science and technology were initially challenged by the populist student and intellectual unrest of the late 1960s and early 1970s, but unlike history, these disciplines were not crippled by the experience. To the degree that accusations of serving the military establishment had any effect, these only served to encourage the hard sciences to shift their sources of funding more towards the commercial/industrial world, something which history could hardly emulate.

This is not to say that the sciences did not themselves experience a crisis from the 1970s. But, in contrast to history, this was a crisis of growth and increasing relevance, rather than one of marginalisation. For example, the growing costs or laboratory research in the emerging academic discipline of molecular biology forced academics to spend more and more time applying for grants from the big outside foundations. Their inability to fund these grants themselves may have diminished the importance of universities, but it did not diminish the importance of the disciplines themselves – quite the contrary. Until then, many academic scientists, like academic historians, had been usually cloistered in the universities, and cut off from the outside world of commerce and industry. From the 1970s, however, the situation had begun to change, with new options opening up. Academics, particularly in the United States, were being encouraged to leave the university altogether for the at times more accommodating atmosphere of biotech 'start-up' companies. Although often ultimately belonging to larger pharmaceutical companies, these small biotech organisations disposed of ample financial resources of their own, as well as wide professional autonomy, and were largely staffed by ex-academics, themselves. Rather than being simply paid employees, they often received shares in their company and were thus more like entrepreneurs-scientists. In fact, the biotech companies showed similarities with the 'high tech' computer start-ups, staffed and managed largely by computer 'geeks'.

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[15] Nuttall and Wright, 'Probing the Predicaments', p 42.

But where were historians to go? They remained as tied to the universities as ever. Since they, in contrast to academic scientists, had no outside market value, and thus no serious professional alternatives, their status began rapidly to fall, not only inside the universities, themselves, but in the community at large. Making attempts to offer themselves free of charge to help the underprivileged in community services, did not necessarily bring funds into the university. Nor have these new commitments necessarily attracted students, despite increasing efforts directed towards improving teaching skills. On the contrary, as Nuttall and Wright, themselves have shown for South Africa,[16] student enrolments have markedly dropped.

In short, during the 1848–1968 period, history had benefited by its structural, university association with the hard sciences. A PhD was seen, rightly or wrongly, to have an equal academic status, whether earned in history or in the sciences. After this period, on the other hand, the public's, and the academic world's, increasing awareness of a disparity between the humanities and the sciences could not but downgrade history's academic status and the gap today can only continue to widen.

What are history's future prospects? According to Nuttall and Wright, attempts are being made to funnel historians into positions outside the academic world as consultants in 'medicine, law, public policy, commerce and ''science and technology'' ',[17] and, of course, there might be merit in this approach. Unfortunately, however, the same loss of status of academic history may provide obstacles to historians being hired elsewhere. To the degree that they are hired, on the other hand, they are apt to be used essentially as public relations advocates, rather than as policy makers. This should act as a serious crimp in their freedom to express themselves academically, a point, in fact, noted by the authors, themselves.[18]

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[16] *Ibid,* p 27.

[17] *Ibid,* pp 46–47.

Nor does there seem to be very bright prospects for a constructive dialogue with the postmodern advocates outside of 'objective' academic historiography, a policy optimistically advocated by the authors.[19] Although any debate is to be welcomed academically, this particular endeavour will not necessarily add any new dimension to academic history. As Nuttall and Wright remind us, '[p]ostmodern ideas see evidence as ''made'', as constructed by the historian.'[20] But this is hardly a new concept and has long been advocated by many academics in the social sciences, whether intellectual historians or Cold War political scientists of the 1950s, analysing abstruse political and economic debates within the Soviet ruling hierarchy. Historians have traditionally been relatively open to debate and often have not minded admitting philosophically the ultimate 'subjectivity' of their particular evidence and intellectual point of view. What is new is that since 1968 such criticism is no longer viewed as simply academic but, more often than not, as an evident attack on the relevance of the profession. The postmodernist attack in this sense becomes a political rather than an academic phenomenon, a symptom, rather than a cause of history's demise.

In short, it is most unlikely that academic history can improve its marketability by trying desperately to change its packaging, much less broaden its ideas. Rather, historians should be trying to widen the scope of its audience quantitatively rather than qualitatively. Lovers of academic history still exist, however few and far between. It is primarily a question of finding them. Instead of limiting itself to a national audience, the historical profession, by means of the internet, should reach out to a much larger audience on a global scale.

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[18] *Ibid,* p 48.

[19] Nuttall & Wright, 'Exploring beyond History', pp 44–48, 56–57.

[20] *Ibid,* p 55.

Kleio 33, 2001

Remembering the AngloBoer War: its place, 100 years later, in our historical consciousness

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Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey (eds), *The Boer War: army, nation and empire. The 1999 Chief of Army/Australian War Memorial military history conference* (Canberra, Army History Unit, Department of Defence, 2000), xi + 235 pp, intro, footnotes, tables. ISBN 0 642 70482 1

O J O Ferreira, ***Viva os Boers! Boeregeïnterneerdes in Portugal tydens die Anglo-Boereoorlog* (Pretoria, Protea Book House, 2000), xi + 306 pp, footnotes, photos, illus, sources, append, index. ISBN 1 919825 07 X**

Steve Lunderstedt (ed), ***Summer of 1899: the siege of Kimberley, 14 October 1899 to 15 February 1900* (Kimberley, Kimberley Africana Library under the auspices of the Friends of the Library, 1999), xvi + 335 pp, intro, chronology, footnotes, maps, sketches, photos, sources, index. ISBN 0 620 23420 2**

J W Meijer, ***eneraal Ben Viljoen 18681917* (Pretoria, Protea Book House, 2000), 294 pp, footnotes, maps, photos, index. ISBN 1 919825 06 01**

Jan Picard (ed), ***Op commando met Steyn en De Wet: oorlogsherinneringe van lt kol FF Pienaar* (Pretoria, Protea Book House, 2000), viii + 203 pp, footnotes, photos, maps, cartoon, sources, index. ISBN 1 919825 05 3**

Alwyn P Smit (ed), ***edenkboek van MJ de Jager (18721939): Boerekryger, staatsartilleris en militêr* (Pretoria,**

Protea Book House, 2000), x + 201 pp, footnotes, photos, sources, index. ISBN 1 919825 04 5

These six recent publications have a great deal in common and yet they differ vastly. Reviewing them together, as it were, has been a juggling act, a back and forth, an assessment and reassessment. All of which has been appropriate because they are all written about a war that took place a century ago and is now being assessed and reassessed. It is thus certainly worth noting what particular issues, what fresh nuances of the same war, are being addressed, and how the treatment of these issues differs in works that were published in the successive decades after the war until the big ten, the year 2000, when five of the six books under review appeared on the bookshelves.[1]

Over the last century this particular colonial war has generated a great deal of literature both locally and in Britain[2] and there is certainly justification for the claim that more has been written on the Anglo-Boer War than any other event in South African history.[3] But as the years have passed so there have been changes in the *way* the war is remembered.[4] Significantly, its name, its label, has also undergone a metamorphosis, reflecting our changing perceptions of the conflict.[5] It has, for example, now been established beyond any doubt that the confrontation did not merely involve the two rival armies or indeed the two main white population groups in South Africa. It was after all contested in a country in which four of the five million residents at the time were Africans, and the significant role played by black South Africans and the way they experienced what was previously seen as a 'white man's war', has now been explored extensively by a number of historians.[6] At the same time, several contemporary researchers have warned against letting the pendulum swing too far the other way; they argue that the role of blacks in the war should not be overestimated. While it is true that Africans played an important role and were certainly not mere passive victims of a white struggle, they cannot realistically be seen as 'major players' in the conduct of this particular war. It was the post-war years and the legacy of the war that were destined to bring Africans into the forefront of 20th-century South African history.[7]

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[1] 1 Lunderstedt (ed), *Summer of 1899,* is the only one of the six books that was published in 1999. The others appeared in 2000, but not necessarily for the first time in each case. F F Pienaar's memoirs, *Op commando met Steyn en De Wet,* was first published in English as *With Steyn and De Wet* (London, 1902), and was then translated into Dutch and published by F B den Boer in the same year. OJO Ferreira's *Viva os Boers* was first published in 1994 but this second edition has been enhanced by numerous additional photographs and sources recently uncovered have been used to provide new insights.

[2] For an incisive article on how historians' perceptions of the significance of the South African War have changed over the last century, see Andrew Porter, 'The South African War and the historians', *African affairs,* 99 (October, 2000), pp 633–648.

[3] See for example Bridget Theron (ed), *Dear Sue: the letters of Bessie Collins from Pretoria during the Anglo-Boer War* (Pretoria, 2000), p 16; Iain R Smith, 'A century of controversy over origins', Donal Lowry (ed), *The South African War reappraised* (Manchester, 2000), p 23.

[4] While I take full responsibility for any flaws in this article, my thanks are due to colleague Greg Cuthbertson who has given freely of his time in discussing aspects of this topic with me. He has also been kind enough to provide me with some of the literature that has been used.

[5] Afrikaner nationalists initially called it the *Tweede Vryheidsoorlog,* the Second War of Independence, while Anglophile historians used the term Boer War. Over the years, those who were less partisan and preferred a more neutral term used 'Anglo-Boer War', denoting the two major warring parties. This is still widely considered to be the most appropriate name, although there are those who feel that 'South African War' is more inclusive and recognises the significant role of Africans. A clumsy new centenary version, initiated in African nationalist circles and currently enjoying very little general usage other than on government controlled SABC, is 'Anglo-Boer South African War'.

There are many significant reasons why, a hundred years down the line, the Anglo-Boer War still counts in national memory. In the first place, it has had a notable international impact, highlighting the triumph of imperial expansionism and capitalist gain over the ideals of republicanism and the survival of national independence. As Nasson puts it: 'For the calculated political and strategic extractions of British imperial interests in southern Africa as a whole, and for the inroads of mining capital and finance, the 1910 Union produced by the war was a splendid political achievement.'[8] Having said this, there is no doubt that what Porter calls 'these grand sweeps' on the making of the modern world imperialism, progress and the importance of the war in defining the global capitalist system are not as popular now as they used to be.[9]

Another reason why the Anglo-Boer War has been remembered on a global scale is that it stimulated a wide debate on the moral issues involved when conducting a modern war. Was Britain indeed guilty of what the Liberal leader of the opposition, Campbell-Bannerman, called

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[6] The work by Peter Warwick, *Black people and the South African War 1899–1902* (Johannesburg, 1983) is the best known, but others include more recent works by Bill Nasson, *Black participation in the Anglo-Boer War 1899–1902* (Johannesburg, 1999) and Jeremy Krikler's *Revolution from above, rebellion from below: the agrarian Transvaal at the turn of the century* (Oxford, 1993). For Sol Plaatje's classic contemporary account of the African experience of the war see J L Comaroff (ed) *The Boer War diary of Sol T Plaatje: an African at Mafeking* (London, 1973).

[7] Greg Cuthbertson and Alan Jeeves, 'The many-sided struggle for southern Africa, 1899–1902', Special issue, South African War 1899–1902: centennial perspectives, *South African Historical Journal,* 41 (1999), pp 10–11. See also Nasson, *The South African War* (London, 1999), p 282.

[8] Bill Nasson, *The South African War 1899–1902,* p 285.

[9] Porter, 'The South African War and the historians', pp 633, 639. See also below on the new interest in personal reminiscences of the war.

'methods of barbarism'? Were the British military authorities in South Africa justified in employing the particular strategies they used in the latter phase of the war?[10] There was certainly controversy over how generals like Roberts and Kitchener managed the war[11] and in the post-war period the tactics applied in South Africa led to sharp split in the already divided Liberal Party and public opinion throughout Britain.[12]

Then too, in terms of its complexity and human cost, its levels of technology, logistical organisation and socio-economic repercussions, the Anglo-Boer War cannot simply be dismissed as a 'limited Victorian backyard war'.[13] Statistics vary, but it was clearly the biggest of the pre-colonial and colonial wars in southern Africa. Both sides thought it would be over quickly and both sides were wrong. The Boers had hopes of another Majuba-type, three-month encounter before the British could muster a full imperial army on the South African veld. The over-confident British predictions that the war would be a brief, trivial affair[14] and that Tommy Atkins would be back home with his family by Christmas 1899 with the war safely won, were also far off the mark. In the event, the war dragged on for a full 32 arduous months.

At the risk of what Porter sees as 'employing the language of hyperbole'[15] some statistics on the magnitude of the Anglo-Boer War are perhaps relevant in assessing why this war has been remembered above other colonial wars. Pakenham sees it as the 'most humiliating war for Britain between 1815 and 1914'.[16] To defeat a Boer nation of approximately 200 000 people it is estimated that Britain spent in excess of £200 million, some sources putting this figure even higher.[17]

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[10] For a scholarly exposition of this debate see S B Spies, *Methods of barbarism? Roberts and Kitchener and civilians in the Boer republics: January 1900May 1902* (Cape Town, 1977). A second edition of this work is due to appear in 2001. See also Lowry, 'Not just a ''teatime war'' ', pp 2–3.

[11] On the role of the British generals in the war see Keith Surridge, *Managing the South African War, 1899–1902: politicians v generals,* Royal Historical Society (Woodbridge, 1998).

[12] Paula M Krebs, *Gender, race and the writing of empire: public discourse and the Boer War* (Cambridge, 1999), p 5. See also Surridge, *Managing the South African War.*

[13] Nasson, *The South African War,* p 7. Lowry uses the Fleet Street newspaper prediction that it would simply be a 'teatime war': Lowry, 'Not just a teatime war', p 1.

[14] Nasson, *The South African War,* p 7. Lowry uses the Fleet Street newspaper prediction that it would simply be a 'teatime war': Lowry, 'Not just a teatime war', p 1.

[15] For two graphic examples of sublime British confidence of victory see Porter, 'The South African War and the historians', p 634.

[15] Porter, 'The South African War and the historians', p 636.

[16] Thomas Pakenham, *The Boer War* (Johannesburg, 1979) p xv.

[17] Porter, 'The South African War and the historians', p 635. Porter also makes some very interesting comparisons: the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 cost the British Treasury £1 million; a decade of Maori Wars cost £ 3 million and the British bill for the Crimean War was just over £ 68 million.

Britain also lost about 22 000 men (almost two-thirds of them through diseases such as enteric fever and dysentery)[18] of the almost half a million troops that were sent to South Africa.[19] On the Boer side approximately 7 000 died, this from an estimated civilian army of just over 87 000 which included foreign volunteers and Cape Afrikaners.[20] Furthermore, 28 000 women and children from the two republics and many thousands of Africans perished in British concentration camps. Warwick maintains that the figure of 14 154 recorded deaths of black people in the camps is probably a gross under-estimation and he is not alone in this view.[21] Most historians see the war as approaching the scale of total war, a 'war on a grand scale, a war of superlatives and comparative extremes'[22] and certainly as one that impacted on the entire South African population.

Quite apart from its geographical scale, its scope and its material and social cost, the importance of this war for South Africans, and perhaps one of the main reasons why it is remembered with such ardour, studied and written about a century later, is that the war acted as what Nasson calls a 'powerful historical hinge'.[23] While modern South Africa might have had its origins in the period of the mineral revolution, the emergence and later entrenchment of segregationist and capitalist state structures and social patterns in South Africa can be dated to the end of the war and the period of reconstruction thereafter. As Cuthbertson and Jeeves point out, the war 'placed white power on an entirely new and very formidable basis'.[24] This is a very powerful reason for all South Africans, of every political persuasion, to remember the war and for historians to analyse the ways in which it is being remembered a hundred years after it was fought, and won and lost.

Given that the Anglo-Boer War was significant enough to be remembered, some attention must be given to the changing perspectives on the Anglo-Boer War as reflected, firstly, in the historiography and, secondly (closely linked to what is being written about the war and clearly fed by these writings), the way in which South Africans, Britons and other former imperial settler communities are choosing to remember, and accordingly, to commemorate the war a century later. Finally, to what extent, then, do the publications under review reflect these changes in our historical consciousness?

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[18] Nasson, *The South African War,* p 279; F Pretorius, *The Anglo-Boer War 1899–1902* (Cape Town, 1985), p 41.

[19] Jack and Ray Simons, *Class and colour in South Africa 18501950,* (London, 1983), p 59.

[20] Pakenham, *The Boer War,* pp 572–573. Nasson, *The South African War,* p 281, claims that the Boers only had 70 000 burghers available for field service, while Porter, 'The South African War and the historians', p 635, puts the number as low as 65 000..

[21] Warwick, *Black people and the South African War,* pp 151–152. See also Stowell Kessler, 'The black and coloured concentration camps of the South African War, 1899–1900', Paper presented at the 'Rethinking the South African War Conference', Unisa, 1998.

[22] Porter, 'The South African War and the historians', p 635; Lowry, 'Not just a ''teatime war'' ', p 2.

[23] Nasson, *The South African War,* p 9.

[24] Cuthbertson and Jeeves, 'Many-sided struggle for southern Africa', p 4.

A cursory preliminary survey of these six books reveals that they fall into several broad categories; some of them, of course, can be placed in more than one such category. There are two substantial academic works written in Afrikaans by Ferreira and Meijer respectively. Also in Afrikaans are two examples of Boer War memoirs written by burghers De Jager and Pienaar, both of whom were on commando with the Boers.[25] In contrast to the two academic works, these two publications are emotive accounts, written by Afrikaner nationalists. Most of the excerpts in the collective work edited by Steve Lunderstedt on the siege of Kimberley reflect the contemporary experiences of individuals who were of British extraction and were anti-Boer. These give some insight into the imperial and the 'South African British' or British settler point of view on the war. There is also another collective work: *The Boer War, army, nation and empire,* a compilation of papers presented at a centenary conference on the Boer War held in Australia in 1999. This publication comprises 16 papers on the imperial memory of the Anglo-Boer War. Most of these papers emanate from Australia but other contributions are by historians resident in Britain, New Zealand and Canada. There are two by South Africans and of these, the most useful for this particular discussion is an incisive paper by South African historian, Bill Nasson, that examines the way in which Afrikaners used the inheritance of the Anglo-Boer War to whip up enthusiasm for Afrikaner nationalism[26] by writing a plethora of 'robust popular histories reminding readers of the Christian Boer crusade' and the fortitude of the Boers in the face of the 'mighty British Empire' that meted out untold suffering on pitiful Boer women and children.[27]

Although none of the six books under review focuses on the impact of the Anglo-Boer War on African historical consciousness, an attempt will be made to afford some sense of the development of a collective African nationalist memory of the war since the 1994 democratic transition in South Africa and to assess the attitude of the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), towards the commemoration of the centenary of the war. To do this, some examples of papers presented by black historians at recent Boer War conferences[28] and to the work of radical authors such as Durban-born sociologist and academic, Bernard M Magubane, who's ideological stance can perhaps best be described as Africanist/ Marxist.[29] An African academic of stature, Magubane has recently been appointed by Thabo Mbeki to head up the newly formed and highly influential ANC-backed and Nedcor-financed South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET), that has been given the brief to write the official history of the liberation struggle and the negotiation process. Magubane's strong views on the legacy of British imperialism and the Anglo-Boer War in South Africa can thus in a very real sense be seen as having the ANC stamp of approval and should be viewed accordingly.

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[25] An argument could be made that at least some of these four authors are (or were) Hollanders, but for the purposes of this discussion it is accepted that they are (or were) Afrikaans speaking South Africans.

[26] Bill Nasson, 'South Africa's post-Boer, Boer War' in Dennis and Grey (eds) *The Boer war, army, nation and empire,* pp 14–30.

[27] Albert Grundlingh, 'War, wordsmiths and the ''volk'': Afrikaans historical writing on the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902 and the war in Afrikaner historical consciousness, 1902–1990' in E Lehmann and E Reckwitz (eds), *Mfecane to Boer War* (Essen, 1992), p 52, quoted in Nasson, 'South Africa's post-Boer, Boer War', p 17.

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[30]Any assessment of the memory of the Anglo-Boer War and its legacy on our historical consciousness should arguably begin with the Boers. For the Afrikaner republicans, the Boers who fought for and eventually lost their independence in the Anglo-Boer War, or the Second War of Independence as they preferred to call it, the war, whatever it was called, was a unmitigated disaster. In 1902 Afrikaner nationalism, so buoyant after the brief war of 188081, had plunged to an all time low. Republican independence, the very reason the Boers had fought so long and so hard, had been ground beneath the heel of imperial Britain in a conflict in which the Afrikaner nation had lost an estimated 17% of its people.[31] Land had been laid waste, stripped of its crops and the herds of livestock that had comprised the bulk of the Boers' capital assets. About 30 000 homesteads had been burned to the ground. In some rural

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[28] For example Bernard Mbenga,'The role of the Bakgatla of the Pilanesberg in the South African War' and Manelisi Genge, 'The role of the EmaSwati in the South African War', both papers presented at the Rethinking the South African War conference.

[29] See for example Bernard M Magubane, *The making of a racist state: British imperialism and the Union of South Africa, 1875–1910* (Trenton, 1996). There is a dedication to the ideals and work of the ANC on the title page.

[30] My thanks to Ian Liebenberg, Sociology Department, Unisa, for this information, and his insights into Bernard Magubane's political ideology.

[31] Nasson, *The South African War,* p 281.

areas there was unrest as African communities attempted to regain their control over land that had been usurped by the Boers in previous decades.[32]

Furthermore, a recurring weakness in Afrikaner history of the 19th century had reared its head again: during the war the Boers had become bitterly divided, causing a deep ideological rift in early 20th-century Afrikaner society.[33] The *bittereinders* who had fought on to the last and their anti-British-imperialist leaders condemned the largely *bywoner* element who had surrendered to the victors. Worse still: some of these men had even joined the imperial army and had fought against their fellow republicans.[34] Lowry suggests that as many as one in four Boers who were still in the field in 1902 were serving in the imperial forces.[35] All this added up to the fact that there was a significant, very personalised sense of loss, disunity and degradation in Afrikaner ranks once peace had been concluded in Pretoria on 31 May 1902.

By most counts the peace terms, as least as far as the Boers were concerned, were generous.[36] Britain was clearly anxious to preempt stirring up even more embarrassment to add to that she had already had to swallow. Nasson suggests that 'while the Boers may have lost the war, their more reconciliationist leadership none the less won a sizable slice of the peace.'[37] Furthermore, the Boers did not 'crumble and disintegrate'; instead they showed themselves to be particularly resilient:

> … despite the terrible mauling of highveldt society, the Boers survived, retaining the basic core of their social cohesion and inscribed cultural traditions, a hankering for political power and independence and a simmering capacity for limbering up again to achieve it. Less than five decades after the end of the war nationalist Afrikanerdom, through the institutions of the new apartheid state, was regaining not only most of the ground lost, but quite a lot more …[38]

How they managed to achieve this is a study in itself, but one particular aspect of their capacity for 'limbering up again' in order to realise their nationalist goals, is relevant in this discussion of how Afrikaners remembered the war: they enshrined it in a literary epitaph and set about creating their own Great Trek/Boer War Afrikaner national heritage. Nationalist ideologues used the memory of the war as a grudge to be nursed in full technicolour. The war became a 'morale boosting legend of heroism and patriotic fortitude, tested and not found wanting against despised British Tommies, moral corrosion … [and] the treachery of fellow fighters'.[39]

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[32] For the aftermath of the war and the physical devastation it had caused see Pakenham, *The Boer War,* p 572; Lowry, 'Not just a ''teatime war'' ', p 3; Pretorius, *The Anglo-Boer War,* pp 88–89.

[33] Nasson, 'South Africa's post-Boer, Boer War', p 14.

[34] For details on the *hendsoppers,* the Boers who laid down their arms, and the *joiners,* those burghers who left the commandos to fight on the British side, see AM Grundlingh, *Die 'hendsoppers' en die 'joiners': die rasionaal en verskynsel van verraad,* 2nd edition (Pretoria, 1999).

[35] Lowry, 'Not just a ''teatime war'' ', p 3; Pretorius, *The Anglo-Boer War,* p 73.

[36] For the broad terms of the Peace of Vereeniging and war damages paid to the Boers see Pretorius, *The Anglo-Boer War,* p 89.

[37] Nasson, *The South African War,* p 7.

[38] Nasson, *The South African War,* p 281.

Porter agrees. In his less adorned yet masterly contribution on how historians have seen the war over the last century he writes of how the war led to a resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism fired by a war-laden historiographical tradition. He adds that this Afrikaner national zeal also inspired political activity in the form of a 'succession of Afrikaner attempts to reassert their separate identity'. These began no more than 12 years after the war when Boer War veterans staged an armed protest against participation in the First World War. Although the newly-formed Union Defence Force put down the rebellion, republican ardour continued to simmer and these ideals were finally realised with the recovery of republican status in 1961. And even in 1988, by which time it was clear that the apartheid state was well on its way out, Afrikaner nationalists linked their commemoration of the 150th anniversary of the Great Trek to Boer War sites.[40]

Clearly then, in the post-war era memory of the Anglo-Boer War was used as a powerful tool to promote Afrikaner nationalism and attempt to unify a divided society. Despite the fact that in the immediate aftermath of the war Boer society was 'riven with conflict' and certain collaborators complained that they were 'branded, distrusted and hated' by their fellow Boers, Grundlingh claims that by 1906 Boer political leaders, notably Louis Botha and JC Smuts, had adopted a conciliatory attitude towards their 'weaker brethren' and had succeeded in papering over the cracks in Afrikaner ranks.[41] This was true at least to the extent that the erstwhile traitors had found acceptance in the new Boer political parties *Het Volk* and *Orangia Unie* in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony respectively, but in the decades that followed it remained the task of pro-republicans and the Afrikaner press to lure Afrikaners into the nationalist cultural fold with value-laden offerings of Anglo-Boer War memories.

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[39] Nasson, *The South African War,* p 282, Nasson, 'South Africa's post-Boer, Boer War', pp 15–16. See also Albert Grundlingh, 'War, wordsmiths and the ''volk', p 52.

[40] Porter, 'The South African war and the historians', p 636.Piet de Wet, one of the leading Boer 'joiners' as quoted in Albert Grundlingh, 'Collaborators in Boer society', in Peter Warwick (ed), *The South African War, the Anglo-Boer War 1899–1902* (London, 1980), pp 276–277.

[42] Nasson, *The South African War,* p 263.

[41] Piet de Wet, one of the leading Boer 'joiners' as quoted in Albert Grundlingh, 'Collaborators in Boer society', in Peter Warwick (ed), *The South African War, the Anglo-Boer War 1899–1902* (London, 1980), pp 276–277.

Afrikaner war poets such as Eugène Marais, Jan Celliers and 'Totius' did their bit, writing of Boer heroes and their selfless bravery, keeping war memories alive in Afrikaner social, political and religious circles.[42] And Afrikaner historians led by Gustav Preller, a former war correspondent on the Boer side and subsequently the editor of an Afrikaans newspaper with a wide readership, did the same. History was used to stir up patriotism and to make Afrikaners aware of their common identity and their mission to continue the fight for their freedom in the future. They had their work cut out to counteract the image that the imperialist novelists in Britain, and more especially the *Penny Dreadful* press had meanwhile popularised of Boer society.[43]This outspoken and often offensive imperial gothic[44] vision described the Boer as an uncultured ignoramus, 'with no legitimate place in capitalist modernity ... who displayed cowardly or shifty fighting qualities in pursuing a criminal war against civilising progress'.[45] Victorian stereotypes of Boers presented the burghers as 'foul and unkempt' with little notion of personal hygiene, and usually included the unflattering comparison that: '... one does not see as much soap and water as used in our camps'.[46] President Paul Kruger also became the frequent butt of this offensive imperial propaganda.[47]

By the 1920s Afrikaner writing had been given official backing by the recognition of Afrikaans and the campaign to promote the nationalist cause began to blossom in popular periodicals such as *Die Brandwag and Die Huisgenoot.*[48] Into the 1930s and beyond, these magazines offered readers a diet of 'earthy folk memory [of the war, memories] of hardship, privation and brave sacrifice'. These magazines were enormously popular and soon had a wide circulation in Afrikaner homes, reading clubs and magazine clubs, particularly those in the rural areas. According to Nasson, 'the influence of this literary pipeline looks to have been quite considerable'.[49] It was just the antidote that Afrikaners sought to offset the crude Boer stereotypes the imperialist press was proliferating.

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[42] Nasson, *The South African War,* p 263.

[43] See for example Krebs, *Public discourse and the Boer War,* pp 5, 117–120.

[44] For a discussion on the literary forms of the 'imperial gothic' see Julie Pridmore, 'From Winchester to Gormenghast: some interpretations of the ''gothic'' ', Paper presented at a History Department seminar, University of South Africa, Pretoria, 9 May 2001.

[45] Nasson, 'South Africa's post-Boer, Boer War', p 17; Krebs, *Public discouse and the Boer War,* p 5.

[46] R H Davis and A G Hales, both of whom were British war correspondents in South Africa, quoted in Pretorius, *The Anglo-Boer War,* p 47. See also Krebs, *The writing of empire,* p 117.

[47] According to Krebs, *The writing of empire,* p 117, 'Kruger was described as blowing his nose through his fingers ... the Boers were a nation of peasants ... either in a state of arrested development or culturally degenerate.'

[48] Nasson, *The South African War,* p 264.

Starting in the early 1900s, the popularising of Afrikaner war memories also took another form: that of pilgrimages to the grave sites of Boer War heroes, military parades, gatherings of *oudstryders,* the laying of wreaths at battle and camp sites and, of course, the creation of Afrikaner heritage sites such as war memorials.[50] The best known of these is the *Vrouemonument* in Bloemfontein, an imposing edifice and a veritable 'condensed repository of memories', built in 1913. Although this particular monument was used by avid ideologues as a symbol of Afrikaner nationalism, a tribute to the suffering of Boer women and children in the war, it has recently been suggested that it merely depicts the passive role the women played and that the active contribution of women in the war needs to be addressed.[51] It is also significant that these early 20th-century moves to erect monuments only commemorated the Boer side of the conflict; no effort at all was made to remember the very real contribution or indeed the suffering of black South Africans.[52] Then too, however varied these different forms of Anglo-Boer War commemoration might have been, they almost inevitably involved a manipulation of 'private or community bereavement to political symbolism through deft Afrikaner nationalist appropriation'.[53]

Until the end of the 1920s there were comparatively few Afrikaans books that drew on Boer War memories but in the period 1930 to 1950 this began to change. Anti- British sentiment was also still very much in vogue in Afrikaner circles and the 1920s tour of the Prince of Wales and the 1947 Royal Visit to South Africa served to rouse antagonism among Afrikaner nationalists royal visitors from Britain had no business coming to a South Africa where British imperialists had used such cruel methods to overcome the Boers and had victimised their women and children.

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[49] Nasson, *The South African War,* p 264.

[50] Nasson, *The South African War,* p 263; Nasson, 'South Africa's post-Boer, Boer War', p 16. See also Elsabé Brink and Sue Krige, 'Remapping and remembering the South African War in Johannesburg and Pretoria', Paper presented at the 'Rethinking the South African War Conference', Unisa, 1998.

[51] Cuthbertson and Jeeves, 'Many-sided struggle for southern Africa', p 13. The point is made here that recent research interprets the role of women in the war quite differently and is critical of the 'generally androcentric historiography of the war'. See also Chrisman, *Rereading the imperial romance,* p 14.

[52] Cuthbertson and Jeeves, 'Many-sided struggle for southern Africa', p 13.

[53] Nasson, 'South Africa's post-Boer, Boer War', p 16.

Histories such as Sara Raal's *Met die Boere in die veld* (1938) and historical novels like *Ruiter in die nag* by 'Mikro' (1941) appeared and served to remind Afrikaners of the war, waxing lyrical on the role played by the sturdy burghers. In this period an increasing number of novels, poetry and biographies of Boer War heroes began to appear and were enthusiastically received. Christiaan de Wet, the epitome of elusive Boer guerilla generalship, who had been able to outfox, out-think and outride the plodding British, became a household name. As Grundlingh explains, this type of literature had a dual objective: it not only served to remind readers of the bitter war experience, it also suggested that the hardy *bittereinder* was the role model to be followed, the typical national character who was brave and tenacious yet had also shown his ability to be wily in adversity.[54]

Afrikaner professional historians produced many histories in the late 1930s and the1940s. There was an intense mission to catalogue everyone who had done their bit in the war, and authors jostled to compile biographies, particularly on the Boer leaders who had fought so selflessly in the defence of Boer freedom.[55] The favoured Boer leaders in this type of study were those who (unlike Botha and Smuts, who had been prepared to 'collaborate' with the British after peace had been signed) had made a valiant effort to regain Afrikaner republican status in 1914. In an overt campaign to promote what became known as Afrikaner *volksgeskiedenis,* the memory of the war was used as an ingredient to stress the ethnic suffering of the Afrikaners, first at the hands of the Africans during the Great Trek and then by the British in the *Tweede Vryheidsoorlog.* This was also a convenient coupling for the 1938 commemoration of the centenary of the Great Trek, an occasion that produced a fresh rash of wreath-laying ceremonies and new memorials, including the formidable Voortrekker Monument in Pretoria that could then be used to symbolise the imposing and indestructible power of Afrikanerdom, the veritable bulwark against 'outside' penetration. These memorials and public demonstrations, then, also fostered patriotism and a common Afrikaner identity. Although it is true that many of them have since virtually been forgotten,[56] at the time, together with the prolific nationalist literature that was coming off the presses, they served a useful ideological purpose and they continued to be important in balancing white political forces right up until after the Second World War. It is quite conceivable that they also played a role in the National Party victory at the polls in 1948.[57]

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[54] Grundlingh, 'War, wordsmiths and the "volk" ', pp 45–46; Nasson, *The South African War,* p 265.

T55 Nasson, 'South Africa's post-Boer, Boer war', pp 19–20. See also Cuthbertson and Jeeves, 'Many-sided struggle for southern Africa', p 15.

[56] Cuthbertson and Jeeves, 'Many-sided struggle for South Africa', pp 11–12.

From the late 1960s to the 1980s Afrikaans academic works on the Anglo-Boer War became significantly less partisan and less crusading in purpose. This can be put down in part to the fact that Afrikaners were enjoying the fruits of post-1948 prosperity under National Party rule. They felt secure and comparatively unthreatened and were probably anticipating 'a bright and prosperous white future.[58] The vice-grip of the imperial conquerors of 1902 had been neutralised and the 1961 restoration of republican status was comfortably reassuring. There was even evidence of what Nasson calls a 'judicious thaw in [Anglo-Boer] war sentiment' and an attempt was made to 'glide English South Africans into a more companionable and inclusive white supremacist nationalism'. The war had apparently begun to loosen its stranglehold on Afrikaner historical consciousness.[59]

By the 1970s the mantle of super-Afrikanerdom and thus the memory of the Anglo-Boer War as an ideological totem, had been taken over by the ultra-right, a small political sector that drew most of its support from the white lower middle class and had by this time become estranged from the 'traitors to the cause', the National Party leadership. These conservative Afrikaners, who had a penchant for riding about on horseback wearing slouch hats reminiscent of those worn by the burghers on commando, refused to relinquish the memories of the war and the suffering experienced by the Boers at the hands of the hated imperialists, and unlike their more enlightened fellow Afrikaners they continued to espouse an overt anti-English agenda. They tried to preserve their bitter memories of the war and to extract a last drop of political blood from the stone. The 1995 tour of Queen Elizabeth II subsequent to South Africa's re-entry into the Commonwealth was one such event that jarred the ultra-right *Boerestaat* and *Volkstaat* groups. South Africa had moved into to a new political dispensation and the 'lunatic right' was becoming progressively more marginalised. They made an angry statement that the Queen was most unwelcome in the two former republics. She was, after all, the 'great-granddaughter of a cruel queen' who had murdered 'our people' in the concentration camps.[60]

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[57] Nasson, 'South Africa's post-Boer, Boer war', pp 15-16.

[58] Cuthbertson and Jeeves, 'Many-sided struggle for South Africa', p 18.

[59] Nasson, *The South African War,* p 266; Cuthbertson and Jeeves, 'Many-sided struggle for southern Africa', p 18.

There was now the dual threat to the old Afrikaner ideology of Boer War bitterness: Englishness was still there but racial equality had become an even more threatening spectre. In 1992 Conservative Party leader Andries Treurnicht naively announced that it was perhaps time for 'all English-speaking patriots to let bygones be bygones, and join hands with the Boer to resist the common enemy of black domination',[61] but his plea fell on very deaf ears as political realists could clearly see the pattern of things to come. Another instance was the tragicomic demand made in 1999 that the visiting British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, make a formal British apology for the atrocities committed by British military authorities in the concentration camps during the Anglo-Boer War. The *Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging* leader, the outspoken and pugnacious Eugène Terre'Blanche (currently serving a prison sentence for attempted murder) also saw fit to make threats that Afrikaners should be granted their freedom 'or else' but no one seemed very concerned. From the perspective of 2001 then, and in the light of the recent ruling party attempts to see the Anglo-Boer War as shared Boer-African suffering[62] it appears to be a matter of: the memory of the *Tweede Vryheidsoorlog* is dead, long live the memory of the Anglo-Boer South African War.

Turning to the imperial memory of the Anglo-Boer War, how historically aware were Britons of the conflict? Do Britons in the metropolis and those in settler communities in the periphery of the empire (who were among the troops to fighting in the imperial army) still recall their experiences in the war? What public interest did it arouse at the end of the 19th century and does this memory of the war still live on a century later?

In the immediate aftermath of the war British society had to square up to several new and troublesome issues such as relative imperial decline and the questionable efficiency of Britain's military structures.[63] Around the world the war had become a symbolic anti-British cause, although mutual distrust between the various European states came down in the end to the fact that although most of Europe was waiting to exploit Britain's position to its own advantage in the 1899 to 1902 period, no single state had been prepared to commit itself on behalf of the Boers.[64] Indeed, given these international rivalries and the failure of Milner's attempts to entrench British hegemony in South Africa in the post-war period, the Liberal cabinet in London opted to salvage some measure of British influence in the subcontinent by taking a conciliatory stance with the white minority in South Africa, thus effectively shelving the interests of the black majority.[65]

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[60] *The Cape Times,* 21 March 1995, quoted in Nasson, 'South Africa's post-Boer Boer War', p 25.

[61] *Weekly Mail,* 16–22 October 1992, quoted in Nasson, *The South African War,* p 271.

[62] Cuthbertson and Jeeves, 'Many-sided struggle for southern Africa', pp 5–9. See discussion of these developments below.

[63] Ian F W Beckett, 'The South African War and the late Victorian army', in Dennis and Grey (eds), *The Boer War: army, nation and empire,* pp 37–44.

As Krebs shows in her innovative analysis of the cultural politics of late-Victorian imperialism, in Britain the Anglo-Boer War was used to inspire loyalties to the empire, the best example being the hectic euphoria of Mafeking night, when the British public celebrated the relief of Mafeking in May 1900:

> In what has been seen as perhaps the premier expression of crude public support of late Victorian imperialism, Liverpool, Newcastle, Birmingham, York and Glasgow rioted with fireworks, brass bands, and blasts on factory sirens. This celebration of empire was made possible by the new halfpenny press that spread the daily news to thousands of households that had never before read a newspaper daily … imperialism distracted the British working classes from their economic problems by promising payoffs from afar in imperial trade as well as by replacing class consciousness with nationalism and pride in the empire …

But Krebs is quick to explain that 'the celebrations in fact say less about British support for imperialism than they do about the power of the press to 'tease the British public into a frenzy of anticipation and then to release that tension in a rush of carefully directed enthusiasm'.[66] On this manipulation by politicians of the British popular press in the service of capitalism, Jacqueline Beaumont concurs, but as she so rightly adds, 'if one wishes to evaluate the effect of the war on contemporary public opinion, it is the newspapers they read that one should examine'.[67]

As has been shown above, by the end of the 19th century the British public had been fed, and had digested, the image of the Boers as backward, uncouth farmers who were not geared to promote a modern capitalist state and were bent on exploiting British settlers on the gold mines. These 'ragged bands of untrained soldiers riding ponies' would certainly be too poorly equipped to mount a successful attack on the formidable British army. 'Black Week' in December 1899 raised some niggling public doubts about the veracity of this image, which was one of the important reasons why Mafeking Night, five months later, received the public attention that it did in the metropolis.

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[64] Pretorius, *The Anglo-Boer War,* pp 83–86. See also Nasson, *The South African War,* pp 280–281.

[65] Magubane, *The making of a racist state,* p 395. See also Cuthbertson and Jeeves, 'Many-sided struggle for southern Africa', pp 16–17.

[66] Krebs, *Gender, race and the writing of empire,* pp 1–2. See also Stephen Badsey, 'The Boer war as media war' in Dennis and Grey (eds), *The Boer War: army nation and empire,* pp 70–83.

[67] Jacqueline Beaumont, 'The British press and censorship during the South African War 1899–1902', Special issue, South African War 1899–1902: centennial perspectives, *South African Historical Journal,* 41 (1999), pp 289.

The war, then, was manipulated to become symbolic of British imperialism and to promote jingoism; it helped to rally patriotism and boost national sentiment that had slipped briefly in late 1899 but was set to recover gloriously. In short, the war became a symbol that was used to evoke sentiments that would unite the British public. 'Everything from biscuit tins to advertisements to schoolbooks … reminded the Britons of ''their'' empire.'[68] The comparison with the post-war boosting of Afrikaner national sentiment in South Africa is a patently obvious one.

In Britain, as in South Africa, popular literary works of the time became one of the important vehicles for promoting nationalism, and the imperial romance did for millions of Britons before the war what *Die Huisgenoot* and Mikro did for Afrikaners once it was over. Laura Chrisman's work is in the same genre as the book by Krebs; it studies the historical experience of British imperialism in South Africa (and thus, by implication, to some extent at the very least, the experience of the Anglo-Boer War) and how this was mediated through the works of three novelists: 'the imperialist H Rider Haggard, the liberal anti-imperialist Olive Schreiner and the African nationalist Sol Plaatje'.[69] Chrisman examines how each of these contemporary writers expressed their opinions and thus moulded British public opinion. She claims that while previously South Africa was of marginal interest for Britons and the far-flung colonial possession attracted little attention, this situation changed after the discovery of diamonds and gold and the rise of imperialism and capitalism.[70] Hunting for 'treasure', as did Allan Quartermain in Haggard's 1885 novel *King Solomon's mines,* held immediate attraction for British readers. And there were other powerful symbols too: 'the new desire for profit-at-any-price converged for the first time with the old ''fortune hunt'' '.[71] Quartermain legitimised imperialism while in contrast, Schreiner's 1897 hero, Trooper Peter, in *Trooper Peter Halkett of Mashonaland,* was a fictional critique of everything colonialism stood for.[72] It is significant that one of the important 'moments in South African transformation' that is identified as producing new kinds of literary responses, is the emergence of the Union of South Africa after the Anglo-Boer War.[73]

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[68] Krebs, *Gender, race and the writing of empire,* pp 7–8.

[69] Laura Chrisman, *Rereading the imperial romance: British imperialism and South African resistance in Haggard, Schreiner and Plaatje* (Oxford, 2000), p 1.

[70] Chrisman, *Rereading the imperial romance,* p 3.

[71] Hannah Arendt, *The origins of totalitarianism* (London, 1986) quoted in Chrisman, *Rereading the imperial romance,* p 3.

As happened in South Africa in the post-war years, the war was also remembered in Britain and elsewhere in the world by erecting Anglo-Boer War memorials. According to Cuthbertson and Jeeves there are over 1100 such monuments worldwide and the names appearing on them are recorded as part of a British-based project.[74] This public expression of the memory of the war appears to indicate that the conflict certainly had a significant impact on the British historical consciousness, albeit, as some researchers have claimed, that this was of comparatively short duration.[75] Many of the British memorials are in memory of particular regiments or individuals, and 77 of them are to be found in cathedrals, giving the war memory a religious overtone.[76]

Early imperial historians such as HW Wilson wrote about the war primarily as a military encounter, fought to promote Britain's international reputation as a world leader. The troops were 'the very flower of the British army', and were well-equipped to the extent that they were reputedly invincible.[77] When the war finally ended in 1902 its cost in both sterling and British pride were hushed up as far as possible and the generous peace terms (from the Boer point of view) and the hurried abandonment of African interests, were symptomatic of British anxiety to put the whole messy affair behind them.[78] Porter points out that contemporary commentators and many of the foremost British historians since, have stressed the global importance of the war, debating the role of gold, the rise of capitalism and even the need for labour as its causative factors. Theorising about the nature of imperialism was another popular topic among British social and political thinkers. These erudite studies on the global importance and the political economy of the war have persisted well into the 1980s and beyond, but Porter feels that there is evidence now, with the centenary of the war upon us, that 'things appear to have changed'.[79] He points out that 'the place of the war in Britain's own domestic and imperial history has been left more and more to one side' and that 'Key words … such as ''gold'', ''mining'' and ''strategy'' were hardly mentioned' at recent conferences on the war.[80] In an attempt to analyse this comparative neglect by British historians, he falls back upon the explanation that after all the war was relatively insignificant for the seat of empire. It cannot really be seen as 'a great turning-point in British history'; nor was South Africa the only colony in the empire that offered good prospects for capitalist expansion.[81] In short he claims that neither the war nor any other South African issues 'captured the attention of the British public in any lasting manner; rarely anticipated, they were also rapidly displaced'.[82]

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[72] Chrisman, *Rereading the imperial romance,* p 121.

[73] Chrisman, *Rereading the imperial romance,* pp 3–4.

[74] Cuthbertson and Jeeves, 'Many-sided struggle for South Africa', p 12.

[75] Badsey, 'The Boer War as a media war', p 82. Badsey claims that by January 1901 the war had almost ceased to feature in the provincial press, while in London there were some editorial articles but 'increasingly few' actual reports from the front. See also Porter, 'The South African War and the historians', p 646, on whether the war had a lasting impact on the British 'public mind'.

[76] Cuthbertson and Jeeves, 'Many-sided struggle for South Africa', p 12.

[77] H W Wilson, *With the flag to Pretoria* (London, 1900), quoted in Porter, 'The South African war and the historians', p 634.

[78] See above; Nasson, *The South African War,* pp 7, 281; Cuthbertson and Jeeves, 'Many-sided struggle for southern Africa', pp 16–17.

The same can also be said, it would seem, of the memory of the Anglo-Boer War in the imperial periphery. The way that the 'South African British', that is, British people living in South Africa (who were in a very real sense involved in the war, but did not fight in it) remember the conflict, will be sidestepped. This constitutes a complex study on its own. For the sake of simplicity and the purposes of this survey, it will be presumed that they either identified more closely with Britons or with less conservative, non-republican, Afrikaans-speaking South Africans.

To return to the memory of the war the rapidly fading memory, it would appear in the imperial periphery, this issue is addressed in another of the books under review: the collection of papers presented at a Boer War Conference in Australia, entitled *The Boer War, army, nation and empire.* This work serves to underline the fact that not only did the Anglo-Boer War have a marginal impact on other settler communities in the empire, but also that the collective imperial memory of the encounter has waned dramatically over the intervening century. Certainly, for obvious reasons, the war was a less traumatic and central event for the empire's settler dominions, but it has been pointed out that it served to promote individual national identities.[83] Canadians were able to use their war experience to underline their Canadian national identity and the Canadian archetype of the upright Mountie emerged; Canadians had shown that they were hardy and courageous and that they were ready to control their own destiny. According to Carman Miller, in the post-war period in Canada an impressive number of memorials were inaugurated and veterans' organisations were formed that gathered annually on Paardeberg Day for a 'patriotic reconstruction of their history.[84] But presumably now that these veterans have all died, the memory of the war has largely died with them, and there is evidence that memorials of this war have become meaningless for most Canadians.[85] Similarly Australian nationals felt strongly that they had been able to do their bit to rescue the inept British performance in the Anglo-Boer War, with 'Australian military ''mateship'' galloping to the rescue of empire'. The war thus became linked with national pride and assertiveness and played a role in emergent Australian federation.[86]

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[79] Porter, 'The South African War and the historians', pp 636–639. New trends in the historiography of the war are discussed below.

[80] Porter, 'The South African War and the historians', p 645.

[81] Daniel Waley, 'Lewes in the Boer War', *Sussex Archaeological Collections,* 132, (1994), quoted in Porter 'The South African War and the historians', p 646.

[82] Porter, 'The South African War and the historians', pp 646–647.

But having said this, other imperial dominions have not shown anything like the ardour felt in South Africa or in Britain, in remembering or commemorating the war. That this is true is borne out by Craig Wilcox, the historian who has been commissioned by the Australian War Memorial to write a history of Australia's involvement in the Anglo-Boer War. Although the war was the third largest in which Australians have been involved, Wilcox admits that a 'minor war fought in a distant land to bring two republics under British rule stirs few of us today' and clearly does not see Tommy Cornstalk as having played a crucial role alongside Tommy Atkins in South Africa from 18991902. Wilcox also points out that numerically speaking, troops from nations on the periphery of the empire made up a comparatively small portion of the imperial army. Of the approximately 500 000 soldiers in the imperial army in South Africa only two-fifths of the units were volunteer units and of these only a fifth came from Canada, Australia and New Zealand combined.[87] Perhaps, then, it is to be expected that apart from what Luke Trainor sees as an 'important conjuncture' between Australian federation and the Anglo-Boer War,[88] one of the few abiding Australian memories of the war is the controversial Breaker Morant episode, an episode that allows Australians 'to share honours with the Boers ... as superior soldiers to the plodding British'.[89] Nevertheless Trainor shows that in Australia at least, there is still enough interest to fire some new scholarship on the war and that historians are busy reassessing the motives and experiences of imperial troops and drawing new conclusions.[90]

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[83] Carman Miller, 'Loyalty, patriotism and resistance: Canada's response to the Anglo-Boer War', *South African Historical Journal* 41 (1999), pp 312–313; Carman Miller,'The crucible of war: Canadian and British troops during the Anglo-Boer War' in Dennis and Grey (eds), *The Boer War: army, nation and empire,* p 84; Lowry, 'Not just a ''teatime war'' ', p 14. See also Carman Miller, *Painting the map red: Canada and the South African War, 1899–1902* (Montreal, 1993).

[84] Miller, 'Canada's response to the Anglo-Boer War', p 322.

[85] See for example the quotation cited in Lowry, 'Not just a ''teatime war'' ', p 14 on the 'forgotten' monument in central Toronto in honour of the war.

[86] Nasson, *The South African War,* pp 279–280.

Because the memory of the Anglo-Boer War in the historical consciousness of black South Africans has become, in a certain sense since 1994, one of most immediate importance, it has been left until last in order to bring the discussion right up to date. The African role in the Anglo-Boer War, as has been pointed out, is now unquestioned. In Nasson's words:

> To the extent that we now recognize the supportive military role played by perhaps as many as 14,000 African and Coloured commando auxiliaries, and possibly 120,00 African, Coloured and Indian men in armed or non-combatant imperial army service, it is quite obvious that this was never a white war. Even if these latest estimates may be rather overstated, there can be no mistaking the importance of the non-European role in servicing both sides, in keeping them in the field, in flexing their fighting power, and in its distinct irregular contribution to the art of war in South Africa: maintenance, transport-riding, scouting, raiding, cattle-rustling, spying, interpreting, dispatch running and riding, and in holding this or that patch of imperial ground.[91]

In 1902, when the war finally ground to a halt, whatever pre-war aspirations Africans had fostered of improving their conditions, were effectively snuffed out when the peace was signed. The peace treaty took little cognisance of African interests. The question of the African vote was shelved, which effectively meant that it was disregarded, and blacks gained little in terms of relief in the form of compensation for damages to property; the 17% on their claims was at a far lower rate than that paid to the Boers.[92] After the conclusion of peace Africans had few opportunities to express their views on their memories of the war.[93]

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[87] Craig Wilcox, 'Looking back on the South African War' in Dennis and Grey (eds), *The Boer War: army, nation and empire,* p 8.

[88] Luke Trainor, 'Convenient conflict? From federal defence to federation' in Dennis and Grey (eds), *The Boer War: army, nation and empire,* pp 224.

[89] Craig Wilcox, 'Looking back on the South African War', p 11.

[90] Papers in the anthology cited above, the same one in which Wilcox, an Australian, looks back on the South African War, include several on the role of the war in the development of national identities, one on the role of the media, two on war literature and number of military history offerings.

[91] Nasson, *The South African War,* p 282.

Most of what we now know about how Africans experienced the war has been gleaned by scholars since the 1980s and several papers presented at centenary conferences are proof of a growing number of academic studies on the war and other fields by African historians.[94] The memory of the war in African historical consciousness is, however, difficult to gauge because sources such as diaries, memoirs, memorials and grave sites that reflect the African experience are limited. Sol Plaatje's remarkable diary of his experiences while Mafeking was under siege by the Boers is one of the notable exceptions.[95]

In his article on the historiography of the war, Porter levels the criticism that South Africa's own black historians appear to be 'oblivious to the past and even present work of their liberal white predecessors.'[96] There is certainly some justification for this comment. But not in the case of Bernard Magubane. Although admittedly not a historian, he is nevertheless an academic who has been accorded considerable status in the capacity of a historian by the present ANC government in South Africa.[97] Magubane has not been 'oblivious' of the work of liberal white histories. He is scathing in his criticism of these works as a collection of 'minute monographic studies' that add up to very little that is meaningful in our understanding of the 'real' South African past, the African one. He dismisses them as 'narrow scholastic quibblings' that were 'written by wealthy [white] men of leisure', liberals who 'betrayed the cause' and created 'many myths to ''explain'' the history of white supremacy and continuing racism'.[98]

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[92] Pakenham, *The Boer War,* p 573; Simons and Simons, *Class and colour,* p 60.

[93] See for example Christopher Saunders, 'African attitudes to Britain and the empire before and after the South African War', in Lowry, *The South African War reappraised,* pp 140–149.

[94] For example Bernard Mbenga, 'The role of the Bakgatla of the Pilanesberg in the South African War' and Manelisi Genge, 'The role of the EmaSwati in the South African War'. Both these papers were presented at the Rethinking the South African War conference. These scholars have also written doctoral theses on aspects of African history in southern Africa. See also an interesting collected work of papers presented at an African Renaissance Conference held in Johannesburg in September 1998, MW Makgoba (ed) *African Renaissance: the new struggle* (Sandton and Cape Town, 1999).

[95] Chrisman, *Rereading the imperial romance,* pp 167–168; Cuthbertson and Jeeves, 'Many-sided struggle for southern Africa', p 11.

[96] Porter, 'The South African War and the historians', p 640.

[97] See discussion above of Magubane's appointment by the ANC as head of a SADET project to write an official history of the liberation struggle and negotiation process in South Africa.

[98] Magubane, *The making of a racist state,* pp xiii, xvii–xxi. Most of these allegations are very vaguely couched. They do not refer to specific pages or passages in the works that are discussed.

In his work *The making of a racist state: British imperialism and the Union of South Africa 1875–1910,* published in 1996, he expounds his particular view. Is this to be manufactured into the *only* ANC view, one wonders, in the light of his recent appointment? Surely room must also be made for other ANC opinions on the injustices wrought by British imperialism in the post Anglo-Boer War years. Magubane sees the war as crucially important in that it was the culmination of British imperialism in South Africa. It was an event that provided the 'great catalyst' for the creation of one of the 'most monstrous states the Union of South Africa' a state that almost immediately entrenched its authority by passing the Natives Land Act of 1913. He puts the blame for the racial exploitation in South Africa squarely on the shoulders of British imperialism.[99] This almost to the extent that he wellnigh absolves Afrikaners of blame in white oppression in establishing the apartheid state. In Magubane's view the racist pattern was set when the British won the Anglo-Boer War and in 1948 the reins of white domination were in effect merely passed on to another racist white minority group.[100]

A point made by Cuthbertson and Jeeves is very relevant here. They show that after the Anglo-Boer War Afrikaner nationalists used lurid (often unconfirmed) accounts of suffering in the concentration camps under cruel imperialists to promote their political cause, a 'cause which needed both martyrs and foreign oppressors'. South African historians are now uncovering details of African suffering during the war in British-run concentration camps where conditions were even worse. And this, Cuthbertson and Jeeves suggest, creates the opportunity for African nationalists to conduct a similar anti-imperial crusade to make the Anglo-Boer War a *shared* struggle in which both black and white suffered together, a war

> in which the shared experience of 'atrocities' at the hand of an alien Empire and its ruthless generals and uncaring bureaucrats is pressed into service to promote a bi-racial nationalism. Afrikaner and African leaders can use the shared experience of suffering in the camps to draw attention away from their own long struggle (with more than its share of racial outrages and murderous rampages) to come together in joint ceremonies that commemorate mutual suffering. If such an approach requires omission of inconvenient facts, there should be no surprise in that.[101]

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[99] See Chrisman, *Rereading the imperial romance,* p 206 for some of Sol Plaatje's views on imperialism.

[100] Magubane, Introduction, *The making of a racist state.* See also Bernard Magubane, *The political economy of race and class in South Africa* (New York, 1979), pp 194–195.

[101] Cuthbertson and Jeeves, 'Many-sided struggle for southern Africa', p 5.

In other words, it is suggested that with the centenary of the Anglo-Boer War, the ruling ANC is using the memories of the Anglo-Boer South African War to construct a new myth of shared African and Boer suffering at the hands of a racist and alien empire.

The Anglo-Boer War centenary is being publicly commemorated by all manner of events, including public lectures, erecting new memorials and polishing up the old ones, and the staging of military re-enactments on Boer War battle sites. And the politicians are clearly trying to popularise these events to achieve their political goal by billing them as national projects. One of the best examples of the new-style public commemoration of the war is the new 'shared suffering' changes in the War Museum of the Boer Republics (formerly the *Vrouemonument*) at Bloemfontein. As Porter says: 'History as exhibited in South Africa's museums is … being turned to the task of nation building, commemoration of the Boer War directed to both the settling of political scores and to communal reconciliation.'[102] In effect, however, this shift towards a shared heritage means that the Boers are being transformed into the defenders of South African liberty, a view that is a controversial one in historical circles. It also heats up the old debate on Kitchener's 'methods of barbarism', making them a new tool to be used in the political promotion of post-apartheid unity in South Africa.[103]

Whether this new myth of the Anglo-Boer War as everyone's war will be accepted by the broad spectrum of South Africans remains to be seen. Nasson makes the valid comment that outside of certain 'elite cultural and academic missionary circles', the war is 'not felt to be a shared legacy, let alone a shared tragedy'.[104] And he points out that some Africans are roundly dismissive of the notion of a shared war, citing the example of a group of ANC councillors in Cape Town who have made it very clear that they consider the Anglo-Boer War centenary initiatives inappropriate for Africans. In their view these would achieve very little in the way of uniting South African people. Why, they argue, should Africans remember a colonial war, a squabble between Boer and Brit over land, and one which subsequently produced a highly racist, exploitative state?[105]

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[102] Porter, 'The South African War and the historians', p 641.

[103] Cuthbertson and Jeeves, 'Many-sided struggle for southern Africa', pp 5–6.

[104] Nasson, 'South Africa's post-Boer, Boer War', p 30.

[105] Nasson, *The South African War,* pp 269–270. See also John Matshikiza's reaction to Johannesburg's Anglo-Boer War commemorations quoted in Elsabé Brink and Sue Krige, 'Remapping and remembering the South African War in Johannesburg and Pretoria', *South African Historical Journal* 41 (1999), p 421.

By way of conclusion, it is clear from these developments in the historiography of the Anglo-Boer War that a century later the most abiding memories of the conflict are in South Africa where, to use a well-worn phrase, the brunt of the war fell. And it fell, in varying degrees and in different ways, on all South Africans of whatever race, or gender, or political persuasion.

The flood of new books on the Anglo-Boer War that have appeared thus far in the 1899–1902 centenary period is impressive. Here the emphasis will fall on these published works rather than on all the other events that have been organised to jog our memory: the public lectures, inauguration of memorials, wreath-laying at concentration camp sites, and the hugely-popular tourist sorties to battle-sites, often accompanied by the dramatic re-enactment of famous Boer War battles. More particularly, here the emphasis is on the six works under review. To what extent are they representative of the development of the historiography of the Anglo-Boer War over the past century? And how, in the pages of these books, is the war being remembered?

Because the foregoing discussion on the memory of the war began with the Boers, it is perhaps appropriate to begin here with the works published in Afrikaans. No fewer than four of the six have been written in Afrikaans, and by implication, for Afrikaners[106] in an increasingly English-language oriented South Africa. All four of these books have been published by Protea Boekhuis in Pretoria, a relatively small publishing house owned and run by Nicol Stassen, who has proved himself to be the most prolific publisher of high quality academic and lay publications (based for the most part on primary source material such as war diaries) on the war in both English and Afrikaans during this centenary period. Being genuinely interested in preserving the memory of the Anglo-Boer War and extremely well-informed on both contemporary works and the more recent additions to the historiography, Stassen has also initiated the translation into English of academic works that have previously only been available in Afrikaans.[107]

Two of the four publications are weighty academic works written by professional historians, OJO Ferreira and JW Meijer. Both are good examples of books based on sound historical research and neither, in the old Afrikaner nationalist idiom of the early post-war 20th century, or the *volksgeskiedenis* era of the 1930s and 1940s, tries to promote a political cause or espouses any political agenda.

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[106] Here the word is used not to denote the typical early post-war-period Afrikaner, the pro-republican Afrikaner nationalist, but the more modern, 1990s liberal or more *verligte* Afrikaner.

[107] The best example is the forthcoming translation of Protea's 2nd edition of Albert Grundlingh's *Die 'hendsoppers' en 'joiners': die rasionaal en verskynsel van verraad* (Pretoria, 1999), a work on a topic that has not been researched in any depth by any other academic.

The first, that by cultural historian, OJO Ferreira, *Viva os Boers! Boeregeïnterneerdes in Portugal tydens die Anglo-Boereoorlog*, fits well into the post-1980 genre of social histories. It is a beautifully produced publication, printed on glossy paper in widely-spaced, easy to read print. It examines the experiences of a particular group of just over 1 000 Boers, including women and children, who were exiled to Portugal, the men having laid down their arms at Komatipoort and crossed into Mozambique in September 1900. Cultural historical details of where and how these Boers were housed (far more comfortably than their compatriots in overseas prisoner-of-war camps, it would seem), how they spent their days, their internal squabbles and their reception by the local Portuguese, are all meticulously recorded. Although most of the research was done in South Africa, principally in the National Archival Repositories in Pretoria and Bloemfontein, much work including an extensive newspaper search, was also undertaken in Portugal, which means that this cultural heritage and its impact on the Boer internees has not been neglected. An appendix providing a full list of names of these people is another useful historical tool.

While this book's great strength is its wide research and attention to detail, it is also in a certain sense, one of its very few weaknesses. All but the most dedicated Anglo-Boer War buffs might find this book a little dry and overly academic. Added to this, it might just be skimmed through by those who are more interested in the *people* involved rather than the culture into which they were introduced. This is not to say that the human side of the story has been neglected, but to some, untangling the controversy that surrounds the surrender of these men, a very substantial number, we learn, amounting to almost one-fifth of the Boer fighting force at the time, might well have been of interest.[108] Central to this debate is the shadowy figure of the Boer commander of these forces, General FJ Pienaar (co-incidently the uncle of FF Pienaar, the author of one of the two memoirs under review, a book that has close links with *Viva os Boers!*). And Pienaar, as the most highly-ranked Boer officer in the group of internees, is one of Ferreira's main characters. FJ Pienaar's actions on the Mozambique border at Komatipoort, where he and 3 000 of his demoralised men laid down their arms, have been questioned [109] but rumours of his treachery have never been satisfactorily resolved. Ferreira hints at this and goes so far as to say that these rumours caused ripples of discontent among the internees but disappointingly, the allegations are not pursued.[110]

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[108] Ferreira, *Viva os Boers!,* p 30.

JW Meijer's book, *Generaal Ben Viljoen 18681917* is another academic work that also does its publisher proud with its crisp presentation and excellent maps. It conforms with another new trend in the historiography of the Anglo-Boer War: a 'marked preoccupation with the reputation of individual commanders.'[111] Meijer does this for a Boer commander, Ben Viljoen, the architect of the Boer victory at Vaalkrans, who rose through the ranks and was promoted to assistant Commandant General during the war. Although a few articles on Viljoen's Anglo-Boer War exploits appeared in the period of popular Afrikaner nationalist writing in the 1920s and 1930s, a time when Afrikaner wartime suffering was being used as a political tool to inspire national feeling, Meijer claims that Viljoen attracted less attention than other Afrikaner role models, leaders like De Wet and De la Rey.[112] He was never quite the typical Boer leader, says Meijer. He was a colourful character, too much of an individualist to bother with popularity or to identify with others unless it suited him to do so. Articles on Viljoen such as those by Gustav Preller, DW Krüger and HC Viljoen, that were written for popular consumption, were guilty of eulogising him to promote the Afrikaner cause.[113] In contrast, WJ Leyds, who was a stickler for conformity and disliked the flamboyant, non-conformist Viljoen, produced an unflattering biographical sketch of him.

Meijer, to his credit, puts straight the record on Viljoen in admirable fashion. After two rather drawn-out chapters on Viljoen's pre-war career (an undistinguished one, it must be said) Meijer gets to grips with the *veldkornet* and then the general. The hard-headed Viljoen really lives in these pages as Meijer's chronological account moves around the theatre of war. It shows how Viljoen makes errors of judgement, often taking controversial military decisions. And Meijer's objectivity about the warts on Viljoen's character is exemplary right up until the end of the wartime period, when just before the end of the Anglo-Boer War, Viljoen was captured by the British and sent to St

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[109] See for example Grundlingh, *Die 'hendsoppers' en 'joiners',* pp 69–70.

[110] Ferreira, *Viva os Boers!,* p 111.

[111] Porter, The South African War and the historians', p 642.

[112] Meijer, *Generaal Ben Viljoen,* p 11.

[113] See Meijer, *Generaal Ben Viljoen,* pp 12–14, 16–17.

Helena. The closing chapters of this very well-worthwhile biography are something of a disappointment because Meijer's thorough primary research on Viljoen's career until the end of the war suddenly gives way to an overview of the last 15 years of his life in Mexico and New Mexico, until his death in January 1917. This last chapter is poorly researched by comparison, and the excuse that overseas research is expensive to undertake is hardly satisfactory. It also leaves some important questions unanswered: why did Viljoen not return to settle in South Africa and why did he lie about signing the British oath of allegiance?[114] Meijer then puts an end to any surviving illusions his readers may have had of Viljoen being a Boer role model. He tries, unsuccessfully, to exonerate Viljoen's indiscretion in marrying an American woman in 1904 while his divorce from his South African wife, Lenie, was only finalised in August 1905.[115]

The other two Afrikaans works, for completely different reasons, are also well worth reading, but both are comparatively lightweight works, easy-reading memoirs of burghers who were on commando with the Boers during the Anglo-Boer War. Again, these are very much in vogue because with the centenary on hand and the 'grand sweeps' on the war on the way out, more attention is being given to 'the many and detailed South African wars experienced at first hand by different individuals.[116] In this respect both these books provide us with useful insights for social histories and the recomposition of our memory of the war.

The first, *Gedenkboek van MJ de Jager,* is introduced, translated into Afrikaans, contexualised and annotated by Alwyn Smit, De Jager's grandson. As the sub-title indicates, De Jager's military career was long and varied and his memoirs themselves and the interesting letters in particular, are very useful. Smit has done some excellent research. Apart from his work on the document he has added background material in the form of discussions on several related issues as well as a history of the document itself, a hand-written journal written while De Jager was a prisoner of war on St Helena. But Smit's biographical commentary on his grandfather's unblemished character is excessive. De Jager may well have been a super-hero, but I would have preferred to have been told this only once or twice, or to form this opinion myself after assessing the document. If Smit is too close to, or is unwilling to be unbiased about the memory of his grandfather, then so too, only more so, is De Jager's daughter about her father. Her *karakterbeeld,* which covers no less than six pages of text, while a touching example of a daughter's love and respect for her deceased father, is laden with saccharine bias and is inappropriate alongside an important historical document, albeit one from a family collection.

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[114] Meijer, *Generaal Ben Viljoen,* pp 243–246, 251.

[115] Meijer, *Generaal Ben Viljoen,* pp 257–258.

[116] Porter, 'The South African War and the historians', p 633.

The other useful personal memoir of the war is that by FF Pienaar, entitled *Op kommando met Steyn en De Wet.* These reminiscences, interestingly enough, were written originally in English and were subsequently published in Dutch. Here they have been translated into Afrikaans and are introduced, far more level-headedly, although with less attention to detailed historical research than De Jager's memoirs, by FF Pienaar's son-in law, Jan Picard. The exploits of the adventurous young Pienaar are fascinating on several counts. His uncle was General FJ Pienaar, who was a very controversial *hendsopper.* Furthermore both Pienaars were interned in Portugal so young Flippie's reminiscences supplement Ferreira's work in *Viva os Boers!* Flippie begins his memoirs in Portugal in 1902: *'Hier in die stil ou klooster van Tomar, die Convento da Ordem de Cristo, het die stryd van die afgelope maande soos 'n droom voorgekom ...'*[117] and like a dream they unfold, right down to mention of the mythical *'Krugergoud.'* These memoirs are a lively, whimsical and yet useful source. It is a pity that they, too, like the hints dropped in *Viva os Boers!* do not unravel the Pienaar controversy, but there is much else here to be gleaned for Anglo-Boer War social historians and enthusiastic amateurs. In some respects the collected work edited by Steve Lunderstedt, *Summer of 1899,* a Kimberley library project, is the most widely accessible, in terms of its content, of the six works. It is a veritable treasure-house of sources for social historians of the Anglo-Boer War, is crammed with wonderful photographs, and for the less erudite reader it has no lengthy academic arguments to be probed. It has a central theme: the siege of Kimberley which lasted from 14 October 1899 until 15 February 1900 and is a collection of diaries and personal anecdotes of this famous Boer War siege. Although it is billed on the cover flap as reflecting the siege experiences of Britons, Boers and blacks alike, most of the inserts have been written by British people and the only reference I could find to blacks was in population statistics or nameless faces in the odd photograph. Unfortunately the book is also full of small typographical and grammatical errors (also some factual blunders in the introductory sections) which are an irritation, and when I opened my copy I found to my dismay that a very long list of errata had been slipped unashamedly into the first page. In general the casual, rather sloppy charm of the book outweighs its flaws, and it will be picked up and put down often by its readers, few of whom, I fancy, will have the tenacity to read all of the 335 small-printed, large pages from cover to cover.

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[117] Pienaar, *Op kommando met Steyn en De Wet,* p 20.

Because many of the papers in *The Boer War: army, nation and empire* have already been cited while compiling the discussion of the collective *imperial* memory of the war, it will not be necessary to dwell on the sixth and final work to be reviewed, but some additional perspectives are perhaps appropriate. It is an absorbing collection of papers that were presented at an Anglo-Boer War conference held in Australia in 1999 and has only one serious shortcoming: its lack of an index, an omission that makes the book very difficult to use effectively for research.

The collection includes two good contributions by John Hirst and Luke Trainor, both of whom assess the links between the Anglo-Boer War and the emergent Australian federation of 1901. This question and the Breaker Morant incident appears to be the only really substantial recollections of the war that live on in Australian memory. Given that in South Africa the memory of the war has survived the last 100 years far more effectively, it is not surprising that the most incisive contribution in this anthology is 'South Africa's post-Boer, Boer War', by South African historian Bill Nasson. In his inimitable and highly readable style he shows how Afrikaner ideologues used the memories of Boer War suffering to promote Afrikaner nationalism after the war. There are also two papers on military history, but impressive as the Anglo-Boer War bill of more than £200 is, studies on the military complexities of the war are less popular these days.[118] The first military offering is by Ian Beckett of the University of Luton, on the strengths and weaknesses of the late Victorian army. Another is a rather lugubrious paper by South African Ian van der Waag, on the Boer military system, including a close study of the origin of the commando system. On the whole this latter paper has little appeal. There are also contributions that are more in tune with the now-popular cultural aspects of the war, such as the role of the media and some interesting discussion on Anglo-Boer War verse, the latter 'arguably the first substantial Australian cultural response to the war'.[119]

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[118] Porter, 'The South African War and the historians', pp 635–636. See also the discussion above on new trends in the historiography of the Anglo-Boer War.

[119] Peter Stanley, 'With Banjo to Kimberley: Banjo Paterson's South African War verse as history', in *The Boer War army, nation and empire,* p 172.

By way of conclusion, the new trends in the history of the war, reflected to a marked extent in these six new centenary publications, make the memory of the war less divisive and racial and far more accessible to a greater number of South Africans. Studies on military history have given way to more personal accounts on the reputations of individual commanders and wartime politicians,[120] which may explain the current popularity of tours to various Boer War battle sites, a so-called 'special kind of military history'.[121] But by far the most dominant new emphasis in Anglo-Boer War histories is on studies of social and cultural aspects and the heritage of the war: the experiences, privations and suffering of combatants and non-combatants, both black and white, women as well as men; the reasons why people had the courage to continue fighting or lacked the fibre and gave up; the verse they read and wrote, the songs they sang and their very personal memoirs and experiences of the war; and latterly, studies that focus on issues such as gender, health and medicine, the media, and the legacy of the war in literature. All these aspects and many others guide our Anglo-Boer War memory away from the crass histories of military confrontation and the impersonal and overarching issues of political economy, away from what Porter calls 'the war's primary significance'.[122] A *shared* memory of a very personally-felt war thus becomes far more feasible and it is this Anglo-Boer War that is taking shape in South African historical consciousness as we commemorate its centenary.

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[120] Porter, 'The South African War and the historians', p 642. Porter cites examples of recent works on Methuen, Wolseley, Kitchener and Salisbury, among others.

[121] Cuthbertson and Jeeves, 'Many-sided struggle for southern Africa', p 9.

[122] Porter, 'The South African War and the historians', p 642.

New histories for a new millennium

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Dan Wylie, *Savage delight: white myths of Shaka* (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 2000), xi + 270 pp, illus, map, bibl, index. ISBN 0 86980 955 5

Paul la Hausse de Lalouvière, *Restless identities: signatures of nationalism, Zulu ethnicity and history in the lives of Petros Lamula (1881–1948) and Lymon Maling (1889–c.1936)* (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 2000), xvi + 317 pp, illus, maps, bibl, index. ISBN 086980 957 1

Benedict Carton, *Blood from your children: the colonial origins of generational conflict in South Africa* (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 2000), xxv + 224 pp, illus, maps, bibl, index. ISBN 0 86980 975 X

'Shaka was a mass murderer like the worst of them' read the headline. The third rebroadcast of the *Shaka Zulu* television series elicited this comment from a television reviewer. She went on: 'I see nothing celebratory about the life of King Shaka and the Zulu nation. His tribal descendants are still bloodthirsty[l]ike the violent taxi drivers'.[1]

The author of this review linked contemporary violent Zulu behaviour with that apparently prevalent in the Shakan kingdom. In particular, her perspective is filtered through a gender framework for she sees Zulu men as modelling their lives on Shaka's male legacy. Thus Shaka is not merely a symbol of violence but also a symbol of an unacceptable masculinity.

At the other extreme is the musical *The spear is born: Bayede Shaka*. Presented both locally and overseas the musical 'pays tribute to the life of the Zulu leader', it is described as being a 'South African King Arthur story' with Shaka's 'magic spear' likened to Arthur's Excalibur.[2] This is directly out of the *Shaka Zulu* television series but more startling was the reference by the musical's producer to Shaka being the 'first African democrat'.[3]

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[1] *Tonight* supplement, *Daily News*, 23 March 2001.

[2] *The Goodlife* supplement, *Mercury* 23 February, 2001;'Learn about Shaka', *Tonight* supplement, *Daily News*, 5 March 2001 and 'Theatre' supplement *Mail and Guardian*, 16 March 2001.

In the space of one month Shaka had been presented as both a mass murderer and a democrat. Mutually exclusive descriptions, to be certain, but nevertheless quite plausible representations considering traditional Shakan historiography. The fact that Shaka could not be both a mass murderer and a democrat does not seem to warrant a serious reconsideration of the perceptions of the past in the various forms of popular media. A television series entitled *Legendary Places* was aired on SABC 3 in February and March of this year. Two episodes dealt with KwaZulu-Natal and were essentially tourist propaganda with the same hoary, legendary tales of the Zulu. Supplementing the narrative and contemporary footage of KwaZulu-Natal were scenes from *Shaka Zulu*. While we may agree that in terms of presenting the past in a more popular format 'history needs considerable editing and adaptation',[4] attempts to grapple with KwaZulu-Natal's past have advanced beyond magical spears and Shaka as tyrannical despot.

This point is borne out by three recent publications of the University of Natal Press. *Savage delight: white myths of Shaka* by Dan Wylie concerns itself directly with the issues raised above. Paul la Hausse's *Restless identities* and Benedict Carton's *Blood from your children* further contribute to our knowledge of KwaZulu-Natal's past.

I approached *Savage delight* with some enthusiasm, as I was about to teach a Culture, Heritage and Tourism module on 'Zulu kings' and hoped that the book would inform my approach to the section on Shaka. *Savage delight*, based on Wylie's PhD thesis, is the result of several years of work. Indeed Wylie has published numerous articles on the subject of 'white writing' about Shaka,[5] a book being long overdue. Its purpose is to examine white perceptions of Shaka and with it, the 'self-contained geneaology of white men's and women's writings about this historical figure, (p 3). Wylie argues that the essentials of the traditional Shakan story have remained static with each literary contribution from the ranks of those with a 'Euro-colonial mentality'

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[3] Interview with E-TV, 12 March 2001.

[4] G Fraser, *The Hollywood history of the world* (London, 1996).

[5] D Wylie, 'Autobiography as alibi: history and projection in Nathaniel Isaacs' *Travels and adventures in eastern Africa* (1836), *Current writing*, 3 (1991) and D Wylie, 'Violently representing Shaka', *Mots pluriels* 1, 4 (1997), available at http://www.arts.uwa.edu.au/MotsPluriels/MP497dw.html.

(p 64). *Savage delight* delves deeply into the history and literature that this mentality has produced. It exposes fallacies, questions accepted convention and offers an analysis of 'white writing' which extends beyond that which deals with Shaka. The book is, however, no mere 'hatchet job'. It seeks to contextualise this writing and locate Shakan myth not so much in errors of historical fact but in the often wild imagination of authors. Indeed Wylie's views are informed by 'a new historicist kind of focus on the reciprocity of texts and contexts in the formation of historically constrained identities'. The issue of identity is significant. These white authors, Wylie contends, sought to bolster their own sense of identity through writing about Shaka. Here he looks to post-colonial and social-psychological theories to provide the tools for textual analysis. Their use does not limit *Savage delight* to examining selected authors however. Wylie is aware that while such literary criticism is the foundation of his study, he acknowledges the need to replace facts identified as fallacies with something more accurate. Accordingly the book does try to answer what really happened (p 5).

The nine chapters cover considerable ground. Wylie begins by assessing the antecedents of the Shaka myth, the qualities attributed to Shaka in historical literature and their penetration by romance structures (pp 1–4 and 35). The contradictoriness of Shaka as mass murderer and democrat, as alluded to above, is shown to be possible since the Shakan story is allegorical. Shaka can be whatever we wish him to be (p 33). The publications of Nathaniel Isaacs, Henry Francis Fynn, Alfred Bryant and EA Ritter are evaluated at length. Here we are shown that these publications were vehicles for psychological projection. When Isaacs paints Shaka as cruel, it is he himself who is cruel. His misadventures in Africa lend credence to Isaacs as a criminal or at best a disagreeable individual. Wylie speculates about the traders' true motives for being in Natal and focuses on their possible role in slavery (pp 92–94). He details editorial manipulation in Isaacs' *Travels and adventures*, *The diary of Henry Francis Fynn* and Ritter's *Shaka Zulu*[6] (pp 97, 125 and 221–222). *Savage delight* concludes with an emphasis on the literary, 'authored' nature of history. Both historical writing and the facts it relies on are contested texts (p 241). Historians are admonished for not reading eyewitness accounts of Shaka adequately, as recording the past, rather than as autobiographical expressions of self-identity (p 70). Although the traders' accounts were received in the 1820s and 1830s with some scepticism, their negative portrayals came to be largely uncritically accepted (pp 77–78, 83, 93 and 105). An example is one of Wylie's historical 'bugbears', the battle of kwaGqokli Hill. The Zulu are alleged to have defeated the Ndwandwe here in 1817. Wylie, who sees the battle as fiction, is critical of historians such as John Laband who continue to refer to this event. This criticism is somewhat unfair as Laband does qualify his reference to the battle by stating that the Zulu 'traditionally' repulsed the Ndwandwe at kwaGqokli Hill.[7] Nevertheless in *Savage delight* history can only 'simulate' the past, it can never replicate it truthfully (p 215).

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[6] N Isaacs, *Travels and adventures in eastern Africa*, ed, L. Herman, vols I and II (Cape Town, 1936); J Stuart and D Malcolm, (eds) *The diary of Henry Francis Fynn* (Pietermaritzburg, 1986); E Ritter, *Shaka Zulu* (London, 1976).

The book therefore does not merely concern itself with Shaka but is directed at the entire canon of Euro-colonial images of the 'other'. Analysing these images is of course not a new field. The subject has been approached from a number of perspectives. Western images of the surrounding world have been brought into question by post-colonial studies, which have produced revisionist material examining a variety of cultural forms including media and literary texts. These studies have forced a re-negotiation of the relationship between colonial discourse and power and the 'other'[8] and have shown that any account of history from a Western perspective is no longer as absolute as before. There has been a growing awareness, through the study of colonial discourse and post-Second World War decolonisation, that European cultural awareness is no longer a dominant centre of world affairs.[9]

Until the 1980s, little work of such a nature had been carried out on particular African societies. There had been studies of European representations of Africa and European reactions to African society but these were general in nature. Analysis of the manner in which representations of Africa were influenced by political and ideological imperatives began with Curtin's seminal work, *The image of Africa*. Curtin went beyond colonial policy in investigating European images of the continent, tracing the development of European colonial knowledge from the eighteenth century, as the latter's contact with Africa expanded.[10] This was followed, for example, by *Tales of the*

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[7] J Laband, *Rope of sand: the rise and fall of the Zulu kingdom in the nineteenth century* (Johannesburg, 1995), p 19.

[8] J. Singh, *Colonial narratives: cultural dialogues* (London, 1996), p 5.

[9] R. Young, *White mythologies: writing history and the West* (London, 1990), p 19.

[10] P Curtin, *The image of Africa: British ideas and action, 1780–1850* (Madison, 1964).

dark continent and Van Wyk Smith's 'The origins of some Victorian images of Africa'. *Tales of the dark continent* examined the experience of imperialism in Africa with its attendant symbols, motifs' and components.[11] Van Wyk Smith assessed representations of Africa in European literature and devoted a section to H Rider Haggard's novels about the Zulu.[12] Russel Martin's 1982 Cambridge thesis investigated the development of a British concept of the Zulu in the 19th century.[13]

Since then scholars such as Paul Forsythe and Daphna Golan, drawing on the notion of invented tradition, have studied the ways in which the Zulu themselves manipulated the past in the service of nationalistic endeavour.[14] Julian Cobbing has critiqued colonial writing about the Zulu by calling into question its objectivity, emphasising the invented nature of such work.[15] In the light of this, Carolyn Hamilton has sought to rehabilitate colonial writers such as James Stuart. At stake in this debate is the access to sources. If we dismiss colonial sources, we 'revert to a denial of that history'. For Hamilton the exchange between colonial writing and indigenous knowledge is more complex than simply invented tradition or self-contained genealogies.[16]

In return Wylie, while not dismissive of Hamilton, does find her argument lacking in areas. He suggests that her conclusions are problematic in places in that she is arguing on the basis of oral traditions collected in the 20th century, which had already been influenced by settler literature. Wylie is determined to show that the Euro-colonial mentality is not to be trusted. Considerable detail and argument are deployed to support this. Chapter Nine, for example, is a study of the life of EA Ritter. Wylie's Ritter is an individual compromised by his financial insecurity and complicated personal life (p 219). These factors contributed to the nonsense that is *Shaka Zulu*.

As I noted above, I was hoping for some direction for the module on 'Zulu kings'. *Savage delight* has much to offer in terms of reassessing

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[11] C Allen (ed), *Tales of the dark continent* (London, 1979).

[12] M van Wyk Smith, 'The origins of some Victorian images of Africa', *English in Africa* 6(1) 1979.

[13] R Martin, 'British images of the Zulu c.1820–1879' (PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 1982).

[14] See for example P Forsythe, 'The past in the service of the present', *The South African Historical Journal* 26 (1992) and D Golan, *Inventing Shaka: using history in the construction of Zulu nationalism* (London, 1994).

[15] J Cobbing, 'A tainted well. The objectives, historical fantasies, and working-methods of James Stuart, with counter-argument', *Journal of Natal and Zulu History* (XI) 1988, p 134.

[16] C Hamilton, *Terrific majesty: the powers of Shaka Zulu and the limits of historical invention* (Cape Town, 1998), pp 29–30.

KwaZulu-Natal's historiography and its authors. As noted, Wylie did intend to say 'what really happened' as far as possible. However, as to who Shaka really was remains an enigma at the end of the book. *Savage delight* argues that Shaka 'is nothing if not – or nothing other than – a textual construct' (p 5). As to how we write about Shaka post-*Savage delight*, Wylie merely states that we should write about him 'honestly' (p 245). Where does this leave the historian of KwaZulu-Natal?

Wylie is not a post-modern extremist, bent on the complete destruction of the credibility of texts. His concern with the tired and repetitive images of Shaka and the Zulu are shown to be valid in their omnipresent reworkings in the media. *Savage delight*'s analysis of Isaacs, Fynn and Ritter, as well as the constituent elements of the Shakan myth, are particularly helpful in evaluating KwaZulu-Natal historiography. Nevertheless, the historian still has to rely on sources. This need informs Hamilton's argument in *Terrific majesty*. Her rehabilitation of Stuart points to the need for balance in using sources; but then do historians not already know that sources must be treated cautiously? The methodologies of internal and external criticism have offered historians the possibility of critiquing sources. Marcel Bloch in *The historian's craft* analyses a 19th-century source and shows it to be false, much as Wylie has, although without the benefit of postmodernist theories.[17] *Savage delight* then is less radical in this regard. However, its most important contribution is to the sources of KwaZulu-Natal's history and there are some important revisionist sections (see, for example, pp 14–15 and 113–114).

Concentrating on 'white images' of the Zulu, if one can categorise them so monolithically, tells only part of the story however. Post-colonial studies have their limitations in that they tend to emphasise colonialism as the defining marker of the past, as well as making a sharp distinction between the colonial and post-colonial.[18] Moreover, they fail to take into account the role of 'indigenous capacities', that is the ability of the colonised to organise themselves outside of colonial control. Ordinary people are seen merely as victims, at the mercy of an omnipotent colonial discourse.[19] Studies of this discourse are themselves part of a discourse themselves, legitimated by and mediated in the academy, something which Wylie is aware of (p 242). In addition, Hamilton warns that to declare representations to be deliberate does not explain the construction of such texts in their entirety. They are not uniquely 'white' images, nor is it to explain why traditions, which are obviously mythical, are seen to be true.[20] Wylie would argue that they become history through repetition (p 180), but how thorough is such an explanation? Paul Forsythe, for example, has shown how black South Africans have utilised this Zuluist discourse for their own ends[21] and continue to do so. Africans also construct representations of one another, more often than not on ethnic grounds.[22] Zuluist ideology, for example, emphasised the historical integrity of the 'tribe', which appealed to many Zulus. It gave them some measure of control over the situations in which they found themselves when in the labour centres of the country and was favoured by the Zulu petty bourgeoisie, as it enhanced their roles by defining them as interpreters of 'tribal tradition'.[23]

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[17] M Bloch *The historian's craft* (Manchester, 1967).

[18] Singh, *Colonial narratives*, p 6.

[19] See R Greenstein, 'Rethinking the colonial process: the role of indigenous capacities in comparative historical inquiry' and R Greenstein, 'History, historiography and the production of knowledge' ,*South African Historical Journal* 32 (May 1995), pp 115 and 221.

Furthermore, the origins of representations do not only lie within the personal psychology of their creators but also within a much wider context. Colonial literature in South Africa was produced in the 'heat of brute historical circumstances' – warfare and racial tension.[24] Such images become part of the consolidation of a national identity. Ethnic confrontation involves the identification of difference, as the 'other' is perceived as alien. Correspondingly, warfare fosters a sense of common identity, binding the ethnic community together.[25]

Into this debate comes Paul la Hausse's *Restless identities*. La Hausse acknowledges the contributions that studies of representation of the Zulu have made. In this publication, however, he attempts 'to reclaim part of the terrain largely abandoned as a consequence of the current scholarly preoccupation with the history of representation' (pp 8–9). He is concerned with the experience of ordinary people, not mere automatons of a powerful invented ethnic metadiscourse, but the individuals whose lives were shaped by and helped to shape a sense of Zulu nationalism and ethnicity. The origins of *Restless identities* lie with Shula Marks' seminal *The ambiguities of dependence in South Africa*.[26] Marks argued that segregation was a collaborative process. As a result of structurally dependent positions within the political economy and the state, black intellectuals such as the *kholwa*, chiefs and the Zulu royal family found themselves co-operating with government officials.[27] *The Ambiguities of dependence* examined the lives of King Solomon kaDinuzulu, John Dube and George Champion and their activities in the face of political and social developments affecting Africans in South Africa. *Restless identities* extends this study by analysing the lives of two early African nationalists, Petros Lamula and Lymon Maling. The book departs from Marks in that these individuals are not seen only as being at the mercy of their positions within the colonial state, but as being more proactive and determined. In doing this, La Hausse recovers aspects of twentieth century Natal history previously ignored. The overwhelming focus on 19th-century Zulu history has been to the detriment of the 20th century. Publications such as Cope's *To bind the nation*, Maylam and Edward's *The People's city*[28] and now *Restless identities* have begun to fill this lacuna.

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[20] C Hamilton, 'Authoring Shaka: models, metaphors and historiography' (PhD thesis, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993), pp 59–77.

[21] Forsythe, 'The past in the service of the present', pp 75–89.

[23] L Vail, 'Introduction: ethnicity in southern African History' in L Vail (ed), *The creation of tribalism in southern Africa* (London,1989), p 14.

[24] Mphahlele, *The African image*, pp 133–136.

[25] A Oboe, *Fiction, history and nation in South Africa* (Padova, 1994), pp 89 and 163.

[26] S Marks, *The ambiguities of dependence in South Africa: class, nationalism and the state in twentieth-century Natal* (Johannesburg, 1986).

Restless identities is a dense, intensively researched book. Based on La Hausse's PhDthesis, the publication delves into the lives of two men, one a controversial author and minister, the other a man of his wits who, from humble beginnings, ingratiated himself into the Zulu royal circle, eventually marrying into the royal family. Land and money eluded both of them and their careers would have remained obscure except for this book. As it was, Lamula's personal papers were destroyed in a fire (p 145), while Maling's body was never recovered after he succumbed to malaria (p 249). Nevertheless, La Hausse has created an impressive portrait of the members of the 'new Bantu' (p 17) and their interactions with their society.

Petros Lamula, perhaps best-known for his historical work *uZulu-kaMalandela,*[29] was a first-generation convert and Lutheran minister. La Hausse traces his career from his posting to the Milne Street Mission in Durban in 1915 to his establishment of an independent church and ultimate fall from grace in the latter part of the 1920s and into the 1930s. During this period Lamula dealt with the problems of the African urban experience as a clergyman in Durban, a position of some prestige. He developed a strong sense of history, angered both whites and African intellectuals such as John Dube with his statements and became immersed in politics (pp 45–49). Eventually both the Lutheran Church (due to his political role) and his own independent church (due to controversial leadership) became disenchanted with Lamula and he became an 'itinerant Zulu prophet' (pp 130–131).

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[27] Marks, *The ambiguities of dependence*, pp 1–5.

[28] N Cope, *To bind the nation: Solomon kaDinuzulu and Zulu nationalism 1913–1933* (Pietermaritzburg, 1993) and P Maylam and I Edwards (eds) *The people's city: African life in twentieth-century Durban* (Pietermaritzburg, 1996).

[29] P. Lamula *uZulu kaMalandela: a most practical and concise compendium of African history combined with genealogy, chronology, geography and biography* (Durban, 1924).

Maling on the other hand had to overcome the stigma of the imprisonment of his father, Petros Maling, due to financial problems. Petros Maling had the 'a' dropped from the family name, hoping perhaps that this would increase the chances of assimilation into colonial society (p 160). His son, Lymon, started out as a clerk on the mines, a member of the 'migrant elite'. He became a spokesman for land issues as his political involvement increased. Regarded by some as an outsider, Maling nevertheless tried to associate with Inkatha and the royal house. The result was an appointment to the royal staff and a strong link with Solomon. By 1932 he had abandoned his family and married into royalty, a position that brought Maling into conflict with other *kholwa* and the colonial authorities (pp 245–246).

The scope of *Restless identities* is much wider than Lamula and Maling however. They are the vehicles for a publication that also examines the experiences of the black middle class, of African converts to Christianity and African and Zulu politics of the period. As La Hausse puts it, 'their careers mirror the times[speaking] to the collective historical experience' (pp 1–2). At the beginning of the 20th century different sets of claims to Zulu identity began to emerge. The primary role players in this process were the royal family and the emerging Christianized *kholwa*. The role of *kholwa* intellectuals such as John Dube was amplified due to the fact that many chiefs were illiterate.[30] Furthermore, segregation led the *kholwa* to search for new constituencies, an avenue opened up for them by the Zulu monarchy. The historical and cultural tradition of the Zulu and the continued existence of this tradition in popular consciousness paved the way for the construction of a Zulu nationalism.[31] La Hausse shows how both Lamula and Maling, figures previously overshadowed by the prominence of John Dube in the historiography of the period (p 260), were part of this process of 'reimagining the Zulu nation'. Lamula's sense of history led to *uZulukaMalandela*, first published in 1924. *Restless*

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[30] T. Nuttall, 'Segregation with honour'? The making of Zulu ethnicities in Natal during the 1930s' (Paper presented at the Conference on Ethnicity, Society and Culture in Natal, University of Natal, 14–16 September 1992), p 6.

[31] Marks, *The ambiguities of dependence*, p 111.

identities provides information about the context within which it was written and compares it to Magema Fuze's *Abantu abamnyama*[32] (pp 98–107).

A minor criticism is that while La Hausse details Lamula's and Maling's careers, little is said of their personal lives by comparison. This is most likely related to a lack of sources, but as a result one feels that Lamula and Maling remain somewhat distant figures. *Restless identities* recovers their public lives and their respective ideologies but their families remain obscure.

As with *Restless identities*, *Blood from your children* is also concerned with a neglected area in the eyes of its author, Benedict Carton, Assistant Professor of History at George Mason University in the United States. Carton's interest is the so-called Bambatha Uprising of 1906, known as the *impi yamakhanda* (The War of the Heads) to those who rebelled. This was in reference to the poll or head tax. The last decade has seen a variety of new perspectives of the uprising. Gender issues and, more specifically, masculinities have been suggested as a motivation for the uprising. Colonial laws undermined patriarchal authority; African males felt that they were losing their power and influence over women. In addition, the crushing of the uprising was not merely a display of settler force but was motivated by competing masculinities, white males versus African males, to put it crudely.[33] Redding, on the other hand, emphasises spiritual or supernatural aspects. Scholars, he argues, have focused on material causes, reporting supernatural beliefs but not analysing them. African belief that their ancestors were unhappy with them contributed to the uprising.[34] Carton adds to these by investigating generational conflict.

An environmental crisis, the deterioration of land and a breakdown of African social systems led to a schism between patriarchy and a younger generation (pp 63–77). Carton traces the affect of the ecological difficulties and colonial laws and structures on homestead life. The courts and the missions offered alternative centres of influence and authority for both young men and women (pp 88–110). Parents complained of losing control over their children; young men were said to be disobedient and aggressive (pp 107 and 124). It was the younger generation then, with some exceptions, who in defiance of their fathers rose up in rebellion. Carton sees such tension between generations as factors in other conflicts, for example in the 1950s in Kenya and in the last three decades of the 20th century in South Africa (pp 176 and 189–190).

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[32] M Fuze *Abantu bamnyama lapa bavela Ngakona* (Pietermaritzburg, 1922).

[33] S Ramsay 'The Bambatha Rebellion revisited: gender and competing masculinities' (University of Natal History and African Studies Seminar, May 1994).

[34] S Redding 'A blood-stained tax: poll tax and the Bambatha rebellion in South Africa' *African Studies Review*, 43, 2 (Sept 2000).

Blood from your children clears up a minor historical fallacy. In 1988, Robert Edgerton alleged that before the battle of Isandlwana, the flesh of a certain O'Neal was eaten as part of the ritual preparation for the battle.[35] His reference for this allegation is Eileen Krige's *The social system of the Zulus*. Krige's source in turn is Stuart's *A history of the Zulu Rebellion 1906.*[36] *Stuart refers to the murder of Oliver Veal, not O'Neal, in July 1906, not 1879.*[37] *Krige made an error, which Edgerton compounded. Carton, however, sets out the correct version.*

Carton prefaces his argument with an overview of Zulu history and refers to the *Mfecane* (pp 20–21). While aware of its controversial nature, Carton seems content to use it to analyse the period. Here he departs from Wylie and Cobbing, who dismiss this as settler fiction (Wylie pp 213–214). In addition, Carton would also earn criticism from these two scholars as he relies extensively on the James Stuart Archive. Carton acknowledges the criticism of Stuart but feels, like Hamilton, that the information contained within is simply too valuable to dismiss (pp 10 and 14).

Blood from your children has part of the story of the 1906 uprising. Although its thesis aims at moving beyond a material explanation of the events of 1906, Carton cannot escape it altogether. Material factors contributed to the breakdown of Zulu social systems and thus tension between generations. *Blood from your children* should rather be seen as part of a process of discerning and then ultimately integrating the various causes of the uprising.

The latter part of the 19th century and the 20th century have seen an enormous output of material about the Zulu. Their way of life, their politics, society, economy, military endeavours and leaders have received wide attention. The last 40 or 50 years in particular have been characterised by a steadily increasing and well-researched body of knowledge about Zulu society. These publications have sought to describe and explain the pre-colonial origins of Zulu society, subsequent interaction with white society and finally the integration of the Zulu people into the wider South Africa, with the political repercussions which followed. However, Jeff Guy has alerted us to the fact that, paradoxically, to be best-known does not mean to be best-understood.[38] The very fact that the Zulu past has attracted a multitude of researchers, writers and interested parties should initiate investigation into the reasons behind this wide interest. Furthermore, the fact that these images may be flawed indicates how important it is to analyse and understand the work that has been published.

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[35] R Edgerton, *Like lion's they fought: the last Zulu war* (Bergvlei, 1988), pp 40, 42 and 45.

[36] E Krige, *The social system of the Zulu* (Pietermaritzburg, 1965), p 270.

[37] J Stuart, *A history of the Zulu Rebellion 1906 and Dinuzulu's arrest, trial and expatriation* (London, 1913), pp 377–378.

The three books reviewed here fulfil this requirement. They show how mature historical writing can be in the new millennium and *Restless identities* and *Blood from your children* show how careful research and innovation can afford us new insights into the past. *Savage delight* reminds us of the dangers that are invoked by an absence of these qualities.

A difficulty facing these three publications is that they will probably have little success in the popular market. A recent editorial asked the following question in reference to historians: 'Why should we let them use facts to destroy a beautiful fantasy?'[39] The three books mentioned here provide an answer to this question. Wylie shows how fantasy was the order of the day in earlier writing about the Zulu and what implications this had. La Hausse and Carton indicate how serious historical enquiry establishes new facts about people, who were not part of fantasies but very much part of reality. Nevertheless, the influence these publications will have on popular perceptions is moot. *Savage delight*, *Restless identities* and to a lesser extent *Blood from your children*, may remain inaccessible to a wider audience than the academy due to their dense academic style.

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[38] J Guy, 'The British invasion of Zululand: some thoughts for the centenary year' *Reality*, 11, 1, 1979, p 8.

[39] *The Mercury*, 27 March 2001.

Kleio 33, 2001

Persistence of vision: writing the history of the British empire[1]

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Nicholas Canny (ed), *The Oxford history of the British empire. Volume I: The origins of empire, British overseas enterprise to the close of the seventeenth century* (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1998), 533 pp, bibl. maps, index, ISBN 0 19 820562 7

P J Marshall (ed), *The Oxford history of the British empire. Volume II: The eighteenth century* (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1998), 639 pp, bibl. maps, index, ISBN 9 780198 205630

Andrew Porter (ed), *The Oxford history of the British empire. Volume III: The nineteenth century* (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1999), 774 pp, bibl., maps, index, ISBN 0 19 8205651

Judith M Brown and W Roger Louis (eds), *The Oxford history of the British empire. Volume IV: The twentieth century* (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press 1999), 773 pp, bibl. maps, index, ISBN 0 198205643

Robin W Winks (ed), *The Oxford history of the British empire. Volume V: Historiography* (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1999), 731 pp, bibl., maps, index, ISBN 0 19820566

This series follows two recent works published by the Cambridge University Press, namely the 1993 text by Cain and Hopkins and the comprehensive volume edited by P J Marshall, entitled *The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire*, published in 1996.[2] In terms of detailed empirical study, the Oxford series presents an extremely detailed account of the emergence, growth and eventual decline of the British empire during a period covering the 16th to the 20th century. Although this series forms a detailed chronological sequence covering four centuries of British expansion in the imperial sphere, an expansion that was unthematic and yet with specific resonances overseas and within Britain and Ireland, there are, at the same time, a number of themes which run throughout the five volumes. This provides a reflection of some of the prominent issues in recent debates on imperial history and historiography.

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[1] For some themes in this review article I have drawn on ideas used in a previously unpublished paper: 'Before and after the English: the origins of writing on Natal' (International Congress of Literature Association, Unisa, August 2000).

[2] P J Cain and A G Hopkins, *British imperialism: innovation and expansion 1688–1914* (London, 1993); P J Marshall (ed), *The Cambridge illustrated history of the British empire* (Cambridge, 1996).

One of the ongoing two-way processes in imperial studies is between imaginative discourse and the historical physical mechanics of empire and volume one does this well, with David Armitage's chapter on literature and empire. Armitage challenges the established view that 'empire spurred the growth of literature, as the planting of colonies went hand-in-hand with the building of a canon'.[3] Angus Calder, on the other hand, has argued for the literary work following Hakluyt as a means of exporting English puritanism as an ideal form and language.[4] This association of the age of reconnaissance with the age of renaissance is one of the enduring myths of modernity and the knowledge that the new discoveries were only haltingly received into European consciousness has taken away one of the nexus points of the myth of modernity. As Armitage notes, Luis de Camoens' 16th-century epic poem *The Lusiads* was written a century after the Portuguese voyages which formed its main theme.[5] Armitage also notes that, until the 18th century, the 'British empire' referred to the kingdoms and colonies within Britain and Ireland as these existed in the 16th century.[6]

'Guns and sails' is the argument of Rodger's chapter on the early English empire and he provides a detailed overview of the developments in European seafaring expansion during the 15th and 16th centuries.[7] The improvements in ship design on the Atlantic seaboard presented distinct advantages for England and Scotland (prior to the geographical configuration of 'Britain') and although this seems to be a confirmation of previous arguments on this topic, Rodger's chapter is refreshingly up-to-date, including for instance Margaret Rule's fascinating discussion of the maritime archaeology made evident by the raising of the Tudor flagship the *Mary Rose* during the 1980s.[8]

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[3] D Armitage, 'Literature and empire' in N Canny (ed), *The Oxford history of the British empire, vol 1: The origins of empire* (Oxford, 1998), p 99.

[4] A Calder, *Revolutionary empire: the rise of the English-speaking empires from the fifteenth century to the 1780s* (London, 1998), pp 40–42.

[5] Armitage, 'Literature and empire', p 117. For other literary ideas on Camoes see for instance M van Wyk Smith, *Shades of Adamastor: an anthology of poetry* (Grahamstown, 1988), pp xiii–xiv; M van Wyk Smith, *Grounds of contest: a survey of South African English literature* (Kenwyn, 1990), pp 19–20; E Axelson, *Vasco da Gama: the diary of his travels through African waters, 1497–1499* (Somerset West, 1998), pp 69–71.

[6] Armitage, 'Literature and empire', p 113.

[7] N A M Rodger, 'Guns and sails in the first phase of English colonization, 1500–1650' in Canny (ed), *Origins of empire*, p 79.

Ohlmeyer's chapter on Ireland reinforces this smaller geographical empire within the British Isles closing the internal frontiers of the British monarchies – when a single political authority emerges in the zone – Scotland and Ireland by the 1640s.[9] Though arguably the political frontier in the Highlands and islands did not close until after the 1745 Jacobite rebellion. Ireland in 1640s seemed to be a closing frontier but Gaelic-Catholic traditions continued until after 1690.[10] During the 17th century, both the Irish and Scottish frontiers gradually became settings for imperial identity and involved themselves in expansionist enterprise and transformed the English imperial experience into a truly British one.[11]

Barnard's chapter takes Ireland into the later 17th century and examines the opportunities for British settlement there. Although the dramatic reconquests of 1649–52 and 1689–91 resulted in enforced British immigration to Ireland, this settlement was singular as Irish land had, in the process, lost much of its appeal.[12] Urban areas thus appeared as isolated, costly and prestigious points on the Irish landscape and were unable to become part of the economy at large as rural Ireland was seen as unsuitable for British immigrants and the encounter was never anything more than superficial. Barnard concludes negatively but graphically that 'the residue from the past settlements stained the supposedly clean sheet, so that the crude geometry of the new plantation, when not obliterated, was blurred as the earlier configurations showed through'.[13]

Land useage was of preeminent importance, not only in Britain's nearest colony Ireland during the 17th century, but also in its new colonies across the Atlantic. In his chapter on the tobacco colonies in the Chesapeake region of North America, Horn makes this clear.

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[8] *Ibid*, p 84.

[9] J H Ohlmeyer '''Civilizinge of these rude partes'': colonisation within Britain, Britain and Ireland 1580s–1640s' in Canny (ed), *Origins of empire*, p 143.

[10] *Ibid*, p 145.

[11] *Ibid*, p 146.

[12] T C Barnard, 'New opportunities for British settlement: Ireland, 1650–1700' in Canny (ed), *Origins of empire*, pp 309–310.

[13] *Ibid*, p 326.

Different conceptions of land possession was the key issue in the initial encounter and rapidly following conflict between English colonists and what Horn depicts as 'one of the most powerful Indian alliances on the eastern seaboard'.[14] While acknowledging the centrality of 'English ethnocentrism' as an underlying discourse to interaction between races in the American colonies, Horn notes that formal segregation intensified after the arrival of African slaves in the 1660s to the extent that, when indentured labour supplies ended in the 1680s, an 'indelible connection between slavery and race' had been formed.[15] This implies a colonial discourse in the evolution of colonial forms as Gikandi has recently noted 'the great categories that came to define the modern age – race and citizenship, civility and authority, were haunted from the start by the colonial question'.[16] Mancall, on the other hand, using Alfred Cosby's work as a starting-point, examines the early European encounters with North America in terms of disease and trade, rather than proprietorship and race. It is impossible, Mancall suggests, to separate the effects of disease and trade when looking at relations between English colonists and Native Americans.[17] Taking this argument into an ideological context he also notes how the Puritans were able to unite their own ideological arsenal of conversion with the devastating effects of smallpox on Native American societies during the early decades of the 17th century, using the latter as a signal of divine intervention in their favour.[18] As a result, Mancall suggests, the Puritan English colonists were able to transform the landscape of southern New England into one which almost entirely represented their own proprietory interests.[19] He concludes his chapter by pointing out that, although relations were not only those of outright hostility, the discourse of clerical writing emanating from the New England of the 1690s indicated a poisoning of relations between Europeans and Native Americans and that this was followed up by deepening suspicion and hostility during the 18th century: the earlier trading partnerships were replaced by conflict as Native American lands were appropriated for colonial agriculture.[20]

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[14] J Horn, 'Tobacco colonies: the shaping of English society in the seventeenth-century Chesapeake' in Canny (ed), *Origins of empire*, p 175.

[15] *Ibid*, p 179.

[16] S Gikandi, *Maps of Englishness: writing identity in the culture of colonialism* (New York, 1996), p 3.

[17] P M Mancall, 'Native Americans and Europeans in English America: 1500–1700' in Canny (ed), *Origins of empire*, p 333.

[18] *Ibid*, pp 339–341.

[19] *Ibid*, p 342.

[20] *Ibid*, p 349.

The first volume in this series thus includes a variety of both physical and discursive mechanisms of empire evident by the late 17th century. As Alymer notes, however, it is important not to exaggerate the scale or inevitability of England's commercial, maritime and imperial strength by the beginning of the 1700s. The extent and increase of this power was an 18th-century issue.[21] This is demonstrated in the opening chapters of the second volume which emphasise the growing financial strength of the 18th-century empire, an expansion which Sinclair has linked directly to the rise of paper currency from the early 1700s.[22] O'Brien notes the 'inseperable connections' between the emerging global economy and domestic industry and agriculture in the Hanoverian empire,[23] while Price examines the interdependency, not only of commerce and sea-power, but of peripheral and lateral colonial trade, credit and financial supply and overseas demand and technological transformation in British industrial life.[24]

Following his excellent chapter on 'guns and sails' in the first volume of this series, Rodger provides an equally interesting contribution to the second volume in which he examines the links between the British navy and the 18th-century empire. Challenging the old view that the navy had, from the outset, been created and developed to provide a defensive stance for the empire, Rodger argues convincingly for an absence of 'strategy' in the 18th-century navy pointing out that the main fleet was deployed primarily in defence of home waters with the protection of trade forming its secondary function, even following the war against America.[25] In similar vein, Duffy argues that British imperial military engagement was always most successful when initiated defensively to the extent that by 1815, the imposition of an extra-European *pax Britannica* was made possible by the deliberate procurement of British safety during the later 18th- and early 19th-century.[26]

Commercial expansion during the eighteenth century resulted in a number of cultural alignments between Britain and the developing empire. Schlenther identifies links between religion and the commercial empire, pointing out that free market competition allowed for some degree of tolerance as the sense of individual destiny in the Americas required a successful 'merging of religious, commercial and political streams' and a broader faith in this 'new world order'.[27] Within the American colonies, and developing from the earlier relationships identified by Horn and Mancall in the first volume of the series, were changing paradigms of colonial contact with Native Americans. For Richter, three strands of narrative history can be identified: regional wars during the period from the 1680s to the 1710s; fragile stability from the 1720s to the 1750s as Native Americans occupied tenuous places in a growing global imperial system; and violence and alliance during the American colonial wars from 1756 to 1815.[28] Although all three phases were 'shaped by earlier parameters, experiences and structural features of empire', there was, by the late 18th century, a clear trend of Native American declining economic importance as traders in the North American empire, accompanied by a return to indigenous religious nativism and a symbolic 'casting off of redcoats'.[29]

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[21] G E Aylmer, 'Navy, state, trade and empire' in Canny (ed), *Origins of empire*, p 479.

[22] D Sinclair, *The pound: a biography* (London, 2001), pp 196–7.

[23] P K O'Brien, 'Inseperable connections: trade, economy, fiscal state and the expansion of empire, 1688–1815' in P J Marshall (ed), *The Oxford history of the British empire, vol 2: The eighteenth century* (Oxford, 1998), p 76.

[24] J M Price, 'The imperial economy: 1700–1776', in Marshall (ed), *The eighteenth century*, pp 79, 82–89, 91–96, 99.

[25] N A M Rodger, 'Sea-power and empire: 1688–1793' in Marshall (ed), *The eighteenth century*, pp 171–3; 181–2.

[26] M Duffy, 'World-wide war and British expansion: 1793–1815' in Marshall (ed), *The eighteenth century*, p 206.

Another obvious form of material and cultural exchange was the rapidly developing institution of colonial slavery in the Americas and particularly in the British West Indies, a system identified by Walvin as one of persistent violence.[30] Richardson agrees with this view and notes also that the British slave trade was responsible for the perpetuation of endemic violence within West African societies.[31] Two chapters of this volume are dedicated to detailed analyses of Caribbean African slavery. Sheridan's chapter provides an empirical study of the growth of plantation society as an unprecedented economic institution, noting that the impact of sugar on Barbados from 1640 to 1660 was nothing short of a 'revolution', using massive amounts of labour and capital and resulting in warfare between European rivals for control of the West Indies between 1689 and 1713.[32] Sheridan notes that by 1700 sugar was the 'paramount tropical agricultural commodity' and that its popularity was accompanied by a substantial growth in the black slave population but a correspondingly small growth of white population in the British West Indies during the first half of the 18th century.[33] Sheridan confirms Walvin's conclusion that plantation society was one characterised by violent control of its slave component while noting at the same time that, despite its reputation for harsh treatment, Barbados formed the vanguard of the British West Indies movement towards civil rights.[34] Sheridan also provides an excellent explanatory section on the international ramifications of the 1713 monopoly agreement between Britain and Spanish America and the infamous 'War of Jenkyn's Ear' of 1739 and the later 1744 conflict.[35] He concludes this well-balanced chapter by examining the resurgence of sugar profitability by the 1750s and the implications of this prosperity for the second half of 18th century.[36] In a second chapter on the British West Indies, Ward deals with the region in the 'age of abolition' from 1748 to 1815, taking as starting-point the material argument that the West Indies was of the greatest economic importance to the British empire during this period.[37] Ward argues that the later half of the 18th century was the last period during which West Indian trade was a dominant part of British imperial exchange and that its contribution during the 19th century was modest compared to that of India. Nevertheless, sugar production provided a significant basis for the late 18th-century empire and this economic trend was accompanied by the emergence of a multi-racial West Indian society as the last slave rebellions gave way to emancipation legislation. Ward notes too that an increasing number of 'free coloureds' occupied an important intermediary position in West Indian society.[38] Another chapter involving slave identity is Morgan's fascinating contribution on the 'black experience' of the eighteenth-century empire in which he examines the 'incredible kaleidescope' of the black imperial experience including demographics, economics, family, creole or 'coloured' identity, culture and language (including an examination of the creolised languages emerging from both Portuguese and Dutch in the Cape Colony), musical expression and spirituality.[39] Not surprisingly, Morgan concludes that the 18th-century black world was a multi-faceted one in which there was no single identifiable 'experience', though a core theme in the construction of black British imperial identity was the forging of a new culture.[40]

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[27] B S Schlenther, 'Religious faith and commercial empire' in Marshall (ed), *The eighteenth century*, p 149.

[28] D K Richter, 'Native peoples of North America and the eighteenth-century British empire' in Marshall (ed), *The eighteenth century*, p 347.

[29] *Ibid*, p 370.

[30] J Walvin, *Black ivory: a history of British slavery* (Washington, 1994), pp 21–22.

[31] D Richardson, 'The British empire and the Atlantic slave trade: 1660–1807' in Marshall (ed), *The eighteenth century*, p 463.

[32] R B Sheridan, 'The formation of Caribbean plantation society: 1689–1748' in Marshall (ed), *The eighteenth century*, pp 394–398.

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[33] *Ibid*, pp 399–400.

[34] *Ibid*, pp 404–406.

[35] *Ibid*, pp 410–414.

[36] *Ibid*, p 414.

[37] J R Ward, 'The British West Indies in the age of abolition: 1748–1815' in Marshall (ed), *The eighteenth century*, p 415.

[38] *Ibid*, pp 436–8.

[39] P D Morgan, 'The black experience in the British empire: 1680–1810' in Marshall (ed), *The eighteenth century*, pp 466–481.

Indian society was, though less central than the West Indies for the 18th-century British imperial experience was, suggests Ray, important, particularly as a specific yet varied set of responses to the establishment of colonial rule.[41] While there are dangers in applying the hindsight gained from a contemporary knowledge of a blanket 18th-century 'orientalism',[42] a number of mechanisms for control of and at the same time, co-operation with, the 'orient' are outlined in this chapter. Ray focuses on, for instance, the types of political as well as fiscal manipulation used by the English East India Company in allying itself with collaborators in the existing Mughal-imposed frameworks of legitimacy.[43] He suggests, furthermore, that the absence of an identifiable national Indian resistance to the foreign presence allowed for a colonial rationale based on negative constructions of 'native character' which justified the disenfranchisement of a whole race.[44] In conclusion Ray identifies an early 19th-century English-educated elite in India who were highly aware of the paradox of a seemingly despotic colonial rule based professedly based on individual liberty and the rule of law.[45] This chapter is a valuable contribution to the second volume of this series as it provides the foundation of several strands of debate encountered more fully in the third volume and the more dominant place of India in the 19th-century British empire.

The 18th-century empire was defined not only by the impact of colonial influences on indigenous and slave society, but also by the export of settler communities from Britain. – a Britain by this period constructed by the union of England and Scotland into the 'United Kingdom'. Horn links this directly to the strikingly different patterns of emigration which emerged in early 18th-century Britain in contrast to the previous century 70% English in the 17th century but – between 1700 and 1780, 70% migration from Ireland and Scotland.[46] While transportation accounted for some 49 000 forced migrations from

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[40] *Ibid*, p 486.

[41] R K Ray, 'Indian society and the establishment of British supremacy: 1765–1818' in Marshall (ed), *The eighteenth century*, p 508.

[42] B and Y Gooneratne, 'Introduction' in B and Y Gooneratne (eds), *The inscrutable Englishman: Sir John D'Oyly (1774–1824)*,(London and New York, 1999), p 6.

[43] Ray, 'Indian society', pp 509–510.

[44] *Ibid*, p 525.

[45] *Ibid*, pp 528–9.

[46] J Horn, 'British diaspora: emigration from Britain, 1680–1815' in J Marshall (ed), *The the eighteenth century*, pp 30–31.

Britain to America between 1718 and 1775, destination for transport ships changed to Botany Bay from 1783 and the Australian convict colony received some 12 000 felons between 1787 and 1816 and a further 17 400 by 1820.[47] Horn includes Welsh immigration as part of an indistinguishable from a broader English movement with the specific exception of Dissenter emigration which increased dramatically in the later 18th century as political and economic stress in Britain intensified.[48] Scottish migration and the 1707 union, economic advantages for Scottish commerce and contribution to metropolitan economy. Although Horn specifically identifies the Scottish Lowlands (as the participants in the new imperial economy of 'Britain'),[49] modernity was increasingly appropriated by the highlands as the 18th century progressed and the highlands moved from archaic self-sufficiency towards commercial modernity.[50] Although Scottish migration to America from both the Lowlands and Highlands had increased gradually from the end of the 17th century, Highland migration was particularly dramatic from the mid-18th century to the extent, notes Horn, that by the time of the war in America in 1775, the Scottish Highlands had contributed up to one fifth of all British migration to the Americas.[51] Horn also points out the contradiction between the traditional idea that Highland migration was a response to the transformation of Highland society after 1746 including the rent inflation of the 1760s, and the fact that the Highlanders who migrated to America were not a dispossessed peasantry, but were representative of ambition rather than indigence and poverty. He also notes the combination of influences for Highland migration from the 1770s, including bad harvests, religious controversy, evictions and rising rents, and emphasises that the dramatic increase in migration followed the Highland clearances of the early 1800s.[52] Horn's chapter concludes with a brief examination of the 'pull' factors exerted by the empire on migration from Britain, including expanding merchant trade and the demand for skilled labour as well as professional ranks. As a result of varying responses, Horn estimates that over one million immigrants left Britain between 1688 and 1815.[53]

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[47] *Ibid*, p 34.
[48] *Ibid*, p 39.
[49] *Ibid*, p 41.
[50] S Makdisi, *Romantic imperialism: universal empire and the culture of modernity* (Cambridge, 1998), p 101.
[51] Horn, 'British diaspora', p 43.
[52] *Ibid*, p 45.
[53] *Ibid*, p 50.

Ireland, as in the first volume of the series, is included in this one as a part of Britain's imperial sphere. The relationship between Ireland and Britain during the 18th century, suggests Bartlett, was one which varied from constitutional subordination to a certain degree of legislative independence.[54] Ireland's 'colonial' status in the 18th century empire has long been a focus of Irish studies,[55] and this chapter does not disappoint the reader looking for a further unravelling of this debate. Drawing on his considerable earlier work on Ireland,[56] Bartlett takes as starting-point the alignment of Irish Dissent with that of American independence during the 1770s and notes the strong sympathy shown by Americans towards Ireland and antagonism against British monarchical rule.[57] The restrictions on Irish trade, like those on American trade, illustrate, for Bartlett, Ireland's constitutional subordination to Britain while in contrast, the 1782 constitution allowed for a certain degree of what could be called 'dominion status' for Ireland.[58] While this can be seen as a turning-point for Irish politics and can be attributed directly to the way in which Irish nationalism was able to take advantage of the war in America, it also marked the beginning of the unfortunate introduction of violence into Irish politics which, as Bartlett states 'might prove difficult to remove', a truth only too evident in the decade of war and revolution which followed the end of the American war.[59] Bartlett views the 1790s as a period which 'highlighted Ireland's hitherto abstract position as the weak link of the empire', a position demonstrated by the failure in obtaining full French support for the 1798 rebellion.[60]

He concludes his chapter by pointing out that Pitt's decision for a legislative Union for Ireland was aimed at curbing and removing tendencies in Ireland to secede from the empire, though a closer look at parliamentary debates for 1799 to 1800 suggests a strong stress in favour of empire on the part of pro-Unionists. Although the Irish were, unlike the Scots, never welcomed as full partners in the imperial enterprise, the Union of 1801 did offer imperial opportunity for the Irish and during the century which followed they experienced full and, at times, enthusiastic imperial participation.[61]

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[54] T Bartlett, '"This famous island set in a Virginian sea": Ireland in the British empire, 1680–1801' in Marshall (ed), *The eighteenth century*, pp 266–7.

[55] See for instance S J Connolly, 'Eighteenth-century Ireland: colony or ancien regime?' in D G Boyce and A O'Day (eds), *The making of modern Irish history: revisionism and the revisionist controversy* (London, 1996), pp 15–33.

[56] See in particular T C Bartlett, *The rise and fall of the Irish nation* (Dublin, 1992).

[57] Bartlett, '"This famous island"', p 264.

[58] *Ibid,* p 267.

[59] *Ibid*, pp 267,269.

[60] *Ibid*, p 270.

In contrast to the earlier empire, literary developments in the 18th-century empire are more clearly identifiable alongside and as part of, the imperial project, exemplified by, for instance the work of Daniel Defoe whose writing permeates an extraordinary range of eighteenth-century colonial themes.[62] While the literary protagonists of the first empire were concerned with the portrayal and control of the physical bodies of the 'other' rather than the purely imaginative depiction deployed by nineteenth-century writers,[63] they nevertheless succeeded in portraying both political and sexual utopias utterly removed from European forms[64] defining identity of the 18th-century British empire was the expansion of knowledge. While neither England nor Scotland were not great powers in either learning or empire in the early 17th century, the newly-joined kingdoms were, for the next two centuries, centres of intellectual pre-eminence, challenged only by the French.[65] Clearly discernable alliances between knowledge and empire, and philosophy (particularly Christian providentialism) and empire[66] also an informal empire of gentlemanly amateurs – European natural history exploration following empire.[67] While this followed the work of the Swedish classification scientist Linneaus, and was evident throughout the empire,[68] focus on London which Drayton notes, 'lay at the centre of this system of intellectual accumulation'.[69] The cultural vitality and university renaissance of the Scottish Enlightenment can also be viewed in the context of that country's participation in the imperial venture.[70] In contrast to Armitage's chapter in the first volume where literary development is seen as less specifically linked to geographical voyages, for Drayton 'it remains possible to construct Britain's intellectual relations with its eighteenth-century empire as the story of ''expansion'''.[71]

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[61] *Ibid*, pp 273–4.

[62] For just a few examples of the links between Defoe and empire see N Armstrong and L Tennehouse, *The imaginary Puritan: literature, intellectual labour and the origins of personal life* (Berekeley, 1992), p 24; M Ellis, 'Crusoe, cannibalism and empire' in L Spaas and B Stimpson (eds), *Robinson Crusoe: myths and metamorphoses* (London, 1996), p 57; P Knox-Shaw, 'Defoe and the politics of representing the African interior' in *South African Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies*, vol 9 (January 1999), p 75.

[63] M.L. Von Sneiden, 'Joined at the hip: a monster, colonialism and the Scriblerian project, *Eighteenth-century studies,* vol 30, no 3 (1997), p 2515.

[64] C Rees, *Utopian imagination and eighteenth-century fiction* (London, 1996), pp 40–41.

[65] R Drayton, 'Knowledge and empire' Marshall (ed), *The eighteenth century,* p 231.

[66] *Ibid*, p 232.

[67] *Ibid*, p 237.

[68] See for instance, S Huigen, 'Natural history and the representation of South Africa in the eighteenth century', *Journal of literary studies*, vol 14, no 1 and 2 (June 1998), p 68.

[69] Drayton, 'Knowledge and empire', in Marshall (ed), *The eighteenth century*, p 238.

[70] *Ibid*, p 240.

In no context did the knowledge and mechanics of empire articulate so closely together as in the 'imperial century' from 1815 to 1914, a period identified by Edward Said as one of critical importance for the ongoing appropriations of tropes which emerged in and from the European imperial sphere.[72] As Andrew Porter noted in his chapter entitled 'Empires in the mind' in the earlier Cambridge University Press history of Empire, and as he points out in his introduction to the comprehensive third volume of the series, the 19th-century empire was unique in its complexity[73]. This volume allocates considerable textual space to the literary and cultural discourse of empire and for this reason it is perhaps the most interesting of the series. John Mackenzie, a prolific contributor to the literature on the culture of imperialism is the author of one of the key chapters on this topic and here he is able to expand on many of the ideas formulated in the Manchester University Press series.[74] Mackenzie argues that a broadly-defined metropolitan culture is one that can be divided both horizontally (between 'ethnic' regions within Britain) as well as vertically (between classes), a culture which has traditionally been overlooked by Marxist historians following the 1902 publication of J A Hobson.[75] In an interesting aside from his earlier work which concentrated on the later 19th and early 20th century, Mackenzie includes a brief discussion of cultural expressions of empire which were evident from the late 18th century but continued in various forms of cultural activity during the elongated 19th century from 1815 to 1914. The cultural signifiers of the 18th-century empire were thus central for the forging of a sense of 'Britishness' which included the English, Scots and Irish ethnic identities.[76] Mackenzie includes in this list of signifiers, the 18th-century military 'history' paintings which dominated British art in varying forms well into the 20th century.[77] Mackenzie then goes on to examine how visual depiction of 'imperial' turning-points was used during the 19th century particularly the new medium of photography and the continuing genre of topical theatre which changed from an emphasis from multi-racial relationships in the 1820s to a more vindictive racism and aggressive nationalism (as exemplified by the original lyrics of 'By Jingo' in 1878) as it entered the music-halls of the late 19th century.[78] Mackenzie makes the interesting point here that the music-hall themes were not restricted to a working-class audience and were enormously popular in middle-class theatre.[79] For Mackenzie, as for many researchers on 19th-century imperialism, the events in India in 1857 were an ideological turning-point for the cultural expression of empire.[80] The Indian 'Mutiny' marked the beginning of a progressive heightening of racism while at the same time assisting in the transformation of the Victorian public's view of the army from street-recruited ruffians to avenging angels of empire.[81] Mackenzie also examines how the later 19th century myths of Christian militarism filtered into organisations like the Boys Brigade, Salvation Army and Cadet Corps and, together with imperial 'frontier' mythology, into the Boy Scouts' Organisation.[82] Mackenzie's chapter is all-inclusive and this article does not allow for a fuller perusal of the themes he discusses which include the imperial culture of 19th- and 20th-century exhibitions; anthropology and social Darwinism as well as pseudo-scientific racism; physical and life sciences and their relationship with the Royal Geographical Society including an interesting digression on the nature of 'municipal' and regional imperialism as exemplified in various local societies; education and literacy.[83] Mackenzie concludes his exhaustive account by noting the pervasive nature of imperial ideology in popular culture well into the 20th century period.[84] Three other chapters in the third volume of this series give detailed accounts of the cultural impact of the imperial project. While the 18th century, was, as Drayton noted, a period of amateur scientific expansion in the imperial ambit, Stafford points out that the 19th century witnessed a more sustained programme of scientific exploration.[85] As he concludes his chapter 'Victorian British culture was pervaded by geographical knowledge and metaphors that reflected the nation's powerful expansionist urge'.[86]

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[71] *Ibid*, p 251.

[72] See especially E Said, *Culture and imperialism* (London, 1993), pp 160 ff.

[73] A Porter, 'Introduction: Britain and the empire in the nineteenth century' in A Porter (ed), *The Oxford history of the British empire, vol 3: the nineteenth century* (Oxford, 1998), p 1.x

[74] Mackenzie's publications in the series include J Mackenzie, *Propaganda and empire: the manipulation of British public opinion, 1880–1960* (Manchester, 1984); J Mackenzie (ed), *Imperialism and popular culture* (Manchester, 1986); J Mackenzie (ed), *Popular imperialism and the military: 1850–1950* (Manchester, 1992).

[75] J Mackenzie, 'Empire and metropolitan culture' in Porter (ed), *The nineteenth century*, p 271.

[76] *Ibid*, p 273.

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[77] *Ibid*, p 274. For a particularly inclusive recent overview of this genre see P Harrington, *British artists and war: the face of battle in paintings and prints, 1700–1914* (London, 1993).

[78] Mackenzie, 'Empire and metropolitan culture', pp 277–8.

[79] *Ibid*, p 279.

[80] *Ibid*, p 280.

[81] *Ibid*, p 281; and see also D Judd, *Someone has blundered: calamities of the British army in the Victorian age* (Moreton-in-Marsh, 2000), pp 62–63.

[82] Mackenzie, 'Metropolitan culture', p 282.

[83] *Ibid*, pp 283–288.

[84] *Ibid*, p 291.

The impact of Christianity in and on the empire is given two chapters in this volume. In the first, Porter deals with the expansion of Christianity as part of British culture and activity, an indication of the unprecedented scale of British influence overseas during the 19th century.[87] This is a creative chapter. Porter examines first how the ecclesiastical structures of the Anglican church hierarchy were initially used to underpin Tory colonial connections and identities in the American colonies, traditionally perceived as potential centres for politically-radical Dissent.[88] This is followed by a tightly-argued chronological section on the growing denominational diversity in the colonies which resulted in an under-resourced Anglican minority, resented by an articulate and influential colonial non-conformist population. By the 1830s, notes Porter, Catholic emancipation in Britain seemed to confirm, by the metropolis, the incompatibility of Anglican dominance and colonial good government.[89] Porter then goes on to describe the emergence of mission-based Anglican activity with the founding of the Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge (1698) and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (1700) noting that both societies were established in a context when the anglicisation of the Scottish Highlands was considered more important than the conversion of indigenous peoples in the empire overseas.[90] The establishment church was in fact remarkably inactive in missionary endeavour and tended to view the work of the evangelical non-conformist societies of the late 18th century as 'Methodist', handicapped by a dangerous excess of religious enthusiasm and low-class identity. Having clearly established that British missionary work was not representative of a ruling-class identity, Porter notes the difficulties of detachment for both missionaries and colonial authorities citing both the Cape Colony and India as places in the empire where Christianity was alternatively encouraged and restrained.[91] While official and missionary impulses were often in tension, the collation of British wealth, stability and expansion intensified as the 19th century progressed and, during the 1840s, the Anglican church was able to move ahead of imperial control and establish its own bishops and dioceses.[92] The later nineteenth century relationship between the colonial Anglican church was epitomised by voluntary attendance, from 1867, by colonial bishops at Lambeth and at the same time, a missionary impulse which acted increasingly outside the borders of formal empire.[93] It is in this context that Porter identifies a number of 'colonial particularisms' including indigenous churches and African bishops. The later 19th century also saw a closer relationship between missions and empire as the former became utilised as distinct forms of cultural imperialism identifying with British security.[94] Porter argues however, that a stark dichotomy between colonisers and colonised was not always a true representation of the missionary encounter and that there was always a range of local responses, engagement and accommodation. Similarly, conversion was not simply an imposition of western 'civilisation' and indigenous contributions to metropolitan understanding were often profound and usually ambivalent as is evident in the example of J W Colenso's ongoing engagement with biblical criticism at the prompting of a Zulu convert, William Ngidi.[95]

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[85] R A Stafford, 'Scientific exploration and empire', p 294.

[86] *Ibid*, p 318.

[87] A Porter, 'Religion, missionary enthusiasm and empire' in Porter (ed), *The nineteenth century*, p 221.

[88] *Ibid*, pp 223–226.

[89] *Ibid*, p 227.

[90] *Ibid*, p 228. On the missionary ideas of these societies for Scotland see J McLeod, *Highlander: a history of the Gaels* (London, 1998), p 121.

The two-way nature of interaction between British Christianity and indigenous societies is examined further in McCaskie's chapter on 'cultural encounters' in which he examines the complex, unstable and ambiguous nature of such transactions.[96] McCaskie uses as examples of the failure of the heroic resonances sought by abolitionist rhetoric and endeavour in the 1840s, the created province Sierra Leone and the failure of the 1841 Niger expedition, and in this research looks at a number of issues surrounding identity, literacy, slavery and abolition.[97] McCaskie then moves on to David Livingstone's encounter with East African slavery, an impact presumed by imperial hagiographers but with little existence outside the pages of Victorian travel fiction.[98]

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[91] *Ibid*, pp 229–30.
[92] *Ibid*, pp 232–234.
[93] *Ibid*, pp 232–234.
[94] *Ibid*, pp 236–238
[95] *Ibid*, pp 239–241
[96] T C McCaskie, 'Cultural encounters: Britain and Africa in the nineteenth century' in Porter (ed), *The nineteenth century*, p 665.
[97] *Ibid*, pp 666–673.
[98] *Ibid*, p 674.

This provides a context for a deeper examination of iconic-type Victorian representations of the eccentric figures of the mid-19th century including Burton, Speke, Baker, Grant and particularly Stanley – Livingstone's supposed rescuer in 1871. These depictions are, for McCaskie, illustrative of shifting attitudes towards Africa in the later Victorian period which include a more patronising view of westernised Africans, as well as a self-promoting rhetoric which emphasised civilising European values against cannibalism and hopelessly backward Africans. McCaskie identifies Wolseley's work on the Asante in this category and contrasts it with the egalitarian approach which had been evident earlier in the century.[99] While the African encounter with British imperialism in the later 19th century was often one of power and racism, accompanied by pseudo-scientific racism and ideas of a 'civilising mission', some states were able to offer military resistance until the early 20th century, for instance Sokoto and the Ndebele state. African cultural resistance (and the 1857 Xhosa 'cattle killing' is included here) was eventually unable to stand up to imperialism though some forms of cultural accommodation, such as Africanised Christianity offered one of the few means of sustaining the seeds of a new African political identity.[100] McCaskie ends his chapter by noting that African cultures are still in a process of negotiating a dialogue with western modernity.[101]

The less obviously 'cultural' mechanisms of formal empire are by no means neglected in this text, and, as in the first two volumes, migration is given a significant place in the growing empire. Harper contributes a detailed chapter on the forms and mechanisms of 19th-century migration including an analysis of migration schemes. Like Horn, in his chapter on the 'British diaspora' in volume two, Harper notes the multifaceted character and diverse circumstances of migration from Britain and Ireland, pointing out that the largest number of migrants were the 123 000 male and 25 000 female involuntarily migrants who were transported to Australia between 1788 and 1853.[102] Harper then goes on to examine the different assisted migration schemes which followed the end of transportation in the 1850s and 1860s noting such iniquities as landlord-assisted migration during for instance the Highland clearances, and charities which filled colonial outlets for

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[99] *Ibid*, p 675

[100] *Ibid*, p 684.

[101] *Ibid*, p 688.

[102] M Harper, 'British migration and the peopling of empire' in Porter (ed), *The nineteenth century*, p 78.

Britain's surplus female population by assisting in the migration of unemployed women and destitute children.[103] Harper concludes by pointing out that, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, migration had, by the late 19th century 'been woven inextricably into the fabric of British life'.[104] A second chapter on migration which also stresses the nature of involuntarily migration is Northrup's contribution on migrants who entered various parts of the British empire under the auspices of indentured labour schemes following the abolition of slavery. Migrants from Africa, Asia and the South Pacific are examined here and Northrup examines the horrors of the system by which forced labour brought from the Pacific islands to Australasia and the less arduous experiences of indentured Indians brought to Natal.[105]

The political mechanisms of empire are given adequate space in this volume and as Porter demonstrates in his chapter on the nature of trusteeship both before and after the formal abolition of slavery, the imperial authorities were eventually unable to deny a certain degree of settler self-government, identifying Natal as a specific exception where some form of responsible government was delayed until very late in the century.[106] The developing political awareness and semi-independent participation in imperial government in the white dominions of Australia, New Zealand and Canada are all examined in detail in well-argued chapters in this volume.[107] Though the constraints of a review article do not allow for a fuller discussion, it would be neglectful to omit the importance of 19th-century Australia's identity as a convict colony, a crucial historical precedent for imperial as well as prison discourse.[108]

Southern Africa, where, as Saunders and Smith note, the 'extension of British power and influence... was not straightforward'[109] requires a more detailed commentary. Given the importance afforded the South African (or Anglo-Boer) war in the fourth volume of this series, it is pertinent to examine some of the issues which were played out in the foreground of this turn-of-century conflict. These two historians provide a tightly-argued sequence of issues and events following the arrival of English control at the Cape in the late 18th century. The evolution of frontier and colonial society, dispossession and conflict is carefully outlined, using key recent work on the framing of colonial and race relations such as Clifton Crais' post-modernist examination of the making of the colonial order and Noel Mostert's comprehensive treatment of frontier tensions.[110] Moving rapidly through the developing colonial society of the 19th century, the authors stress the key theme of South African capitalism from the 1880s, a phenomenon which placed the region at the centre of world competition for colonial control on the African continent.[111] While recognising the ramifications of involvement by key capitalist players in a section called 'Rhodes, Rhodesia and the Raid', Saunders and Smith state clearly that the South African war was not caused by gold-centred capitalism, pointing out that 'it was not gold that Britain was after in 1899, but the establishment of British power and influence over the Transvaal on a firmer basis, to advance the unification of the region within the Empire'.[112] The South African war, they then suggest, was one of the greatest tests of British imperial power since the 1857 'Mutiny'.[113] The authors of this chapter conclude that the aftermath of the war was crucial for the establishment of a racially-segregated South Africa, a social and political construction which would dominate the involvement of this 'white' dominion from 1911 to 1961.[114]

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[103] *Ibid*, pp 80–81.

[104] *Ibid*, p 85.

[105] *Ibid*, p 88.

[106] Porter, 'Trusteeship, anti-slavery and humanitarianism' in Porter (ed), *The nineteenth century*, p 212.

[107] G Martin, 'Canada from 1815'; D Denoon and M Wyndham, 'Australia and the western Pacific'; R Dalziel, 'Southern islands: New Zealand and Polynesia' in Porter (ed), *The nineteenth century,* pp 522–545; 546–570; 573–595.

[108] See for instance J Hirst, 'The Australian experience: the convict colony' in N Morris and D J Rothman (eds), *The Oxford history of the prison: the practice of punishment in Western society* (Oxford, 1995), pp 263–265.

[109] C Saunders and I R Smith, 'Southern Africa: 1795–1910' in Porter (ed), *The nineteenth century*, p 597.

Before leaving the white settler dominions for this volume, one could perhaps note that Burroughs' chapter on imperial defence and Green's on the political economy of the empire at the end of the nineteenth century includes issues up to 1914 and these two chapters serve as essential background material on matters financial and military.[115] Kubicek's chapter on the technologies which empowered the 19th-century empire is also worthy of noting here as it is a fascinating overview of the technical aspects of imperial expansion including a temporarily-grounded (and thus, for this reviewer, refreshing) late 19th-century contextual linking of steam-power to Joseph Conrad's *Heart of darkness*,[116] perhaps one of the most overworked texts for 'post-colonial' deconstruction.

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[110] *Ibid*, pp 597–8.

[111] *Ibid*, pp 608–610.

[112] *Ibid*, p 617.

[113] *Ibid*.

[114] *Ibid*, p 620.

[115] P Burroughs, 'Defence and imperial disunity'; E H H Green, 'The political economy of empire: 1880–1914' in Porter (ed), *The nineteenth century*, pp 320–342; 346–369. For an excellent recent discussion on the issues of dominions, defence and empire in the late nineteenth century see A Thompson, *Imperial Britain: the empire in British politics, c. 1880–1932* (Harlow, 2000).

Ireland, as in the first two volumes of the series, is not neglected in the 19th century. Fitzpatrick's chapter is entitled 'Ireland and the Empire', an association which contains a number of meanings. While the formal union of 1801 to 1922 was a 'hybrid' administrative structure though embodying at the core, manifest colonial elements all of which carried varying interpretations of Ireland's dependency.[117] For Fitzpatrick, the historiography of Ireland still neglects colonial elements evident in Ireland's status under the 19th-century union.[118] Celtic inferiority and racial stereotyping, as Curtis has made clear, remained dominant strands in Victorian British discourse on Ireland.[119] At the same time, a variety of Irish attitudes towards the empire were evident during the 19th century including positive identity with the empire as a devolved commonwealth providing emigration opportunities (particularly in the armed services) as well as negative perceptions of the empire as an oppressive form of imperial rule.[120] Ireland's own ambiguous position in the empire as colonised and coloniser, concludes Fitzpatrick , can be seen in the fact that, by the late Victorian period, there was an 'imprint of Ireland on every colonial institution' as well as a colonial (British) imprint on every Irish institution.[121]

Imperial India as an obvious exception to imperial identity as encapsulated in white settler dominion territories, has formed a key nexus for the debate on post-colonial 'subaltern' studies.[122] In keeping with these recent historiographical approaches, Washbrook begins his chapter by stressing the 'need to view India less from perspectives of British rule and more from those of the practices of Indian society'.[123] At the centre of the imperial encounter with India was 'orientalism', a process by which the colonisers attempted to reconstruct 'traditional'

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[116] R Kubicek, 'British expansion, empire and technological change' in Porter (ed), *The nineteenth century*, pp 257–259.

[117] D Fitzpatrick, 'Ireland and the Empire' in Porter (ed), *The nineteenth century*, p 494.

[118] *Ibid*, p 499.

[119] L Curtis, *Nothing but the same old story: the roots of Anti-Irish racism* (London, 1984), p 57.

[120] Fitzpatrick, 'Ireland and the Empire' in Porter (ed), *The nineteenth century*, pp 509–519.

[121] *Ibid*, p 520.

[122] D Chakrabaty, 'Postcoloniality and the artifice of history: who speaks for ''Indian pasts''?', *Representations*, vol. 37 (1992), pp 1–36.

[123] D A Washbrook, 'India, 1818–1860: the two faces of colonialism' in Porter (ed), *The nineteenth century*, p 395.

Indian society while at the same time justifying colonialism as an anglicising imperative, essential to the 'civilising' of indigenous society and so vividly explained by Macaulay in his Minute in 1839 – 'a splendid example of the arrogance of the argument that Indian beliefs and customs would be corrected by Western knowledge'.[124] Washbrook examines the tensions between these two approaches during the period of English East India Company rule and notes that a 'tangled web of cultural meanings' developed as attempts at anglicising reforms often produced, by default social consequences which strengthened 'oriental' traditions.[125] While Washbrook, like any competent Indian historian stresses the multitude of possible causes for the 'Great Mutiny' of 1857,[126] he notes the central significance of Dalhousie's westernising policies which antagonised the holders of vested interests under the earlier neo-Orientalising Raj. The clearest manifestation of this response was undoubtedly the military mutiny focused on the Bengal army where high-caste privileges were threatened.[127]

Washbrook notes that the contradictions of British rule – caught between inventing an Oriental society and abolishing it – were manifested in many of the complex patterns of revolt witnessed in 1857'.[128] These contradictions not only, as Harlow and Carter have recently suggested make 'unequivocal representation' of the 1857 rebellion an 'impossible endeavour'[129] but also continued to epitomise the main tensions in colonial rule in India in the decades which followed.[130]

The tensions between collaboration and resistance to the British Raj, evident, as Ray illustrates in the first volume of this series and as Washbrook has further clarified, were, suggests Moore, a connecting strand in Indian history during the period of crown rule from 1858 to 1914. With the financial and military reconstruction of the Raj following the Mutiny, westernising and anglicising efforts were resumed and high-caste Hindu-speakers were recruited into the lower ranks of the colonial service as 'interpreters' of British rule. The establishment of fully-fledged Indian universities at Calcutta, Bombay and Madras provided further impetus for a developing professional class and Moore stresses that these reforming impulses resulted in a national turning-point for Indian colonial politics in the form of the Indian National Congress, founded in 1885.[131] Moore then traces the growth of the Congress' legislative demands which was alternatively encouraged (by Lansdowne's reforms) and contained (by Curzon's plans for India as part of 20th-century British power).[132] Moore concludes that, despite a growing and increasingly articulate Indian nationalism by 1914, the 'Raj was ultimately a despotic foreign regime'.[133]

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[124] A Pennycook, *English and the discourses of colonialism* (London, 1998) p 80.

[125] Washbrook, 'India, 1818–1860' in Porter (ed), *The nineteenth century*, p 416.

[126] For recent empirical accounts of the 'Mutiny' see L James, *Raj: the making and unmaking of British India* (London, 1997), pp 250–252; A Ward, *Our bones are scattered: the Cawnpore massacres and the Indian Mutiny of 1857* (New York, 1996), p 555.

[127] *Ibid*, p 418.

[128] *Ibid*, p 419.

[129] B Harlow and M Carter (eds), *Imperialism and orientalism: a documentary source book* (Oxford, 1999), p 166.

[130] Washbrook, 'India, 1818–1860' in Porter (ed), *The nineteenth century*, p 420.

In conclusion, the meticulous chapters on 'informal Empire' in this volume also deserve to be mentioned for instance Lynn's chapter on the relationship between the metropolitan centre and the controversial role of free trade in which he includes a re-examination of Robinson and Gallagher's thesis on empire and free trade;[134] Knight's chapter on Britain and Latin America, which traces British economic imperialism in this sphere from Canning's 1824 statement 'to make Spanish America English' to an analysis of the serious challenges facing British trade in Latin America by 1914;[135] and Osterhammel's detailed chapter on British economic involvement in China, in which he suggests that Britain's role as an 'imperial presence' in that region has to be approached with caution.[136]

Louis begins the fourth volume of the series by noting the extremely short nature of the 20th-century empire, given a 1914 ending date for the previous century and a decolonisation process from the late 1940s culminating in the onset of the 'post-colonial' world, for Britain, in the 1960s. These constraints he suggests, make this volume chronologically problematic though there are, at the same time, distinct markers such as the ending of the South African War in 1902 at the beginning of the century, and the transfer of Hong Kong in 1997 at the end of the century.[137] Louis sees cultural legacies such as sport and literature as influential remnants in the post-Britannic age[138] and although the series as a whole pays consistent attention to the literary canon of imperialism it is disappointingly silent on the pervasive influence of sport, especially cricket which, as Derek Birley has noted, formed such lasting links between imperial places in the post-imperial commonwealth world.[139] This reviewer finds the lack of material on cricket disappointing, particularly in a series where a key participant in imperial and commonwealth cricket, the British West Indies, is so well represented. At the same time though, due credit must be given to Johnson's contribution on the twentieth-century West Indies in which he focuses on the distinct nature of Caribbean literature, a literary development so significant for the post-colonial cultural studies which later emanated from this region.[140]

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[131] *Ibid*, pp 431–432.

[132] *Ibid*, pp 433–437.

[133] *Ibid*, p 444.

[134] M Lynn, 'British policy, trade and informal empire in the mid-nineteenth century' in Porter (ed), *The nineteenth century*, p 121.

[135] A Knight, 'Britain and Latin America' in Porter (ed), *The nineteenth century*, pp 122, 144.

[136] J Osterhammel, 'Britain and China: 1842–1914' in Porter (ed), *The nineteenth century*, p 159.

[137] W R Louis, 'Introduction' in J M Brown and W R Louis (eds), *The Oxford history of the British empire, vol 4: The twentieth century* (Oxford, 1999), p 1.

[138] *Ibid*, p 45.

Like the previous volume, this one also contains fascinating glimpses into the culture of empire in a variety of 20th-century forms. Following on from his detailed chapter in volume three, Mackenzie provides an equally enthralling section on 20th century metropolitan popular culture. Focusing particularly on the inter-war years, he looks at a range of depictions of imperial themes, including the 1924 Wembley Exhibition and its successors for this particular form of imperial propaganda as well as the developing British Broadcasting Corporation during the 1920s and 1930s.[141] Mackenzie examines the continuing phenomenon of the imperial adventure story and its dissemination from the books of authors like Edgar Wallace and G A Henty into the new form of popular literature – comics – many of which were published into the 1950s.[142] A large part of this chapter is devoted to an analysis of imperial cinema which, for Mackenzie, was 'the most powerful influence on the public's views on the Empire' and whose racial message expressed a new fulfilment of imperial ideology.[143] Mackenzie's chapter is yet another example of his comprehensive research on this theme and it demonstrates his grasp of what he calls 'the extraordinary Indian summer in the popular culture of Empire'.[144]

Central to the first part of the fourth volume is a contextualisation of the changing forms of colonial control prior to the Second World War.

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[139] D Birley, *Playing the game: sport and British society, 1910–1945* (Manchester, 1995), p 25 ff.

[140] H Johnson, 'The British Caribbean from demobilization to constitutional decolonization' in Louis and Brown (eds), *The twentieth century*, p 617.

[141] J Mackenzie, 'The popular culture of Empire in Britain' in Louis and Brown (eds), *The twentieth century*, pp 213–218.

[142] *Ibid*, pp 221–222. For a recent reappraisal of the 'adventure story' see M Green, 'Adventurers stake their claim: the adventure tale's bid for status, 1876–1914' in K R Lawrence (ed), *Decolonizing tradition: new views of twentieth-century "British" literary canons* (Urbana and Chicago, 1992).

[143] Mackenzie, 'Popular culture of Empire', p 225.

[144] *Ibid*, p 229.

This is extremely well-provided in a number of core chapters and, as the authors demonstrate is not always distinct from the cultural experience of empire. Hyam's contribution on the empire during the Edwardian period examines the contrasting attitudes towards empire during the first decades of the century, a spectrum of opinion which varied from pride to pessimism.[145] The different attitudes were also indicative of the political tensions during a period of continuing ambivalence in the relations between the white dominion colonies and metropolitan power.[146] Hyam concludes by noting that the empire was, in the period immediately before and after 1914, characterised by continual transformation and renewal.[147] The mechanisms of evolving colonial nationalisms are discussed by Darwin in his chapter on the 'third British Empire'. Darwin suggests that the pre-1917 'Edwardian stalemate' was broken by the dynamic phase of imperial politics which followed the new movement towards Irish Home Rule and the dominion contribution to the First World War.[148] He also notes the pro-active role played by Ireland and South Africa in the 1926 Balfour Report and the interesting variety of dominion responses to the 1931 Statute of Westminster which was 'eagerly endorsed in Dublin and Pretoria, carefully emasculated in Canada and comprehensively ignored in Australia and New Zealand'.[149] Dominion links to Britain were, for Darwin, two-fold. Firstly in terms of economic interdependence, more keenly felt after the abandonment of free trade in 1932 and secondly in terms of race sentiment or 'Britannic nationalism' which was sentimentally challenged in South Africa, Quebec and Ireland by 'therapeutic anglophobia' though not by any serious attempts to reconstitute the political architecture of empire.[150] The attachment to Britannic institutions ensured that the dominions were not, in 1939, 'nations-in-waiting' for independence.[151] Darwin concludes that even after the break-up of formal empire from the 1950s a general belief in adherence to British institutions left, in the former dominions a void in place of an ideological legacy and this was not easily filled.[152] The experience of colonial rule explains Cell, was another instance of ways in which British institutional structures, especially the civil service, were appropriated by colonial administrators.[153] Hyam in a second chapter in this volume, reiterates a point made in his earlier one – that although British colonial bureaucracy can be seen as providing an infrastructure for post-colonial national structuring – this process was to some extent still incomplete in the context of independence in the 1960s.[154]

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[145] R Hyam, 'The British Empire in the Edwardian era' in Louis and Brown (eds), *The twentieth century*, pp 49–50.

[146] *Ibid*, pp 57–58.

[147] *Ibid*, p 63.

[148] *Ibid*, pp 66–67.

[149] *Ibid*, p 69.

[150] *Ibid*, pp 74–76.

[151] *Ibid*, p 77.

[152] *Ibid*, p 86.

In keeping with the first three volumes in the series, the story of Ireland's continuing ambiguous status in the empire is completed in this volume. McMahon provides an illuminating and tightly-argued discussion on a complicated and tragic set of events, beginning with the 1916 rising which she carefully places in its imperial context, noting the parallels with the 1914 South African rebellion and its effects on Irish communities in Australia and New Zealand.[155] McMahon then traces the events between 1919 and 1922, noting that the 'Indian measures' suggested by the British government 'revealed the peculiarly ambiguous position of Ireland in the Empire', a relationship deliberately left in abeyance following the establishment of the Republic in 1919.[156] The clear interplay between separate theatres of empire makes this period of Irish politics fascinating for a South African reviewer and the detailed account of J C Smuts' involvement in the negotiations for Irish dominion status serves to illustrate the close relationships of imperial politics during the 1920s.[157] This is again reinforced in McMahon's illustration of the implications for the other dominions of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty which granted the Irish Free State 'self-governing' status within the British commonwealth.[158] This was followed by the Irish initiative in being the first dominion to adopt the Statute of Westminster in 1931.[159] The links between Ireland and the empire were later shown, for McMahon ironically, in the parallels of partition and independence evident in India and Ireland in the late

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[153] J W Cell, 'Colonial rule', in Louis and Brown (eds), *The twentieth century*, p 253.

[154] Hyam, 'The British Empire', pp 60–61; R Hyam, 'Bureaucracy and ''Trusteeship'' in the colonial Empire' in Louis and Brown (eds), *The twentieth century*, pp 277–278.

[155] D McMahon, 'Ireland and the Empire-Commonwealth, 1900–1948' in Louis and Brown (eds), *The twentieth century*, p 141. For a revisionist summary of the events of 1916 see also D G Boyce, '1916: interpreting the rising' in Boyce and O'Day (eds), *The making of modern Irish history*, pp 170 ff.

[156] McMahon, 'Ireland and the Empire-Commonwealth' in Louis and Brown (eds), *The twentieth century*, pp 143–145.

[157] *Ibid*, pp 147–151.

[158] *Ibid*, pp 153–154.

[159] *Ibid*, p 156.

1940s though the difference in questions of alleigance was starkly demonstrated by the fact that while India joined the commonwealth in 1949, the Republic of Ireland seceded from it.[160]

While the Second World War can be identified as a turning-point for what Jeffrey calls the 'apotheosis of the British Empire',[161] it is difficult to find a single temporal hinge for the 'post-colonial' era. Anti-imperial sentiment had been apparent in British politics throughout the first part of the 20th century. The South African War was, suggests Nicholas Owen the key turning-point in early 20th-century imperial politics and the Fabian Society and later Labour Party opposition to the war ensured that the conflict 'drove this imperial wedge firmly into the society'.[162] Using three chronological frameworks for the period from 1900 to 1964, Owen examines the various forms of opposition to the 20th-century empire, from the socialist Fabian response to the South African War, including J A Hobson's 1902 text through the anti-trusteeship criticisms to the Labour Party's concerns that power be transferred in a manner to promote economic growth, given the vulnerable position of the ex colonies between American capitalism and Soviet communism.[163] Despite these obvious general trends there were clear temporal processes by which the empire was formally dismantled. Louis, in a chapter which marks the beginning of the second half of volume four provides a careful chronological account of the dissolution of the empire, using as specific temporal points the two decades following the Second World War.[164]

In a somewhat distracting layout, the volume does not follow the chronological path laid in Louis' chapter but includes instead a number of thematic and regional studies which cover key formal colonial regions both before and after independence. These include Brown's chapter on India, Ashton's on Ceylon, Stockwell's on South-East Asia, Falola and Roberts' on West Africa, Lonsdale's on East Africa, Marks on Southern Africa, Mackenzie on Canada, Johnson on the West Indies, MacIntyre on Australasia. This is not to in any way criticise these extremely comprehensive chapters, all of which bear witness to their authors' expertise in their own fields. Particularly well-argued and succinct overviews of 20th-century issues are provided in Judith

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[160] *Ibid*, p 160.

[161] K Jeffrey, 'The Second World War' in Louis and Brown (eds), *The twentieth century*, p 306.

[162] N Owen, 'Critics of Empire in Britain' in Louis and Brown (eds), *The twentieth century*, p 191.

[163] *Ibid*, pp 192–210.

[164] W R Louis, 'The dissolution of the British Empire' in Louis and Brown (eds), *The twentieth century*, pp 328–355.

Brown's 'India' and in Shula Marks' 'Southern Africa' both of which place these regions within the broader framework on continental and imperial political economy. Marks also highlights the links between South Africa and the imperial and later commonwealth academic world,[165] connections only too evident for any researcher of imperial history and historiography.[166] Also included in these broad sweeping overviews of 20th century history are those regions which constituted the informal empire. Two chapters examine British relations with the Muslim world – both as a wide sphere including North Africa, the Middle East and Asia – and in a specifically Middle Eastern context. As in the third volume, both China and Latin America are afforded detailed treatment as economic sections in the informal British empire and in the post-empire world economy. An additional theme, sadly missing from the first three volumes in the series is that elucidated in Rosalind O'Hanlon's chapter on gender in the empire. O'Hanlon comments on the newly hospitable nature of the imperial terrain for gender studies and although her chapter is short, and confined to the late 19th and 20th century empire, it contains a well-researched appraisal of a growing literature.[167]

In her conclusion to this volume, Judith Brown notes that this, like its predecessors has 'attempted … to stand back and review the Imperial experience with the benefit of the wealth of historical evidence which has become available in recent years'.[168] In this, as in the preceding three texts, volume four succeeds admirably. Not only have the authors identified a number of histories, they have also engaged, from a position of post-colonial hindsight, with the when and how of those narratives.[169] In this they have not only carried out their tasks as expert historians but have also moved beyond traditional territory in engaging with some of the elusive meanings of the 'post-colonial'.[170]

The enormous resonance of this project is finally demonstrated in the fifth volume of this series – a volume dedicated to imperial historiography. At first glance this volume seems in many ways a coda to a set of volumes containing vigorous historiographical debate. However, as Washbrook points out, the literature on 'colonial discourse' theory and 'orientalism' – to name but two recurring paradigms in recent historiographies of empire – is prolific and constantly being utilised in alternative methodologies.[171] Washbrook gives a sensitive and insightful analysis of recent trends in discourse theory and engages with Said's 'orientalism' and Foucault's and Derrida's questioning of the enlightenment epicentre for western (and imperial) epistemology.[172] Taking a different view, but with evidence of similar influences in recent hermeneutics is Thornton's chapter on the 'shaping' of imperial history in which he questions the 'aura of ceremony still attending archive and atlas'.[173] Thornton tantalizingly concludes that the distinction between historical 'facts', imagination and memory needs further investigation and that no achievement, including this five-volume series, is permanently sound'.[174]

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[165] Marks, 'Southern Africa' in Louis and Brown (eds), *The twentieth century*, p 545.

[166] See especially R Symonds, *Oxford and empire: the last lost cause* (London, 1986), pp 284–293.

[167] R O'Hanlon, 'Gender in the British empire' in Louis and Brown (eds), *The twentieth century*, p 379.

[168] J Brown, 'Epilogue' in Louis and Brown (eds), *The twentieth century*, p 703.

[169] See R Gregg, 'Class, culture and empire: E P Thompson and the making of social history', *Journal of historical sociology*, vol 11, no 4 (December 1998), pp 418–420.

[170] A Quayson, *Postcolonialism: theory, practice or process?* (Cambridge, 2000), pp 48–54.

In addition to these theoretical engagements, this volume contains a remarkable collection of both thematic and regional assessments of imperial historiography. In line with the cultural depiction and reception of empire discussed in volumes two, three and four, a number of cultural disseminations are given space here. Richard Drayton, following his chapter in volume two examines the nuances and cultural impact of science and medicine, both of which 'participated in British expansion from the age of Ralegh to that of Curzon and Nehru'.[175] Taking note of recent trends in discourse theory Drayton wryly comments that the idea of the West has changed from 'heroic' to 'demonic'.[176] Diana Wylie notes that the changes have in fact been far more subtle as historians, following the work of Said have looked for alternative conceptualisations 'of the nature and modes of power of British rule', a new approach to gender being but one of these strands.[177] Robert Stafford gives a detailed context for the former 'heroic' reputation, noting that the age of European exploration was one which required the English-speaking world 'to reformulate the subject in a popular, condensed form appropriate to the age of information'.[178]

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[171] D A Washbrook, 'Orients and Occidents: Colonial discourse theory and the historiography of the British Empire' in R W Winks (ed), *The Oxford history of the British empire, vol 5: Historiography* (Oxford, 1999), p 596.

[172] *Ibid*, p 597, 610.

[173] A P Thornton, 'The shaping of imperial history' in Winks (ed), *Historiography*, p 613.

[174] *Ibid*, p 633.

[175] R Drayton, 'Science, medicine and the British Empire' in Winks (ed), *Historiography*, p 264.

[176] *Ibid*, p 275.

[177] D Wylie, 'Disease, diet, and gender: late twentieth-century perspectives on Empire' in Winks (ed), *Historiography*, p 277.

[178] R A Stafford, 'Exploration and empire', in Winks (ed), *Historiography*, p 300.

The regional historiographies present in this volume are equally illustrative of historians' willingness to engage with a bewildering variety of theoretical constructs. To note just two of a comprehensive set of examples. David Harkness comments that Ireland appears consistently throughout the volumes of the series, a fact which indicates the complex nature of the region's developing historiography as Ireland moved from colonized island through membership of a modern Empire and eventually to republicanism.[179] Southern Africa has had a similarly interesting career at the hands of historians from 19th-century British writers through both African and Afrikaner indigenous responses and the liberal and Marxist writing of the 20th century. Post-modernist reassessment since the early 1990s has, suggests William Worger entered a new post-colonial phase since 1994 and 'new conflict is also likely as to who will set the agenda for post-Empire, post-colonial scholarship'.[180]

It is clearly beyond the scope of this article to do justice to this enormous project, a project in many ways as long, complex and comprehensive as the Empire it seeks to record. The editors and writers are to be congratulated on their efforts in bringing together a chronological and yet thematic collection of writing on empire, imperial historiography, discourse and debate. As a final comment on the series, one could perhaps note, not only the carefully compiled Select Bibliography which appears at the end of each chapter and which indicates the contributors' prolific knowledge of the literature in this field but also the numerous footnotes which begin 'From a growing literature'.

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[179] D Harkness, 'Ireland' in Winks (ed), *Historiography*, p 115.

[180] W Worger, 'Southern Africa' in Winks (ed), *Historiography*, p 539.

Book reviews/ Boekbesprekings

Africa/Afrika

Kenneth Christie, *The South African Truth Commission* (London, Macmillan, 2000), xi + 215 pp, tables, abbrev, notes, select bibl, index. ISBN 0-333-69126-1

Functioning between November 1995 and April 1998, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to a considerable degree symbolised the relatively optimistic political atmosphere of the early phase of the New South Africa. It is this period with which this monograph, written shortly afterwards, is concerned.

The author argues that in fact the Commission was not so much interested in ethical, moral concerns or 'political correctness' but was pragmatically seeking to bring about a peaceful political transition (p 66). This explains its moderate position in steering a compromise course between ignoring past political conflicts on the one hand, and on the other, seeking to put former white National Party leaders on trial for alleged war crimes. Instead, amnesty was granted to those who openly and publicly confessed their crimes. 'Amnesty was the price of securing peace and cooperation in the negotiated collapse of white rule' (p 122). A peaceful political transition was so necessary because there were no clear-cut political winners in 1994 (pp 68, 176).

In fact, however, it is hard to see the 1994 settlement as a real compromise. The legalisation of the ANC in 1990 assured it political control of the townships where it had already achieved *de facto* hegemony between 1983–1985, prior to the state of emergency. Its only significant black rival had been the IFP, which, in late 1992 had in fact been excluded from the negotiations through the Record of Understanding signed between the government and the ANC. By the end of 1993 the Nationalists had finally been pressured into conceding the principle of a unitary state based on a full one man, one vote principle. From then on, the result of the election was a foregone conclusion. Furthermore, during the period of the interim government (December 1993 – April 1994), the two remaining 'independent' homelands not yet under ANC control had collapsed and fallen under ANC influence. Within two years of the 1994 elections the National Party had formally withdrawn from the initial Government of National Unity for the obvious reason that they had had so little influence in it anyway.

Can one thus easily agree with the view, allegedly expressed by members of the TRC to the author, that 'if there had been no negotiated amnesty, the country would have been faced with a bloodbath scenario' (p 66)? In view of the fact that the whites had already given up power to the ANC, did the amnesty really make such a crucial difference in their eyes? For that matter, as Christie himself points out, white opinion about the TRC was generally hostile (pp 101, 169).

A more plausible argument, therefore, for the conciliatory nature of the Truth Commission would be that while the ANC government was not overly concerned about domestic white reaction, it was being careful not to alienate overseas public opinion and in particular, not to frighten off overseas investment. During the 1995–1998 period (the period of the TRC) after all, the government still viewed the prospect of growing future foreign investments in a relatively optimistic light. As Adrian Guelke has pointed out, the National Party was in fact hostile to the TRC 'in contrast to the overwhelmingly positive international reaction … Indeed, the TRC has served to underpin the international legitimacy of the transition …'[1] Conversely, with the waning of overseas investment interest, during the past few years the impact of the TRC's concept of 'reconciliation' has faded in South Africa.

Christie for his part argues that growing affirmative action policies in favour of Africans were, in any case, bound to challenge the non racial, reconciliation policies of the TRC (pp 100–103, 147–148, 166). In this respect, his admittedly all too brief distinction between Archbishop Desmond Tutu, chair of the Commission, and Thabo Mbeki (at that time, deputy president) in their respective attitudes towards reconciliation is of interest. Tutu saw both reconciliation and transformation as part of 'an overall development of a human rights' culture' (pp 144–145). By implication, therefore, Christie suggests that for Tutu, both processes were to occur simultaneously. For Mbeki, on the other hand, reconciliation was to occur only after socio-economic transformation. Christie could well have added that Tutu's more conciliatory position towards whites in fact explains why his own political influence in the new South Africa appears significantly less today than a few years ago.

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J P J Coetzer, *ister se dade vandag se oordeel* (Pretoria, J P van der Walt, 2000), 351 pp, illus, bibl, index. ISBN 0 7993 2693 3

In writing this book J P J Coetzer, a former director-general of the Department of Justice and a member of the State Security Council, was motivated by a determination to refute the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's (TRC) condemnation of the crimes of the apartheid state. Coetzer believes that the National Party (NP) government and the Afrikaner have no reason to feel guilt or remorse about the past. The central theme of the book is the justification of the NP government's harsh security measures.

The cornerstone of Coetzer's attack on the TRC's findings is his argument that the NP's actions must be seen against the background of a merciless communist onslaught, organised and manipulated from Moscow, to secure control of South Africa. According to Coetzer this left the NP with no option but to abolish the rule of law to allow it to deal with ruthless revolutionaries. On a personal level, Coetzer claims he was unhappy with the concept of detention without trial and the way detainees were treated. He believed for example, that a judicial commission of inquiry should have investigated the death of Steve Biko in detention, but he was overruled by John Vorster. Despite his qualms, Coetzer convinced himself that the revolutionary situation in South Africa justified draconian security measures and he argues that in the long-term they paid off. According to him, the peaceful handover of power in 1994 to the African National Congress (ANC) was only possible because the NP had prevented a communist takeover which would have reduced South Africa to ruins.

The influence of communism and the military support of the communist bloc for the liberation struggle cannot be denied, but Coetzer's stance that the struggle was communist-inspired and controlled by Moscow is too simplistic. His obsession with communism as *the* motivating factor for the liberation struggle is puzzling as he admits that there were many indefensible apartheid measures – he says, for example, that he felt uncomfortable prosecuting transgressors of the Immorality Act, that many reforms were too late or too timid and that the NP government must accept some responsibility for the conflict in South Africa. It is surprising that a man of his experience and obvious intelligence did not understand that repressive measures were counter-productive and did more than communist agitators or agents to secure recruits for the liberation struggle. Equally baffling is his inability, as an Afrikaner nationalist, to understand that, like the Boers who fought for their freedom against British imperialism, Africans also desired freedom. As Irish nationalists made use of Germany during the First World War, and as some Indian nationalists supported Japan during the Second World War to secure their freedom from Britain, so the ANC turned to the Communist bloc for arms. Ultimately it was the intolerance and oppression of apartheid, and not communism, that fuelled the liberation struggle.

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[1] A Guelke, *South Africa in transition: the misunderstood miracle* (London, 1999), p 173.

Another flaw in Coetzer's insistence on the communist threat is that he does not explain why security measures were used against people who did not even remotely fit into the revolutionary category. Men such as Ernie Wentzel and Peter Brown, for example, both members of the South African Liberal Party, were dedicated democrats, rejected communism and violence, and opposed apartheid by peaceful means to prevent a racial revolution. Yet they were abused, vilified and detained more than once without trial. Brown was eventually banned. Alan Paton, the leader of the Liberal Party and a person dedicated to peace and tolerance was also hounded by the security police. They stationed themselves permanently outside his house, photographed his visitors, shadowed his every move, tapped his telephone, intercepted his mail, searched his home and vandalised his property. Only a paranoid government could have seen Paton, Wentzel and Brown as revolutionaries. The treatment of these liberals prove that the 'communist onslaught' was used as a smokescreen to suppress those campaigning for racial equality.

Coetzer has also relied too heavily on Henry Pike's flawed *A history of communism in South Africa*. An example of Pike's unreliability is his use of two photographs of piles of weapons which the police allegedly collected after the shooting at the Sharpeville police station in 1960. This is used by Pike as evidence that the black protesters were armed. The same two photographs, which Coetzer reproduces in his book, date, however, from 1946. The weapons were confiscated from workers at the Sub Nigel Mine during a mine workers strike. The original photographs can be found on the front page of the *Rand Daily Mail* of 17 August 1946. Coetzer, however, is not blind to the police's culpability and he condemns their uncontrolled shooting into the fleeing crowd. Another historical gaffe is that Coetzer credits Leo Marquard and Alan Paton with establishing the Labour Party instead of the Liberal Party.

Coetzer's naivety is also puzzling. For example, he argues that at the time of the Rivonia Trial the ANC leadership could not prove that Africans supported the armed struggle against apartheid. He bases this on the fact that no ordinary Africans came forward during the trial to testify that the trialists had acted on their behalf. Can he really believe that in a police state, in which the rule of law has been abolished an African with a poorly paid job, a family to raise and employed by a white person would have volunteered to testify in support of the armed struggle? In the mid-1950s, Titus Ramonyali, a black postal worker, was dismissed merely for supporting the Liberal Party.

Despite its shortcomings this book will be a valuable source for historians on the workings of the apartheid state and on the leadership of John Vorster. It helps to explain Vorster's too trusting attitude towards officials who contributed to the information scandal and his resignation in disgrace. Coetzer also confirms that the Soweto uprising of 1976 caught the government by surprise and that, despite his image as an iron man, Vorster was lethargic and had no idea of how to deal with the events of that year.

As a rebuttal of the TRC, however, the book fails and in effect it bolsters the

Commission's report. Coetzer confirms that by destroying the rule of law the NP had created a situation in which detainees could be tortured, and thugs like Ferdi Barnard and Eugene de Kock could murder with impunity in the name of the apartheid state and the Afrikaner.

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Robert R Edgar and Hilary Sapire, *African Apocalypse: the Story of Nontetha Nkwenkwe, a twentieth century South African prophet* (Johannesburg, Witwatersrand University Press, Athens, Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000), ix + 190 pp, index, ISBN 1 86814 337 6

In his highly-acclaimed book, *Native life in South Africa*, Sol Plaatje speaks of an unknown African prophetess of Vereeniging who prophesied about the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War and the Great War. According to Plaatje, this 'interesting lady carried great weight among the surrounding native peasants and the Dutch neighbours on the farms of that neighbourhood ... and uttered her last prophecy'.[1] The book reviewed here, co-authored by historians Robert Edgar and Hilary Sapire does not uncover the identity of the unknown prophetess referred to by Plaatje, nor does it attempt to reconstruct the events or uncover her prophecies. Instead, the historians have uncovered the history of an equally compelling African prophetess called Nontetha Nkwenkwe.

The eastern Cape has a long history of prophetic movements and since colonial times many prophets and prophetesses have regularly appeared and disappeared. It is therefore not surprising that yet another prophetic movement emerged in the Eastern Cape at the beginning of the twentieth century. *African apocalypse* is not merely a conventional historical biography which tells the story of a Xhosa woman Nontetha Nkwenkwe, but it also entertains the reader in an absorbing manner within the historical context of modern twentieth century South Africa. *African apocalypse* comprises five chapters, and each chapter addresses different issues such as Nontetha's calling as prophetess, the response of her adherents, her interpretation of the influenza epidemic, state intervention, her mental status and confinement to Weskoppies asylum, her death and burial. But the story does not end here. Retrieving and reconstructing the history of Nontetha became important for several other reasons too. At a time when South Africa was engaged in shedding itself of the apartheid past through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it simultaneously sought black heroes or heroines to redress the imbalances of the past. Thus, uncovering the Nontetha narrative became an exercise of public history, memory and heritage. Efforts begun by the authors a few years previously, finally came to fruition in 1998 when the remains of Nontetha were exhumed. Months later, during a memorial and burial service conducted in the presence of members of the Church of the Prophetess Nontetha, the public and other high-ranking officials, her remains were reburied in Khulile, a village in the eastern Cape.

In 1918, the entire world suffered the devastating consequences of the influenza pandemic. In South Africa too, the scourge claimed many lives. 'Influenza' write Edgar and Sapire 'was a merciless leveller, leaving few families or communities untouched' (p 6). In the historiography of prophetic and millenarian movements, it is known that natural disasters usually ignite the emergence of prophetic movements. In his book, *Disaster and the millennium* (New Haven,

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[1] S Plaatje, *Native life in South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1995), p 295.

1974), Michael Barkun describes how disasters, earthquakes, disease and natural catastrophes led to the emergence of millenarian and prophetic movements. The Nontetha movement emerged under similar circumstances as she was 'called' during the outbreak of the influenza epidemic. Called to her mission in 1918, Nontetha launched her prophetic career by interpreting the cataclysmic influenza scourge. As a religious leader, Nontetha concluded that 'God had unleashed *umbathalala* as *isibeto*, a punishment for peoples' sins'. (p 8). Moreover, she encouraged her followers to repent and to mend their ways 'as judgment day in which everyone would be flying in the sky was imminent'. (pp 9–10).

Years later, Nontetha's preaching coincided with the aftermath of the Bulhoek religious movement and massacre of 1921. To a greater, rather than lesser degree, this event dealt her religious movement a major blow. The local police mistook her preaching and prophecies as a sub-branch of the more famous millenarian Israelite movement. Led by the prophet Enoch Mgijima, the millenarian movement was crushed by the Smuts regime and was marred by severe casualties. Reports that Nontetha was 'anti-white', no doubt triggered alarm bells that the Israelite movement had revived itself, headed this time by Nontetha. Arrested for sedition and confined to an asylum in Beaufort West before being transferred to Weskoppies in Pretoria in 1922, Nontetha soon discovered her fate laid in the hands of the state. State psychiatrists diagnosed Nontetha's mental condition as *dementia praecox* of the hebephrenic type of schizophrenia.

Although 'institutionalized', Nontetha kept proselytising to her fellow inmates to embrace her visions and prophecies. This sadly worsened her chances of release and she remained confined to Weskoppies until her death in 1935 from liver cancer. The asylum authorities informed Nontetha's relatives of her death, instructing them to claim the body immediately. When Nontetha's family responded nearly two weeks later due to communication hitches, they decided that Nontetha would be buried by her family in the eastern Cape, but the authorities at Weskoppies informed them that Nontetha had already been given a pauper's burial in Pretoria's Newclare Cemetery. Despite the concerted efforts of her relatives to exhume her body for re-burial in the eastern Cape, this proved a frustrating if not futile exercise. However, nearly sixty-three years later, collaborative efforts headed by the authors in conjunction with the Directorate of Museums and Heritage Resources of the Eastern Cape local government, descendants of Nontetha, religious leaders, historians, forensic scientists and a team of archaeologists culminated in the exhumation of Nontetha's remains.

Although the authors make a strong and convincing case about the importance of Nontetha, the reader is unfortunately left with the impression that prophecies were restricted to African women. This was certainly not the case. The authors, for example, ignore Afrikaner female prophets. A contemporary of Nontetha, Johanna Brandt, an Afrikaner prophetess also predicted the outbreak of influenza in 1918. Johanna Brandt predicted in 1916 that a plague would erupt as prelude to the millennium. Like Nontetha, her prophecies were affirmed in 1918, but Brandt quickly added that this was only *'die begin der smarte'* (the beginning of the pain) as indicated in Revelations 16:10–11. Incidently, Nontetha also preached 'that the influenza was just a taste of what God was bringing'. (p 9). Clearly, prophetic utterances were not restricted to African societies nor to black women.

A comparative analysis between Johanna Brandt and Nontetha Nkwenkwe reveals striking parallels. As contemporaries, born in 1875 and 1876 respectively, both Nontetha Nkwenkwe and Johanna Brandt began their prophetic careers during the influenza epidemic of

1918 when both predicted that this scourge was merely the beginning of greater adversity. Unlike Nontetha, Johanna Brandt was not regarded as mad nor was she confined to a mental institution. The authorities had clearly regarded Nontetha's prophecies, as made by a black woman, to be more 'threatening' than those by Brandt. Moreover, Brandt was an educated and influential white woman who rose to prominence during and after the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902. Her prophecies could therefore not have been threatening to the state nor damaging to society. In fact, the Dutch Reformed Church embraced her prophecies as gospel truths. This indicates a deeper history about the treatment of the 'insane' and their prophetic pronouncements in South Africa. In colonial times, the state paid special attention to prophetic messages as preached by indigenous prophets and always attributed prophetic utterances to resistance or the work of a deranged person. Prophetic utterances by black men or women were interpreted as rebellious acts. Prophecy implied defiance or sedition and threatened the *status quo* of white rule. Naturally such opposition could not be tolerated and the obvious response was suppression. The Dutch, for example, under VOC rule during the 18th century, suppressed a Khoikhoi prophetic movement following the prophecies of a Khoikhoi person named Jan Paerl. In 1788 the colonial Khoikhoi prophet Jan Paerl predicted that the world would cease to exist on October 25, 1788. He urged followers to kill their cattle, burn their European clothes and attack settler farms on October 25, 1788. Although the cattle-killing movement disintegrated when the predictions were not realized, its leader Jan Paerl was still sought. Paerl fled, but was arrested and jailed. The court case was extremely important. First of all, the Dutch authorities had no idea what charge would be brought against the messianic leader. During the course of the trial, certain court officials tried to portray Jan Paerl as a mad man. The Dutch authorities and local settlers of Swellendam rendered Paerl as insane or mad. In the colonial records, Jan Paerl is seen as a *''zot''*, meaning mad. Additional words used by court officials to describe his alleged insanity included, *''kinderachtig''* (childish) and ''belachelijk'' (ridiculous). Their paths to ''imprisonment'' or ''institutionalized'' were similar, but also different. Unlike Nontetha, the Khoikhoi prophet was not ''institutionalized'' in an asylum as none existed at the time. Banishment to Robben Island was not considered either. Paerl was, however, confined to a conventional colonial prison in Stellenbosch.

The study also unveils how the state dealt with troublesome persons. Having identified and used several mechanisms of control, namely the police, wrongful prosecution and prison, the state soon added psychiatric hospitals to their list. Mental institutions provided the state an ideal solution to eliminate or silence what they termed troublesome persons.

African Apocalypse merely scratched the surface regarding the social history of madness, fools, lunatics and prophecy in modern South Africa. Many such histories lay buried in archives or hidden in the memory of individuals waiting to be uncovered by historians. One such history is millenarian history. The recent Manenburg tornado, which rocked the Cape flats in August 1999, is but one case in point as many residents feared the ''end of the world''. Ironically the blocks of flats destroyed were named *Alpha* and *Omega*, meaning beginning and end according to the Biblical book of Revelation. Millenarian history, is thus a branch of social history endowed with endless possibilities. Despite a few minor criticisms, the authors and publishers are to be congratulated on this achievement as they packaged a good product bound to generate considerable interest in public history, heritage and commemorating the past as a whole.

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Steven D Gish, *Alfred B Xuma: African, American, South Africa* (London, Macmillan, 2000) xii + 305 pp, illus, bibl, index. ISBN 0-333-67073-6

If South Africans should be approached in the street and asked their opinion on Alfred B. Xuma it is unlikely that more than a handful would know who he was. This ignorance would be understandable, as during the apartheid years he was ignored in school history; nor has he received the recognition he deserves since 1994. Yet he was one of the giants of the liberation struggle against white domination in South Africa. Steven Gish, a historian from Auburn University, Montgomery in the United States, goes some way to rectify this situation in this outstanding biography.

Even had Xuma not become the President General of the African National Congress (ANC), and a leading campaigner against racial injustice, the story of his life from cattle herder to highly respected physician would have justified a biography. He was born in March 1893, the seventh child of a farmer and Methodist lay preacher in rural Transkei. The church and particularly the Wesleyan institution, Clarkebury, played a crucial role in his development. From it he assimilated his life long philosophy that educated Africans had an obligation to uplift their communities.

On concluding his studies at Clarkebury in 1911, Xuma became a primary school teacher. He had a burning desire to study in the United States of America and by1913 had saved sufficient to leave for Booker T. Washington's Tuskegee Institute in Alabama. It would be 14 years before he would see the land of his birth again.

The Tuskegee Institute's philosophy that blacks could uplift themselves through hard work and sound moral judgement profoundly influenced Xuma. After Tuskegee he went to do agriculture at the University of Minnesota in 1917. After awarded a B.Sc degree in 1920, Xuma set his sights on becoming a physician. This he achieved in 1926 at the Northwestern University medical school in Chicago. It was Xuma's never-say-die attitude that made this remarkable achievement possible. He had to do various demanding odd jobs to pay for his studies and during his years at medical school was dependent on the financial support of sympathetic white liberals. This support left him with an enduring belief in the value of multiracial partnership.

Before returning to South Africa at the end of 1927 Xuma had to pass qualifying examinations at the University of Edinburgh to enable him to practise medicine in his own country. He returned with a mission to serve his people and to work for a Christian brotherhood based on racial reconciliation with whites in South Africa.

The first years back in South Africa were extremely challenging ones and Xuma found it difficult to pursue his ideals. He found that his education and experiences in America had distanced him from his own people. A consequence of this was that both his wives were African-Americans. After the death of his first wife in 1934 he specifically sought a second African-American wife. His years in America also made it easier for him to relate to white South African liberals than to his fellow blacks.

The biggest obstacle for Xuma was the stifling racism in South Africa. Whites were uncertain how to deal with a black physician. For most of them his qualifications did not elicit admiration, but suspicion and resentment. The contemptuous attitudes and actions of white officials were the bane of his life. In December 1940 he was slapped by a white policeman who demanded to inspect his pass. The policeman was subsequently prosecuted and fined.

Xuma eventually had no choice but to open a private medical practice as there was no place for him as black man in the state-run 'white' hospitals. Establishing a practice was a hard and time-consuming struggle, leaving him little time for politics. His dedication to African upliftment did, however, make him an influential and respected figure in the black community. He became politically active in 1935 as a leading member of the All African Convention which aimed to prevent the removal of Africans from the common voters roll in the Cape Province. Although the Convention failed in its aims, his involvement catapulted him into the front ranks of African political leadership.

Xuma's more confrontational attitude to segregation in the late 1930s also strained his relationship with leading members of the white liberal South African Institute of Race Relations whom he found too paternalistic. Gish's conclusion that Xuma had created a bitter rift with white liberals, and that it was manifesting his growing militancy and skepticism towards them is, however, too simplistic. Gish seemingly does not take into account that liberalism amongst white South Africans had various strands. In the 1920s, more outspoken white liberals like Margaret Ballinger, a future leader of the South African Liberal Party, clashed with the Institute as they regarded it as too paternalistic, conservative and timid in its opposition to segregation. Later in the book Gish does point out that Ballinger, who epitomized white liberalism in the 1940s, was a close ally of Xuma and regularly discussed political strategy with him. Xuma's fall out was thus not with white liberalism *per se*, but with one of its more conservative strands.

In December 1940 Xuma was elected President General of the ANC. By then it seemed as if though the organization was dying a slow death. Its affairs were chaotic and disorganised and it had hardly any organisational structure. It was also finacially bankrupt. Together with James Calata, the ANC Secretary, Xuma set about rebuilding the organisation. He tightened internal discipline, drafted a new constitution, appointed organisers, opened new branches, as well as a national head office. Through fundraising, Xuma lifted the ANC from its burden of debt to the position where its treasury had a surplus by 1949. Starting from nothing, Xuma rebuilt the ANC to become the primary organization for African nationalism in South Africa. Although not yet a mass organization, he laid the foundations for it to become one.

Apart from rebuilding the ANC Xuma also played a leading role in opposing the segregationist policies of the South African government. At the same time he continued to practice medicine and was also involved with humanitarian activities such as drought relief. By 1945 his heavy workload had strained his health to breaking point.

There would, however, be very little relief for Xuma as the United Party government applied its segregationist policies with increased vigour after the end of the Second World War. Conditions for blacks worsened with the victory of the National Party in 1948. By then Xuma was trapped between a racist government and the young militants in the ANC. These militants of the Congress Youth League (CYL), the founding of which Xuma had encouraged, wanted the organisation to be more confrontional. Xuma, however, felt uncomfortable with mass protests such as anti-pass campaigns. His personality was not suited to lead such actions. His core values were still respectability and rationality. He thus prefered deputations and meetings to express his opposition to government policies. In addition he also feared that the confrontational approach of CYL was over hasty as the ANC's organisational machinery was not ready to support it.

That Xuma lacked the common touch, he could be aloof and distant, also did not endear him to the CYL. At the ANC's conference in December 1949, the CYL succeeded in getting its programme of action accepted as official Congress policy, and to replace Xuma as President with their candidate.

After 1949 Xuma slowly drifted away from the ANC as he became increasingly uneasy with its militancy. He for example urged pupils to return to their classes during the school boycott of 1955. The ANC on the other hand dismissed him as seriously out of touch with grassroots political sentiment. By the late 1950s Xuma had become an outsider who had distanced himself from the ANC. Despite this political moderation the government continued to regard him as a political risk.

Gish points out that in some way Xuma's life ended tragically. He had spent his last years in the political wilderness aware that all the causes for which he had struggled had failed. At the time of his death in 1962 the apartheid state seemed invincible. It was a state that not only robbed him of his rights as a citizen, but even denied him property rights as he was forcibly removed from his Sophiatown home of near thirty years. Despite this seeming failure Xuma's tireless struggle for freedom in South Africa represents a powerful contribution which must be remembered. Ultimately it was his rebuilding of the ANC in the 1940s that provided the organisation with its durability in the long struggle against apartheid.

Alfred Xuma was a hero and Gish does justice to his life with this balanced, well researched and highly readable biography.

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H Rider Haggard, *Diary of an African journey: the return of Rider Haggard* (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 2000) xii + 345 pp, maps, bibl, index. ISBN 9-780869-809549

Rider Haggard is best known for his colonial adventure stories, *King Solomon's Mines, Alan Quatermain* and *She*, that are widely held to have reinforced the values that promoted British imperialism in the late Victorian period. His heroes are nearly always brave in danger, stoical in adversity, upright in morals, and just when they subdue natives to whom they impart elevating elements of British culture. Blacks, or 'natives' are usually seen as violent barbarians and, at best, noble savages. However there are other aspects to the author. In 1875 Haggard came out to southern Africa on the staff of the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Henry Bulwer. He accompanied his great friend and mentor, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, when he annexed the Transvaal for Great Britain in 1877. Haggard even helped to hoist the Union Jack on Church Square in Pretoria.

When the Anglo-Zulu War broke out in 1879 Haggard was indirectly involved and many of his friends perished in the battle of Isandlwana. Finally, he settled down to farm at Hillsdrop near Newcastle. But in 1881, after the British defeat in the First Anglo-Boer War he was disillusioned with the constant bloodshed and violence in southern Africa and decided to return to England. Here he set himself up as a gentleman farmer and began to write his famous adventure novels, or romances, his romances as he disparagingly called them.

In the mid-1890s, Haggard began writing scientific books on agriculture and lobbying for the improvement of the lot of poor farmers. This introduced him to public service and culminated in his appointment to the Dominion Royal Commission which was to report on the state of affairs in the British Empire. So it was that early in 1914 after 33 years absence, he was once more in southern Africa. The *Diary of an African Journey* records his expedition.

Haggard's journey in the sub-continent was strenuous to say the least. After extensive travels in the southwestern Cape, he sailed to Port Elizabeth and then went on to Kimberley, Bloemfontein, Newcastle and Pietermaritzburg. Backtracking somewhat, he then travelled to Pretoria, Mafikeng and Rhodesia via the Bechuanaland Protectorate. While in Rhodesia he visited Bulawayo, Salisbury and the Zimbabwe ruins. The last leg of his tour brought him to Durban, after which he embarked on a 400 mile excursion into Zululand. The closing sections of the *Diary* describe his voyage from Durban up the East coast of Africa to the Mediterranean.

The central theme of the *Diary* way is the way in which South Africa has changed, and this manifests itself largely in three areas of interest: the economy (principally agriculture and mining), politics (mainly race relations) and personal experiences and anecdotes (including reflections on past events). In relation to personal experiences we see, on the public level, the civil dignitary being feted in Cape Town, the smaller inland cities and numerous farms. On the trip from Newcastle to Pietermaritizburg, he nostalgically visits Hillsdrop, the farm where be began his agricultural career in South Africa. He laments on its decline but is pleased to find the spot where he made bricks for the farmhouse – and even some leftover bricks. In Pietermaritzburg he is delighted to find Mazooku, his servant from his young days in South Africa who, on one occasion saved his life. Subsequently the black man accompanies Haggard on his trip through Zululand. In Zululand he meets a young 'witch-doctress' whose incantations apparently helped the travellers extricate their car from a flooded ford. The book abounds with such anecdotes and these add considerable interest, but perhaps his account of southern African affairs is more important for the historian.

Haggard is amazed by the changes in the region. In Cape Town he finds cars and trams bustling though the city where previously there had been none. Scientific farming, yielding far greater produce than before, is prominent in the southwestern Cape, as is exceptionally profitable viticulture. In Kimberley he marvels at new machinery that extracts diamonds from the gravel. He goes into great detail about the new harbour built at Durban, the wharves and the whaling station, all quite new from time he had been there earlier. However, there is a more dismal side to his picture of southern Africa. The interior is in the grip of a devastating drought. Some farmers who once had over 15 000 head of cattle now have none. Rhodesia is in an even in a worse plight: hugely expensive dams are empty, although he does notice that in some areas near Salisbury, tobacco is flourishing. Presciently he advocates that this should be the country's chief crop in the future.

Perhaps the greatest changes Haggard sees are in the area of politics and race relations. But old attitudes persist. While visiting the Zimbabwe ruins, which feature indirectly in *King Solomon's Mines*, he still cannot believe that Africans had the technical skills to have constructed them; he endorses the old Sabaen theory of their origin despite the fact that this had already been debunked. In generalising about Rhodesia he wonders whether the territory 'is a white man's land' (p 167). Meditating on the future of the country he notes that whites have only recently conquered the land and muses 'perhaps one day their [the Matabele] turn will come again, either with steel or bullet, or more probably by sheer weight of numbers and the ballot box' (p 166). His view of the Matabele has obviously advanced a long way since *King Solomon's Mines.*

South Africa offers more intractable problems. Haggard can, at times, display a patronising attitude to blacks, as at numerous *indabas* between British magistrates and local chiefs where he revels in being called 'Great Chief' and treats a Zulu warrior's *Iziqu* (which indicates that the owner has killed a man in battle) as a curio – albeit a valuable one. But he also acknowledges to Annie Botha (wife of the prime minister) that 'the native could no longer be suppressed, or even oppressed: he must follow his destiny … often he was an able and a competent person' (p 72). The problem, however, lies with the dominant white population because 'to 99 out of 100 [whites] a native is just a native from whom land may be filched on one pretext or another, or labour and taxes extracted, and who, if he resists the process or makes himself otherwise inconvenient may be shot with a clear conscience' (p 209). He shrewdly points out the nature of white disregard for blacks in a discussion of white-owned newspapers (which sounds all too contemporary): 'the amount of real interest taken in natives, their problems and troubles may be measured, roughly, by the inches of space allotted to them in the local newspapers (excluding reports of crimes and trials). It will, I think, be small' (p 240). The result of such attitudes is to be found in the 1913 Land Act.

In an interview with John Dube, the first president of the ANC, Haggard reports some of the African views on the legislation:

> My points of objection to the Land Act of last year are: (1) I regard the refusal to let us buy land from Europeans as depriving natives of their rights ... . You must remember that we natives hold only as native reserves 10 million morgen (20 million acres) out of the 400 million morgen (800 million acres) in the Union.(2) That natives are not allowed to lease land or to farm on shares with Europeans ... . (p 227).

For Dube, the solution is firstly, education, and, secondly, some type of 'organisation to speak for us for we have no representation in the Union parliament' (p 227). At local level, Dube suggests 'that in every magisterial division there should be either a magistrate with some more leisure or some gentleman specially appointed to devote himself to native affairs, with whom we could consult on all matters affecting us and our welfare' (p 227). Haggard so thoroughly endorses Dube's views on inequitable land tenure, education and co-operation on local levels that these form major themes throughout his travel memoirs. However, he is not optimistic about change because of white intransigence and he foresees some violence because

> the native, taking him *en masse*, is probably rising [socio-politically and educationally]. His eyes are not shut; he sees a great deal. His brain is not dull, he learns day by day ... . He has wrongs to be righted, which gives him a great moral advantage, a great support in any national struggle (p 239).

The editor of Haggard's *Diary* does not allude in any depth to the reasons why the writer of apparently racist boys' adventure stories has become a pro-black polemicist. One of the causes of this oversight lies in the fact that while Coan notes that as a youth in southern Africa, it was 'Theophilus Shepstone who was to exert the greatest influence on the young Haggard, becoming in effect a surrogate father figure and a mentor' (p 6), he never really explains the nature of the older man's influence. Fundamental to Shepstone's policies about the African people in Natal and Zululand was the idea of 'indirect rule'. Indirect rule implies that 'the subject peoples of the British Empire should be allowed ''to develop on their own lines'' '.[1] Compare this with Haggard's comments to Annie Botha that the black man should 'follow his own destiny'. Accordingly, these people would be allowed to retain their own leaders, customs and religions as long as they did not interfere with the economic interests of the Empire. This eventually led to the Protectorate system such as practised in Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana. Indirect rule was an arrangement to limit exploitation of blacks while offering them opportunities of developing on western lines if they so desired. The concept of indirect rule has some similarities to the thinking underlying the conclusion of *King Solomon's Mines*. In bidding farewell to the three Englishmen, Quatermain, Good and Curtis, Ignosi, the king of the Kukuanas says:

> No other white men shall cross the mountains ... . I will see no traders with their guns and rum ... I will have no praying men to put the fear of death in their [his people] hearts, to stir them up against their king, and make a path for the white men who follow to run on

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[1] Norman Etherington, *Rider Haggard* (Boston, Twayne, 1984), p 104.

> ... none shall come for the shining stones [except the British trio]'.[2]

Ignosi shows a shrewd understanding of the imperial dynamic. He is, however, amenable to Quatermain, Good and Curtis returning to acquire wealth, especially if they remain and selectively improve Kukuana technology so that they can develop along their own lines but not be vulnerable to western incursions. The British men are effectively to act as protectors of a territory which they can exploit commercially while 'uplifting' its inhabitants. There is so little racism in Haggard's thinking that he can make Quatermain say in *Allan Quatermain*: 'In all essentials the savage and the child of civilization are identical.'[3] However, Haggard is sufficiently a child of his times to assert the western civilization, if properly imparted, can be beneficial and improve the black man.

As expressed in his *Diary*, Haggard's views had not changed radically but they had developed, probably as a result of his extensive research into the plight of the rural poor in England and his assiduous efforts to improve their lot. But, in South Africa, the rural poor were black and parliament, largely protecting white interests, especially when they clashed with those of blacks, was unlikely to implement the reform measures both he and Dube supported. Despite all the enjoyment and lionising he had experienced in the subcontinent, it was a rather pessimistic man that left Durban for Cairo.

Although Stephen Coan could have put more emphasis on the views of a man who so importantly influenced Haggard and could, perhaps, have examined the novels in a little more detail (after all, his fame rests on them), he has produced a most lavish and scrupulous edition of Haggard's *Diary*. His endnotes are copious, perhaps a little too copious; for, not only do they distract a reader from Haggard's main narrative, but there are also some notes that appear rather inflated and superfluous. For example, the notes concerning the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 could have been shortened because Haggard includes much of Coan's details in his account of the background and proceedings of the war. However, these are but minor quibbles in a book that makes a significant contribution to the literary, social and historical aspects of the period.

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John Laband and Paul Thompson, *The illustrated guide to the Anglo-Zulu War* (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 2000), xii + 201 pp, illus, maps, bibl, index. ISBN 0 86980 972 5 (paperback), 0 86980 973 3 (hardback)

In 1979 when Laband and Thompson's *Field guide to the war in Zululand and the defence of Natal, 1879* first appeared I bought a copy and its weather-beaten appearance testifies to the use to which it has been put over the last twenty years. It has proved an invaluable companion on numerous explorations of the battlefields of the Anglo-Zulu War. The fact that the *Guide* has been reprinted with corrections and revisions three times since 1979 testifies to its value to others as well.

However, much new research has been done on the War since 1979, not least by the two authors of the *Guide*. Far more is now known of the Zulu side of the conflict while details of battles are clearer now than was the case twenty years ago. Because of this, a complete revision was considered necessary. John Laband undertook this revision and completely rewrote the text, co-operating with Paul Thompson in rethinking the maps. The result is a most attractive, beautifully illustrated *Guide*, with many of the maps reworked and redrawn.

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[2] H Rider Haggard, *King Solomon's mines* (London, Cassel, 1885), p 306.

[3] H Rider Haggard, *Allan Quartermain* (London, Longmans, 1887), p 4.

The text is greatly expanded – 201 compared to the previous 124 pages – and offers a far more detailed and nuanced account of the War. The new knowledge of Zulu participation is particularly well handled and the *Guide* now offers a more balanced account of the struggle. It also offers insights absent from the previous *Guide*; for example, the section on the dispersal of the army after battle now includes an account of how the warriors were ritually purified.

The new *Guide* vastly improves on its predecessor both in the quality of the illustrations and in its use of colour. This enables the reader to enjoy the many drawings and paintings as they were originally drawn; the contrast between the paintings and the black and white photographs and illustrations is particularly effective and adds to the aesthetic appeal of the book. More importantly, it is now far easier to follow the development of the battles.

Whereas previously each battle, even that of Isandlwana, was depicted in one map, now maps are included for various phases of each battle. In addition to a general map of the Isandlwana battle, for example, there is also a map of the situation at about 13h00 and another of the final stage. This makes it far easier to comprehend what happened. The two maps of Rorke's Drift are particularly effective in illustrating the desperate struggle.

The new *Guide* provides not only a record of the War but also a record of fortifications which since 1879 have either fallen into disrepair or been completely obliterated. It is thus also an invaluable archaeological record. I am confident in predicting that this elegant, beautifully illustrated and meticulously researched *Guide* will prove as useful and be as widely consulted and used as its predecessor.

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C J Pretorius, *Op St Helena – vol van hartepyn: die oorlogskuns van Erich Mayer (1899–1902)* (Pretoria, Protea Boekhuis, 2000), 83 pp, illus, bibl, index. ISBN. 191 9825 088

The serious reviewer of this slim little volume of pictures with captions faces considerable difficulties; clearly it was designed to grace coffee tables of establishments with cultural and historical pretensions. The charm of its subject matter and the fact that any publication dealing with South African historical (as opposed to contemporary) art is most welcome, makes this enterprise even more hazardous. But whether the endeavour of historical, art historical and cultural historical scholarship is advanced by this publication – clearly timed to coincide with, and cash in on the resurgent interest in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899 to 1902 – is another matter.

The name of Erich Mayer is very well known to students of South African art and especially Afrikaner culture, and he deserves to be better known among scholars of Afrikaner nationalism and white culture. When he died in 1960 I lived as a very young boy down the road from the house where he used to lodge with his friend, a man called Tromp. I was far too young to have any clear recollection or awareness that in that rambling house in Park Lane (now Emily Hobhouse Street) in Pretoria North lived a famous, and somewhat mysterious, and as I now know, probably sickly *kunstenaar*, the *kunsskilder* Erich Mayer. Perhaps contributing to my awareness of him is the fact that my maternal uncle who was *pater familias* to several households including ours, knew him and Tromp particularly well.

Despite his fame, little of lasting and discursive value has been published on Mayer. Sadly the entry in the much maligned Berman is still the best, together with the Werth contribution in the *Dictionary of South African biography*. Both are short entries and parade the bare chronological 'facts' of his life. These are again rehearsed in Pretorius, but even more perfunctorily and therefore unsatisfactorily. The paucity of sound scholarship is but one instance in which the previous generation of Pretoria-based and by extension, South African art historians and cultural historians, have failed in their task. Schoonraad's contribution (cited in Pretorius) comfirms rather than denies this assertion. This is particularly surprising in Mayer's case as his paintings and sketches have consistently been much sought after by the art-buying public, and they were less pricey than those of Pierneef, for example. Thus, one would have imagined that the requirements of marketing and publicity would ensure that critical, if not valedictory publications would have been forthcoming. Reference to Mayer is scattered throughout various publications and dissertations, but nowhere is his art production the sustained centre of focus. Regrettably despite the promising title, this publication perpetuates this trend. A perusal of the bibliography of sources (pp 77–78) confirms this.

I was asked to review an Afrikaans copy of the book. I am not aware of an English version, but I am sure that the Afrikaans is the original. Ordinarily, comparing the Afrikaans and the English versions could be quite instructive. Bilingual editions, or publication in both previous official languages dealing with the arts and culture, is a well established, if somewhat passé politically correct tradition in this country.

The title is very troubling – *Op St Helena: vol van hartepyn, die oorlogskuns van Erich Mayer (1899–1902).* It is off-putting; it is also untranslatable. *Hartepyn* could be rendered as heartache or sorrow, and implies emotional and spiritual pain that is manifested in physical symptoms. Overstatement makes the point clear nevertheless. Apart from the experience of exile, what else could have caused such profound sorrow? What is more to the point is that visual evidence is presented by Pretorius of such *hartepyn*. The careful reader is frustrated in an attempt to find an answer. After all, as is related in the book itself, the sickly surveyor from Vrede and Orange Free State volunteer, was captured in an unauthorised assault on Mafeking. He had made his choices. While in exile on the island that even today sends a chill down the spine of the Afrikaner collective memory, he was perhaps more fortunate than most in that he shared the famous Deadwood camp below Longwood House in which Napoleon Bonaparte spent his last days, with many fellow Germans. There is a fine reproduction of the group of Germans swilling beer (p 38); Pretorius refrains from making any reference to the probable substance in the mug Mayer holds in his hand, despite the fact that those in the foreground are openly displaying their half empty beer glasses. What strikes me about this photograph is Mayer's position at the back, somewhat removed from the group, sporting a cap probably manufactured in the camp by a fellow inmate. On the fringe of a large group with whom identification should have been natural, is a very noticeable and suggestive place to be, but of course not an apposite one for the observing visual artist; Mayer's pose strikes me as something between shyness and jauntiness.

As far as I know, the cultural and social issues underlying the German and all foreign European participation on the Boer side has not been adequately researched or explained. Pretorius, on the very first page of the text, tantalisingly suggests that Mayer was sensitive enough not to offend his English benefactors by joining the Boer forces right at the outbreak of the war, but his identification with the Boer cause meant that he did join them later. As he was of a sickly disposition (seeking a better climate was the reason he came to South Africa), he joined as a war artist. He was not unique. Oerder and others also convinced a very relaxed and fumbling administration to allow them to join as war artists. But the really interesting question of the social and emotional dynamics that impacted on the foreigners on the Boer side is neglected. The pervasive and self legitimating assumption in so much writing on Afrikaner nationalism that the non-English Europeans completely and uncritically identified with the political cause of the Boers, and that the 'fit' was seamless, also informs this book. Far from being a negligible feature of Afrikaner nationalism, the co-option of foreigners served to preserve the little David myth, and showed the eminent reasonableness of the Boer cause. That foreign volunteers may have been motivated by perceived self-interest, or other reasons, is seldom acknowledged, especially by historians of Afrikaner culture. Most were city and town dwellers, and a fair proportion could surely not speak Afrikaans fluently. Why does Pretorius view them as so readily accepted by the Boers? Lamentably, despite the author's ready psychologising and whimpering sentimentality this issue remains unexplored; indeed, no awareness that this may be the location of an interesting avenue of academic investigation is given. This train of enquiry is not nit-picking or mere intellectual pabulum. Mayer, a German, is known for his life-long and dedicated attempts to establish and develop an indigenous white South African art. The question of what motivated his total identification with the Boer and later Afrikaner cause, should thus be the very core of scholarly probing into Mayer's artistic endeavour. This publication makes no contribution to that. Pretorius does relate the interesting episode where the non-Boer but pro-Boer prisoners objected to the incessant droning of dour psalms by the captive Calvinists, but this is presented as a vaguely humorous incident of no significance. The somewhat rare opportunity it presents to the historian to glimpse the conflict between Boer and pro-Boer is left unexplored. Given the stated importance of religion to the Boers, it must have taken real courage by the pro-Boers to object. Singing was then restricted to certain hours.

The book consists of many very short 'chapters' and in fact most are one-pagers. This is very irritating and even the most casual and inattentive reader will find this disruptive. One would have assumed, for instance, that the chapter dealing with young boys in the camp would excite the author, as she has clearly notified the reader of her emotional interest. However, we are left unenlightened with only two sketches of the same strangely self-absorbed young boy, and about two paragraphs comprising gasping platitudes and obvious descriptions of what is patently visible in the sketches.

It would be possible to continue along these lines, but doing so would serve no purpose. There can be no doubt that the visual material presented and the subject in general are most compelling, certainly to the historian of South African art. But the author attempts no chronology or other ordering of the material except by subject matter. The assumption is made that Mayer illustrated out of boredom and the urge to record the daily lives of ordinary prisoners. And although this is not incorrect, it is seldom sufficient. There are many images that might have been made to sell to the tourists and the residents of the island. A number of the sketches depict landscape and other scenery on the island, and one may assume that a small if ready market did exist. This leads one with the conclusion that the sketches that we have are those which were not sold. Thus presumably many sketches do not really have any bearing on the prisoners themselves or on prison life directly. The fine composite tableau of Napoleon, striking the hand-in- tunic pose is a case in point.

The last part of the book includes images and photographs of artefacts made by the prisoners. In themselves they are interesting and quaint but they prove very little except that the prisoners were mighty wielders of the pocket knife and had a great deal of time to kill. They insist that the Boers were a particularly gifted and therefore wronged group. This is of course absolute nonsense. But the real question goes a-begging: namely, to what extent was Mayer inspired by the handicrafts he saw being manufactured and peddled by the prisoners? Did they motivate him to devote his long and regrettably still unpublished life to the promotion of an indigenous *volkskuns*. During the 1920s Mayer was criticised for insisting that the San and black people have much to teach whites. As the study of *volkskuns* is a particular speciality of the author, it is not too much to expect her to have pursued that line of enquiry.

In conclusion, this book is a missed opportunity and a fails as an academic work. Its obvious commercial intentions should not be an impediment to sound and truly enlightening presentation. Its sole contribution is the highly selective publication of the sketches; they and the hundreds of others in the Mayer patrimony still await an interpreter. Judging by the quality of some of the sketches, this may well be a pleasurable prospect.

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Raal, Sarah (Mrs O J Snyman), *The lady who fought: a young woman's account of the Anglo-Boer War* (Cape Town, Stormberg, 2000), 121 pp, glossary. ISBN 0-620-25406-8

A century after the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902 conferences, journals, and books proliferate as research makes new material available and previously accepted facts are reappraised. Women's memoirs about war are written for a variety of reasons and readers. Susan Travers has written about her experiences as the only woman in the French Foreign Legion 'to let my grandchildren know what a wicked grandmother they had'.[1] In contrast, Sarah Raal recorded in 1936 that her hope and expectations were that her book would contribute to 'an awakening sense of patriotism and nationhood in the younger generation, and strengthen the ties which bind us together as an Afrikaner people.' Her she succeeds and few readers will remain untouched by this tale, told in a sober, unembellished manner, of a young Boer woman's experiences during the Anglo-Boer War.

In the well-researched introduction, Anne Emslie gives a vivid overview of Sarah Raal's involvement in this war. Sarah was at first a spectator, but then she became deeply embroiled and was forced to take responsibility for herself. Emslie emphasises Sarah's deep fear and her 'remarkable courage' in circumstances of hardship and danger. Emslie points out that the Anglo-Boer War broke 'many previously held rules of warfare and this conflict was waged against the entire Boer population (p 2), both of which are clearly illustrated in this memoir.

Sarah Raal was born and grew up on the farm *Olijvenfontein*, in the district of Edenburg in the then Republic of the Orange Free State. Sarah, barely in her twenties, together with her parents, a younger brother and sister, remained on the farm when her four brothers were called to do military service against the British. The Raals were accused of having given supplies to the Boers and Sarah's father was subsequently taken captive by the British. Sarah's mother and the two younger children went to the nearest *dorp* (Jagersfontein), to collect provisions and when they did not return Sarah realised that she would have to fend for herself. The uncertainty of what had happened to her family remained with her for months. This book highlights the courage, but also the fears of this young woman. Tryn, the wife of Sam, a farm worker, was aware of the dangers facing a young woman on her own in the empty farmstead and she moved into the house with Sarah while Sam took over all the responsibility of running the farm. Seven anxious months later Sarah, Sam and Tryn realised that a former farm worker was keeping the British informed of all her movements and the three of them made hurried preparations to leave.

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[1] S Travers, *Tomorrow to be brave: the remarkable true story of love and heroism by the only woman to join the Foreign Legion* (London, Bantam Press, 2000), p 277.

The title of the English translation is misleading as throughout this account Sarah relates that she did not plan to actively participate in the fighting. The title is taken from a remark made by Captain Reed, a British officer: 'Miss Raal, according to this letter you are the lady who fought'. The publishers should perhaps have retained the direct translation of the Afrikaans title: *Met die Boere in die veld* ('With the Boers in the veld'), as Sarah after the war assured the British commanding officer that she had only fired in self-defence (p 121). Her experiences as a prisoner of the British, and an inmate of various concentration camps form the bulk of the contents.

After leaving *Olijvenfontein* Sarah describes the six weeks of living on another empty farm, *Boomplaats* (where the historic battle took place in 1848). Tryn once again took care of her, while Sam looked after the livestock they were able to bring along. Her brothers saw her from time to time when their commando was in the vicinity. Before long the British became suspicious and she was interrogated. She warned her brothers, but was detected and she realised that she would be sent to Springfontein camp. In a lively manner Sarah recounts her experiences in the Springfontein concentration camp and relates her shock that Boer women could be friendly with some of the English troops. A strong-willed and stubborn young woman, she and two friends succeeded in escaping from the camp. The detailed description of how this was done makes excellent reading and the translator is to be congratulated on retaining the naivety of the original style.

Sarah joined her brothers on commando under Commandant Nieuwoudt as most of the Boer farms had been gutted. The day to day experiences of the Boers in the veld are vividly recalled and Sarah offers some light relief when she laughs at herself for trying to 'hands up' a *steenbok* which she in panic mistook for a British soldier. She makes no bones about the fact that she was often terrified. Another important contribution made by this book is the insight offered by Sarah on the state of mind of the Boers. The young burghers realised, for example that the war had disrupted their plans to further their education: 'How many of them had sacrificed good positions and a good living? Could the sacrifice ever be repaid?' (p 52), Sarah asked. Although the young men still had dreams for their future one of the older men reacted: 'Where do we find the courage to start all over again?' The horror of war is in no way minimised and Sarah wrote that in battle she 'would laugh and cry at the same time, to fool my brothers … that there was no fear in me'(p 54). She describes a young English soldier kneeling at the side of his wounded brother crying: 'Oh, I promised mother I'd look after you, what am I to do now?' Sarah wrote: 'With that, all my joy disappeared and I cried with the Englishman' (p 55). Her ambivalent feelings about the enemy are captured in her horror of coming upon a flock of about 2 000 sheep that had been burnt to death – the suffering of these animals she found unbelievably cruel.

Sarah and her brothers were captured, and she was separated from them. The Boers who had been captured at the same time were shackled and led past Sarah, who then, unbeknown to the British, sang all the news she had in the meantime gathered, although she had problems synchronizing the words with the melody! She was marched to Edenburg and there given the opportunity of spending the night with people she knew but had to endure the humiliation of being turned away at the door. After further interrogation, where her impertinent answers angered the British, she was sent to Bloemfontein under heavy guard. A friend of their family, the well-known medical doctor, Dr Otto Krause, who had previously experienced being imprisoned by the British, was given permission to take her into his home. Sarah had money sewn into the hem of her dress; she later put this into a bag under her bodice. She and Mrs Krause then devised a plan to sew the money into a pillow, which Sarah would send to Mrs Krause if a crisis arose.

Sarah reported daily to the British for questioning. She was still trying to find her mother and one of the interrogators, Captain Reed, became friendly with her. When she was sent to the Kroonstad concentration camp he invited her to write to him if the need should arise. On the train journey to Kroonstad Sarah received neither food nor drink, and upon arrival was questioned further and then taken to the so-called 'birdcage'. This was an area of 100 square metres, fenced with barbed wire, without a gate, and with a tent in the middle. Under extremely harsh conditions in this solitary confinement, Sarah fell dangerously ill. She was eventually taken to hospital where she nearly died. She then spent the next six months in the concentration camp at Kroonstad. Her vivid writing about the daily lives of the inmates adds valuable knowledge to the historical writings on life within a concentration camp. Her quest to find her mother was unceasing and she heard rumours that her family was in the concentration camp in Bethulie. However, it eventually transpired out that her father had joined her mother, and that they, together with her brother and sister were in the camp at Uitenhage. Sarah was allowed to join them if she paid her own way. She was accompanied by a guard on the four-day journey by train to Uitenhage, where she was re-united with her family.

After 31 May 1902, when peace was declared and the family returned to their farm, general living conditions were appalling, but the money that Sarah had carried throughout the war helped the Raals to slowly regain their financial independence. Her brothers were held as prisoners of war in India and because they refused to swear the oath of allegiance to Britain they only returned to South Africa 17 months later, when they then rejoined their parents and Sarah on the farm.

The translation into English of this simple but poignant tale makes good reading. After 100 years the ashes from the fires of war are settling and old scores are fading in our collective memory. As a fitting tribute, the publication of this edition is dedicated to 'the memory of all the women of South Africa who endured suffering and hardship during the Anglo-Boer War'.

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Robert Ross, *A concise history of South Africa* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999), xiv + 219 pp, illus, bibl, index. ISBN0 521 57578 8

Robert Ross is a remarkably prolific historian who has published extensively on a wide range of themes in South African history, concentrating mainly on the early colonial period. This publication is something of a departure since it covers a time span reaching back to the earliest human habitation of southern Africa and extending to some observations on the 'acid rain of freedom' (pp 198–201) of the post-1994 democratic state. In fact considerably more than half the book deals with the history of modern South Africa since unification in 1910.

The *Concise history* is a gem. In one slim volume Ross provides a fluent, analytical and impressively comprehensive survey of over a millennium of South Africa history. He has distilled a vast historiography to provide a clean and colourful narrative for the non-specialist reader, without over-simplifying or ignoring the debates which engage academic historians. He provides essential factual information for those who are looking for it, and even some references to the nature of evidence and historical truth. For example, of the prophecy which unleashed the disastrous Xhosa cattle killing of 1857 he writes:

> So efficiently did [Sir George Grey, the governor of the Cape Colony] exploit the Cattle-Killing that many Xhosa today are convinced that Grey himself was hiding in the reeds by the Gxarha, whispering to Nongqawuse ... As a simple statement of historical fact they are mistaken, but not if it is taken as a metaphor – and oral texts of history deal above all in metaphors (p 53).

The text is illuminated throughout with economical sketches of personalities and incidents as well as Ross's own astute commentary. Only rarely do the exigencies of balancing all these demands impinge on the literary style of this accomplished writer. It seems churlish even to cite an example, but the marathon sentence on p 63, which attempts to encompass the entire second phase of the Anglo-Zulu War, illustrates the point.

In his introduction, Ross sets out his objective: 'to show how South Africa became a single, though not uniform, country'. These central themes of process and of unification with diversity are sustained throughout giving coherence and pace to the narrative. Chapter 1 provides the geographical context of this process and an introduction to the early inhabitants of the region, the Khoisan hunter-gatherers and herders and the Bantu-speaking agro-pastoralists. Economies, languages, social and political systems are not only described but explained. Nor are they presented as static. The chapter traces changing structures and relations to the mid-17th century and concludes that in general 'South African society was fragmented as it came to confront the challenge of European colonisation' (p 20).

Chapter 2 covers two centuries of 'colonial conquest'. The process of white settlement and expansion is explored, as is the evolution of particular social and economic systems. Ross is conspicuously sure-handed here, having published studies on numerous aspects of early Cape colonial history. These include among many other topics a history of the Griqua, slavery, the changing position of the Khoisan under colonial rule, class formation among settlers, and most recently, the notions of status and 'respectability' in the colony. It is to his credit that he does not allow the narrative to balloon as he traverses his own terrain of specialisation. Reflecting the directions of current historiography, the two migration movements of the 19th century, the 'mfecane' and, to a lesser extent, the Great Trek are relatively played down and blended into broader trends. The Trek nevertheless survives as 'one of the crucial events in the formation of the country' (p 39). In passing, in the opinion of this reviewer, the omission of the term 'mfecane' from text and index could be construed as coming down too hard on one side of the academic debate. It also unnecessarily complicates quick reference. Central to the chapter is the outcome of interaction between the original inhabitants and colonial settlers: dispossession, accompanied by economic, social and political dislocation.

Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the processes of structural unification and consolidation of power which resulted in the emergence of the white-dominated state of South Africa. Despite the constraints of the format, Ross succeeds again in providing nuanced and often surprisingly detailed discussions of major events and issues of the period to 1948. Embattled historians attempting to persuade a materialistic generation of students of the relevance of their discipline, will be impressed by the subtle connections Ross makes between past and present and the human face that he gives to his account. His discussion of the economic incorporation of Africans into the industrialised economy and the myriad of social ramifications illustrates this well:

> [T]he man who went to town and never returned, leaving his wife and children in rural poverty, was, as is, a genuine figure in many South African families, and the town woman, who

> would trap the migrant, relieve him of his money and alienate him from his home, took on many of the attributes of a witch in the mythology of the countryside (p 93).

In his discussion of the development of apartheid and its consequences (Chapters 5 and 6) Ross maintains this approach, focusing more on social and economic issues than political machinations. The 'victims' of the system are as much subject as object and black resistance is given a relatively extensive treatment. Furthermore, in the midst of the visions of growing alienation and conflict, Ross does not lose sight of his objective, that is to explain the emergence of an integrated South Africa. His discussion of the pervasive violence and lawlessness that took root in South Africa in the 1980s (pp 150–154) has particular relevance and currency in a society obsessed with the problem of crime. It is also a useful corrective to a fairly general perception in formerly protected white suburbia, that this pathology dates from and is directly attributable to the transition to the 'new' South Africa. This discussion forms part of a grim stock-taking of the 'costs of apartheid', including the disastrous 'Bantu education', inefficient labour, unemployment, poverty and its consequences for health standards.

The penultimate chapter traces the steps towards the 'ending of apartheid and the transition to democracy'. Given his central theme of convergence and his emphasis on the anomalous nature of apartheid almost from its inception, its passing seems inevitable. Yet as Ross shows, freedom was not won without violent conflict, including brutality between and within black communities and resistance movements. It is an aspect of the struggle which cannot be written out of history and Ross shows characteristic integrity in confronting the issue. The epilogue offers no simple happy ending. On the one hand Ross is cautiously optimistic: 'by 1997 the signs were that the long slow cure of South Africa's problems had begun'. On the other hand he is realistic: 'South Africa still has to reckon with its history' (p 199). His conclusion that 'South Africa will never be a normal country. It is far too interesting ... ' (p 201), is probably more easily interpreted as positive from the distance of Leiden than from Pretoria.

The book is not entirely typo or error-free. For example, Ross writes that the National Party leadership wished to turn South Africa into a Republic, and that 'this was done following a referendum in 1961, the first election in which the National Party received a majority of the white vote (p 139)'. The referendum (1960) was by definition a 'yes/no' affair and votes were not cast for political parties. In fact there were many non-Nationalists who publicly supported the Republican ideal.

Notwithstanding such trifling issues, this is a remarkable publication. It is neat, compact and generously illustrated with an unusual and interesting collection of visual material, such as that of an overcrowded black school in the 1980s (p 162) and the *braaivleis* scene (p 192). The verbal illustration already referred to at the beginning of this review bears second mention. Ross is sharp. Consider the description of President Paul Kruger, who to 'prejudiced, progressive Britons in the late nineteenth century and since ... looked and sounded like a living fossil' but was 'capable of using his ''Boer'' image for political effect' (p 68), or J H Hofmeyr, 'the pug-faced ex-child prodigy who was expected to be Smut's successor' (p 115). In all, the *Concise history* admirably fulfils the publisher's brief for the series, namely that these books should serve 'as university and college textbooks and as general historical introductions for general readers, travellers and members of the business community'. It is a remarkable combination of the entertaining and the scholarly which will please a wide readership. That it will become a favoured core text for many teachers of history seems assured.

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Johannes A Smit (ed), *Body, identity, sub-cultures and repression in texts from Africa* (Durban, CSSALL, 1999), 210 pp, ISBN: 0-947445-47-1

This collection of 15 articles is the result of a conference held in September 1997 by the Centre for the Study of Southern African Literature and Languages (CSSALL) at the University of Durban-Westville. The topic of this conference was 'Body, identity, subcultures and repression in texts from Africa'. As is evident from the title the scope of this collection is rather wide. Perspectives include amongst others postcolonial debates on identity, a Marxist perspective on postcolonial Africa, a homosexual reading of an Afrikaans text and a discussion on postmodernist philosophy of education. One rather sad shortcoming is the lack of organisation in this collection – the articles are arranged alphabetically by author and the preface does not provide the reader with any idea of the themes that occur in this collection. Grouping together thematically related articles and commenting on their relationship to each other as well as the larger topic would have assisted the reader in navigating this text. The articles fall into several loose and overlapping thematic groups, namely postcolonial discourse about identity and literature, the unravelling of the old order and the gendered position of women in society.

In his article 'Resisting totalisation: Afrikaans literature and the postcolonial project' Philip John addresses the issue of 'globalising or totalising literary critical manoeuvres on the postcolonial terrain'. Analysing Jolly's article dealing with South African culture he warns of the damaging effect 'of being locked in the binary bind characteristic of (metropolitan) postcolonialism' because 'the analyst's access to local (or for the more metropolitan critic, ''remote'') complexity is blocked'. John also criticises Jolly's simplistic conceptualisation of South African literature and her marginalisation of mainstream Afrikaans literature. Related to this discussion is the article by Graham Pechey, 'Carnal knowledge: reading the body of South African writing'. Pechey questions, among other things, the fiction of a homogeneous identity for Africa, African cultures and by implication South African literature. He also warns against a simplified postcolonial reading history. Both these articles are must-reads in this collection.

The question of postcolonial identity is also addressed by Isaura de Oliveira in his article 'Body, repression and identity in Pepetela's *Yaka*. He looks at how Pepetela uses parts of the human body as metaphors for the change in Angola over the past 85 years and how colonial oppression and the birth of an Angolan identity are related. Oyekan Owomoyela in his article 'Identity and cultural repression in the colonized African psyche: Mariama Ba's *Scarlet Song* and Tsitsi Dangaremba's *Nervous Conditions*' states that the end of colonialism 'did not bring an end to the confusion and colonisation of the African mind'. Another article on identity is that of Lionel W Watson 'The search for identity in student literature of the late 1960s to early 1970s'. He points out that the realisation of identity as a requirement for wholeness was a critical factor in student writing during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

SM Qono writes about postcolonial Africa from a Marxist perspective in his article 'Postcolonialism in Africa: whereto'. He looks at pre-capitalist formations before colonialism, at colonialism and its legacy and at postcolonial Africa. He advocates 'a just international economical order' as an answer to 'the woes of Africa'. Unfortunately, he does not indicate the relevance of his discussion to postcolonial texts.

John and Pechey's articles on a postcolonial body of South African writing provide an interesting background to the articles of Luc Renders and DH Steenberg. Renders in his article 'A house divided: ideological conflict in contemporary Afrikaans literature' argues that the ideology of apartheid has driven a wedge through Afrikaner families and communities and that the resulting divide is represented in contemporary Afrikaans literature. Steenberg in his article 'The rural novel as cultural memory' investigates the contribution of the rural novel to cultural memory and how major transitions in South African society are reflected in this genre. He focuses, specifically, on how the 'old order' is 'unravelled'.

Two articles that also address the upsetting of the old order are those by AE Scheepers and Christell Stander. In '*Griet skryf 'n sprokie* as rupture in patriarchal ideology' Scheepers investigates the inverted fairy-tale strategy used in *Griet skryf 'n sprokie* and how it disrupts conventional and hierarchical narrative patterns. Stander in 'Desiring the undesirable: developing a methodology of queer reading' examines the notion of the sexually dissident margin versus the centre of heterosexual normality by attempting a homosexual reading of the lesbian novel *Wit vis*. She investigates lesbian subjectivity in relation to the dominant logic of phallogocentrism. Linked to this upsetting of the old order is Andries Visagie's article 'Flaunting the gay male body: *Slagplaas* by Koos Prinsloo'. Visagie hypothesises that Prinsloo's graphic descriptions of the gay male body engaged in sexual acts reflect a desire to abolish and shatter the self.

The articles by Rose Bloem, Flora Veit-Wild and J Wrolson all deal with how women are portrayed in literature. Bloem in 'Politics of the body: Rosa Burger's defection' investigates issues related to the gendered position of women by discussing Rosa Burger's abrogation of patriarchal authority in Gordimer's *Burger's daughter.* Veit-Wild uses the metaphor of the 'borderline' to investigate the work of African women writers in her article while Wrolson investigates how gender is defined and negotiated in Shona culture by looking at a Shona play by Charles Mungoshi in her article 'The abjectification of female bodies in Shona theatre'.

Remi Bamisaiye's article 'Postmodernist philosophy: an attempt at clarification' looks at the role of postmodernist philosophy of education in teaching literature. Her conclusion is that this philosophy cannot be the philosophy of education for our times. It is rather difficult to relate this article to the others in this collection.

This collection covers a fascinating array of topics and perspectives which challenge accepted conceptualisations such as that of a delimitable and demarcated South African identity and literature.

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Bridget Theron (ed), *Dear Sue: the letters of Bessie Collins from Pretoria during the Anglo-Boer War* (Pretoria, Protea Book House, 2000), 112 pp, intro, photos, bibl, notes, index. ISBN 1 919825 17 7

Much has been written on the Anglo-Boer (South African) War, and as the centenary of the war approached, more publications appeared along with new, revised editions of the old ones. This small volume stands out, not so much for its information on the war (there is plenty of that around) but for its personalised content. It has a clarity and freshness not often seen, and it is based on a most unusual document.

The book is the edited version of a diary which is actually a letter, a 95-page letter started on 28 December 1899, added to from time to time, and finally posted some time after 1 June 1902. By this time the war was over and most of the content was nearly three years old.

The letter was written by Elizabeth (Bessie) Collins to her friend Susan (Sue) Haarhoff in Graaff-Reinet. Bessie Collins (she signs herself BC) was a white woman of mainly English descent who lived in Pretoria during the war. Her family had previously lived in Graaff-Reinet where she and Sue had been childhood friends.

BC came from an impressive family. Her grandfather had come to South Africa from Yorkshire, England in 1827,and her grandfather, father and uncle had all held teaching posts or senior positions in the administration of the Boer republics of the OFS and Transvaal. They were English-speakers who had risen in the ranks of Boer hierarchy. Their sympathies were with the Boers. One is immediately intrigued, because this is a contradiction of stereotype. BC also clearly moved easily among both British and Boers, and there is a message in that.

BC was 26 years old when the war began. She was clearly an educated woman and she could express her opinions well. With postal communications being disrupted for the duration of the war, her long, newsy letter soon became a diary. Why, one wonders, did she decide to keep a diary? Various reasons have been put forward as to why women, especially Victorian women, wrote diaries, but these have not been convincingly explained. Cinthia Gannett's work, *Gender and the journal: diaries and academic discourse* (New York, 1992) is helpful in this regard. Gannett argues that journal and diary writing by women was part of a larger historical tradition and constitutes a tradition in its own right. She notes that Victorian children were required to keep a diary as a form of self discipline. She also suggests that in a world still dominated by male writers, diaries were a contribution women could make. BC's diary might have had its roots here. On the other hand, letters were a means of keeping in touch, in this case in a world turned upside down by war. Writing letters was also therapeutic.

Gannett also suggests that diaries were useful as 'wild zones' where women could explore their innermost feelings in private. Bessie, however, tells us little in this regard. She vents her anxieties and frustrations in the diary, but writes little of an intimate nature. The cousin who later became her husband is referred to regularly but only because she is concerned for his safety on the front.

In wartime, the women who kept diaries must have had a sense of living through historic times, and a desire to make a record of these. Diaries were not official records and they could be flexible. This is what makes them so interesting. BC called her letter to Sue 'an account of our life in Pretoria during the war' (p 75) but it is much more than that. It is a speculative commentary on issues of historical and social import.

The diary tells us what she saw as significant about the war. She has, for example, her own divisions of time. For her, the turning point of the war was not the fall of Pretoria but Cronjé's surrender at Paardeberg (p 41). This hurt her deeply. We see, too, the great affection she and her friends had for the old generals like Cronjé and Joubert (especially Cronjé) and even 'Oom Paul' Kruger, whom she admired greatly until he betrayed Pretorians by making off with the state funds (pp 32, 42 and 51).

BC disliked Rhodes intensely and feared that people like him would 'gloat' over pro-Boer people and 'do as they pleased' once the war was over (pp 33 and 51). She also hated the British, but here she meant the officials responsible for war (p 32). She had sympathy for the soldiers who had to fight in the war and for the women back in Britain who heard even less news than she did on the whereabouts of their men (p 51). The sense of isolation in Pretoria, the lack of news and the rumours got to her the most, but she commented on how much worse it must have been for the women overseas.

When the British occupied Pretoria and thousands of soldiers streamed into the city, BC's distress was tempered with sympathy for their terrible condition. The hostel where her father was principal had been converted into a hospital. The soldiers were half-starved and sick with fever (probably typhoid). Their 'tongues were black, their lips blue and cracked' and their bodies 'covered with insects' (p 57).

BC poured scorn on the women in Pretoria who fraternised with the British soldiers (p 63) and included Annie Botha, the wife of General Louis Botha, in her criticism. This is somewhat surprising as other sources do not bear this out. It is possible that BC might have misconstrued Annie's role as negotiator, but it was nevertheless a perception held by her and possibly some of the other Pretoria women as well.

The diary represents a woman's point of view about these issues. Although BC comments on some serious aspects, she cannot resist the trivia. Dare one say that perhaps only a woman would at times appear to be more concerned about the scarcity of hats and shoes, and the birth of a friend's baby, than about the military strategy that had clearly gone wrong? BC preferred to blame the British and their superior numbers. She also tells us (p 44) that 'more boy babies seem to be born during wartime – maybe as nature's way of compensation'. These are womens' sentiments and they make her diary an endearing read.

Something we tend to forget is that this war was fought at the dawn of a new millennium. BC refers to this (p 27) and to her hopes and fears for the future. We can empathise with her in this regard as we, too, also enter a new millennium.

BC is fiercely pro-Boer but not totally blinkered in her opinions. She is horrified by the looting of the government stores by Pretorians, and by other corrupt acts (pp 30 and 45). She is complimentary about the wreath that is sent by the British to Piet Joubert's funeral (p 46). What is totally lacking in her account is any news of what the war was like for black people in Pretoria. BC only makes a few fleeting references to the 'Native Law' and servants (p 55). One does, however, have to view this within the context of the time. She would have had little, if any contact with black people.

Some of her writing is quite beautiful. She says on one occasion: 'We have grown old and subdued and I feel I have very little love left for life' (p 71) and on another (after supplies had started to come through) 'We still have some sunshine in between' (p 73). One is also amused by some of her comments: 'There is a Duke in the hospital … grand, isn't it?' and the not-so-grand concluding remark in the same entry: 'Four of their Lords were killed this week. Good night.' (p 57).

Bessie's final comment is that the letter is meant for Sue's eyes alone (p 75), but one wonders whether she meant this. Whatever her reasons for writing this letter, the sheer persistence of her efforts suggest that she anticipated a wider audience. Her critical comments about both Boers and British hint at deeper motives.

The letter eventually became the possession of the recipient's younger sister, Miss MR (Mildred) Haarhoff, who kept it for some twenty years after Sue's death, before donating it to the National Archives in Pretoria in 1972. Mildred Haarhoff wrote that despite BC's request that the letter be for Sue's eyes only, she could not bring herself to destroy it. BC's descendants knew nothing of the existence of the letter until the work on this edited version began, which suggests that BC's request was genuine and that Sue had respected her wishes.

The charm of this little book is that it can be read and enjoyed by a wide reading public. There are people out there who want to read history, good history that they can trust, but who find many of the books inaccessible. Here Bridget Theron is superb. She has a clear, readable style and her research is sound. Her introductory notes place the diary in context and her explanatory notes at the end are skilfully researched – with two possible exceptions: the unidentified poem, Evangeline (p 50) and the reference to 'Malays and coolies' (p 40) whom Bessie feared might accompany the dreaded British into Pretoria. The latter is a very strange comment and one would have liked to know more.

From a purely convenience point of view, notes at the foot of each page would have been ideal. But one realises the impracticality of this. The text is peppered with references which need explaining. There would quite possibly have been pages with more notes than text. The end notes were a fascinating read in their own right, but it was disruptive to page to and fro. Brief biographical notes in alphabetical order at the end, would also have helped. There were several Williams and a few interesting-sounding characters – for example, 'So', whom one knew one had read about previously but could not quite place. These are small details.

The book has been beautifully produced and edited with flair. The choice of title 'Dear Sue', and the full-on cover picture of Bessie Collins in distinctive Victorian dress (high neck, small collar, lace trim, tucks on shoulders) and remarkably modern hairstyle, as well as other photographs distributed throughout the book, make this a most appealing volume and ideal gift.

The publishers, Protea Book House and the editor, Bridget Theron, are to be congratulated on a charming addition to the works by women on the war.

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General/Algemeen

Eugenio F Biagini, *eneral Gladstone: British history in perspective* (London, Macmillan, 2000), 138 pp, bibl, index. ISBN 0-333-61353-8

For any student to master the intricacies of nineteenth century British politics it is essential to understand the role played William Ewart Gladstone, four times prime minister and the most influential Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Victorian era. He presided over the shaping of Victorian liberalism, based on free trade and the gradual incorporation of all classes into the political process. Today his name is still synonymous with classical liberalism, although this was not how he started his political career.

As a young politician Gladstone was a leading member of the Conservative Party that represented the landed classes and opposed any extension of political power to the lower classes. Gladstone was personally seen as the rising hope of the stern and unbending reactionaries in the party.

Biagini, a lecturer in modern British history at the University of Cambridge, succeeds admirably in explaining the forces that drove Gladstone to become Britain's leading reformer. The most important force was his Christian devotion. Gladstone believed strongly in the religious responsibility of the individual standing alone before his God to justify his actions. It also encouraged a strong work ethic as he had to fulfill the potential and the gifts God has bestowed on him. Christian concern also led to Gladstone walking London streets at night interviewing prostitutes as he wanted to redeem them as 'fallen women'. Gladstone's moral rectitude was so highly regarded that these unconventional nocturnal activities did not tarnish his reputation.

Gladstone's political actions were also based on his intellectual development which was influenced by the classical authors Aristotle, Plato and Homer. Aristotle provided Gladstone with the intellectual foundation that man is a political animal, and that society and government are natural institutions. Plato influenced him with the notion of the perfectibility of society. Homer provided the ideal of a deeply religious aristocratic society, sustained by values such as chivalry, generosity and friendship. The Anglo-Irish philosopher Edmund Burke also had a life-long influence on Gladstone with his emphasis on the need to be sensitive to tradition, and the possibility of change through organic growth. It was also from Burke that Gladstone derived his principled pragmatism.

Gladstone gradually evolved from a conservative into a liberal. The initial break with the Conservative Party came over his support for free trade whilst a large section of the Party wanted to retain economic protection for Britain through tariffs. This alienation became permanent as Gladstone intensely hated Benjamin

Disraeli, a leading campaigner for economic protection and powerful presence in the Conservative Party. (Disraeli would eventually become the leader of the Conservative Party, a prime minister and Gladstone's lifelong enemy). Gladstone's desire for administrative and financial reform also played a role in his decision to link up with the Whigs to form the Liberal Party in 1859.

As a liberal prime minister from 1867 Gladstone played a crucial role in extending the franchise amongst the classes which were excluded from the electoral dispensation. By 1885 he had secured the vote, based on qualifications, for most working class men. Ironically Gladstone was no democrat as he always believed in the aristocratic principle in government. His reforms were the result of his pursuit of stability, not change. He realized that stability could only be achieved by establishing a greater degree of justice and equity, and that this required political and economic reform. What Gladstone wanted was a participatory citizenship for all classes. In this he succeeded as compared to her continental neighbours Britain experienced continuous political stability. In the 20th century the totalitarian ideologies of communism and fascism remained alien to Britain. As late as the early 1920s many working class voters supported the Liberal Party instead of the socialist Labour Party.

Gladstone also applied his participatory citizenship to the white colonies of the British Empire. He believed that Britain could not hold on to them with power alone as the lost American colonies testified. He wanted to make the Empire more flexible, less vulnerable to nationalist movements and easier to run by traditional elites. In this he succeeded, but he ultimately failed to secure Ireland a separate parliament in order to empower the responsible Irish politicians and electors to counter nationalist attempts to secure Ireland's independence from Britain. This failure ended his political career in 1894. In Ireland the absence of Home Rule ensured decades of bloodshed.

Gladstone can be recommended with confidence to students studying British history, and to those with any interest in this very remarkable man.

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John Wyse Jackson, (ed), *Flann O'Brien at war; Myles na gCopaleen, 1940–1945* (London, Duckworth, 1999), 191 pp ISBN 0715-629-417

Readers of the *Irish Times* of an older generation will remember with nostalgia the regular pithy columns of Brian O'Nolan, alias Flann O'Brien, alias Myles na gCopaleen; there were over 3 000 of them in all, published under the title of 'Cruiskeen Lawn' (bad Irish for 'A full jug'). In South Africa his former readers would have amounted to about a dozen souls. And for them this collection, running from 19 October 1940 to 24 December 1945, will be a delight; a journey back to the Second World War, to what in neutral Eire was coyly termed 'the emergency'. For the younger Irish exile in Africa it may prove a curiosity, to be flicked through in a bored moment. For the genuine South African it will be bit of an enigma. And because of that, of course, it may be fascinating, but it may well not be.

I remember some years ago suggesting to a former newspaper columnist that he publish a selection of his writings. His reply was frank. 'Such books don't sell, at least not after the column ceases.' He was probably correct. The daily column is an ephemeral thing relevant for the day, stale by tomorrow, sought after only by the social historian who more likely than not misses the sub-text. Such a volume, and this one falls into this category, may have literary merit. But does literature sell books?

I suppose this volume might be classified as satire, but it is not of the variety so treasured by the South African English-speaking white liberal. This is a mixture of sharp Dublin humour and what in Northern Ireland would be termed 'brave crack'. Any book which is described on the flyleaf as 'hilarious' and written by 'the funniest man who ever lived' must, of course, be approached with caution. Parts of it are amusing but other parts are incomprehensible even to the Irish-born. I smiled at the following piece which was published on 4 December 1942:

> There was a play at the Abbey recently called *The cursing Fields*. I am sorry I missed it because I knew them well. As lads we were forbidden to have anything to do with the family or play with the Fields boys. The reason was that they all used appalling language. Often old Mrs Fields used to come up the lane at dusk and curse in through the hedge at my parents. Sometimes old Fields himself would swear horribly at me through a window when I would be passing by on my way to school. Even the youngest of them, a stripling of ten, had a repertoire of cursewords that would surprise a sea-faring man. One of the older boys emigrated to the States and is now said to be a respectable and valued citizen there. A thing I doubt very much.

But what is all this about? Myles na gCopaleen wrote this in the *Irish Times* when it was edited by the legendary Mr Smiley. It was a period of transition for the paper, casting off its Anglo-Irish southern Unionist heritage (at least in part) and developing into a paper for the educated middle classes, though not yet the paper for 'all right thinking people'. Smiley was able to balance the old with the new: na gCopaleen was part of the new.

John Wyse Jackson, a London bookseller, is to be congratulated for putting this anthology together and for an interesting introduction on this civil servant/ novelist/columnist who died in 1966. I do not, however, feel that Mr Jackson will be able to buy many bottles of KWV from his South African royalties' cheque.

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Andrew S Thompson, *Imperial Britain: the empire in British politics, c 1880–1932* (Harlow, Longman, 2000), xvii + 219 pp, map, tables, bibl, index. ISBN 0 582 31920 and 0 582 31921 8 PPR

In recent years there has been a lively academic interest in imperial studies and in the way in which the presence of empire impacted on Britain's subject peoples. The most notable bringing together of academic expertise on the empire was the outstanding multi-volume *Oxford history of the British Empire* published by Oxford University Press in the late 1990s. The decade saw too, a focusing of academic attention on the effects of the imperial experience on the British in the United Kingdom. In *Imperial Britain*, Andrew Thompson, a lecturer in modern British history at the University of Leeds, turns his attention to the impact of the empire upon British culture. He examines how imperialism influenced the British both as an ideology and as a political movement influencing party politics. The book is far more than a party political history, however, and it offers a study of the intellectual, demographic and economic influences of imperialism.

In the first chapter, Thompson examines imperial identities. He discusses the concept of a British identity both in the British Isles and in the Dominions and the extent to which the sense of this identity shaped a common outlook. For decades, Dominion history has been the step-child of imperial studies and the prominence Thompson gives to the impact of the Dominions on British imperial attitudes is most welcome. Not only was it in Britain's relationship with the Dominions that the most important imperial experiments were carried out, but there would have been few people in the United Kingdom who did not have families or friends in the Dominions and who would not have been affected by developments in them.

As Thompson points out, by the late 19th century, growing British insecurity in the face of challenges from countries like Germany saw an awareness of the benefits the Dominions could give to Britain's international position. Accordingly, British politicians and leaders in other fields turned to ways of strengthening the British-Dominion relationship. In Chapter Two he examines the ways in which the British tried to 'mobilise imperialists' through organisations such as Chamberlain's Tariff Reform League, the Navy League and the Royal Colonial Institute. Although singling out Chamberlain's role in trying to draw the Dominions closer to Britain, Thompson does not ignore popular involvement.

Chapter Three examines the ways in which imperialism was propagated in Britain. While mainstream newspapers such as *The Times* were becoming more aware of the importance of the Dominions, it was essentially the popular press which led the way in propagating the new view of the Dominions. Both the *Daily Mail* and the *Daily Express* launched in 1896 and 1900 respectively, gave extensive coverage to the South African War and to imperial affairs generally. Northcliffe, the founder of the *Daily Mail*, identified a very real thirst for imperial news amongst the British public and consciously set out to meet it. With their stress on imperial news, newspapers such as the *Mail* were obviously enthusiastic supporters of pro-imperial campaigns yet, as Thompson shows, they shared a general wariness of campaigns which ran counter to free trade such as that promoted by the Tariff Reform League. Free trade divided the mainstream newspapers as well and, bearing in mind the role they were to play in imperial affairs during the early 20th century, this reviewer would have liked to have seen more included on the way in which imperialists such as Amery and Kerr used newspapers to propagate their own views of the way in which British relations with the Dominions should develop.

Chapter Four looks in some detail at the work of the Tariff Reform League. Thompson sets it against the confused thinking in Britain on the whole question of free trade and protectionism. It is interesting to read, in the light of later Dominion hostility to a general tariff, that as early as the 1887 Colonial Conference, Jan Hofmeyr suggested levying an imperial customs tariff on foreign goods entering the empire, a suggestion welcomed by the majority of the other colonial delegates but rejected by the British. Although with hindsight it is easy to accept that the economic unity of the empire was a lost cause from the start, it is fascinating reading how the question was agonised over in turn-of-the-century Britain and the Dominions.

Chapter Five examines the question of imperial security and defence. As is to be expected the size and upkeep of the navy receives the most attention. With the rise of rival fleets, notably those of Germany, Japan and the United States, the future of the navy became an important political issue. It was becoming obvious that the Royal Navy no longer had the resources to protect the whole empire and no issue created greater anxieties both in Britain itself and particularly in Australasia and western Canada, both of which were uncomfortably aware of the rapidly expanding Japanese navy. The issue of the protection of the empire's eastern interests and the discussions surrounding the question of Dominion participation in naval defence are well covered in the chapter.

Chapter Six concentrates on overseas migration and on the importance attached to keeping the white populations of the Dominions British. Female and child emigration receive attention. In view of the later revelations of the abuses implicit in many of the schemes of child emigration, the Colonial Office conclusion that it was 'the most economical and the most successful of all methods of emigration' (p 150) rings hollow.

The final chapter which looks at the First World War and its imperial aftermath is very much a concluding chapter which does not offer a detailed discussion of the importance for British politics of the war, or of the events leading up to the

1931 Statute of Westminster. It gives an unfortunate impression of having been tacked onto the rest of the book and the way in which it jumps backward and forward between post-war and war years is confusing and irritating. The post-war years were so different from the pre-1914 period, both in Britain and in the Dominions, that the attempt to take the book up to 1932 does not really work.

Despite this quibble, *Imperial Britain* is an invaluable book, both for the student of British political history and for anyone interested in the history of the relationship between Great Britain and the British Dominions overseas.

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Warren Treadgold, *A concise history of Byzantium* (Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave, 2001), xii + 273 pp, illus, maps, table, list, bibl, index. ISBN 0 333 71829 1 (hardcover) 0 333 71830 5 (paperback)

Warren Treadgold is Professor of Late Ancient and Byzantine History at St Louis University, Missouri. The author of numerous books on Byzantine history and culture, with *A concise history of Byzantium* he has written a work which is aimed at a wide audience and whose intention is to trace the development of the Byzantine Empire from its origins in the 3rd century AD until the Muslim capture of Constantinople in 1453.

In a short text of under 250 pages, this is a tall order. Yet Professor Treadgold has succeeded admirably in providing a clear and succinct account of the political history of the Byzantine state balanced by chapters on social and cultural developments. The book begins with an introduction which examines the problem of decline and looks at Byzantine attitudes to the state. The author's comments are most useful in offering an understanding of the continuities in a state which lasted for well over a thousand years. By bearing in mind his observation that the loyalties the Byzantines considered worth fighting for were those to religious doctrines and political leaders, and that rebels did not want to divide or overthrow the empire but impose their own opinions (usually religious) or leaders on it (p 3), the intrigues and often seemingly pointless violence within the state become more intelligible.

And, indeed, what a history of intrigue and violence is outlined within these pages. At the imperial level a story of murder, assassination, mutilation (frequently blinding), coups and countercoups unfolds. Few emperors died in their beds or allowed potential rivals to die in theirs. Mothers intrigued against sons and sons against mothers; emperors against officials and officials against emperors; adherents of rival Christian doctrines against each other. One of the most depressing aspects of the book is to read of the almost wilful blindness of leaders whose obsession with internal rivalries gave the empire's enemies the opportunities to whittle away imperial territories until by 1453, even the city of Constantinople itself was overthrown.

The book is divided into six main phases. These are: The formation of Byzantium (285–457); Reconquest and crisis (457–602); Catastrophe and containment (602–780); Recovery and Victory (780–1025); Wealth and weakness (1025–1204); and Restoration and fall (1204–1641). It ends with a concluding chapter which assesses the Byzantine legacy.

To this reviewer the importance to the modern world of the Byzantine Empire is to be found in its legacy to later societies, particularly that of Christian Orthodoxy. I therefore found the value of *A concise history of Byzantium* to lie more in the chapters on society and culture than in those dealing with the political history of the empire. These outline a picture of a society and culture which, no matter what was happening to the empire politically, continued to adapt to changing circumstances and was able to overcome setbacks and even to flourish. By the eleventh and twelfth centuries the empire was enjoying a cultural revival which foreshadowed the later Italian Renaissance and indeed made it possible. Throughout the centuries, Christianity and the Greek language gave a cohesion and resilience to the empire while, by exporting Orthodox Christianity to the Slavs, the Byzantines were able to extend their influence to the north. Professor Treadgold sums up the cultural importance of Byzantium as follows: 'Byzantium's failure was political not cultural. Although its higher culture failed to outlive its government by very long, its language, literacy, Church, and spiritual traditions were to outlast the Ottoman Empire.' (p 233)

A concise history of Byzantium is an extremely useful book to the scholar or layman interested in the Byzantine Empire, its history and culture.

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