Aspects of Violin and Art Fraud and the Criminal Law
L C Coetzee & Jan-Hendrik van Rooyen
`[H]istory is ... agreed-upon myth. The violin world, like the public, likes a good story and doesn't particularly care if truth gets in the way.' James N. McKean in VanClay (ed). Musical Instrument Auction Price Guide 1993 Edition. String Letter Press, San Anselmo California, 1993: 25.
1 DEFINING AND ILLUSTRATING THE PROBLEMThis article is a preliminary study of aspects of certain `dishonesty' offences related to works of art and violins. The authors inter alia examine whether the conventional criminal justice approach of general deterrence by the threat of criminal sanctions is or can be an effective mechanism for combating these crimes. They also ask themselves why they are concerned about art and violin fraud at all.
In South Africa, any person with an active interest in violins sees fakes regularly -- and also the disillusionment and often heartache caused by such falsehood. Fake Stradivarii and other `old Italian master' violins are seen regularly, sometimes in tragic circumstances. In the random examples that follow, names and places have been changed where appropriate to preserve privacy.2
- Miss de Villiers, aged 82, phones from Harmoniehof, a Pretoria retirement centre. She has a Guarneri del Gesù in damaged condition. Would the Professor care to come and look at it? On arrival, he is welcomed cordially by a very frail and shaky old woman, invited in for tea, and finally handed a black plastic container in which there is a very old faded `Premier Mills' flour bag. In the bag is a violin in seven pieces. It bears a facsimile Guarneri label. The author immediately recognises the violin as cheap Czechoslovakian factory-made, dating from the 1920s. At the time such an `outfit' (violin, bow, case, cloth and rosin) cost about one pound sterling compared to a real Guarneri which would then have fetched in excess of two thousand pounds. At present, a good genuine Del Gesù would fetch more than a million pounds. A wreck would still make five figures if genuine. A modern brand-new Czech outfit of the same quality as Miss de Villiers's can today be bought for R1 500. Miss de Villiers explains to the visitor that her father gave her the violin when she was a child; he had bought it from a travelling peddler. It was very, very valuable -- a treasure, an investment against future hard times. To her everlasting regret, she had disobeyed her father when she was twelve years old; instead of putting the violin back into its case (now long lost), she put it on a sofa and someone sat on it. She made a vow to have it repaired. She now feels that death is near and she still has not found someone to repair the violin; she has been haunted day and night and has had no rest for her soul. She has moved house some twenty times in the course of her life; she has always personally carried the bag with the broken violin close to her heart. Can the violin be repaired? Yes, Miss de Villiers, wood is patient; anything can be repaired, but it is really not worth it; the bag of scraps is practically worthless. It is not a true Guarneri; it is a cheap fake. To repair it would be a huge undertaking. After the initial shock and many tears, Miss de Villiers asks whether the Professor would not please still undertake to repair the violin, for the sake of her conscience, so that she could die in peace. He agrees, but not soon; it would have to be a labour of love which he would do during some future holiday. But by then she might be dead already; won't he please buy the bag of scraps and then do the repairs at his leisure? Yes, but for how much? Well, only the black ebony parts have any intrinsic value, perhaps R10. But he offers her R20, plus the required solemn undertaking. Then, trembling: Is the Professor quite certain it is not a genuine Guarneri? Yes, regrettably, he is quite sure, he has no doubts whatsoever. She wraps up the pieces, puts them back into the flour bag, holds the bundle like a baby to her breast, shivers, and asks with tear-filled eyes, `Do you think the Lord will now forgive me so that I can die in peace?' Peace at last, after seventy years. (Except for the Professor, who now has it on his conscience to repair the violin!)
This broken Guarneri fake made a woman suffer almost all her life. Fully restored, the violin may be worth around R900,00. If it were authentic, it would have been worth millions.
- Mr Smith keeps his fake Stradivari in a Chubb safe. It smells musty, but has quite a nice, mellow sound. It was probably made in Mittenwald around 1880 and is varnished in typical `German brown'. In 1959 the second author, then still a high school pupil, played various pieces on it, accompanied on the piano by the late Attie Badenhorst; this was taped on a Philips reel-to-reel tape recorder for the owner. Today Mr Smith still listens to the tape in awe and occasionally takes out his heirloom to buff and admire it. He refuses to believe that it is worth no more than R2 000. It lies unplayed, slowly deteriorating. It would make a very serviceable student instrument, much better than any new equally priced Far Eastern violin. Many such instruments are around, while South Africa's young people are crying for affordable decent student violins -- the authors call this `the curse of Stradivari', or, rather, the curse of South Africa's thousands of fake Stradivari. If someone brings in such an instrument for evaluation in order to sell the instrument, the second author always makes it clear that he cannot offer to purchase the violin, for fear of being thought a crook. And so another potential student violin disappears into a closet or safe to lie mute, deteriorating as time passes.
- Not all `victims' deserve our sympathy, since some have unclean hands such as Mr Jones of Verwoerdburg who bartered his Mercedes-Benz car for a `Strad'. He came to the second author for an evaluation of the violin, to sell it through Sotheby's. He really looked bad when he got the news. He had thought that he was ripping off the other person!
- Two final histories: first, in the 1950s the second author's Amon Bilmark violin (made in Durban in 1937) was sent to a firm in Johannesburg for adjustment. It was returned sans label. The maker in Durban fortunately could identify the violin and inserted another label. Now there is, of course, somewhere a violin which, through insertion of the stolen Bilmark label, has been `promoted' (Afrikaans `gepromoveer' -- a recognised term for this fraudulent but frequent practice in the violin trade) to a `better' (read: more expensive) instrument. Second, the second author once bought three extremely low-quality Chinese violins at a liquidation sale, simply to get their cases. He then advertised the violins in the `Under R50' classified ads column of a local newspaper as decorative wall-hangings; they were definitely not `musical' instruments. A dentist bought two for his consulting rooms; a Mr X bought the other one (for R50); the second author had his three violin cases. A year later a Pretoria violin teacher sent a violin to the author to see if its terrible sound could be improved through adjustment. It transpired that it was the third Chinese violin, now sporting a disguising coat of dark varnish and a modern German label! The pupil had purchased it from Mr X for R1 500. The author could identify it positively inter alia by a hidden secret serial code which he always inserts in instruments. One phone call plus the threat of immediate criminal action led to a prompt refund.
These examples may seem to trivialise the `problem' of falsehood in violin art/craft. After all, the fakes in these examples only fool the very ignorant; even someone with a little experience and expertise can identify without any difficulty these instruments as factory (or, rather, assembly-line) commercial or trade violins; the identification procedure may take as little as 30 seconds. But the individual cultural harm caused by these fraudulent instruments is real. There are also much more dramatic fakes. The most famous and best preserved of all Stradivarii violins, the so-called Count Salabue (also known as `Le Messie' - - the Messiah; most Stradivarii have nicknames), which rests in the Ashmolean Museum at Oxford, is a disputed instrument; many knowledgeable people believe that it is a fake made by the great French copyist, Vuillaume. Another `great' faker was Vuillaume's British collaborator, John (Jack, to his friends) Lott. McKean writes as follows about Lott:
'Lott ... was virtually alone among copyists to thoroughly assimilate the style of {Guarneri} del Gesù. to the point that he made original fakes rather than duplicates. In the world of fine art, the most successful forgers have always thoroughly steeped themselves in the techniqes, execution , and compostition of their chosen target, and then created new works, rather than meticulously copying an existing work ... Lott was quite successful in reproducing the classic Cremona {undercoat and varnish} finishes; it is only when his work is seen next to the real thing that the forgery becomes apparent.'3 McKean recounts how the great virtuoso Ida Haendel discovered to her distress that her beloved Guarneri del Gesù violin was actually a John Lott -- `and from that day on beloved no more'. (Today a John Lott is worth `only' about 25 000.) On the topic of the prevalence of fakery in the violin business, McKean concludes as follows:
`One must remember that violin shops are service enterprises; if a shop doesn't give its clientele what they want, it won't survive. Violins are antiqued because musicians like them that way. Although all violin makers may not agree with this practice, most will not argue that it is easier to sell an old-looking fiddle.'4 Granted. Provided that the `copy' is honestly, clearly and permanently identified and marked for what it actually is.
Crimes of deception and dishonesty are often regarded with a degree of awe, rather than with disapprobation; the faking of a violin or artefact is often seen as an art in itself -- `the art of the forger'. Very few cases of these crimes ever find their way into courts. If they do, the prosecution often finds that such cases present considerable stumbling blocks, making it difficult to obtain a conviction. It is justifiable to ask whether the conventional criminal justice approach is an effective mechanism for restraining the incidence of violin and art fraud.
A few remarks on the terminology used are necessary. In this study, we use the term `fraud' in a wide, lay sense; in it we include most of those acts of dishonesty and misrepresentation which experience has taught us are prevalent. We use `fake' and `faking' in a similar sense. When we use the terms `fraud', `forgery' and `uttering' in a narrow, legal-technical sense, it should be apparent from the context.
The second author removes misleading labels from his violins as a matter of policy. The miniature fiddle is worth R150,00 - more than many fake Stradivari's!
2 THE HISTORY OF ART AND VIOLIN FRAUD
Introduction: why fake?To get a picture of the art forgery scene as a whole and to develop a better insight into its working and the driving forces behind it, one needs to take a glance at art forgery through history.5 Why did forgery take root? What are the roles of cultural trends, spiritual forces and social changes in the development and different forms of art forgery?
It seems to us that the key to understanding the phenomenon of art forgery lies in the concept of `collecting', with all the historical and cultural ballast that the word contains. Works of art have been forged for as long as they have been collected. The connection between art forgery and art collection is explained by Merryman and Elsen:6
`Either activity presupposes an enhanced appreciation of specific objects beyond their functional value. As long as a stamp is used only for dispatching a letter, its value is determined by the postal regulation. But as soon as stamps are bought not for mailing letters, but to complete a collection, their price will go up, especially if the stamp wanted is no longer in use. And when the demand surpasses the possible legitimate supply, the unobtainable commodity will be illegally produced, that is to say forged. It is exactly the same with works of art. As long as such works served only their immediate purposes, such as the satisfaction of religious or magical needs, or the decoration of bodies, abodes or sacred buildings, forgery did not exist. But as soon as such objects were sought for their aesthetic merits and as collectors' pieces, they were forged when the natural supply was exhausted. ' Art fraud and forgery generally appear and spread in highly differentiated, advanced cultural periods. Art forgery has been particularly common during periods in which people were extremely partial to specific art products of the civilisation of a bygone era, that is periods in which people preferred the works of a remote epoch to contemporary art. For instance, in the last century of the Roman Republic, Phaedrus relates that the artists of his time, to obtain better prices for their works, signed their marble sculptures `Praxiteles', their silverwork `Myron' and their paintings `Pausias' or `Zeuxis'.7 During the Renaissance the works of Antiquity were forged, and during the Romantic period, Gothic paintings.
At present, great (and sometimes not-so-great) art from all periods, past and present, is being forged.
During the Middle Ages, when the church occupied a central position in society, the main art collector was the church. Artist were seen as craftspersons and, while the religious content of their work was admired, their artistic personality was of little significance and they retreated behind their work in anonymous seclusion. Since art had a mainly religious function, the motive to copy great foreign artistic models (like the Greek sculptures) was lacking; it is therefore not surprising that the phenomenon of art forgery as we know it in the modern world did not exist.
With the Renaissance came the dawn of a new spirit of individualism. The artist's personality was freed from the anonymity of religious art; the human talent of creating a fine work of art, that is the genius of the artist, was greatly admired. An important development was the use of a signature, which had been introduced by the painters' guild to facilitate distinguishing between foreign and local paintings. Later it became a sign of authenticity per se. A corollary of the glorification of the artist's personality was the idea of originality which became an important criterion in the judging of a work of art and in determining price.8 Original masterpieces acquired great value. Consequently, human nature being what it is, many artists resorted to dishonest copying and forging of works of art.
In our epoch, many factors provide fertile ground for forgery. The growing museum industry has greatly increased the demand for works of art. There is a potent awareness of art as an investment among the public and the number of persons, corporations et cetera, who can afford to buy art works has increased. The number of authentic works of art on the market remains relatively constant while the demand rises, and when the equilibrium tips in the direction of demand, prices soar.9 The forgery business accordingly holds good opportunities for the informed forger who can fill the gap between supply and demand on the art market. Because the art market has become an investors' market, many opportunists with no serious inclination for art have entered the market as `art dealers'. The world of art has to a large extent moved from the hands of knowledgeable, expert art lovers, connoisseurs and collectors into those of mere buyers looking for an investment who lack true critical abilities.
Further examples of violin fraudThe nexus between art fraud and violin fraud is collectability: `every category of objects suitable for collection -- which includes virtually everything -- was or can be subject to forgery.'10 Paintings (Rembrandts, Vermeers, Pierneefs, Renoirs -- to mention but a few),11 violins and other (stringed) instruments,12 sculptures,13 statues, statuettes, lithographs,14 porcelain,15 jewellery and antiques in every form from furniture16 to dolls17 -- all have fallen prey to the `art' of deceit. When the value of a violin came to be associated with its master, faking spread rapidly, paralleling the history of art fraud.
As is evident from the examples in the first part of this paper, the mass production of facsimile-labelled violins in Germany is still having repercussions on the violin scene today. The extent of what took place is staggering. The town of Markneukirchen in Germany turned out fifty thousand `factory' (i e assembly- line) fiddles a year during the years before World War I.18 Mittenwald also provides a good example of the mass production of inexpensive violins. This small Bavarian town lies on the main road near the better-known Garmisch-Partenkirchen, between Munich and Innsbruck on the Austrian border. Serving as a stopover on the bustling trade route from Augsburg to Venice, Mittenwald had for centuries been a prosperous town. Mathias Klotz (1656--1743) was Mittenwald's most famous violin maker. Klotz left Mittenwald as a young man to learn violin-making in Vils, Padua and possibly Cremona. He returned in 1683 to a Mittenwald that had, after the Thirty Years' War, lapsed into a very serious depression. Klotz started making violins -- good violins, though never of superlative quality. He had no trouble in finding people to train as apprentices and assistants, since experienced wood carvers (making religious and other artefacts) were plentiful in Mittenwald. Mathias's five sons, and later their sons, also pursued the trade. Besides some forty violin-makers by the name of Klotz or Kloz, Mittenwald had a great number of other violin-makers as well.
Guilds were organised. Salesmen were trained and vended the violins throughout Germany. The local violin business expanded rapidly; soon recourse had to be had to methods of mass production. Artisans began to specialise; some made only bodies, others scrolls, still others chiselled pegs and bridges or cut fingerboards. Assemblers assembled the parts and varnishers did nothing but varnish the assembled violins. In the early nineteenth century almost every household in Mittenwald -- man, woman and child -- partook in the manufacturing of some violin part.
The successors to Klotz imitated the style of Stainer, a great maker from Absam, near Innsbruck in Austria. Some began faking Stainer's labels. Soon other styles and labels were being `copied'. In those days, children were employed to stencil many thousands of facsimile labels -- `Stainer', `Amati', `Stradivarius', `Guarneri' or whatever. The resulting confusion has been sketched above. Here is another, recent, case: On 19 February 1993, soon after the present authors had commenced their collaboration, the following small advertisement appeared in the classified section of The Pretoria News19 under the heading `Musical Instruments':
Antonio Stradivarius: Violin made in 1730.
Asking price R12 000. Phone G ...after 4 pm. The authors were delighted. At their instigation, on Monday, 22 February 1993, the Reverend Mr N.A.S. Lombard (also a violin enthusiast), visited the would-be seller, Mr G, who was an aged, retired person. Reverend Lombard inspected the instrument. He explained to the seller that in his opinion the violin was a fake and was worth no more than about five hundred rand; he gave reasons for his opinion. He hereupon briefed the researchers on his visit and the discussion.
The researchers made an appointment with the seller and visited him on 25 February. In response to their questions, he `affirmed' that he believed that the violin was genuine, that no-one had ever given him an evaluation of the instrument, and that they were the first to respond to the advertisement. He produced an old Guinness Book of Records to show them just what Stradivariuses were worth. When they asked him why then he was asking so little, he pointed to a crack (badly repaired) below the right-hand soundhole. When asked what his very lowest price would be, he said ten thousand rand.
He recounted the history of the violin (for a violin with a history it was -- all violins have histories!); it had been bought by his grandfather around 1875 in the Eastern Cape. The violin carried a printed label which read:
Antonius Stradiuarius Cremonenfis
Faciebat Anno 1736 *
(At * there was the usual double circle with `AS' below a cross; the `s' of `Antonius' and the `6' were faded or worn; the seller thought that the `6' was an `0', but the researchers feel positive that it was a `6'.)
The violin was a typical German assembly-line mass-produced Stradivarius `copy', probably from Markneukirchen or Sch”nbach (now Luby, Czech Republic), with the table made of fine spruce from the B”hmerwald and the back of good quality maple from Bosnia. The soundholes were typically German with deep nicks, and the small- headed scroll also typically German, with the roughly cut centre ridge not extending down to the pegbox. The colour separations between the neck and scroll, and neck and body, were fairly sharply defined. The purfling was genuine inlaid work. The varnish was a cheap brown spirit varnish on a golden-yellow ground, with traditional `wear' letting the ground show at selected places. The table was very badly worn in the bridge area. In the opinion of researcher Van Rooyen, the violin was probably some hundred and fifty years old, brought to the Eastern Cape by the 1842 German settlers, and in its present condition worth around two hundred to three hundred rand. The cost of complete restoration, acoustical and cosmetic, would be in the order of a thousand rand. Thus the restored violin, with a new low-cost fibreglass bow and a new but cheap case could be supplied to a young player for about two thousand rand. The result would be a much better `outfit' than the currently available `Cremona' factory outfits from Luby, which are of inferior wood and workmanship, with ink-drawn instead of inlaid `purfling' and which cost R1 500. But young South African players would never have the benefit of this instrument -- all because of the fake `Stradivarius' label and the fact that `(h)ope springs eternal in the human breast ... `20 Many of these good violins today are resting in South Africa's cupboards and safes or are stowed away in lofts -- for a labelled violin might just be worth a fortune! And so the `curse of Stradivari' repeats itself.21
In 1992 the Vienna Dorotheum fanfaronaded the auctioning of a `rare master violin' in a specially printed flyer accompanying their catalogue, complete with glossy colour pictures.22 The violin was labelled Joseph Guarneri filius Andreae, Cremona 1714. The bidding for this `Altitalienische Meistergeige' was to start at 800 000 Austrian schillings (400 000 pounds sterling), representing one third of its value, and was expected to reach two million schillings (a million pounds).
To confirm the identification of the violin, experts were brought in; all were in agreement -- that is, all but one. Violin-maker Jacob Saunders identified the `1714' old Italian master violin as a new instrument by the hand of British violin-maker Roger Hargrave who specialises in copies. When Hargrave heard about this, he offered to fly over and confirm Saunders's identification. The so-called Guarneri was withdrawn from the auction. It was indeed a modern Hargrave copy of Guarneri; Hargrave himself (of course) had never intended any fraud or deception. Despite Hargrave's testimony, some of the experts remained obstinate in their original confirmation! Unanswered questions remain: What was that label doing there? And why were no criminal charges laid and investigated?
3 THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
IntroductionIn this section, we give an overview of the most common crimes of dishonesty. We explore the effectiveness of a traditional criminal justice approach in curbing the incidence of art fraud, and especially violin fraud. This area of law is difficult and complex. We have tried to simplify our statement of the law greatly for the sake of non-legal readers; further simplification would be dangerous since it could be misleading. As it stands, it provides a source of reference for non-legal readers.
In considering the application of the criminal justice system to the present area of concern, it must be kept in mind that it is a complex system, involving many functionaries or parties, such as the public (from whom the complainant usually comes, that is the person who is a `victim' and who lays a charge with the police), the police, the prosecution, the courts, witnesses (including expert witnesses who may give opinion evidence) and, of course, the law, which consists of common law, statutory law and judge-made law. Of importance are substantive criminal law (which defines the various crimes), the law of criminal procedure (which regulates the step-by-step procedure to be followed in investigating and prosecuting suspected offenders), and the law of evidence (which regulates how certain issues in dispute and related matters may be proved). While the criminal justice system empowers the public and the law enforcement officers to prosecute crime, it confers no absolute powers; all powers are limited. These limitations may sometimes constitute formidable obstacles to successful implementation of the criminal law as a method of combatting certain offences. We proceed to expound some principles of substantive criminal law.
In line with Burchell and Milton,23 we define criminal law as that branch of the law which defines certain forms of human conduct as crimes and provides for the punishment of those persons with criminal capacity (i e who are not `insane') who unlawfully and with a guilty mind commit a crime. For our purposes, `crime' and `offence' are synonymous.
South African criminal law has evolved various offences which may be used to deal with art-related wrongdoings. We shall first briefly expound common law fraud.
FraudFraud may be defined as the unlawful and intentional making of a misrepresentation which causes actual harm or which is potentially prejudicial to another.24 Four essential elements 25 can be abstracted from the preceding definition, viz (1) a misrepresentation, (2) unlawfulness, (3) prejudice and (4) intention.26
- Misrepresentation The basic requirement for fraud is misleading or deceiving the victim of the crime. A misrepresentation is made if a person represents to another that a certain fact or set of facts exists which in truth do not exist.27 For example, a person represents that a violin by Carlo Bergonzi is one by Antonio Stradivari, or that a late nineteenth-century `assembly-line' German violin is a genuine seventeenth-century Italian Amati. A misrepresentation may be made by written or spoken word. It may also be made by conduct alone, for example by nodding one's head, 28 or by words as well as conduct, that is verbal and non-verbal (body language) communication. Whether a person's conduct (or conduct and words considered together) amounts to a misrepresentation, is a question of fact and should be established by taking into consideration all the relevant circumstances of the case. A misrepresentation can also be made by an omission, that is non-action -- for example failure to disclose a relevant fact.29 However, failure to disclose a fact will be tantamount to a misrepresentation only if there was a legal duty to disclose that fact.30 A misrepresentation is made by an omission if a person fails to disclose a material fact as a result of which another is induced to act to his/her prejudice.31 No general rules have been formulated to determine when a legal duty to disclose a fact exists; the courts determine this from case to case. If a seller knows or has reason to suspect that a violin has been `promoted' by the switching of labels (for example substituting a Stradivari label for a Bergonzi label), he/she will certainly be under a legal duty to reveal this to a customer. Not revealing this would constitute a misrepresentation by omission.
- Unlawfulness Not every misrepresentation can be said to be `unlawful'. For instance it is not unlawful for a vendor to extol a work of art or the abilities of the artist concerned in exaggerated or extravagant terms which amount to `puffing'. `Puffing' is an exaggerated laudatory statement made by a vendor about the nature or qualities of his/her merchandise, and is, within bounds, accepted as a lawful practice.32 For instance, a dealer may quite lawfully wax lyrical about the shape of a violin's soundholes, its tone, or even the case in which the instrument comes.
The fact that a complainant knew that a misrepresentation was false is no defence against a charge of fraud. Thus, if an expert is sent by the police to establish that a dealer is misrepresenting an instrument, a conviction of fraud can be obtained against the dealer even though the expert was not deceived.33 Mr G above would be guilty of fraud even though the authors knew in advance that he would be showing them a fake.
- Prejudice Telling a lie per se is not tantamount to fraud, although the law about fraud has become so wide that a teller of lies runs a grave risk of prosecution. Not a mere lie but actual or potential harm or `prejudice' is required to constitute fraud. In the majority of instances the victim of fraud will suffer actual prejudice. However, potential prejudice suffices. This means that fraud is committed if the misrepresentation, viewed objectively, may (not necessarily did) cause prejudice.34 The risk of prejudice need only be reasonably possible.35 In R v Jolosa 36 Solomon J. said that `it is not necessary to prove actual prejudice, but ... it is sufficient if the act were done with intent to deceive, and if in the ordinary course of things it was calculated to prejudice some person or persons'. The phrase `calculated to prejudice' was subsequently interpreted by the Appellate Division as follows:
` It seems to me that when it is said that the act must be `calculated to prejudice', the word `calculated' does not refer to the intention of the doer of the act but is used in the sense of `likely', and the meaning is that the act must be of such a nature as, in the ordinary course of things, to be likely to prejudice.'37 In R v Heyne 38 Schreiner J.A said that `the use of the word ``likely'' was not intended to convey that there must be a probability as opposed to a risk of harm ...'39 Accordingly, it is not necessary that the potential prejudice be to the representee. It is sufficient if the government or the general public or a third party could have been prejudiced by the misrepresentation.40 Once again, Mr G above would be guilty of fraud.
If the risk of prejudice is `too remote or fanciful', potential prejudice in the foregoing sense does not exist.41 If the representation is so preposterous that in the ordinary course of events the reasonable person will not be deceived, there is no prejudice, potential or real.42 However, if the representee is so foolish as really to believe a preposterous story and actually acts upon the misrepresentation to his prejudice, then there is actual prejudice and fraud is committed. An instance would be the purchase by an ignoramus of a violin as a genuine Stradivari where the small print at the foot of the facsimile Stradivari label reads: `Made in Czechoslovakia'. The seller knowingly commits fraud.
- Intention The requirement of `intention' in order for the crime of fraud to be committed, means that the person who makes the representation must know that the representation is false.43 It can be very difficult to show what went on in the mind of another; in court, however, an inference of knowledge of untruth may be drawn from all the circumstantial evidence. If the accused then does nothing to rebut the inference (for instance, he/she refuses to testify), the latter may `harden' into concrete proof (that is proof beyond reasonable doubt). In addition, the legislature saw it fit to include section 245 in the Criminal Procedure Act 44 to alleviate the heavy burden of proving intent that would otherwise face the prosecution. Section 245 reads as follows:
`If at criminal proceedings at which an accused is charged with an offence of which a false representation is an element, it is proved that the false representation was made by the accused, he shall be deemed, unless the contrary is proved, to have made such representation knowing it to be false.' (Our emphasis.) This section creates a `presumption of intent' on the part of an accused, which comes into operation as soon as it is proved that the accused actually made the false representation. The presumption has the effect of placing the onus on the accused to prove on a balance of probabilities that he did not know that the representation was false.45 Someone who does not have an honest belief in the truth of his representation, or who acts recklessly as to whether it is true or false can be said to `know' that his representation is false.46 Likewise, the requirement of knowledge of the falsity of the representation is complied with if a person who, being suspicious of the truth of his representation, intentionally refrains from checking on sources of information for fear of establishing the falsehood of his representation.47 When an ignorant seller of a fake Stradivarius is properly alerted that the instrument may be a fake, and nevertheless continues to offer the instrument to ignorant buyers as a genuine Stradivarius, he commits fraud. Once again, Mr G is guilty.
For fraud to be committed, an intention to defraud, as opposed to an intention merely to deceive, is required. The difference appears clearly from the eloquent statement in Re London and Globe Finance Corporation Ltd:48
`To deceive is to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which is false, and which the person practising that deceit knows or believes to be false. To defraud is to deprive by deceit; it is by deceit to induce a man to act to his injury. More tersely it may be put that to deceive is by falsehood to induce a state of mind, and to defraud is by deceit to induce a course of action.' Therefore, the prosecution must show that the accused had the intention not only to make somebody believe something which is false, but also to induce somebody to act upon the misrepresentation to his or her prejudice. Thus the mere telling of lies which the teller does not believe the representee will act upon, does not amount to fraud.49 Bragging to one's friends that a fake Stradivarius is genuine, is not per se fraud. It becomes fraud when the motivation is, for instance, to sell the instrument as a genuine masterwork.50
ForgeryForgery is a species of fraud. Forgery may be defined as the unlawful making of a false document (a violin label!) with intent to defraud, which causes actual prejudice or which is potentially prejudicial to another.51
The requirement of misrepresentation for fraud to be committed is, in the case of forgery, met by the falsification of a document. Furthermore all the other requirements for fraud also apply to forgery, such as actual or potential prejudice and intent to defraud.52 The most obvious difference between the two crimes is that fraud is completed only after the representation comes to the attention of the representee, while forgery is completed as soon as the document is falsified. Bringing the document to the attention of others constitutes a different crime, namely uttering. Making (for instance by stencilling) fake `Stradivarius' labels constitutes forgery. Pasting them inside the instrument and offering the instruments for sale to the public constitutes uttering (as well as fraud).
The document Forgery can be committed only in `documents'. Our courts have not yet given an authoritative exposition of the term `documents'. Milton and Hunt 53 explain why:
`In all the forgery cases the forged material has either obviously constituted a `document', or else some other requirement, such as prejudice, has been lacking, with the result that it has not been found necessary to pronounce on the ambit of the word. In any event, the matter is usually not very important in South Africa, as forgery is a species of fraud, and in a borderline case the prosecutor should avoid the difficulty by indicting for fraud.' De Wet and Swanepoel 54 suggest that in a proper interpretation of the common law only the falsification of certain documents is actionable, namely documents embodying a legal transaction or which afford evidence of a legal transaction, and officially drawn-up documents. However, our courts give a wider interpretation to the term `documents' (used in regard to forgery) than that of De Wet and Swanepoel.55 The following objects have been treated as documents: testimonials; bonds; negotiable instruments, for example cheques and promissory notes; a written request to the military authorities for a pass; written orders for goods; receipts; educational certificates; passes and permits; a certificate of competence to repair watches; licences; a `letter of attachment' of property; a power of attorney to transfer; scrolls accompanying medals; the surrender of a general dealer's licence; and an international vaccination certificate.56 This approach is influenced by English law and the wider definition of `document' found in the old Native Territories Penal Code.57 Section 290 of this Act defines `document' for the purpose of forgery as `any substance on which is impressed and described by means of letters, figures, or marks, any matter which is intended to be or may be used in a court of justice, or otherwise, as evidence of such matter'. The interpretation of the term `document' by Wessels J in Seccombe v Attorney-General that brought him to the conclusion that a book was included under the term is very similar:58
`The word `document' is a very wide term and includes everything that contains the written or pictorial proof of something. It does not much matter of what material it is made. If it contains in writing or cyphers proof of some facts it is a document, and the fact that a number of leaves happen to be bound together so as to take the appearance of a book cannot make any difference. If in fact it contains written proof of facts, it is a document.' Milton and Hunt 59 are of the opinion that the Transkeiean definition, which to their mind might influence our courts if ever the ambit of the word `document' is to be considered, `cannot be restricted to writings whose words are intended in themselves to carry legal consequences, or which are ``official'' or ``semi- official'', or which would be admissible in court on a strict application of the rules of evidence'. The authors see the words as a roundabout way of saying that a `document' covers any objectively intelligible form of communication. Milton and Hunt 60 prefer the following definition by Russell which in their opinion is a more direct and therefore more acceptable way of saying much the same thing:
`Writing in any form, on any material, which communicates to some person or persons a human statement, whether of fact or fiction.' Some corollaries of this definition are mentioned by Milton and Hunt:61 First, the substance on which the writing appears, be it paper, stone, wood, canvas, earth or even air, is of no consequence. Nor does it matter whether the writing is effected by ink, type paint, blood or smoke. Second, the writing must be such that, reasonably interpreted, it conveys the message of the spoken word and conveys the same meaning to all persons able to read it, even if they require special qualifications to be able to read it.
The latter corollary has a material bearing on the art scene. Burchell and Hunt 62 (relying on Russell's definition and with reference to Milton and Hunt) contend that since visual and musical art conveys different messages to different people, a painting or musical performance as such is not a `document' and thus cannot be forged. Milton and Hunt's 63 argument is to similar effect because, as they put it, `a drawing or a painting or a sculpture, or a piece of music, does not qualify because it conveys, and is intended to convey, a subjectively variable message'. They continue:
`On the other hand, a code might be written in picture form and it would qualify, and so would a drawing which was meant, objectively, to be merely a substitute for words, such as an architect's drawings.' It is their submission, however, that any words that are written or printed on a picture may be the object of forgery. In particular, if someone forges a painter's signature on a painting by someone else, it amounts to forgery. By signing a painting, the painter declares that he/she painted it, so they say, and that declaration is a `document'.64 Different individuals may have subjectively varying interpretations of his paintings, but there is only one possible interpretation of his signature.65 These considerations apply mutatis mutandis to violins. Just making a violin, say, on an Amati pattern, will not as such amount to forgery. A violin is a violin is a violin. But Amati labels or Stainer brands or Vuillaume signatures may be `forged', and that amounts to crime.
Unlawfulness It is not unlawful to sign another's name to a document with that person's consent.66 Thus a master may authorise his apprentice to put his (the master's) signature, seal or brand on an approved instrument. Most of Stradivari's instruments were probably not made by him alone but with the assistance of his two sons and Carlo Bergonzi; if they labelled them with the master's consent, using his labels, they committed no crime.
Falsification A document is not false merely because it contains a false statement or statements.67 A lie does not undergo a metamorphosis and turn into a forgery just because it is reduced to writing.68 A document is false only if it purports to be what it is not.69 The highest incidence of forgery, also in the violin labelling business, occurs when the document tells a lie about the person who made the document or authorised its making.70 Forgery is also committed if a document is a counterfeit or spurious representation of a genuine document (typically facsimile labels),71 or if after alteration it contains information which was not contained in it when it was originally made, information which is of material importance to the transaction underlying the charge.72
A falsification may be effected in a number of ways: alteration,73 endorsement,74 erasure (for instance scraping off with a knitting needle the small-print at the foot of a fake `Stradivarius' label which states: `Made in Czechoslovakia'),75 substitution (for instance `promoting' a Bergonzi to a Stradivari label substitution),76 and addition of particulars (for instance antedating a Collin- M‚zin violin to make it twenty years older).77 Snyman78 submits that the destruction of the whole document is not forgery whereas Milton and Hunt79 take the opposite view, stating that the `removal or execution of the whole thing' is an instance of forgery. We support the latter view.
Falsification of the document may take place through an innocent agent; in nineteenth-century Mittenwald children were used to stencil thousands of fake labels.80 Today, the instigators would be regarded as the criminal forgers, not the innocent children.
Forgery is committed as soon as the false document is `made', a moment which arrives when the document is completed or left in such a condition as to indicate that it was intended to be acted upon as genuine.81 A document that has not yet reached that stage is the object of an attempted forgery.
Intent The intent required to constitute forgery is exactly the same as the intent required for fraud:82 the forger should have the intention of defrauding and not merely the intention of deceiving.83 The forger should at least foresee the possibility that the document may be false and that it may cause prejudice and nevertheless proceed to make it. Section 103 of the Criminal Procedure Act84 makes it unnecessary to allege and prove an intent to defraud a particular person; an indeterminate intent is sufficient to constitute the crime.
Prejudice The requirement of prejudice is also substantially the same as that for fraud. There is a significant difference as regards potential prejudice, though. In the case of fraud, potential prejudice cannot be inferred before the misrepresentation has been communicated. In the case of forgery this can be done at an earlier stage, namely as soon as the false document has been made with the necessary intent. The document need not be uttered for potential prejudice to arise.85
UtteringUttering is the unlawful `putting off' (see below) of a forged document with the intent to defraud, which causes actual prejudice or which is potentially prejudicial to another.86 If the person who utters the document is the one who forged it (which is mostly the case), he or she will be charged with two offences, namely forgery and uttering.87 If the document is uttered by a person other than the one who forged it, the former could be charged with uttering only.88 A false document for the sake of forgery is also a false document for the sake of uttering. The requirements of intention to defraud and prejudice are similar to those required for fraud.
`Putting off' The distinctive requirement for uttering is `putting off' or `passing off' the forged document. This implies that the utterer must communicate 89 the document to another by way of a delivery, offer or attempt to make use of it in some way or other.90 In R v Kolia 91 the court declared its approval of the view expressed in Gardiner and Lansdown that the words `offer, utter and put off' mean that `the accused tendered or attempted to pass or make use of the instrument'. As Milton and Hunt 92 correctly point out, the use of the word `attempt' in quotation should not be understood to mean that completed uttering can take place without the document having been communicated (as is the case when a document is lost in the post). It is their submission that uttering in essence consists in communicating the forged document to another. If the other refuses to take it, the crime is still uttering, but if the document never reaches him there is only an attempt.93 We agree with this view. The document must be uttered on the pretext that it is genuine or authentic. Therefore, uttering is not committed if the document is communicated by a forger to an accomplice who knows that the document is false and who, in turn, has not yet uttered it.94 The forger, however, may still be convicted of conspiring with his accomplice to utter the document. The putting off may be effected through the post or some other (innocent or guilty) person or agent.95 On the violin scene, the crime of uttering will typically involve offering for sale violins with faked labels (or brands or signatures) and faked certificates of authenticity. (Fraud is, of course, also committed in such cases, if all the requirements are there.)
4 CRIMINAL JUSTICE DYNAMICS: THE ACHILLES' HEELIs the conventional criminal justice approach an effective mechanism to combat violin and art fraud? We doubt it. It is widely accepted that the risk of conviction of crimes relating to art forgery and fraud is relatively small and that it is very difficult to get an overview of the real extent of criminality in such crimes.96 Various reasons may be advanced to explain this. Nowadays the scientist is well-equipped to detect forgery with advanced technical apparatus. However, he/she does not come into the picture until the art expert is alerted to the possibility of a forgery. The trained eye and developed intuition of the connoisseur or historian are the first 'nose' to smell a rat. The assistance of the scientist is then called upon to confirm or negate these premonitions. This sounds good. But, in real life, the services of the art expert are not accessible to every prospective or interested buyer of art works. The quality and validity of expert authentications are also not always beyond doubt because there are no licensing agencies, ethical committees, or competency exams to control them. This situation makes negligent or incompetent advice a very real danger. Thus far the role of the detector of the forgery.
Now for the antagonist, the forger (and the fraud). The forger becomes more and more cunning as the range of modern technical and artistic resources, skills and knowledge available increases -- racing to stay one step ahead of the authenticators.
The collector, the gallery and the museum director often (unwittingly) play into the hands of the forger. `They often are hesitant in the face of costly advice, huge publicity, and a desire not to besmirch the good name of the art market or their own good names to admit publicly they have bought a forgery and thus fail to cooperate in criminal prosecution.'97 Of course the fear of being ridiculed also has a deterrent effect -- not on the forger, but on the victim, who is too shocked to be willing to go to the police and the courtroom.98 For criminal law to function optimally, the situation must be such that the victim is determined to institute criminal proceedings. Too often in art fraud or forgery cases, the victims fight shy of taking action; victim dealers are afraid that their customers and potential customers will lose confidence in them and that their business may be detrimentally affected; victim collectors are afraid that they may lose the value of their bargain if the fraud or forgery becomes known. So they remain quiescent -- one to preserve his/her supposed integrity and the other to preserve the `authenticity' of his/her purchase. Jurisdictional problems because of the international nature of the art market further frustrates the ordinary smooth(er) course of the legal process.99 If we consider all of these factors, it is not surprising that art forgery and fraud trials are so rare. Würtenberger100 speaks a true word:
`For almost no other crime is the `dark number' of offenses committed but never discovered or cleared up as large as it is for fraud in all its forms ... We should not allow ourselves to be deluded by individual sensational cases, which we can follow almost every year'. Grasping the nettle despite all these odds can be stinging to the prosecution. Even if the victim does complain and proceedings are instituted, it might be very difficult to secure a conviction. It can be extremely difficult to prove that a painting or a violin is indeed a fake:
`Scientific analysis is not foolproof and the appraisals of experts are just expressions of opinions which ... judges may not find convincing. The prosecution must prove a connection between the fake and the faker which is costly and many times more difficult because the chain of title or origins of the work often can be difficult to trace. This is further complicated by the international nature of the art market'.101 Whether the artefact or violin is a fake is a matter to be decided on all the evidence presented, which in art and violin forgery and fraud cases to a great extent will rely on the testimony of expert witnesses. It can very easily happen that the opinions obtained from expert witnesses are not unanimous or completely convincing, even if modern methods of criminalistics and analysis are applied. The trial of the painter Otto Wacker for forgery in Berlin in 1931 illustrates the dilemma that may face the court if this scenario should arise.102
The Wacker trial Wacker was accused of having brought more than thirty Van Gogh paintings, of which the majority were probably forged, onto the market. A small number of them could possibly have been genuine. The court had the unenviable task of determining which of the paintings were genuine and which were forged. To assist the court in its task, a number of expert witnesses were summoned to give their detailed opinions on authenticity. The German and Dutch experts who were called upon to testify gave contradictory opinions. Worse still, while giving evidence, one witness changed his earlier opinion several times. This trial is an example of how precarious and extremely uncertain the opinions of experts, even those of reputable scholars, may be and consequently of how little evidential value.
The Werro trial Another notorious example of the difficulties inherent in a criminal case is the trial of the well-known and previously highly respected violin dealer and expert Henry Werro in Bern in 1958.103 Werro was accused of fraud in the course of his work committed through the sale of old stringed instruments. He was charged with having sold nineteen violins, one cello and three bows that were either completely or partly fake.
The Italian Chamber of Commerce constituted a commission of experts charged with the investigation of old stringed instruments. The Association of Swiss Violin Makers also formed a commission of experts. The experts of both commissions investigated a number of violins that had been sold for 100 000 Swiss francs or more and that appeared to be fakes. Werro's objections to the experts led the jury to appoint another five experts that had to give `Oberexpertisen'.
One of the highlights of the trial was the performance by one Albert Phillips-Hill, a very famous violin expert of the old and prestigious firm W. E. Hill and Sons in London. (The firm sadly `folded' in 1992.) He stated in court that Werro was a first class violin-maker, trader and expert, and was highly esteemed throughout the realm of violin expertise and trade. Phillips-Hill himself of course also qualified as an expert witness. When asked about a violin that was ascribed to Ruggieri, Hill said that certain characteristics of the instrument pointed to the master. A violin that Werro had sold for 120 000 Swiss francs as a 1716 Stradivarius was acknowledged by Hill to be the work of Stradivarius but subject to the reservation that the top could possibly be of a later date. Another violin which Werro had sold for 80 000 Swiss franks as a violin by Carlo Bergonzi, and which had been labelled a fake by the `Oberexperten', was described by Hill as an original by the master from the year 1732. Hill later admitted that determining the specific year of manufacture in the first place rests on the date on the label!
Later in the trial Hill was heard again. Hill's opinions conflicted with those of the experts appointed by the bench. The experts were of the opinion that a certain violin was a Cappa that had been `promoted' to a Guarneri. Having previously held the opinion that the instrument was definitely a Cappa possessing all the characteristics of an instrument built by the master, Hill could now not remember ever having seen the violin. The so-called Bergonzi was also an object of conflict. The experts appointed by the bench furnished evidence that the violin was a fake; the varnish had been artificially given an old appearance with black dye; the f-holes had been `corrected'; and the bottom showed a superficial and hasty finish, not expected from the meticulous craftsman that Bergonzi had been. The value of the instrument, in their appraisal, would at the very highest be a twentieth of the selling price of 80 000 Swiss francs. Hill persisted that the violin was the work of Carlo Bergonzi.
5 CONCLUSION: WHAT NOW? AND WHY?The number of fake works of art and violins on the market is increasing and one can expect this trend to continue104 -- the market forces of supply and demand will see to that. For various reasons the dupe or victim of art and violin- related crimes is not always eager to lodge a complaint. It is also clear that our criminal justice system is not ideally suited to curb the growing incidence of these crimes -- the difficulty of proving one's case, especially when having to rely on the precarious opinion-based evidence of experts, is but one of many obstacles facing the prosecution. Where then should one turn for an answer? And why?
The purchaser could buy only from reputable dealers and thus minimise the risk of buying a fake, although even experts can be (and often are) deceived. If the artist is still alive, the buyer could contact the artist to authenticate the artefact. Knowledge is a very important weapon; buyers should become inquisitive and should do their homework before investing in any work of art. The expert, the academic, the dealer, the museum industry and, very important, the media (TV) could all play a major role in the fight against art and violin-related crimes of dishonesty, by informing and educating the public.
Marking artefacts with a special mark or label is often suggested. One suggestion is that artists should mark their works with their fingerprints which are then preserved by chemical treatment.105 Fingerprints would be a safe option because they cannot be forged. There are, however, quite a few disadvantages to this suggestion: a large repository would have to be kept to store all of these fingerprints and some artists might refuse to have their finger-prints placed in such a bank; only local artists' fingerprints would be kept in such a repository; and only artefacts by artists who were alive at the time of institution of such a plan would be provided with such markings. Another suggestion is to mark all known fakes and copies (also legitimate copies) with indelible ink106 or an invisible laser sign107 to prevent them being passed off as originals in future. An art archive could be set up in which contemporary works of art could be registered.108 All living artists could then file certificates of authenticity which could be kept in the archive together with photographs of their works and documentation of the identity of purchasers. These are just a few possibilities that are open for investigation. To us, however, they do not seem realistically workable in the near future. More thinking needs to be done -- plus more moral and other education. Also, more than one approach can be tried to combat evil; it is not a question of either criminal sanctions or other approaches.
Which brings us to the final question: Why do we insist on finding out whether an artefact is original or whether it has been faked or copied, when it sometimes provides (almost) the same intensity of esthetic pleasure for the ordinary person as the original? Why did we bother at all with this study? Many of the `victims' of minor violin frauds are ignorant and gullible; often the economic harm is small. The victim of a major fraud acquires a vested interest in perpetuating the fraud to protect his/her investment; he/she will not expose his/her instrument by `taking it to court'. The criminal justice system does not work, because the harm done by the fraud is either too small or too big. Some fakes are good instruments in their own right. So, why bother, why care?
We think that the answer lies in the realm of the inner person, the innate yearning for truth that is part of our humanness. To be sure, our study has illustrated that our humanness has a parallel darker side. People will also pervert truth; the view that originality is sacrosanct indirectly provoked an increase in the incidence of art-related crimes! Originality in art or in violin- making presupposes a process of delving for inner truth, truth in oneself, on the part of the artist or craftsperson. Just as the quest for originality itself is a manifestation of humanity's search for truth, so is our quest for integrity, for authenticity. We believe that truth and integrity do exist and, contrary to the sentiment expressed in the quotation by McKean at the beginning of this article, we believe that they do matter, despite their elusiveness,109 and that they deserve our care, attention and protection -- also in the context of human creativity and commerce relating to art and violins. Hence our interest in authenticity.110
Notes1 L C Coetzee BLC LLB (Pretoria). Principal project researcher, Criminal Justice Research Unit, Department of Criminal and Procedural Law, Unisa, Pretoria. Jan-Hendrik van Rooyen BA LLB (Pretoria) MCL (Michigan). Project leader; chairperson, Criminal Justice Research Unit and head, Department of Criminal and Procedural Law, Unisa, Pretoria. The two authors are solely responsible for the end product. The second author dedicates his share in the article to his daughter, Maggie van Rooyen. 2 Where the authors refer to personal histories, experience(s) or knowledge, they draw on materials from the second author's files. He has been involved in violin research, evaluation, repair, restoration and adjustment since 1979 and inter alia is listed in Reeve (ed). The Strad Directory 1993. Orpheus Publications, London, 1993: 127 (qv `Violin Restorers -- South Africa'). The authors use both the original and Latinised names of violin makers interchangeably, as does the literature generally, e g Antonio Stradivari / Antonius Stradivarius. 3 McKean `Lott's original fakes' in VanClay (ed). Musical Instrument Auction Price Guide 1993 Edition. The String Letter Press, San Anselmo California, 1993: 25--27. 4 McKean `Lott's original fakes' in VanClay (ed). Musical Instrument Auction Price Guide 1993 Edition. The String Letter Press, San Anselmo California, 1993: 27. 5 See in general Harvey Violin Fraud: Deception, Forgery, Theft, and the Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992: 10--19; Locher. Das Recht der bildenden Kunst. Karl Thiemig, München, 1970: 170--171; Dö:pfner. Der Restaurierungsbetrug. Schmidt Rö:mhild, Lü:beck, 1989: 65--76; Arnau. 3000 Jaar Kunstbedrog: Ware Geschiedenissen van Vervalserspraktijken. W Gaade, Den Haag, 1959 in toto, but 17--38 in particular; Würtenberger in Van Bemmelen (ed). Aspects of Art Forgery. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1962: 16--18; Merryman and Elsen. Law, Ethics, and the Visual Arts. Vol 2. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1987: 556. 6 Merryman and Elsen. Law, Ethics, and the Visual Arts. Vol 2. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1987: 556. 7 Merryman and Elsen. Law, Ethics, and the Visual Arts. Vol 2. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1987: 556. 8 Würtenberger in Van Bemmelen (ed). Aspects of Art Forgery. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1962: 17; Döpfner. Der Restaurierungsbetrug. Schmidt Römhild, Lübeck, 1989: 67. 9 See e g Rogerson. The Dali Scandal. Victor Gollancz, London, 1987: 173. 10 Merryman and Elsen. Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts. Vol 2. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1987: 556. 11 Van den Brandhof. Een vroege Vermeer uit 1937: Achtergronden van leven en werken van de schilder/vervalser Hans van Meegeren. Het Spectrum, Utrecht, 1979; Werness. `Hans van Meegeren fecit' in Dutton (ed). The Forger's Art: Forgery and the Philosophy of Art. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1983: 1--57; The Pretoria News 30 October 1991; Time 25 May 1992: 64--65; Cape Times 19 May 1992; Time 7 May 1990: 62--63; Reader's Digest June 1992: 81--83. 12 Harvey. Violin Fraud: Deception, Forgery, Theft, and the Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1992; Von Schulmann-Finnland. Echt oder Falsch? Ein Beitrag zur Beurteilung altitalienischer Meistergeigen für Geigen-liebhaber. Franz Schmitt, Siegburg, 1961; Hart. The Violin: Its Famous Makers and Their Imitators. Dulau, London, 1909; Heron-Allen. `Old Violin Frauds' in Goodkind. Violin Iconography of Antonio Stradivari 1644--1737. New York, 1972: 109--115; Hill, Hill and Hill. Antonio Stradivari: His Life and Work (1644--1737). Dover Publications, New York, 1963: 84--86, 210--220; The Strad August 1992: 700; The Strad May 1992: 396. 13 Time 8 June 1992. 14 Rogerson. The Dali Scandal. Victor Gollancz, London, 1987; Reader's DigestMarch 1991:65--70. 15 The Pretoria News 1 April 1992. 16 The Pretoria News 19 August 1992. On 15 March 1993, the authors participated in a workshop on fake versus genuine antique furniture held by antiques and restoration expert Ms Emmy van der Meulen in Johannesburg; they wish to express their thanks to her for insights gleaned there. The second author also consulted her in Somerset West, Cape, about a draft of this article. 17 South African Garden and Home November 1986: 166--167; Lantern 1993, 42(2): 55--59. 18 Wechsberger. The Violin. Calder and Boyars, London, 1973: 144--151. Violin production on a similar scale took place in Mirecourt, France. 19 The Pretoria News 19 February 1993. 20 Alexander Pope (1688--1744) An Essay on Man. 21 Expression coined by Van Rooyen Archimedes August: 1990: 14--15; cf Van Rooyen Lantern 1992, 41(4): 32--37. For various reasons the researchers did not press criminal charges against Mr G, although a prosecution might well have succeeded -- see below. 22 The Strad May 1992: 396. 23 Burchell and Milton. Principles of Criminal Law. Juta, Cape Town, 1991: 1; cf Rabie, Loubser, Van der Merwe and Kemp in Joubert (ed). The Law of South Africa. Vol 6: 1. 24 Botha. Bedrog in die Suid-Afrikaanse Strafreg. Unpublished LLD dissertation, University of South Africa, Pretoria, 1988: 384; Burchell and Milton. Principles of Criminal Law. Juta, Cape Town, 1991: 523; Snyman in Joubert (ed). The Law of South Africa. Vol 6: 288; Snyman. Strafreg. Butterworth, Durban, 1992: 528. 25 Some writers, such as De Wet and Swanepoel (Strafreg. Butterworth, Durban. 1985), add a fifth element, namely causation, but this should be regarded as redundant because the existence of potential prejudice suffices to constitute fraud -- see infra. 26 Burchell and Milton 1991: 524; Snyman 1981: 289. 27 Snyman 1992: 529; Botha 1988: 384; Burchell and Milton 1991: 525; De Wet and Swanepoel 1985: 393. 28 R v Larkins 1934 AD 91 at 94. For a discussion of misrepresentation by way of conduct, see Botha (1988: 384--387). 29 S v Heller 1964 (1) SA 524 (W); S v Burstein 1978 (4) SA 602 (T). See Botha (1988: 392--398) for discussion. 30 S v Heller 1964 1 SA 524 (W) 537--538; S v Burstein 1978 4 SA 602 (T) 604-- 605; S v Brande 1979 3 SA 371 (D) 381; S v Harper 1981 2 SA 638 (D) 677--678; S v African Bank of SA Ltd 1990 2 SASV 585 (W) 646--647. See also Snyman (1992: 530); Botha (1988: 393). 31 S v Larkins 1934 AD 91 94; S v Heller 1964 1 SA 524 (W) 536. 32 Burchell and Milton 1991: 524. 33 Snyman. Strafreg. Durban, Butterworths, 1992: 532--533, 534. 34 R v Jolosa 1903 TS 694 698; R v Jones 1926 AD 350 353; R v Seabe 1927 AD 28 32--34; R v Dyonta 1935 AD 52 55; R v Kruse 1946 AD 524 532--534; R v Heyne 1956 3 SA 604 (A) 622; S v Kruger 1961 4 SA 816 (A) 827--828. 35 R v Seabe 1927 AD 32, 34. 36 1903 TS 694 700. Compare the view of Innes CJ at 698. 37 Per Tindall JA in R v Kruse 1946 AD 524 533. 38 1956 3 SA 604 (A) 622--623. 39 Cf R v Bester 1961 2 SA 52 (F) 54; R v Kruger 1961 4 SA 816 (A) 828--829, 832--833. 40 R v Frankfort Motors (Pty) Ltd 1946 OPD 255 259--260; R v Moshesh 1948 1 SA 681 (O) 683--684; R v Nel 1952 4 SA 535 (T) 537; R v Heyne 1956 3 SA 604 (A) 622; S v Minnaar 1981 3 SA 767 (D) 778--779; S v Myeza 1985 4 SA 30 (T) 32C. 41 R v Heyne 1956 3 SA 604 (A) 622. 42 Snyman 1992: 532; Milton and Hunt. South African Criminal Law and Procedure. Vol II, `Common-Law Crimes'. Juta, Cape Town, 1982: 776--777 and the authorities cited there in note 238. 43 R v Rubin 1956 4 SA 225 (E) 230C--D; S v Heller 1964 1 SA 524 (W) 537; S v Hepker 1973 1 SA 472 (W) 477E--F; Ex parte Lebowa Development Corporation Ltd 1989 3 SA 71 (T) 101--104. 44 Act 51 of 1977. 45 R v Olivier 1959 4 SA 145 (D) 145--146; S v Shepard 1967 4 SA 170 (W) 173; S v Isaacs 1968 2 SA 187 (D) 191; S v Coomer 1971 1 SA 543 (C) 545; S v Harper 1981 2 SA 638 (D) 649. 46 R v Meyers 1948 1 SA 375 (A) 382; R v Bougarde 1954 2 SA 5 (C) 7--9; R v Harvey 1956 1 SA 461 (T) 464G; S v Hepker 1973 1 SA 472 (W) 477E--F. 47 R v Meyers 1948 1 SA 375 (A) 382; R v Bougarde 1954 2 SA 5 (C) 7--8. Snyman (1992: 535) is of the opinion (correctly, we submit) that all the above rules are simply applications of the rule that dolus eventualis suffices, i e that it is sufficient if the accused foresees the possibility that his representation may be false but nevertheless decides to make it. Cf Milton and Hunt (1982: 765). Negligence, even gross negligence, however, cannot be equated with intention: R v Meyers 1948 1 SA 375 (A) 382--384; S v Van Niekerk 1981 3 SA 787 (T) 793F--G. Negligence, and in particular gross negligence, can lead to strong suspicion of fraud, but it cannot by itself constitute fraud. One acts with dolus eventualis only if one actually foresees the possibility that one's representation may be false, but nevertheless makes it -- the test is subjective; one acts negligently if one ought reasonably to foresee (but in fact does not foresee) that one's representation is false -- the test is objective. See Milton and Hunt (1982: 765- -766). 48 (1903) 1 Ch 728 733 per Buckley J, approved in R v Bassey (1931) 47 TLR 222 and S v Isaacs 1968 2 SA 187 (D) 191. 49 Lin Yunn Chen 1908 TS 634; R v Harvey 1956 1 SA 461 (T) 464G. 50 Until 1956 it was taught that there could be no `attempted' fraud; the argument was that since `potential prejudice' has such a wide ambit, every attempt to defraud someone will involve some potential prejudice and hence will amount to completed fraud. See Milton and Hunt (1982: 778); Snyman (1992: 536); Botha (1988: 450--451). Since the decision in R v Heyne 1956 3 SA 604 (A) 620-- 622 it has been acknowledged that attempted fraud is possible, for example where a misrepresentation is made but does not reach the person to whom it is addressed. For a discussion of the subject see Botha (1988: 450--456). Cf Milton and Hunt (1982: 778) who identify five situations in which there may be attempted fraud. 51 Milton and Hunt (1982: 785); Snyman (1992: 537); Burchell and Milton (1991: 531); R v Jolosa 1903 TS 694 700; R v Lin Yunn Chen 1908 TS 634 637; R v Muller 1953 2 SA 146 (T) 148A. 52 Snyman (1992: 512). 53 1982: 785. 54 424--426. 55 Snyman (1992: 538) points to the fact that the narrow definition of `document' that De Wet and Swanepoel favour has never been adopted by the courts and was only once referred to obiter in S v Banur Investments (Pty) Ltd 1970 3 SA 767 (A) 770--771. Cf Milton and Hunt (1982: 788). 56 See Milton and Hunt (1982: 785--786) (who, incidentally, state that stamps, tickets, wills and many other instruments also qualify) and Snyman (1992: 538) for references to decided cases. 57 Act 24 of 1886 (Cape). 58 1919: TPD 270 277--278. 59 1982: 786. 60 1982: 786. 61 1982: 786--787. 62 1991: 532. 63 1982: 787. 64 Ibid. On this point they are followed by Burchell and Hunt (1991: 532). 65 The provisions of S 99 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 are relevant:
- In any charge relating to the forgery, uttering, stealing, destroying or concealing of, or to some other unlawful dealing with any document, it shall be sufficient to describe the document by any name or designation by which it is usually known or by the purport thereof, without setting out any copy or facsimile thereof or otherwise describing it or stating its value.
- Whenever it is necessary in any case not referred to in subsection (1) to make any allegation in any charge in relation to any document, whether it consists wholly or in part of writing, print or figures, it shall be sufficient to describe the document by any name or designation by which it is usually known or by the purport thereof, without setting out any copy or facsimile of the whole or any part thereof, unless the wording of the document is an element of the offence.
66 See S v Potgieter 1979 4 SA 64 (Z). Coercion or some other ground of justification may also negate the apparent unlawfulness of a falsifier's conduct. 67 S v Dreyer 1967 4 SA 614 (E) 618C; S v Banur Investments (Pty) Ltd 1970 3 SA 767 (A) 772E--G; Milton and Hunt (1982: 788); Snyman (1992: 539); Burchell and Hunt (1991: 532). 68 S v Banur Investments (Pty) Ltd 1970 3 SA 767 (A) 772. 69 R v Ritson (1869) LR 1 CCR 200; S v Banur Investments (Pty) Ltd 1970 3 SA 767 (A) 772D. Cf S v Dreyer 1967 4 SA 614 (E) 616--618; S v Katiyo 1981 3 SA 34 (Z). 70 R v Qumbu 1952 3 SA 390 (O); R v Leballo 1954 2 SA 657 (O). 71 S v Dreyer 1967 4 SA 614 (E) 618B--C; S v Banur Investments (Pty) Ltd 1970 3 SA 767 (A) 772D. 72 Snyman (1992: 539) and the authorities cited there. To determine whether a document signed in the name of a fictitious or non-existent person has been forged can be problematic. If the document purports to emanate from someone other than the person who has signed, then it is a forged document. However, Milton and Hunt point out that as a person may sign in a pseudonym, it is possible that a document signed in an assumed name need not be false. The answer that Milton and Hunt wish to suggest is that a document is always false if it is signed in the name of a fictitious or non-existent person or in an assumed name, the person thus signing the document escaping conviction in the genuine pseudonym cases because of lack of an intent to defraud. It appears to us that in genuine pseudonym cases, using a pseudonym does not militate against public policy and therefore cannot be said to be technically `unlawful'. 73 C v De Beer 1940 TPD 268; R v Kruger 1950 1 SA 591 (O); S v Dormehl 1966 1 PH H223. 74 R v Joffe 1934 SWA 108. 75 R v Leibrandt 1939 WLD 377; Damhouder Pracktycke in Criminele Saken. 1660: 110 pr. 76 R v Leibrandt 1939 WLD 377. 77 R v Muller 1953 2 SA 146 (T). 78 1992: 539. 79 1982: 790. 80 R v Joffe 1934 SWA 108. See Milton and Hunt (1982: 790). 81 Milton and Hunt (1982: 790). 82 R v Sedat 1916 TPD 431 438; R v Letsoela 1942 OPD 99; S v Bell 1963 2 SA 335 (N) 337. 83 S v Bell 1963 2 SA 335 (N) 337. Contra S v Keppler 1970 4 SA 673 (T) 677-- 678: a mere intention to deceive is required. 84 51 of 1977. 85 R v Hymans 1927 AD 35 38: `We are concerned with a charge of forgery -- an offence which, though a species of crimen falsi, possesses special features of its own. In a case of ordinary fraud, the falsity is contained in the fraudulent misrepresentation made to the person affected. But in forgery there is a fraudulent perversion of the truth as soon as the false document is made, for a false instrument is thereby brought into existence. One stage of a larger criminal scheme is concluded; there has been a wilful perversion of the truth with intent to defraud. In order to effect the full purpose of the scheme the forged document must be uttered; but the uttering is also a distinct stage, a transaction which, if carried out with knowledge of the forgery, is in itself a crime. The two transactions are generally carried out by the same person; but they may be performed by different persons, each responsible for his own act. From which it follows that, even if the whole scheme has been carried out by one person, two criminal acts have been committed. Provided only that in respect of each of them the element of prejudice or potentiality of prejudice which the law requires can be said to be present.' 86 Milton and Hunt (1982: 793); Burchell and Milton (1991: 533); Snyman (1992: 540). 87 R v Hymans 1927 AD 35 38. 88 R v Hymans 1927 AD 35 38, 40. 89 Milton and Hunt (1982: 794). 90 Snyman. Criminal Law. Durban, Butterworths, (1989: 515). Milton and Hunt (1982: 793--794) quote the definition ascribed to `uttering' by s 6(2) of the English Act as taking place when a person, having the necessary intent, `uses, offers, publishes, delivers, disposes of, tenders in payment or in exchange ... tenders in evidence, or puts off' a forgery. These authors regard the English definition as `a fairly accurate representation of our own law'. 91 1937 NPD 105 109. 92 1982 794. 93 Cf Snyman (1992: 540--541). 94 R v Kolia 1937 NPD 105 108--109; S v Latib 1968 1 SA 177 (T). 95 R v Joffe 1934 SWA 108, 109. 96 Hodes. Legal Rights in the Art and Collectors' World. Oceana Publications, New York, 1986: 28; Wrtenberger. `Criminological and Criminal Law Problems of the Forging of Paintings' in Van Bemmelen (ed). Aspects of Art Forgery. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1962: 18. 97 Hodes (1986: 29). 98 Würtenberger (1962: 18). 99 Würtenberger (1962: 20) states: `... [F]orging and swindling by no means stop now at national boundaries, but are organised largely on an international scale. In the past it has admittedly been known for a statuette, for example, to be produced fraudulently in Italy, given a deceptive patina in France and finally disposed of in the United States. But the international character of criminal art forgery has now become such an important feature of this crime that even state prosecution can only promise success if it proceeds along the path of close international co-operation against the offenders, above all with the aid of Interpol in Paris.' Cf Hodes (1986: 29). 100 1962: 18-19. 101 Hodes (1986: 30). 102 See Würtenberger 1962: 28--30; Arnau. 3000 Jaar Kunstbedrog: Ware Geschiedenissen van Vervalserspraktijken. W Gaade, Den Haag, 1959: 221--239; Arnau. Kunst der Fälscher, Fälscher der Kunst: Dreitausend Jahre Betrug mit Antiquitäten. Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf, 1959: 258--276. 103 See Arnau. Kunst der Fälscher, Fälscher der Kunst: Dreitausend Jahre Betrug mit Antiquitäten. Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf, 1959: 344--358; Arnau. 3000 Jaar Kunstbedrog: Ware Geschiedenissen van Vervalserspraktijken. W Gaade, Den Haag, 1959: 296--309. 104 Feldman and Weil. Art Works: Law, Policy, Practice. Practising Law Institute, New York, 1974: 1064. 105 Feldman and Weil. Art Works: Law, Policy, Practice. Practising Law Institute, New York, 1974: 1066--1067. 106 This suggestion was apparently made by the New York art world: The Star Tonight 9 September 1991: 2. 107 Daniel Delamare, who makes and sells copies of paintings, uses this technique to pre-empt accusations of forgery and to ensure that an X-ray would detect his works as copies: The Pretoria News 7 July 1992. As for artefacts made of wood, for example violins and antique furniture, Thames Valley's special antiques squad has an answer: they insert tiny implants into `woodworm holes' to help trap antiques thieves. The implants can carry a great deal of information which can be read with a special decoding gun: The Pretoria News 19 August 1992. 108 Feldman and Weil. Art Works: Law, Policy, Practice. Practising Law Institute, New York, 1974: 1067--1068. 109 We do realise that `truth' has many facets and that it may truly be elusive. In this article, `our' truth is of a relatively common `garden' variety -- the `whodunnit' type of truth. In the world of art and philosophy, matters can become far more subtle and complex. For example, in post-modernism, the method of artistic `appropriation' has generally been accepted; it inter alia involves `borrowing' or appropriating imagery from mass media and other sources and repositioning them within the borrower's work, thus forcing the viewer to consider how different contexts affect meaning (truth!) and to realise that all meaning is socially constructed. Does this practice amount to copyright infringement? `Yes -- under certain circumstances,' said the US courts in the recent case of Art Rogers versus Jeff Koons, which involved Koons's wooden sculpture `String of puppies' (1988); the work was based on Rogers's greeting- card photograph of a man and a woman holding eight German Shepherd puppies. Koons is also in trouble over his use of MGM's Pink Panther character and the dog Odie from the Garfield comic strip. Other artists who have had similar runins with the law include Andy Warhol. See Buskirk `Appropriation under the gun' Art in America, June 1992 (37) and references there. In the present article, we do not deal with these issues or with copyright law as such. The very important work by Geldenhuys, Die regsbeskerming van inligting (unpublished LLD thesis, Unisa 1993), appeared too late to be considered in this article. 110 Our topic is by no means exhausted. Further work needs inter alia to be done on the impact of the British Trade Descriptions Act and its equivalents (if any) in other countries; the law of copyright (see n 109 above); civil remedies (including the Small Claims Court); modern techniques of criminalistics (such as those used in the Lothar Neethling Forensic Laboratory in Pretoria); the precise philosophical and practical distinction between concepts such as `original', `copy' and `fake'; the development of the German prohibition against document forgery (`Urkundenfälschung'); restoration ethics and related matters; further intricacies and consequences of the Werro and similar cases; and problems surrounding `certificates of authentication' -- to list but a few topics.
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